VOLUME 8, NUMBER 1

WINTER 1971–72

Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the

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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, and German languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

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The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,200 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	iii
The international political environment	
Basic factors	1
Foreign policies	11
Tension areas	33
The strategic environment	
Modern war	42
Weaponry and technology	43
Defense policies and strategies	48
Consequences of defense policies and war	68
Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace	
International law	77
International organization	80
International peace and security forces	85
Other means	85
Arms control: general discussion	
Historical background	90
General analyses	90
Comprehensive approaches	93
Arms control: specific problems and measures	
Reducing the risk of war	95
Conventional arms transfers	96
Nuclear proliferation	96
Chemical and biological weapons	97
Strategic arms limitation	98
Regional arrangements	102
Special environments	108
Enforcement of agreements	109
Consequences of arms control	111
Other problems and measures	112
Author index	114
Subject index	118

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS

1
Alker, Henry A. A QUASI-PARANOID FEATURE OF STUDENTS' EXTREME ATTITUDES AGAINST COLONIALISM. Behavioral science, v. 16, May 1971: 218-227.
BF1.B4, v. 16

"Portions of this paper were presented at the 19th International Congress of Psychology, London, England, July 28, 1969."

Three alternative explanations concerning an apparent paranoid quality of extreme political attitudes were tested: (1) Such attitudes reflect exceptional, if embarrassing, perceptiveness by their proponents; (2) such attitudes reflect a cognitive style similar to that of paranoids without any attendant defensiveness, and (3) such attitudes represent paranoid defensiveness. Results on a selected total sample of 96 "left," "middle" and "right" college students supported only hypothesis (3) and, furthermore, suggested that paranoid-like functioning was most prevalent in those on the extreme "left." Paranoid defensiveness was indicated through an interaction with manipulated suspicion-arousal during assessment. (Abstract supplied)

2
Andreasian, R., and D. Penzin. OIL AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1971: 53-59.
D839.I465, 1971

The "Third World" is struggling against the exploitation of its natural wealth in oil by the monopoly capitalists. The stakes in this struggle are economic as well as political. Given the great strategic value of imported oil in the economy and defense of the United States, West Europe and Japan, the importance of the oil supplies in North Africa and the Middle East to the imperialists cannot be discounted. Though the imperialists are trying to persuade world opinion that the monopolist cartels must retain control in the "Third World" in order to ensure an uninterrupted oil supply, the imperialists are, in fact, opposing national liberation movements and confronting the world Socialist system on the international level. Political tension has resulted in the "Third World" from the economic struggle against the oil monopolies. Because of the united front of the oil-producing countries since the formation of the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries in 1960, the cartels have begun to lose their ability to guarantee the imperialist oil supply.

3
Beaufre, Andre. STRATEGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE 'SEVENTIES. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 100, Oct./Dec. 1970: 425-433.
U1.U5, v. 100

Demonstrates that the trend of the seventies will be away from bipolar confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union and towards new multipolar situations. Since such relationships are not stable, a new bipolarity can be expected as the conservative elements, capitalistic and Communistic, realine themselves against "all the forces of change." Beaufre visualizes an American-Soviet combination pitted against China and considers its effect in the Middle East and in Europe. He also postulates other patterns of alliances and predicts their consequences.

4
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [A NEW CONCERT OF THE GREAT POWERS] Ein neues Konzert der Grossmächte. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Aug. 1971: 445-450.
D839.A885, v. 22

Moscow and Peking have for some time been reproaching one another for collaborating with Washington in a two-against-one strategy in the international geopolitical triangle. The Soviets enjoyed the advantages in this three-way situation of being the only party on diplomatic speaking terms with both their adversaries. Further, they exploited the Vietnam War to keep Peking and Washington apart and at the same time endeavored to expand their own influence in Hanoi at Chinese expense. President Nixon's Guam doctrine, the American withdrawal from Vietnam, and the resulting thaw in Chinese-American relations have had the effect of nullifying or redistributing these Soviet advantages. The Chinese, for their part, have countered the Soviet ploy in Vietnam with a "Vietnam" of their own in the Russian backyard, where they have been encouraging Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania in their opposition to the Brezhnev doctrine. Since Nixon's doctrine of nonintervention in "internal aggression" is the reverse of the hated Brezhnev doctrine, it could serve as an opening point in the upcoming Sino-American discussions. The Soviets will have a difficult time adjusting to their more disadvantaged role in the new triangular relationship. The Americans, on the other hand, will gain greater freedom of action on the international stage.

5
Bullock, Alan. EUROPE SINCE HITLER. Listener, v. 85, Apr. 29, 1971: 537-540, and May 6, 1971:

577-579. illus. AP4.L4165, v. 85
Originally presented on BBC Radio 4.

By 1945 Europe had lost the primacy it had held at the beginning of the century. Depletion of European material and spiritual resources caused insecurity, breaking down the wartime coalition. Soviet policy backfired, producing a firm American commitment which froze the continental divisions. Three times since Stalin's death, Western emotions have gone through the cycle of hope for a European settlement and an ensuing letdown. Western Europe would be happy with normalization of the status quo, but the Russians desire instead reversal of the conditions that resulted from the confrontation of the 1940's. Eastern Europe has suffered more from the polarization of the continent, and whether continued Soviet domination will lead to permanent separation is yet unknowable. In the West, the division of the continent has actually been a benefit, with economic recovery, the movement for integration, and the reacceptance of Germany into the family of nations hastened by the spur of cold war fears. Europe's political success has not been as outstanding as its economic restoration, and the future is uncertain. But if Europe's people have lost their leading role, developments since 1945 show they retain the vitality which made them preeminent among the world's peoples.

6
Cattani, Alfred. [FAREWELL TO BIPOLARITY?] Abschied von der Bipolarität? Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 51, Sept. 1971: 385-388.
AP32.S47, v. 51

Whatever the outcome of Nixon's visit to Peking, the intention itself represents a turnabout in American foreign policy and foreshadows new power configurations in the world. To be sure, Nixon's motivation is primarily domestic, that is, to influence events in Southeast Asia in such a way as to favor his reelection next year. The long-term consequence of his decision, however, may be the transformation of today's bipolar world into a multipolar one including a nuclear-armed China and possibly a few other highly industrialized states. New power configurations are appearing at a time when the American and Soviet hegemonies show signs of disintegration from within.

7
[COMMUNIST SYSTEMS OF DOMINION IN THEORY AND REALITY] Kommunistische Herrschaftssysteme in Theorie und Wirklichkeit. Mainz, von Hase und Koehler [1970] 230 p. (Institut für Internationale Schriftenreihe, Bd. 7)
HX44.K617
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--System of dominion and the social structure of the Soviet Union, by Boris Meissner.--The Brezhnev Doctrine, by Heinrich Lummer.--The policy of the Albanian Communist regime in its alternating effect on the Sino-Soviet conflict, by Horst Teltschik.--Communism in Asia, by Oskar Weggel.--The historical background of the Third Communist World Council 1960-1968, by Christian Meier.--Titoism, by Konrad S. Krieger.--Ché Guevara and the revolutionary liberation struggle in Latin America, by Helmut Palla.

Traces and analyzes causes of the tendencies toward divisiveness in the Communist camp and describes their effects on Western and neutral countries, especially in Asia and Latin America. The chapter on communism in Asia lists information relative to the strength and position of the Communist Party in 20 Asian states.

8
Denker, Rolf. [EXPLANATION OF AGGRESSION] Aufklärung über Aggression. 3d. ed. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz, Verlag W. Kohlhammer [c1971] 178 p. (Kohlhammer Urban-Taschenbücher, Reihe 80)
BF575.A3D4 1971

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--Kant (I).--Darwin.--Marx and Engels on Darwin.--Adler--superstructure aggression drive.--Frustration-aggression hypothesis versus the aggression-drive theory.--Frustration-aggression hypothesis of the Yale school.--Freud--aggression-drive theory.--Reich--secondary aggression drive.--Current psychoanalysis--Mitscherlich.--Tests--experiments.--Lorenz--aggression-drive theory of behavioral research.--Kant (II)--Lorenz's Kant critique.--Critique of behavioral research.--Results and new emphases.--Aggression-favoring industrial societies.--Instead of a conclusion: four discussion topics.--Selected bibliography.

A survey of human aggression and its accompanying phenomena of thanatos, inhibitions, and defensive mechanisms. An understanding of these phenomena, Denker believes, may enable man to alter his behavior and that of his institutions and thereby avoid the final catastrophe of war.

9
D'Ombrain, Nicholas J. DECISION-MAKING: SCIENCE OR CRAFT? In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, Sept. 1971: 56-58.
U1.R8, v. 116

The extensive application of methodological and quantitative techniques to the politicomilitary decisionmaking process begun enthusiastically in the Kennedy administration peaked in the Johnson years and declined in the aftermath of the Vietnam War during which quasi-scientific decisionmaking processes proved to be unsatisfactory. American universities were among the first to discover that economic theory and quantitative analysis were inadequate techniques for solving complex politicomilitary problems. "The technique of statesmanship is a craft rather than a science." To produce better statecraft, the government needs to call once again on the services of academics knowledgeable in political and military history.

Scientific analysis plays a secondary role to craftmanship in politicomilitary decisionmaking.

10
Dormann, Manfred. [FACTORS OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONMAKING] Faktoren der aussenpolitische Entscheidung. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, v. 12, June 1971: 14-28.
JA14.P63, v. 12

Analyzes various approaches to the cataloging of the factors influencing foreign-policy decisionmaking in an effort to objectivize the realities of foreign-policy making. Dormann discusses the internal, external, and institutional settings of the frame of reference of the Richard Snyder approach and the aggregation of subsystems in the formation of a global system associated with J. David Singer's approach.

11
Drost, Bruce A., and Paul D. Knott. EFFECTS OF STATUS OF ATTACKER AND INTENSITY OF ATTACK ON THE INTENSITY OF COUNTER-AGGRESSION. Journal of personality, v. 39, Sept. 1971: 450-459.
BF1.J66, v. 39

Male college students were exposed to a Same, Lower, or Higher status confederate, and to a small or large number of electric shocks from the stooge. Subjects in the Same and High status conditions were more counter-aggressive, both in terms of mean intensity and number of shocks, than subjects exposed to a Low status confederate. These results are in contradiction to the related human and animal data, which have generally indicated that more aggression is directed toward low rather than high status persons. The major implications of the present data for other research in this area are: (1) the importance of varying status of the attacked as well as status of the attacker; (2) the necessity for systematically varying the different dimensions of "status," e.g., functional (i.e., powerful) vs. nonfunctional aspects of status; (3) the importance of looking at different kinds of aggression, e.g., physical as well as verbal; (4) the perceptions of the attacker and the subject's own emotions--arousal, anxiety, guilt, etc. at the time of the attack; and (5) the potential for studying variables that determine aggressive and altruistic behavior within the same experimental context. (Abstract supplied)

12
Dubnic, Vladimir Reisky de. [IDEOLOGY AS AN INTEGRATING AND DIVISIVE FACTOR IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST BLOC] Ideologie als Integrations- und Spaltungsfaktor in den Ländern des sozialistischen Blocks. Zeitschrift für Politik, v. 18, June 1971: 131-145.
JA14.Z4, v. 18

The Socialist-bloc states are torn between nationalism and internationalism, as the histories of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have shown. The theoretical forces allegedly leading to a convergence of national and international interests are the international character of the proletariat, the general concept of Socialist development, and the universal interrelation of phenomena. Divisive or nationalist theories countering integration are the concept of individual roads to socialism and of dialectic change. The Socialist international system has two choices: it can return to Stalinist orthodoxy or permit individual countries to follow independent policies of Socialist development. If the Soviet Union chooses, as it has, to support the theories of integration by force, it will only heighten existing contradictions. If the individual Socialist countries pursue individual policies, as some have, the result will be an easing of tensions within those countries at the expense of the Socialist international system. Socialist theories are not standing up well in light of practice, and contradictions are developing that cannot be assuaged through ideological imperatives. In this connection Soviet ideology is the weakest link in efforts to integrate the Socialist bloc.

13
Eron, Leonard D., Leopold O. Walder, and Monroe M. Lefkowitz. LEARNING OF AGGRESSION IN CHILDREN. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971. 311 p. illus.
BF723.A35E75

Contents.--Introduction.--Theoretical orientation to learning of aggression in children.--Methodological considerations.--The reinforcement and punishment of aggression.--Instigation to aggression.--Identification and aggression.--Sociocultural variables and aggressive behavior.--The learning conditions of aggression.--Implications for child-rearing.--Appendixes.

Reports the results of a research project begun in 1955 and recently completed to study the aggressive behavior of children and its antecedent learning conditions. The study identified "a number of conditions that singly and/or in combination . . . [are] consistently associated with children's expression of aggression in the school context." Abstracted and introduced systematically into a child's environment, these conditions might hypothetically be used to control aggression.

14
Fawcett, Jan. comp. DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE. Chicago, Ill., American Medical Association, 1971. 198 p.
BF575.A3D9

Partial contents.--General perspectives: Violence and aggression. Toward a theory of collective violence. Psychological aspects of international violence. What is the cause of violence?--Clinical perspectives: The lethal situation: transmission of the urge to kill from parent to child. Aggression--adaptive and disruptive as-

pects. On the ego restraint of violence.--Research investigations: Experimental investigation of hostility catharsis. The assassin and the assassinated--as non-patient subjects of psychiatric investigation. The role of genic activity in the determination of sensitive periods in the development of aggressive behavior.--Epilogue.

Articles and research reports on "violent aggression," i.e., "not the ordinary form of aggression in most of us--the instinctive drive for self-assertion that makes us discover continents, build cities and fly to the moon--but aggression distorted pathologically into violence, a destructive, sometimes deadly mutation of a normally constructive human trait." The causes, dynamics, and control of violent behavior are explored from theoretical and speculative perspectives and by means of evidence drawn from clinical experience and from more formal and systematic investigations.

15
Florin, Peter. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATION OF FORCES BETWEEN THE XXIII. AND THE XXIV. CONGRESS OF THE CPSU. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 4, 1971: 275-289.
DD261.4.D353, v. 10

The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concluded that the international relationship of forces is changing in favor of the Socialist world. More independent states are following the anticapitalist path of development. The Soviet Union accounts for one fifth of the world's production, and it has doubled its national income in 10 years. Increased Soviet military strength is another decisive factor in this changing balance. As a consequence of this new power, the Soviet Union is playing a significantly more influential role in world affairs. It has successfully championed causes at the United Nations in spite of American opposition. Soviet influence has made possible the signing of the nonproliferation and seabed treaties. The imperialists are, nonetheless, still active, but the Soviet Union is conscious of its obligation to pursue policies contributing to "the activation of the world-wide anti-imperialist struggle [and] to the consolidation of the militant unity of all its participants." The threat of a new world war has, however, not yet been eliminated. To this end, the Soviet Union calls for acceptance of its arms control and elimination program enunciated at the Party Congress, ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, and the speedy convocation of a European conference on security and collaboration.

16
Gebhardt, Hermann P. [GUERRILLAS: FATEFUL QUESTION FOR THE WEST; THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT] Guerillas: Schicksalsfrage für den Westen; die lateinamerikanische Revolutionsbewegung. [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald Verlag [c1971] 168 p. (Militärpolitische Schriftenreihe, 5)
F1414.2.G42
Bibliography: p. 161-162.

Contents.--Foreword: A phenomenon of the West.--A way of thinking.--The struggle.--The future of the Latin American revolutionary movement.--Epilog: Fateful question for the West.--Bibliography.--Index of names.

Foresees the probability of strategic, political, and economic confrontations leading to a world conflict between North America, the bastion of capitalism, and a Latin America that will in the not too distant future become a vassal zone of the Communist East. The author examines the role of the Communist parties and leftist groups in the Latin American countries. Although the class background of Latin American guerrillas and their objectives differ from those of revolutionary groups of other continents, there is agreement that the chief enemy is the United States. The author questions, however, whether a Socialist society is suited to the Latin American mentality and whether government expropriation of private industry will improve the lot of the people.

17
Gray, Colin S. THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON. World politics, v. 24, Oct. 1971: 39-79.
D839.W57, v. 24

Investigates arms races as specific phenomena of international relations. Gray describes ten nonexclusive categories in a typology of arms races, five arms race strategies and five possible outcomes of an arms race: war, bankruptcy, victory, parity or political agreement. The study concludes with a hypothetical examination of the dynamics impelling arms races.

18
Habsburg, Otto von [interview] [DO YOU THINK THAT EUROPE IS BEHAVING CORRECTLY?] Finden Sie, dass Europa sich richtig verhält? Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, June 1971: 17-19. illus.
AP30.E78, v. 11

Fresh initiatives must be taken to give political life to the European Council. Member states should hold direct popular elections for national representatives to the Council, for this is prerequisite to any broadening of the Council's authority. These efforts need not be frustrated by the existence of an opposing bloc of states in Eastern Europe. In fact, the free states of Europe should spend their energies promoting Western European integration rather than anxiously looking over their shoulder at Eastern Europe. What must be built, however, is not a closed society--as the European Economic Community has become--but an open community that the states of Central and Southeastern Europe may one day enter on the same basis of self-determination. West Germany's Ostpolitik is an unfortunate development, for the Federal Republic is too vulnerable to speak for the entire Western community and its initiatives came when the Soviets were showing less interest in détente. The New Left will not damage the European unity movement, if those in authority do

not succumb to intimidation. The emergence of a powerful China does not obscure the fact that real power in Asia is Japan, with which Western Europe should seek active collaboration. With the entry of Communist China into the United Nations, Peking will have the opportunity of taking over the leadership of the Third World states, with the result that the partnership between the United States and the Soviet Union will become far more evident. The Soviet call for a European security conference is designed to gain Western recognition of the Brezhnev Doctrine, drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, and protect the Soviet rear. Western Europe should show no interest in this conference and, if it does participate, should drive a hard bargain.

19
Holbraad, Carsten. THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1971: 77-90.
DL55.C66, 1971

While the recent interest in the international role of middle-sized powers may be traced back to the end of the Second World War, some European writers of earlier centuries touched upon the subject. Both the older and the modern writers have used the term "middle powers" in various senses and have failed to draw up satisfactory criteria for distinguishing them from other states. Yet, it is possible to examine the roles of middle-sized powers by studying their behaviour in a variety of historical situations. Here their typical roles are outlined in several distinct situations of the "bipolar" system, namely, cold war, condominium and détente, as well as in two characteristic situations of the "multipolar" system, namely, concert and competitive balance of power. (Abstract supplied)

20
Kiener, Franz. [ON THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF BAVARIANS AND FRANCONIANS; STEREOTYPE AND REALITY] Über die Aggressivität der Baiern und Franken; Stereotyp und Wirklichkeit. Psychologische Beiträge, v. 13, no. 2, 1971: 161-220.
N&CPR

Discusses on the basis of comparative statistics and information obtained from questionnaires the cause of aggressiveness in the conduct of Bavarians and Franconians toward one another. Criteria used for the study included verbal aggressiveness, physical aggressiveness, and quarrelsomeness. Kiener states that there are considerable differences between the two Germanic groups as far as auto- and heterostereotypes are concerned. He concludes that the statistical comparisons regarding crimes support the stereotypes to a certain degree.

21
Kintner, William R., and Harvey Sicherman. TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CRISIS OF WISHING. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 13-27.
D839.068, v. 15

Effects of technology on the international system, particularly on international security, integration, development, and new resources. The authors contend that arms control and disarmament attempts to ameliorate the strategic situation between the superpowers have not been consonant with the development of technological processes, quoting Henry Kissinger to the effect that "the rate of technological change has continually outstripped the pace of negotiation." They assert that the major effect of technology has been to increase the state's military power while decreasing its political ability to resolve problems. Kintner and Sicherman conclude that while technology has allowed man to conquer his physical environment it is going to make him face the problem of whether or not he can achieve mastery of himself.

22
Krüger, Joachim, and Anton Latzo. [THE SOCIALIST WORLD SYSTEM, MAIN FORCE IN THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS] Sozialistisches Weltsystem, Hauptkraft im weltrevolutionären Prozess. Berlin, Staatsverlag der DDR, 1970. 104 p. (Blickpunkt Weltpolitik) HX44.K74
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The power of the Socialist community of states and its growing international influence. --The Soviet Union--decisive force of the Socialist community of states.--The urgency for further comprehensive stabilization of unity and unanimity in the Socialist community of states.--The urgency for the rallying of all anti-imperialist movements around the Socialist world system.

Extols the Socialist world system, led by the Soviet Union, as the decisive force in the struggle for liberation from imperialist domination and for the attainment of peace. The authors call upon the states of the Socialist community to close ranks in this struggle. The Socialist policy of coexistence, they explain, opposes those "imperialist" circles that profit from the armaments race at the expense of the working classes. Was it not the Soviet Union that arranged for the signing of the nuclear test ban and the nonproliferation agreement and that is even now trying to arrange for a ban on the chemical and biological weapons which the United States is producing and storing in West Germany?

23
Kuliang, K. K. L., and J. K. L. Kuliang. THE MEANINGS AND APPROACHES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION, WITH SOME REFERENCE TO DIPLOMACY, MODERNIZATION PROCESS, AND THE USE OF CYBERNETICS. Politico, v. 36, Mar. 1971: 103-125.
JX18.P65, v. 36
Includes bibliographical references.
Abstract in Italian.

A non-quantitative exploration of the scope and meaning of international political communication, with specific reference to Afro-Asian diplomacy in the United Nations after 1960, nation-building and the flow of information, and Soviet-American relations before the August 1968 Czech crisis. The emergence of new Afro-Asian states, the fear of nuclear war and the progress in communications technology are cited as the factors which are changing the very nature of international communication and which, at the same time, are the reasons why research in international communication is of increasing importance in the world of today. The authors elaborate on a study written by Karl Deutsch in which he set forth several methods of analytical study of international communication. The use of cybernetics in control and regulation of international communication is considered "highly possible" by the authors.

24

Mitchell, C. R. FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS AND POLARIZED POLITICAL COMMUNITIES: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A SIMPLE MODEL. British journal of political science, v. 1, Apr. 1971: 223-251. illus.
JA8.B7, v. 1

The political communities of many states are polarized into majority and minority communities distinct from each other in geographic, linguistic, and religious ways. Such divisions may affect the external problems of national leaders, bringing them to engage in "enemy-searching" to find a common foe to unite against, or in "ally-seeking" to find outside support against one of the groups. The absence of any automatic connection between domestic instability and external conflict suggests that enemy-searching is not as important as conventionally supposed. Foreign elements become involved in internal conflict when either or both of the domestic communities engage in ally-seeking, thus affecting the foreign relations of the divided state, the international patrons of the conflicting groups, and the states in competition with the patrons.

25

Nissen, Iingjald. THE ROLE OF THE SEXUAL CONSTELLATION. Acta sociologica, v. 14, no. 1/2, 1971: 52-58.
HM1.A1A3, v. 14

This paper contains in its first part an attempt at showing that certain important results of Alfred C. Kinsey's investigations can throw new light upon the problem of equality for woman and upon the relations of woman to war. The second part tries to demonstrate that the suppression of woman is not an expression of a striving for power in the man, but is his attempt at solving a difficult special sexual problem, the problem that he in the lasting sexual relation in the last half of life, is the sexually weaker. The third part points to the fact that woman is involved in the mechanism leading to war and that she therefore has responsibility in connection with war. It is explained why it is so important that woman learn to see the difference between the men's society and the secret male society. (Abstract supplied)

26

"PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION." Peace and the sciences, no. 2, June 1971: 1-65.
JX1901.P25, 1971

Papers on various aspects of European security, prepared in conjunction with a conference of scientists held in Vienna, Austria, Feb. 19-21, 1971, under the sponsorship of the International Institute for Peace, Vienna. The political and strategic context, a proposal for the control of violence by means of regional security commissions, the special problems of the two Germanys and West Berlin, the potential contribution of international law, and proposals for a European security conference are among the matters discussed. Summary reports on the political, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural dimensions of European security, as well as on the global implications of European developments, are also included.

27

Phillips, Warren R. DYNAMIC PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1969. 144 p.
Micro (Order no. 70-19,513)
Abstract in Dissertation Abstracts, v. 31, Oct. 1970: 1868A-1869A. Z5055.U5A53, v. 31
Dissertation (Ph.D) "completed under the Dissertation Support Program funded by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and administered by the National Academy of Sciences."

Factor analytic study of conflict between states over a period of a year. Conflict dimensions were identified and profiles drawn. "Groups corresponding to Cold War conflict, routine military activity, crisis behavior and third world discontent with major powers were delineated in profile analysis."

28

Platz, Heinz P. [THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS] Die Zukunft Europas. Wirtschaftliche, politische und weltanschauliche Aspekte. Karl T. Frhr. von Guttenberg antwortet Heinz P. Platz. [Düsseldorf] Patmos-[Verl., 1970] 66 p. (Das theologische Interview, 17)
D1058.P57

Contents.--How the future began.--Only an economic community?--Rising to meet the "American challenge"?--Europe's relationship to the United States.--Our own European nuclear might.--The political raison d'être of Europe.--Europe and the East.--Current German Ostpolitik.--Europe and the Third World.--Christian faith and political intercourse.

The end of the Second World War furnished Europe the incentive for unification, for associating a common heritage and belief in personal freedom. Although success in this direction has been modest, it is not true that the only progress has been economic. Even the European Economic Community is primarily a political body that permits and regulates economic collaboration. A strong, unified Europe would improve the partner relationship with the United States, as President Kennedy once said. Europe should not, however, rely indefinitely on the United States for its security. In fact, when a measure of responsible political unity has been achieved, Europe should develop its own nuclear capability. The Soviet Union is an expansionist power and a suppressor of personal freedom. It is not interested in the status quo as West Germany's Ostpolitik erroneously assumes. Europe should develop a long-range policy aimed at ameliorating conditions in Eastern Europe and avoid all unequal concessions. The impact of a prosperous, unified Europe would go beyond the confines of the continent, for Europe could become a major source of assistance to the developing states. Christian faith is a moral force for preserving traditional human values, but it falls to man and not to his ecclesiastical institutions to solve political problems.

29

Quester, George H., comp. POWER, ACTION, AND INTERACTION: READINGS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Little, Brown, Boston [c1970] 573 p.
JX1395.Q46 1971

Partial contents.--Domestic structure and foreign policy, by Henry A. Kissinger.--The President, by Dean Rusk.--Another "Great Debate": the national interest of the United States, by Hans J. Morgenthau.--Bargaining, communication, and limited war, by Thomas C. Schelling.--Hypotheses on misperception, by Robert Jervis.--The pole of power and the pole of indifference, by Arnold Wolfers.--Rise and demise of the territorial state, by John H. Herz.--From balance to deterrence: a theoretical analysis, by Arthur Lee Burns.--The stability of a bipolar world, by Kenneth N. Waltz.--The balance of power: prescription, concept, or propaganda? by Ernst B. Haas.--The development of the European states system since the eighteenth century, by F. H. Hinsley.--Farewell to empire, by William L. Langer.--Conciliation and deterrence: a comparison of political strategies in the interwar and postwar periods, by Evan Luard.--International systems and international law, by Stanley Hoffmann.--The "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" states negotiate international law: a case study, by Robert L. Friedheim.--From League of Nations to United Nations, by Leland M. Goodrich.--Toward a model of competitive international politics, by Bruce M. Russett.--United Nations use of military force, by Inis L. Claude.--Balance of power in the missile age, by Glenn H. Snyder.--The delicate balance of terror, by Albert Wohlstetter.--Arms races: prerequisites and results, by Samuel P. Huntington.--Keeping the strategic balance, by Carl Kaysen.--Facts and morals in the arms debate, by Robert A. Levine.

A collection of articles intended to explain and clarify "particular aspects of international politics." The articles, reprinted in their entirety from the journals of first publication, represent a "traditional" rather than "behavioristic" or "quantitative" approach. The editor believes the traditional presentation provides students with the clearest explanations. Suggestions for further reading are included.

30

Ropp, Klaus von der, Freiherr. [STARTS AT REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN BLACK AFRICA] Ansätze zu regionaler Integration in Schwarzafrika. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, June 25, 1971: 429-436.
D839.E86, v. 26

The many attempts at limited political and economic integration of the states of Black Africa have generally foundered. In the first days of their independence the prospects appeared propitious for the establishment and fruitful operation of regional arrangements, since these new states had no national state concept. They soon showed, however, that they had no desire to surrender any part of their newly acquired sovereignty to a regional body. Further, the absence of a sound infrastructure, especially interstate transportation and communication, the lack of developed trading contacts with neighboring states, and the failure to plan ahead doomed many of these regional arrangements. The former British colonies have fared somewhat better, by reason of geography and the earlier organizational efforts of the British settlers, than the former French colonies. The industrial states should seek to promote African regional arrangements whenever possible, for the Balkanization of the continent is in no one's interest.

31

Russett, Bruce M. AN EMPIRICAL TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCES. Midwest journal of political science, v. 15, May 1971: 262-289. illus.
JA1.M5, v. 15

"This research has been supported by the World Data Analysis Program of Yale University under grant #GS-614 from the National Science Foundation and contract #N-0014-67-A-0097-0007 from ARPA, Behavioral Sciences, monitored by the Office of Naval Research."

All military alliances concluded during the period 1920-1957 are examined according to a variety of background and output variables. The duration of alliances is generally unrelated to the degree to which they are dominated by a single power; similarly, if a war does occur, members' likelihood of fighting together on the same side cannot be predicted either from duration or from dominance, nor from the strength of the formal commitment undertaken. Multilateral alliances among

equals are most likely to find the members fighting on the same side. On the other hand, dominated alliances seem to provide deterrence most effectively. The characteristics of pre-World War II alliances are not greatly different from those formed since the war. (Abstract supplied)

32
Scherk, Nikolaus. [DECOLONIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY. THE INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA] Dekolonisation und Souveränität. Die Unabhängigkeit und Abhängigkeit der Nachfolgestaaten Frankreichs in Schwarzafrika. Wien, Stuttgart, Braumüller [1969] 184 p. illus. (Schriftenreihe der österreichischen Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen, Bd. 3)
JX33.08, Bd. 3
Preface in French.
Bibliography: p. 172-176.

Contents.--Preface, by Daniel Pépy.--Index of abbreviations.--Author's foreword.--pt. 1. Historical background.--pt. 2. Contractual bases of cooperation.--pt. 3. The political reality of cooperation.--Summary: Sovereignty of the successor states of France in Black Africa.--Annexes.--Bibliographical references.--Index.

Examines in the context of neocolonialism the real degree of independence of the French successor states in Black Africa. Scherk thinks it difficult to prove that the nature of the sovereignty of the Black African states is limited by economic dependence on France, for a preference born of cultural affinity is inextricably interwoven with trade advantages. These states are free to follow their own economic and foreign policies, as Guinea and Mali have done, although often at the cost of their neutrality. The African states can turn elsewhere for development aid, but they have found that other sources encroach more on their sovereignty than does France. Scherk concludes that these states possess the attributes of sovereignty.

33
Schwarz, Urs. [TURNING AWAY FROM FORCE; CONFRONTATION AND INTERVENTION IN THE MODERN WORLD] Abkehr von der Gewalt; Konfrontation und Intervention in der modernen Welt. Düsseldorf, Econ Verlag [c1971] 306 p. JX4481.S35
Bibliography: p. [292]-297.

Contents.--Turning away from force in the interstate realm.--Confrontation as limited conflict.--Confrontation: Berlin, Suez, Congo.--Berlin epilogue. Confrontation in Asia and Cyprus.--Intervention as limited use of force.--Earlier intervention.--Intervention today: Truman Doctrine to Santo Domingo.--Intervention today: Congo, Vietnam, the Brezhnev Doctrine.--International law and intervention.--The strategy of intervention and confrontation.--Confrontation, intervention and the peoples.--Bibliography.--Index.

Develops the thesis that the two superpowers, ideologically irreconcilable but united in wishing to avoid a nuclear war which would doom both of them, have elaborated a strategy of confrontation and intervention designed to protect their interests. Schwarz cites examples of this limited use of power from recent and current history.

34
Sloan, Stephen. A STUDY IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE; THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE. Chicago, Rand McNally [1971] 107 p. (Rand McNally studies in political change) DS644.S56
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--The need for new conceptualizations in comparative politics.--Violence and the nation-state.--Unity and division in the Indonesian political configuration.--Coup and reaction.--Extended crisis and the challenge to United States foreign policy.

Advances evidence from a case study of the Indonesian domestic crisis of 1965, in which large numbers of Communists and Communist sympathizers were slaughtered for allegedly plotting a coup, in support of some general conclusions concerning the impact of modern ideologies and technology on backward societies, the nature of political and social change, and the root causes of violence. Sloan also reaches some conclusions concerning U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. In the developing states, where instability and the potential for widespread violence are always great, the United States can contribute most to the nation-building process, while avoiding the dangers of overcommitment, by channeling its assistance through multilateral and regional arrangements and organizations.

35
Smith, Douglas E. KILLING IN THE RAT: ITS CHEMICAL BASIS IN THE LATERAL HYPOTHALAMUS. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1970. 82 p.
Micro (Order no. 71-14,420)
Abstract in Dissertation Abstracts, v. 31, June 1971: 7648B. Z5055.U5A53, v. 31
Dissertation (Ph.D) "completed under the Dissertation Support Program funded by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and administered by the National Academy of Sciences."

Research in the physiology of aggression. The first experiment demonstrated that stimulation of a cholinoceptive mechanism in the lateral hypothalamus triggered killing in rats which ordinarily ignore target mice. A second experiment explored hypothalamic stimulation further and demonstrated an anticholinergic treatment which inhibits killing in rats which quickly and consistently kill mice. The final experiment showed that administration of the drugs previously used could

also stimulate or inhibit running and indicated a "pharmacological overlap between running and killing," or, more generally, between arousal and aggression.

36
Spencer, Martin E. CONFLICT AND THE NEUTRALS. Sociological quarterly, v. 12, spring 1971: 219-231.
HM1.S69, v. 12

Challenges the two party conflict model, offering in place a model based on the presence of neutrals. Spencer distinguishes this three-party model from three-party conciliation and coalition models on the basis of the special character of the neutral: its diffuseness, complexity, and manifold possibilities of action. He argues that the three-party model as here conceived is by far the most common form of conflict, being found wherever conflicts over issues fail to sharply divide a population into two all-inclusive factions and where outside groups (external neutrals) can affect the course of conflict although not being themselves directly engaged. In his view the significance of the three-party form lies in its profound bearing upon the dynamics of ideological conflict, politics, and law. (Abstract supplied, modified)

37
Spiegel, Steven L., and Kenneth N. Waltz, comps. CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS. Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers [1971] 474 p.
D843.S63
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by Steven L. Spiegel.--pt. 1. Great power conflicts: Superpowers. Superpowers and challenger.--pt. 2. Hegemonic conflicts: Conflicts within hegemony. Conflicts muted by hegemony.--pt. 3. Violent conflicts: Divided countries. Ethno-national confrontations. Internal conflicts.--pt. 4. Muted conflicts: Three-sided conflicts. Inter-continental cooperation and potential conflict. Social and economic cooperation and conflict.--pt. 5. Policy conflicts: Conflicts in policy formation and application. Conflict in world politics.

Examines 22 specific conflicts in as many essays, the aim being in every case to acquire an analytical understanding of the life cycle of each dispute, as viewed within a given set of conditioning circumstances. The origin, evolution, scope, and aim are considered; factors tending toward a dampening of the dispute, or the contrary, and those favoring or retarding the resort to force, are examined.

38
Stauffer, Paul. [CHANGING DIPLOMACY] Diplomatie im Wandel. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 322-328.
AP32.S47, v. 51

Diplomacy is changing but by no means disappearing as a necessary means of interstate intercourse. Although technological progress has circumscribed somewhat the freedom of action that distance and time once gave an ambassador, it must be remembered that he was always bound by the general parameters of his instructions. The new communications do enable the ambassador to increase his information input to his home office and so participate in and influence foreign-policy decisionmaking. Multilateral diplomacy has grown enormously to meet the demands of the many flourishing international organizations, but it has not replaced the traditional bilateral negotiations except in the areas of trade and economics. The advent of the superpowers, traumatic perhaps for former great powers now reduced to a middle-power role, has actually enhanced the status of the lesser powers by equalizing the nonnuclear powers. The new public-relations role of the ambassador or foreign-service officer constitutes an entirely new field of activity. This role brings him into broad-based contact with the people to whose country he is sent and not just with its elite, policymaking circles.

39
Svoren, Velimir. CONFLICT AND ITS SOLUTION. New York, Exposition Press [c1971] 87 p. (An Exposition-University book)
BF173.S884

Psychoanalytic review of ego defense mechanisms, including narcissistic, exhibitory, cognitive, and teleologic or "Ur" defenses. Svoren describes the neuroses and conflicts that various people have experienced while undergoing these mechanisms. He concludes that "rational logical creative elaboration is the only acceptable way to complete mental health."

40
Teichmann, Max, ed. POWERS AND POLICIES; ALIGNMENTS AND REALIGNMENTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. [North Melbourne, Vic.] Cassell Australia [1970] 217 p.
D843.P67
Bibliographical notes.

Contents.--pt. 1. Towards an understanding of the international system: The study of international relations, by J. A. Camilleri. The cold war, by J. A. Camilleri. South-East Asian conflict and great power involvement, by J. A. Camilleri.--pt. 2. The great powers in Asia: China and Asia, by C. P. Fitzgerald. Sino-Soviet relations since 1950, by C. P. Fitzgerald. Soviet policies in Asia, by Ian Cummins. American policies and objectives in Asia, by Max Teichmann.--pt. 3. The South-East Asia triangle: The Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, by Astri Suhrke. Indonesia, by Astri Suhrke. Australia, by Max Teichmann.--pt. 4. The Indo-Pacific perimeter: Japan, by Max Teichmann. India and Pakistan, by Max Teichmann. Epilogue, by Max Teichmann.

"These essays are designed to provide a picture of the post-war political environment in the Indo-Pacific region, and to attempt some predictions as to the future foreign policies likely to be pursued by the great powers and by the other nation states of this region." The contributions move from the general to the particular, beginning with theories of international relations and their cold war context, then investigating great-power--U.S., Soviet, and Chinese--policies in the region, and finally examining the roles of individual states there. The editor's epilogue summarizes the state of the area as one of "utter confusion" from which the Soviet Union and China stand to gain for the moment. However, the long-term prospect may well be that none of the main actors can be a winner.

41

Väyrynen, Raimo. ON THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF SMALL POWER STATUS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1971: 91-102.
DL55.C66, 1971

This article is aimed at describing and defining small power status. Definitions can explain either the extensional or intensional meaning of a concept. The intensional way of defining a concept is selected and on this basis the following possible defining characteristics of small powers are explored: low rank, high degree of penetration by environment, a given type of behavior, a distinct role and conflicting interests. The investigation leads to the conclusion that low rank is apparently the most useful, but also the most conventional defining characteristic. For this reason the author suggests that approaches based on the concepts of role and interest are worthy of closer investigation and that they may add new dimensions to the study of small powers and their behavior. (Abstract supplied)

42

VIOLENCE; AWARD WINNING ESSAYS IN THE COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES COMPETITION. Essays by Robert Audi [and others] Introd. by Jerome A. Shaffer, editor. New York, McKay, 1971. 178 p. (A David McKay college text)
HM291.V46 1971
Bibliography: p. 177-178.

Contents.--Introduction.--Violence, force and coercion, by Ronald B. Miller.--On the meaning and justification of violence, by Robert Audi.--Violence and nonviolence, by Robert L. Holmes.--Violence and the rule of law, by Bernard Harrison.--Bibliography, by Robert Audi.

Award-winning essays in a competition sponsored by the Council for Philosophical Studies to stimulate thinking on the problem of violence. The essays are not historical, etiological, or empirical, but philosophical, that is, "they attempt to bring clarity to our thinking about violence by analyzing the concept violence and by applying that analysis to questions about its moral footing and status." Miller and Audi are concerned with the problem of conceptual clarification, and Audi with the question of justification as well. Holmes concentrates on the problem of war and pacifism; Harrison on the question whether or not the resort to violence is ever justified under a rule of law.

43

Walker, Richard L. THE NEW PACIFIC COMMUNITY: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON RECENT CHANGES. World affairs, v. 134, fall 1971: 115-124.
JX1901.W7, v. 134

The United States must fully recognize the importance of the Pacific community and the significance of its increasingly active role economically and politically on the international scene. Traditionally Europe-centered, the United States has too long thought of the Pacific as Asian and has associated with it only crises like those in Japan, Korea and Vietnam. The United States with its long Pacific coast is one of the leading powers in a Pacific community consisting of thirty states. The Pacific community includes industrial states like the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, that is, three of the four most populous states in the world. The growing political stability within the states of the community has accelerated the trend toward internationalization of politics and planning and has promoted the growth of world trade and tourism. "A major factor behind the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine has been the conviction of an interrelated destiny which the United States as a Pacific power shares with the new Pacific community."

44

WORLD POLITICS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970'S: FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 463 p.
D839.068, v. 15

Twenty-six articles analyzing the foreign policy problems that the United States will face and the general outlook for the international community in the coming decade.

45

Yost, Charles W. THE INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct. 1971: 59-68. D410.F6, v. 50

Examines instruments like the Secretary and Department of State employed by Presidents to carry out foreign affairs. Franklin Roosevelt usually bypassed the State Department and Foreign Service and relied on himself, a few advisors, and, in a wartime environment, the military. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower appreciated the need for a strong State Department that would give unity to postwar policy. During the three most recent administrations emphasis has been shifted away from

the State Department and currently resides with the National Security Council. "Decision-making in the whole field of foreign affairs has in recent years become more and more entangled and distorted in the machinery of the Council." In Yost's opinion the most reasonable alternative is an upgrading of the State Department with Presidential encouragement to carry the responsibility for the formulation and administration of foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICIES

46
Abosch, Heinz. [CHINA DRAWS NEARER] China rückt näher. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 18, Aug. 1971: 572-575. H5.N36, v. 18

The current relaxation of tensions between Peking and Washington is founded on the same principle that contributed to the counterpart détente in Europe: recognition of international realities. Contributing factors on the Chinese side are threefold: an expanded international role following the cultural revolution, the continuing ideological rift with the Soviet Union, and a fear of Japan's growing economic and military strength. On the American side, the factors influencing a change of posture toward China include the failure of the Vietnam policy, gradual recognition of the non-expansionist nature of Chinese policy, and apprehensions regarding Japan's growing power.

47
Arbatov, G. QUESTIONS DEMANDING AN ANSWER IN PRACTICE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Sept. 7, 1971: 1-4.
D839.C87, v. 23

Questions the possible bearing the forthcoming visit by President Nixon to the People's Republic of China will have on world tensions. In analyzing why certain political and social forces in the United States support a rapprochement with the People's Republic Arbatov indicates the potential political consequences of improved Sino-American relations. Since the American press is "feeding its readers the conclusion that the rapprochement with Peking has advantages on the plane of a step-up in anti-Soviet intrigues," the Soviet Union can only wait for deeds instead of words to reveal what the U.S. démarches to China will mean to the Soviet Union and to world peace. The Soviet Union is prepared to meet any turn of events with strength.

48
Barnet, Richard J. THE ILLUSION OF SECURITY. Foreign policy, no. 3, 1971: 71-87.
N&CPR

The current crisis in U.S. security stems from a dangerous misunderstanding of the problem. U.S. defense policy is designed to protect against the three classic threats, nuclear attack, direct, and indirect aggression. Yet the danger of aggression of any kind is largely a myth based on a World War II experience with international politics that is no longer relevant as a result of advances in military technology and the spread of unconventional warfare techniques and nationalist ideologies. Equally misguided are the various theories advanced to link American security in an adverse way to indigenous revolutionary change. To a naive observer, it might well appear that the only real military threat in the world today is the United States itself. To rectify this situation, the United States must abandon the notion that it "can be safe in the world only by running as much of it as possible." It must learn to accept certain realities of the modern world--that poor countries will resort to revolutionary experiments to solve their problems; that a high degree of disorder and instability is inherent in a world undergoing rapid change; and that it is to everyone's advantage to make the travail of modernization as painless as possible. It must also come to see that the United States itself is a part of the world problem as U.S. security is an element in world security. Finally, American decisionmakers must move to dismantle the military and bureaucratic structures that are the chief upholders of the security myths of recent decades, and must be prepared even to alter consumption patterns in the U.S. economy, if it can be shown, as some have claimed, that these are major sources of the U.S. imperialist impulse.

49
Barnett, A. Doak. HOW TO LIVE WITH BOTH PEKING AND TAIWAN. Life, v. 71, Aug. 13, 1971: 17. illus.
AP2.I547, v. 71

The future of Taiwan is a major impediment to improved Sino-American relations. It is time for the United States to reassess its position with regard to Taiwan and formulate a realistic policy. The U.S. should make it clear that it recognizes the People's Republic as the government of mainland China at the same time that it supports "the Taiwan regime only as the existing authority on that island." Further, the U.S. should indicate that although it will continue to defend the island, American troops will be withdrawn, and the U.S. will wait for a peacefully negotiated settlement of the Taiwan problem worked out by Chinese of both sides and agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If the settlement is slow in emerging, the United States should plan to push a dual-representation forumula in the United Nations to accommodate both Peking and Taiwan. Maneuvering around the Taiwan obstacle is possible if there is "open-mindedness and imagination" and if "Washington and Peking are both determined to devise mechanisms to establish a new relationship."

50
Baroch, Charles T. THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. American Bar Association journal, v. 57, July 1971: 686-690. LL

Clarification of some misconceptions about the Brezhnev Doctrine will make its underlying purpose clear. First, the doctrine represents a policy decision emerging from the apparatus of the Communist Party Central Committee and was not originated by Brezhnev alone. Further, the policy is not new, but is derived directly from Marxist-Leninist tenets. The doctrine, spelled out in 1957 in Moscow by representatives of 12 Socialist countries, is not in conflict with international law, since, operationally, the relations between Communist states are considered to be above international law and guided by a separate Socialist law. Thus, international laws guaranteeing sovereignty and prohibiting unwanted intervention are formally accepted by the Communists but disregarded in practice for the sake of the Socialist system. The underlying assumption of the Brezhnev Doctrine is the "irreconcilable confrontation" between socialism and capitalism "which is bound to end with a revolutionary transformation of capitalist society." All sovereignty, equality, and national interest must be subordinated to this end.

51
Berkenkopf, Galina. [PARTY CONGRESS WITHOUT DECISIONS] Parteitag ohne Entscheidungen. Neue Ordnung, v. 25, June 1971: 225-231.
AP30.N478, v. 25

Communist party congresses do not serve as initiators of change--that role is reserved in Socialist countries to death in the leadership, revolt, and intervention--but they do provide the opportunity to review problems facing the Party and to measure achievements. The recently held 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union presents such an opportunity. The Soviet Union has scored its greatest successes in the field of foreign policy, attaining the tsarist goals: domination of the Baltic Sea, penetration into the Middle East, hegemony over Eastern Europe, and the initiative in Western Europe. Lesser degrees of success mark other areas of state life. The two most significant domestic problems plaguing the Soviet Union are the rights of the nationalities and the geographic distribution of resources. It is ironic that the Soviet Union has not succeeded nearly as well in fulfilling Communist dogma by reconciling contradictions as it has in carrying out the foreign policy goals inherited from the tsarist empire.

52
Birnbaum, Karl E. [THE NORTHERN STATES AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE] Die nordischen Staaten und das kontinentale Europa. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Aug. 25, 1971: 573-578.
D839.E86, v. 26

Considers the effects on Scandinavia of East-West détente and the revitalized program for integration of Western Europe. Although Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland strongly favor a relaxation of tensions and were in fact active early in this effort, Birnbaum declares that each of the states has its own special circumstances in the light of which détente must be examined. Denmark and Norway are members of NATO, although with some qualifications. Sweden desires to continue its neutrality, and Finland's interests demand that nothing be done to incur Soviet distrust. The four states have common economic interests, but they want to avoid the economic isolation possible from a hardening of East-West relations resulting from too extensive an integration of Western Europe.

53
Birrenbach, Kurt. [THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA] Die Vereinigten Staaten und China. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Oct. 8, 1971: 511-522.
D839.E86, v. 26
Includes bibliographical references.

The American opinion is that Communist China has sought détente since the end of the cultural revolution primarily because it regards its ideological conflict with the Soviet Union as a principal and long-term problem, all the more so since the promulgation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Once convinced that Washington intended to end its involvement in Vietnam and return Okinawa to Japan, Peking responded favorably to President Nixon's "approchement" initiatives. The Soviet Union now faces a new situation in the Far East where its arms shipments were responsible for tying down American forces. Now as China grows stronger daily, Soviet troops will be needed in greater numbers along the Chinese border, and pressure on overall American defense policy will be eased. The major test to the new Sino-American relationship will be the seating of Peking in the United Nations. There are no generally recognized principles of international law that can serve as a guide to the complexities of the Taipei-Peking question. China cannot be expected to draw too close to the United States, for if it did its credibility would be jeopardized in the Third World, where its anti-imperialist policy is its chief weapon.

54
Blank, W. J. [SOUTH AFRICA AT THE CROSSROADS] Südafrika am Scheidewege. Mitarbeit, Zeitschrift zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturpolitik, v. 20, July 1971: 35-48. N&CPR

A critique of racial policies and practices in the Republic of South Africa. The attitudes of the Anglo-Afrikaans and the Bantu toward one another, trends toward a relaxation of racial tension and the promotion of multinational development, and the beginning of change in relations between Johannesburg and the independent black republics are examined. More enlightened racial practices are slowly emerging, the author contends, with an accent on multinational partnership between the racial communities, although deeply ingrained thought patterns among the white resi-

dents will not change as rapidly as outside critics would like. The greatest disservice would be stepped up pressure or intervention from without, for this would certainly eventuate in a reversal of the current favorable direction. South Africans who previously regarded themselves as in a western outpost are beginning to feel themselves part of Africa. This changed attitude can be seen in Johannesburg's endeavors to establish contact with the black republics on the continent and in the lively trade with those republics in spite of the boycott of the Organization of African Unity.

55
Boardman, Robert. CONFLICT IN WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE: TWO PROFILES OF CHINA. British journal of political science, v. 1, Apr. 1971: 191-208. JA8.B7, v. 1

The establishment and subsequent actions of the People's Republic of China gave rise to two distinctive sets of British attitudes about the regime and Western policy toward it which can be summarized as "operational code" profiles of beliefs and values. The first set of assumptions evaluates events in China against a background of international Communism's role in the cold war; the second set sees the Communist regime as a popular, reforming and nationalist movement indigenously Chinese in nature. These divergent interpretations postulate the nature of Chinese foreign policy from perceptions of the structure and behavior of the regime and lead naturally to recommended policy approaches. Implications of the nature of these differing systems suggest avenues for future research into the underlying determinants of political perceptions.

56
Bonsdorff, Göran von. [FINLAND'S NEUTRALITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTIES] Finnlands Neutralität zu Beginn der siebziger Jahre. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 11, no. 2, 1971: 114-120. DB47.043, v. 11
Address presented on December 14, 1970 to the Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik.

Mindful of the geopolitical realities, Finland has moved since the end of World War II from a policy of narrow, introspective neutrality to one of neutral partisanship in behalf of international peace and security. The Paasikivi line, based on the recognition of Finland's size vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the latter's legitimate strategic interests, still underlies Finnish foreign policy but no longer intimidates it. The withdrawal from Finland of the last Soviet garrison in 1955 and Finland's entry into the United Nations the same year gave credibility and maneuverability to Finnish foreign policy. The 1961 Novosibirsk meeting, when Kekkonen demonstrated the mutuality of the friendship and assistance treaty with Moscow by declining to participate in military consultations that the Soviet Union had requested, strengthened Finland's international position. Later in that decade Finland became an associate member of the European Free Trade Association and hosted a session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Finnish foreign policy for the Seventies, oriented toward peace with security and founded on current realities rather than obsolete issues, seeks to create the prerequisite conditions and institutions for negotiating that peace and security.

57
Brandt, Willy. [ADDRESS] News from Germany, v. 26, May/June/July/Aug. 1971: 1-8.
DD257.N518, v. 26
English-language text of address delivered by Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, in observance of the "Day of German Unity" on June 17, 1971, in New York.

Although much has changed since the East Berlin uprising of June 17th, 1953, certain basic factors remain unchanged. Western Europe and the United States still need one another, for only together can they maintain a balance of power vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. Stagnant for some time, the movement for Western European integration is again stirring, but care must be taken that this integration does not eventuate in isolation. Western Europe must speak with one voice in world affairs and must ease the burden so long shouldered by the United States. The North Atlantic Alliance has rightly been strengthened, for only through military preparedness is détente possible. Yet perhaps the balance might be upheld at a lower level through a mutual balanced force reduction. West German foreign policy is intended to complement that of the Allies. It is now endeavoring to organize its relations with the German Democratic Republic, although it anticipates that confrontation and cooperation will coexist for some time to come. Efforts at détente are doomed, however, unless the Berlin problem is solved. Essential in a solution are unhindered traffic of persons and goods, preservation of the links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, and the right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin and vicinity. The Federal Republic and its Allies will stand together in negotiations, yet there is no denying the need for military readiness as a complement to détente.

58
Brandt, Willy. [CURRENT ISSUES IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY] Aktuelle Fragen der deutschen Aussenpolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, July 10, 1971: 437-442. D839.E86, v. 26
"Address by the Federal Chancellor . . . on June 25, 1971 in Bonn . . . at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik."

Two parallel developments of paramount significance to the economic and political picture of Europe and the German Federal Republic are emerging:

the expansion of the European Economic Community and the effort to limit the East-West confrontation. The entry of Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland into the Common Market appears now to be only a matter of time. While it may not be as easy to find consensus among ten members as among six, the expansion will strengthen the Market economically and enhance its political weight. Rumors that Great Britain's entry is being facilitated by fears of West German hegemony are nonsense, since "realities in Western Europe do not tolerate a relapse into the thought patterns of the previous century." The expanded Common Market must avoid unnecessary conflicts of interest with the United States, for "what is gained in European collaboration must not be lost in the Atlantic Alliance," to which the continued presence of American troops in Europe is indispensable. Although West German détente initiatives have attained some success and allied approbation, tensions in Europe cannot be truly relaxed until the military confrontation is eased. The Soviet Union's late but welcome reply to the 1968 NATO call for mutual balanced force reduction is encouraging. The security interests of the Alliance, nonetheless, must be preserved in any arrangement and due consideration given to geographical asymmetry and other factors.

59

Briessen, Fritz van. [THE NEW PATHS OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY] Die neuen Wege der Aussenpolitik Japans. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, July 1971: 385-400.
D839.A885, v. 22

Foresees no immediate changes in Japanese foreign policy in spite of domestic pressures and the contradictory influences of Washington, Peking, and Moscow. The author reviews Japan's relations with these capitals and Taipei and explores the question of a revival of Japanese militarism. The Nixon Doctrine, the emergence of China as a nuclear power, and the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union have given rise to some Japanese concern for security and the possibility of developing defensive nuclear weapons. While there may be some increase in nationalist sentiments, they are not accompanied by militarist tendencies. Japan will assume a greater international role, as the United States has urged, but it is unwilling to do so at the cost of prejudicing its relations with Moscow or Peking. No country in the world, the author concludes, is so dependent on maintaining good political and economic relations with everyone.

60

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. HALF PAST NIXON. Foreign policy, no. 3, 1971: 3-21.
N&CPR

The Nixon Doctrine, less a doctrine than "a continuous process of redefinition of American foreign policy in the light of new domestic and international circumstances," is meant to strike a proper balance between the overinvolvement of earlier administrations and the looming danger of isolationist underinvolvement. It seeks, in outline, military disengagement in Vietnam regardless of the eventual outcome of the war; parallel progress in negotiations with the Soviet Union on regional conflicts, functional relations, and strategic arms limitations; encouragement of greater equality within the alliance system; and greater flexibility in the triangular relationship with Communist China and the Soviet Union. In military terms, it intends to put less reliance on conventional ground forces and more on the early use of nuclear weapons and on seapower. The general priorities of this policy are well chosen, but there are failings, among them, inattention to the problems of the third world and to the spread of global anarchy; unwillingness to assert the kind of world leadership that only the United States can provide; and neglect of an admirable opportunity to create a broader community of the developed nations. Policy toward China also leaves something to be desired, particularly in regard to Taiwan, and military affairs seem to be shaped more by political and fiscal pressures than the logic of doctrine. Perhaps the soundest elements in the Nixon program relate to the Soviet Union. The approach to the strategic arms talks with that country has been sober and realistic, though a more flexible negotiating strategy might have created a better climate for comprehensive agreement and given an earlier indication of true Soviet intentions. The gist of all this is that on some matters the Nixon administration is doing extremely well; on others, however, it remains a prisoner of history and its own narrow perspectives.

61

Campbell, John C. SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Current history, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 193-197, 245-246.
D410.C82, v. 61

The Nixon administration "takes a practical middle course" between the beliefs that the cold war is over and that Soviet policy is as rigid as ever. Although occasional negotiation is possible, broad agreement is not likely in the near future. At the recent 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist party the traditional, rigid ideology was heard, but the theme of peaceful coexistence was also present. In Europe the Soviets hope to see the eventual withdrawal of American troops and a weakening of the Western European nations so they are "impotent and controlled." At present the Soviets seem willing to settle for a period of relative quiet. In the Middle East the United States and the Soviet Union are in "direct rivalry" since each sphere of power has not been strictly defined. In the Far East the Soviets want a role, but positions have not congealed. The future may see China, Japan, and a united West Europe changing the shape of world affairs, although the United States and the Soviet Union may be the last to realize it.

62
Chang, Wei-ya. AN ANALYSIS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST'S INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION ABROAD. [Taipei] Asian Peoples' Anti-communist League, 1969. 116 p. (Publications of the APACLROC: Pamphlets no. 138) DS740.4.C345

Surveys Communist China's infiltration and subversive activities in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Chang concludes that China is a very real threat to world peace.

63
Childs, David. GERMANY SINCE 1918. London, Batsford, 1971. 208 p. illus. DD232.C48
Bibliography: p. [196]-201.

Contents.--The making of Weimar.--Weimar from crisis to stability.--Weimar crisis and collapse. --Hitler's Gleichschaltung and gambles.--Phoney war, total war, and total defeat.--Germany under occupation.--Adenauer's Germany.--Ulbricht's Germany.--East Germany in the sixties.--West Germany in the sixties.

Survey of German history since the First World War emphasizing the development of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The reunification of Germany is not likely because it would jeopardize Soviet hegemony over the other states in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, a series of small steps like those now being taken, leading to a relaxation of tensions between the two Germanys, may coincide with Soviet desires for a détente with the United States. Childs is cautiously optimistic that the replacement of Stalinists in East Berlin and of revanchists in Bonn may contribute to a gradual amelioration of relations.

64
CHINA. Survival, v. 13, Sept. 1971: 292-302. U162.S9, v. 13

Seven articles including President Nixon's announcement of his intended visit to the People's Republic of China and David Wilson's examination of China's motives and of the implications of a Sino-American rapprochement for Asia, particularly Japan. The other articles are selected press reports analyzing public reaction in those countries most affected by a redefinition of Sino-American relations.

65
CHRONICLE OF SOVIET MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ACTS BETWEEN THE 23RD AND THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESSES. International affairs (Moscow) no. 2, Feb. 1971: 93-100; no. 3, Mar. 1971: 106-112; no. 4, Apr. 1971: 114-120; no. 5, May 1971: 102-108. D839.I465, 1971

A chronology of major Soviet foreign policy acts between the 23rd and 24th Party Congresses.

66
Clough, Ralph N. MUSING ON NIXON'S PEKING VISIT. Foreign policy, fall 1971: 130-137. N&CPR

Of the two most plausible reasons for Chinese willingness to entertain a visit from President Nixon, concern over Soviet designs and Japanese ambitions, the latter played the greater role. Peking looks with anxiety at Tokyo's deepening economic relations with Taiwan and the possibility of Japanese remilitarization as a consequence of the Nixon Doctrine. These concerns may have caused "Peking to move now to improve relations with the United States and to make a start toward resolving the Taiwan problem before it is too late." Washington-Peking relations will probably not take diplomatic form, because of the unlikelihood of Washington jettisoning its ties with the Nationalist Chinese. It is more probable that an American "negotiations representative" will be assigned to Peking. The Chinese would not have been receptive to American initiatives without the assurance of Washington's fulfilling two preconditions: winding down the Vietnam War and refraining from a vigorous and successful campaign to deny Peking a U.N. seat. In the talks with Chou En-lai President Nixon should exercise care that he does not serve Chinese purposes at the expense of American relations with Japan.

67
Clubb, O. Edmund. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND PING-PONG. Current history, v. 61, Sept. 1971: 129-134, 180. D410.C82, v. 61
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Scans the improvement of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China to determine how quick and how complete the reconciliation will be. In Clubb's opinion Mr. Nixon "approaches the bargaining table with much to ask but little to offer." The problem of the Chinese on Taiwan remains a primary obstacle, for the Communist Chinese have determined not to open relations with any country that maintains friendly ties with the government on Taiwan. United States support of Japan, reinforced by the anticipated reversion of Okinawa, is also a problem for Peking. Always at issue are the Vietnam War and the ill-defined role of the United States in the Pacific. Although Clubb is pessimistic about an early revival of diplomatic relations, he hopes that the President's visit may demonstrate a new awareness of "Asian realities" leading someday to a clearer perception of the issues.

68
Cohen, Jerome A. RECOGNIZING CHINA. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct. 1971: 30-43.
D410.F6, v. 50

Probes the twisted and perplexing problems of Taiwan's identity and points to some of the ironies involved. Starting with the assumption that the people of Taiwan are "ethnically, linguistically and culturally Chinese," Cohen reviews various perceptions of the island and reports that both Nationalist China and the People's Republic of China consider the island to be Chinese. The United States, however, has refused to acknowledge Taiwan as Chinese even though it recognizes the commanders of the territory as the government of China. This logic permits the United States to send the Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa without intervening in a civil war. Cohen discusses other problems that could hinder the progress of diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington such as American prisoners still held in China and Peking's influence on Chinese "nationals" living in America. He stresses his belief that despite these problems, the United States must eventually recognize the Peking government.

69
Cycon, Dieter. [THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS AT STAKE; A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WILLY BRANDT] Es geht um die Bundesrepublik; eine kritische Wertung der Aussenpolitik Willy Brandts. Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag [c1971] 300 p.
DD259.4.C9

Contents.--Foreword.--The great rivals--spotlight on Russia and America.--The world revolution without atomic war.--Confrontation of social systems in Germany.--Prelude in Bonn.--"Convergence" in "all Europe"?--The Moscow Treaty.--The Treaty with Warsaw.--A status quo minus for Berlin?--The security conference--Moscow's weapon against America.--Priority for Western Europe.--Atlantic response to the Soviet challenge.--The intelligentsia--a disappointed class?--Appendix.

A collection of articles largely from the Stuttgarter Zeitung and Die Welt to support the compiler's contention that Brandt's foreign policy is leading the German Federal Republic closer to the Soviet camp and out of the West's "gravitational field." Cycon's foreword urges West German voters to end this trend and scrap Brandt's Ostpolitik in favor of an active Westpolitik.

70
Dmitriev, E. SOVIET-ARAB FRIENDSHIP: A NEW STAGE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1971: 66-68.
D839.I465, 1971

The change of leadership in the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1970 initiated speculation in the Western press that the UAR was abandoning its previous policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. To the complete dismay of the foes of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, the visit of N. V. Podgorny in May 1971 resulted in the signing of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which served to further the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation existing for many years previously between the two states. The treaty itself has undergone attack in the pro-Zionist press for promoting Soviet control over Egypt and for further endangering the chances for peace in the Middle East. By strengthening the Soviet presence in Egypt, the treaty frustrates the plans of the Israeli and American aggressors in the Middle East.

71
Fircks, Otto, Freiherr von, and Hans J. Knaute, comps. [ONE GERMAN NATION--TWO GERMAN STATES; MILESTONES, PATHS, FALSE COURSES; A DOCUMENTATION ON THE DISPUTES OVER THE NEW POLICY FOR GERMANY AND THE EAST] Eine deutsche Nation--zwei deutsche Staaten; Meilensteine, Wege, Irrwege; eine Dokumentation zu den Auseinandersetzungen über die neue Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik. [Leer, Rautenberg, 1970] 127 p.
DD259.4.F5
Introduction by Mathias Walden.

A collection of documents, correspondence, and newspaper articles appearing in the three-month period following the coming to power of the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition in Bonn relevant to the Federal Republic's new policy toward the East in general and the German Democratic Republic in particular. In the foreword, Fircks and Knaute question the effectiveness of this policy. Walden's introduction charges that Bonn's current Ostpolitik lacks realistic goals and that the results to date have been only West German concessions. The continuation of the policy will deprive the peoples of Eastern Europe of any hope for freedom, for the policy resigns itself to "realities" that even the Communists are not resigned to.

72
FORT KNOX INTO FORTRESS AMERICA [editorial] New statesman, v. 82, Aug. 27, 1971: 253-254.
AP4.N64, v. 82

President Nixon's recent political and economic policies are unpopular internationally, especially in Japan where American pressures to revalue the yen and reduce textile exports have caused U.S.-Japanese relations to plummet to their lowest point since the early 1950's. But America's "low profile" policy has borne some fruit, namely an agreement over West Berlin, and it has increased hopes for a successful outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Although President Nixon's "America First" policy is self-serving, it is having the effect of making war less likely in Europe and Asia.

73
Frye, Alton. CONGRESS: THE VIRTUES OF ITS VICES. Foreign policy, no. 3, 1971: 108-125.
N&CPR

The problem of reconciling "public discussion and the legislative process . . . with the requirements for competent and sustained action in a hostile international environment" is a perennial one, but experience in recent decades indicates that as often as not the alleged vices of legislative bodies are virtues. The capacity of Congress to impose and remove various types of constraint on executive actions abroad can, when properly used, be a definite asset. By statutory action and in public debate, the Congress can also serve as a communicator with foreign governments of ideas that cannot so readily or safely be expressed by the executive branch. Finally, by means of its resolutions, the Congress can give additional weight to public support for a policy and increase the President's flexibility in dealing with a foreign issue. Positive Congressional contributions to foreign policy go well beyond the traditional ones of giving advice and consent to treaties, approving diplomatic appointments, and appropriating funds. By a sophisticated use of its powers of constrainer, communicator, and liberator, Congress can add a significant new dimension to U.S. diplomacy.

74
Gati, Charles. SOVIET TUTELAGE IN EAST EUROPE. Current history, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 206-209, 243.
D410.C82, v. 61

Based in part on an unpublished paper presented at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles, Sept. 1970.

An important, though not always perceptible, change in Soviet-East European relations is underway. Despite the strictures of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviets are slowly and grudgingly learning to accept individual differences among the countries of East Europe. They are coming to tolerate some diversity in ideology and foreign policies. "Thus, Soviet policy in East Europe today can be said to be more tutelary than imperious, and Soviet problems in this area are those of an unpopular and resented guardian." Moscow faces a dilemma in the choice of future tactics. An attempt to return to subjugation and imposition would lead to violence and trouble, but greater independence is "ideologically and strategically unacceptable."

75
Gelb, Leslie H. VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED. Foreign policy, no. 3, 1971: 140-167.
N&CPR

The notion that the United States stumbled blindly into the Vietnam War through some failure of the "system" is an erroneous one. The truth is that the system worked tragically well, and every President from Roosevelt to Johnson knew exactly what he was doing and why. The United States moved into Vietnam because U.S. decisionmakers believed that a Communist conquest of that country would be a serious blow to U.S. security in Asia and elsewhere. They sought not military victory, however, but a negotiated settlement, not realizing the impossibility of resolving a civil war by compromise. Nor were they misled by the over-optimistic reports from the field. They knew from the beginning that the steps they were taking could not win the war, but hoped that at some stage in the escalatory process the firm demonstration of American will would cause Hanoi to withdraw. If this analysis is correct, it follows that there are no political-bureaucratic panaceas by which to prevent a repetition of the Vietnam experience. Rather it is necessary to challenge the assumptions underlying the U.S. decision to intervene, the most important of these being, first, that the loss of Vietnam to the Communists would dangerously undermine U.S. security because security is indivisible and weakness in one place invites aggression in others, and, second, that the American people would punish any political faction that allowed Vietnam to go Communist. The President must make it his practice to demand that the bureaucracy subject determinations of what is important or unimportant in security to the most rigorous tests. He must also take the lead in reducing the virulence of anti-Communism as a domestic political issue, though here he must be careful not to undermine all support for the use of force, which is still sometimes very necessary.

76
Gilberg, Trond. SOVIET POLICIES IN WEST EUROPE. Current history, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 198-205.
D410.C82, v. 61

Generally stated, Moscow's goals for West Europe involve a reduction of American influence and an increase in Soviet importance. Examined in detail the Soviet strategy for advancing these ends is "complex and sophisticated." Under the guise of a "global understanding" the Soviets hope the United States will acknowledge the status quo of Kremlin dominance in East Europe. In order to disrupt West Europe's systems of political and economic alliances, the Soviets favor countries such as France and Finland, are ambiguous toward some, like Denmark and Norway, and are critical of others including Spain, Greece, and Portugal. The Soviets also take advantage of anti-American occasions to denounce the United States as an imperialist power using European business "as milking cows for transatlantic financiers to help finance the chronically sick United States economy." Finally, the Soviet Union presents itself as a European power with natural ties to West Europe, and "the increasingly sophisticated foreign policy analysis taking place in the Kremlin represents a serious challenge to Western diplomats."

77
Gromyko, Andrei A. OUR FOREIGN POLICY; PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, May 1, 1971: 427-430.
PN6121.V52, v. 37
"Delivered at the 24th CPSU Congress, April 6, 1971."

It is evident that the policies of the Soviet Union are correct. The labors of the Soviet people have so strengthened their motherland that no international decision of importance can be made without Soviet participation or approval. The appeal of Soviet policies to the peoples of the world lies in their peace-loving, truthful nature. In pursuit of its objectives the Soviet Union neither shies from a challenge nor overreacts to it. Since the war the United States has attempted futilely to conceal its role in promoting instability and fomenting aggression. Soviet policy clearly recognizes the distinction between the uncompromiseable ideological struggle and the necessity for peaceful coexistence. Since the last party congress, much progress has been made in Europe toward a lasting peace. The Soviet Union can play a major role in wiping out the last vestiges of colonialism. It desires normal relations with the United States, but is impatient with American stalling. Improved relations with China depend on China's leaders. The eyes of the world are on the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress as it confidently prepares for the difficult task of bringing liberty, peace, and socialism to humanity.

78
Guttenberg, Karl T., Freiherr von und zu. [THE NEW OSTPOLITIK; COURSES AND FALSE COURSES] Die neue Ostpolitik; Wege und Irrwege. Osnabrück, A. Fromm [c1971] 82 p. (Texte, Thesen, 11)
DD259.4.G837

Contents.--Continuity?--The essence of the treaties.--Renunciation of force.--Self-determination for all Germans?--The treaty on Germany, the constitution, and the Munich agreement.--Berlin, an internal German situation.--Slogans, wishful thinking and real alternatives.--What remains of Germany?--Text of the treaty.

Castigates the Bonn government of Brandt and Scheel for its new Ostpolitik and, most especially, for signing the Treaty of Moscow. That treaty presents the Federal Republic with two almost equally distressing alternatives. Ratification of the treaty will facilitate Soviet penetration of Western Europe; failure to ratify will lead to a serious East-West crisis. Of the two alternatives, Guttenberg thinks nonratification the lesser evil.

79
Harrison, Stanley L. CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT: NATO TROOP-REDUCTION CONFLICT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Sept. 1971: 13-24. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

The struggle between the President and the Congress over the important question of troop withdrawals from Europe is an issue of immediate relevance to U.S. foreign and military policy. It is also an issue that raises more general questions concerning legislative and executive powers in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy. The U.S. executive has long supported a policy of maintaining troop strength in Europe while making overtures to the Soviet Union for the negotiation of mutual and balanced force reductions. The Congress, however, concerned from the very beginning that the European allies were not assuming their fair share of the defense burden, and in more recent times increasingly fearful of overcommitment abroad, has always been less than enthusiastic about maintaining U.S. forces in Europe at the levels desired by the executive branch. Recently, this longstanding discontent has taken on concrete form in the Mansfield Amendment and other legislative pressures to bring about substantial troop withdrawals. Though the Mansfield proposals have been defeated, some troop reductions are a virtual certainty, and the only real question is how to bring this about with a minimum of dislocation and damage to Western security. To a large extent, this has now become the responsibility of the diplomats, who must get on with the urgent business of negotiating mutual and balanced force reductions with the East.

80
Hirasawa, Kazushige. JAPAN'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 338-350. D839.068, v. 15

The direction Japanese-American relations will take in the coming decade will depend upon the successful or unsuccessful resolution of present military, political, and economic problems. Specifically, these problems center on Japanese rearmament, Communist China, and the threat of an international trade war. Whatever the fate of Japanese-American relations, stability in the Asian Pacific region is inconceivable without a continuing close relationship between the two countries.

81
Hoadley, J. Stephen, and Sukehiro Hasegawa. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 1950-1970. International studies quarterly, v. 15, June 1971: 131-157.
D839.B2, v. 15
Includes tables.

A case study of China's postwar relations with Japan and Japan's response using the linkage model of international politics originated by James N. Rosenau. The authors examine the existing ideological, political, economic and quasi-diplomatic links between the two states to produce a study which combines "the insights of the study of domestic politics with those of international relations to create a wider-ranging, more systematic approach" to the phenomena of Chinese international politics. The study concludes that material

linkages, i.e. trade relations, tend to be more effective than immaterial linkages, i.e. ideological and political ties; that Chinese links with the Japanese majority party are more effective in the long run diplomatically than links with the Japanese opposition party; and that the bamboo curtain has placed China and Japan on opposing sides in the Cold War and thereby hindered the establishment of diverse and effective linkages.

82
Holmes, John W. CANADA: THE RELUCTANT POWER. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 292-304.
D839.068, v. 15

Discusses the problems and prospects of Canadian foreign policy and the bases on which this policy has rested, namely the United Nations, the British Commonwealth, NATO, and the continental partnership. Canadians have grown skeptical of their role in world affairs, especially in NATO, arms control talks, and American strategic policy, and the temptation to drift away from the traditional commitments to international security is becoming greater. Holmes maintains that in terms of territory, resources, industry, and trade Canada is on the verge of becoming a world power and that Ottawa will find its future role in the realm of economics, which increasingly influences the issues and problems of world security. He concludes with an assessment of Canada's role in the Far East within the context of the American disengagement, noting that such old-fashioned but valid remedies as economic aid, mutual bilateral trade, and efforts at political and cultural understanding between the larger powers will continue as the backbone of Canadian foreign policy in the region.

83
Hudson, W. J. AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMACY. [Melbourne] Macmillan of Australia, 1970. 102 p. illus. (The Making of Australia)
DU113.H78
Bibliography: p. [94]-96.

An introduction to the history of Australian diplomacy that emphasizes "Australian governments' activities in their dealings with the world rather than with the forces at work in the shaping of foreign policy." Hudson's objective in part is to dispel the folk and personality myths that have marked the writing of Australia's diplomatic history. Lists of the previous Ministers for External Affairs and the Permanent Heads of the Department of External Affairs since its reestablishment, along with a brief description of the functions and organization of the department, are appended.

84
Humphrey, Hubert H. THE COURSE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 65-71.
D839.068, v. 15

Internal pressures and changes in the international situation could cause more accommodation between the superpowers. Although the Soviet Union and the United States differ ideologically, traditionally, and culturally, they can consult on issues that immediately affect their own national interests. The arms race, a Middle East settlement, the future of Europe, and economic relations are among the crucial areas where Moscow and Washington have compatible interests. Although the superpowers are going ahead with their strategic weapons production programs, they have been willing to negotiate on the limitation of strategic arms. In the Middle East, both powers have a responsibility to bring about an equitable solution in view of the dangerous politicomilitary situation there. As for Europe, Moscow is likely to retain its phobia about bridge-building between Eastern and Western Europe, but its artificial barriers left over from the critical years of the cold war can be significantly improved. Trade relations have improved between the two giant powers, and, more importantly, these relations can serve as a vehicle toward achieving political cooperation. Whether or not Soviet-U.S. relations will improve during the coming decade will depend upon the candor and open-mindedness of the leaders in Washington and Moscow. It is essential that they act reasonably and never lose sight of their countries' interests and, thus, of the interests of the international community.

85
Hunck, Joseph M. [AUSTRALIA'S CLOSE CONNECTION WITH ASIA AND THE PACIFIC] Australiens Verbund mit Asien und Pazifik. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, July 1971: 421-434. D839.A885, v. 22

No longer a political extension of Europe and an economic outpost of the Commonwealth, Australia has become an Asian and Pacific power closely subject to the events and influences of the region it occupies. Politically and diplomatically mature, Australia pursues a foreign policy based on close defense ties with the United States through the Australia-New Zealand-United States pact (ANZUS) and on entente with Japan. The Australian policy is to improve relations with other countries in the region and to promote collaboration and common regional defense. In implementation of this policy, Australia has joined the Asian and Pacific Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and sent troops to the Vietnam War. Australia's regional orientation is further pointed up by its close ties with Indonesia, by the extending of almost all its development aid to regional projects, and by the dramatic climb in exports to Japan.

86
AN INTERVIEW WITH HAN SUYIN. Liberation, v. 15/16, Feb./Mar. 1971: 4-12.
BF1995.L47, v. 15/16

Speculations as to the moment when China will intervene in Vietnam are meaningless, since China

has been giving the maximum effective aid all along. If the Americans continue to escalate, "the use of atomic weapons is practically a certainty--yet it is not a foregone conclusion." There can be no Sino-American commercial agreement in view of American support of Taiwan and "I do not envision any political agreements either." The changes wrought by the cultural revolution have contributed to the general growth of consciousness of the Chinese people. This "upsurge of consciousness" is an important phenomenon in the Third World, to which China is doubling its interest-free aid. China objects to resurgent Japanese militarism, but is confident that in the long run militarism carries in itself the seeds of its defeat. The United Nations is withering because China is not represented, but China will continue calmly to conduct its relations with the West in the spirit of Bandung.

87
IUrkov, S. UNWISE COURSE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Sept. 21, 1971: 5, 25.
D839.C87, v. 23
Condensed from Izvestiia, Aug. 26, 1971.
Slav Rm

Briefly traces the development of Peking's anti-Soviet policy. Iurkov says that Peking has alined itself with the Western imperialist powers against the Soviet Union in the hope of finding assistance in the development of its economy. The Soviet Union has remained ever-mindful of the fact that the fundamental interests of China and the Soviet Union do coincide. Soviet efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations will induce the People's Republic of China to renounce its anti-Soviet policy and thereby strengthen the solidarity of the Socialist system and restore the stature of the once great Chinese people.

88
Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, comp. [DISTRUSTFUL NEIGHBORS. GERMAN OSTPOLITIK 1919/1970. DOCUMENTATION AND ANALYSIS] Misstrauische Nachbarn. Deutsche Ostpolitik 1919/1970. Dokumentation und Analyse. Hrsg. von Hans-Adolf Jacobsen unter Mitwirkung von Wilfried von Bredow. Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag [1970] 504 p. DD120.E8J3
Selected bibliography: p. 493-495.

Contents.--Preface.--1919-1933: Germany between East and West.--1933-1945: Struggle for "Lebensraum" in the East.--1945-1961: Policy of rigid fronts. Western integration as a means of German Ostpolitik.--1961-1970: Policy of movement. From confrontation to cooperation.--Appendix.--Index.

Selected documents to illustrate the spectrum of concepts toward Eastern Europe that have been developed in Germany since the end of the First World War and in the German Federal Republic since 1945. The documents show, Jacobsen states, that Germany's position toward the peoples of Eastern Europe was never class-biased, although certain leadership levels set policies designed to evoke distrust, and that the style and orientation of Ostpolitik has undergone basic changes. This transformation is due not only to changes in power relationships and to the Federal Republic's middle-class power status but to the recognition that force is no longer a means for settling international disputes. One of the foremost tasks of German foreign policy will be reconciliation with the peoples of Eastern Europe and a lessening of prejudices. In this connection the signing of the Moscow Treaty was salutatory. Although the dispute between Europe's two social systems will continue and the Communists will vigorously pursue the ideology of class struggle, the decisive issue is rather the pursuit of social justice.

89
Kaplan, Morton A. TOWARD THE 1980'S: A POLICY "VISION" IN SEARCH OF A PROJECTION. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 275-282.
D839.068, v. 15

Outlines the future goals of U.S. foreign policy with respect to Europe, the Soviet Union, Communist China, the Third World, and the United Nations. Kaplan contends that "the main purpose of U.S. foreign policy [in the 1980's] should be to make the world safe for the common values to which Marxian communists and Western democrats appeal."

90
Karnow, Stanley. THE MEANING OF NIXON'S CHINA COUP. Progressive, v. 35, Sept. 1971: 14-16.
AP2.P8655, v. 35

President Nixon believes that an easing of relations with China will provide him with a foreign policy victory that will enhance his chances for reelection in 1972. In 1969 he first encouraged exploration of a possible rapprochement. Fortunately, the Chinese have also been thinking about improving relations with the United States in the hopes of achieving a "triangular diplomacy" to deter a Soviet invasion. Chinese leaders found Mr. Nixon suitable because of his traditional anti-Soviet stand and his Republican politics. Clearly many problems, like Taiwan and Indochina, stand in the way of any permanent improvement. From Peking's point of view the forthcoming visit establishes that China has genuine "big power status." Mr. Nixon hopes to employ China to guarantee his election victory. "Thus their forthcoming meeting reflects a conjunction of interests that may, in the process, bring the world a bit closer to stability."

91
Kirchschläger, Rudolf. [AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY] Die österreichische Aussenpolitik. Vortrag gehalten von Rudolf Kirchschläger, Bundesminister

für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten am 15. Jänner 1971 vor dem Polnischen Institut für Aussenpolitik, Warschau. Wien, Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Abteilung Presse und Information [1971] 9 p. DB99.2.K5

Austrian foreign policy is one of peace, neutrality, independence, and solidarity with other states irrespective of social systems. It is the reflection of the real interests of the Austrian people in the maintenance and securing of peace. Complementing Austria's policy of perpetual neutrality is the independence expressed in its refusal to join any military alliance or to permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil. As an active participant in the promotion of peace and security, Austria supports the proposed European security conference, one of whose agenda items should be the mutual and balanced reduction of military forces in Europe. This question is difficult but should not be shunned because of the course other disarmament negotiations have taken. Austria has let its opinion be known that the setting of preconditions is not appropriate preparation for the conference. Austria acknowledges, however, that events will have a decided influence on conference philosophy. The Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw are events that establish the atmosphere of trust prerequisite to the work of the conference. Austria's foreign policy is not, however, confined to an East-West perspective. It takes special cognizance of the needs of developing countries and of the desirability of foreign trade, both of which contribute to peace and security.

92
Kohler, Foy D. AN AMERICAN VIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 72-86. D839.068, v. 15

"Much of the material in this article has been drawn from the author's recent book, Understanding the Russians--A Citizen's Primer (New York: Harper & Row, 1970)." DK274.K6 1970

The primary objective of Soviet foreign policy during the next decade will be to increase its global presence and power. However, because of the nature of the Soviet leadership, the rise of nationalism, and the decline of ideology, adventurism will not characterize the Soviet drive for superpower equality. Much of what Moscow will do, especially in South and Southeast Asia, will be thought out within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In Europe, the Kremlin's objectives will continue to be the confirmation of the status quo, weakening of the Atlantic Alliance, and reduction of the American commitment to the alliance. In the Middle East, although Moscow's politicomilitary presence is firmly entrenched, the Soviet Union will shy away from another confrontation in the foreseeable future in view of the disastrous Arab-Israeli 1967 war and the presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO Mediterranean forces. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which will inevitably be complex and long, will tend to dampen vast arms programs. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union's policies will be dependent upon the posture and policies of the United States. As long as America continues to meet the responsibilities for its own security in the next decade, it will continue to represent the basic restraint on the Kremlin's adventurist tendencies.

93
Kolodziej, Edward A. FRENCH MEDITERRANEAN POLICY: THE POLITICS OF WEAKNESS. International affairs (London) v. 47, July 1971: 503-517. JX1.I53, v. 47

Since the social and economic crises of 1968, France has begun to emphasize less its military power as the basis for its great power status than the weight of its regional presence and its history, which is invoked to justify France's right to participate in major decisions concerning the Mediterranean. In other related courses of action, the French have attempted to manipulate the superpower conflict in the area, alined themselves with the Arab States in the Middle East, and encouraged the regrouping of the western Mediterranean nations around French leadership. Despite these efforts aimed at maintaining a viable competitive position against either superpower in the Mediterranean, the French position in the region remains weak. France does not have the superpowers' ability to persuade and command, and France is less able to satisfy national ambitions in the area with arms and economic assistance. The major obstacle remains Algeria. French dependence on Algerian oil and markets and Algeria's key geographical and strategic position have weakened France's bargaining leverage. "The principal difficulty with French Mediterranean diplomacy is that it threatens to collapse from its own inner stresses." The differing reactions by the former Maghreb dependencies to the Arab-Israeli War indicate that the formulation of a common foreign policy defined by Paris or even by these states will not be easy. The French also confront great difficulties in their attempts to unite Spain and Italy within a common foreign policy framework for the western Mediterranean. Italy prefers NATO protection, while Spain's continued repressive domestic policies make an alinement with its liberal neighbors very difficult.

94
Krippendorff, Ekkehart. [THE AMERICAN STRATEGY. THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY] Die amerikanische Strategie. Entscheidungsprozess und Instrumentarium der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik. [Frankfurt a. M.] Suhrkamp [1970] 495 p. E183.7.K68

Contents.--Basic historical pattern of American foreign policy: On the American governmental system. The foreign policy executive power. Legislative power and foreign policy.--Foreign policy

implementation: The classic instrument: diplomacy. The military as an instrument of foreign policy. The unconventional instrument: intelligence services. The democratic instrument: propaganda. Foreign activities of social groups and organizations. Economics as an end and a means.--Pax americana.

Finds that American foreign policy is frozen in a set of egocentric values that is an extension of domestic self-interest attitudes based on an inflexible belief in the superiority of the free-enterprise system and what Americans are wont to call the "good life." Decisionmaking is an ad hoc process erroneously termed pragmatic. American foreign policy places economic advantage before considerations of legitimacy, democracy, or constitutionality and, Krippendorff continues, all possible means--military intervention, economic pressure, and propaganda--are used in its implementation.

95
Leff, Nathaniel H. BENGAL, BIAFRA & THE BIGNESS BIAS. Foreign policy, no. 3, 1971: 129-139.
N&CPR

U.S. foreign policy is afflicted with a bias in favor of mere bigness. Humanitarian claims to the right of self-determination for national minorities are countered with arguments of the overriding advantages of larger politicoeconomic units. Yet a brief survey of the experience of the underdeveloped countries indicates that these arguments may well be erroneous. Indeed, real advantages, political and economic as well as humanitarian, can lie with the smaller state. The allocation of development resources might be larger and more efficient in a small state. Foreign trade and the formation of customs unions could be used to offset some of the disadvantages that might result from the breakup of a larger market area. A degree of fragmentation might also presage a reduction in military spending, first, because of the reduced threat of civil war, and, second, because military spending is related to national pretensions in world affairs. The allegation that political fragmentation would deprive the underdeveloped countries of diplomatic leverage is pointless since these countries can scarcely be deprived of something they do not have. The domestic political situation of these countries could only improve, with fewer sources of internal conflict and a generally strengthened political process. All this suggests that "a U.S. policy of not contributing to the repression of secessionist movements may be justified." Current attitudes toward these problems hopefully can be changed before the United States finds itself confronted with another Biafra or Bengal.

96
Lemnitzer, Lyman L. THE IMPACT OF THE GERMAN OSTPOLITIK ON THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. East-West digest, v. 7, Aug. 1971: 247-257.
N&CPR
"American Institute on Problems of European Security, 22 May 1971."

While Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik seems to have had few positive results for the Germans, it may endanger future NATO solidarity. The Western alliance has reacted with caution and guarded approval to a policy which may profoundly challenge European unity. Brandt has based his negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland on the position of strength provided by NATO unity. It is hoped that West German negotiations will not lead to a détente solely between West Germany and the East but will result in a general reduction of East-West tensions. Otherwise, Ostpolitik could become a Soviet tool to achieve three important policy goals: to get the United States out of Europe; to obtain recognition of the status quo in Europe; and to thwart European integration. Ostpolitik may help towards the relaxation of East-West tensions if Germany does not reduce its NATO force level and thereby encourage the breakup of NATO solidarity. "The cautious approach urged by NATO, combined with continued solidarity and military strength of NATO, seems to be the only way that Ostpolitik can achieve real success."

97
Leonidov, E. USSR-FRANCE: BROAD HORIZONS OF COOPERATION. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, June 25, 1971: 52-55.
DK266.A2R37, v. 12
Translated from Izvestiia, May 19, 1971.
Slav Rm

The signing of the Soviet-French protocol on political consultation on October 13, 1970, was a major demonstration that differing social systems can cooperate in easing European tensions. The two countries concerned have begun to make clear their positions on the problems arising in connection with West Berlin, the proposed all-European security conference, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The mutually profitable coordination in the economic, cultural, and scientific areas envisaged for the near future will deepen and consolidate this coordination. Brezhnev described to the 24th Communist Party Congress the importance to be ascribed to Soviet-French understanding in international relations.

98
Link, Werner. [AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE REVISIONIST VIEW] Die amerikanische Aussenpolitik aus revisionistischer Sicht. Neue politische Literatur, v. 16, no. 2, 1971: 205-220.
H5.N38, v. 16

A revisionist trend in respect to American foreign policy has emerged since the 1960's and has grown significantly with the dissent arising from the Vietnam War. This revisionist movement ques-

tions the thesis that the Cold War is a consequence of the expansionist and aggressive policies of the Soviet Union and postulates rather that today's bipolarity is a result of a split in the wartime coalition for which the United States bears some if not all of the blame. The revisionists see, in general, the rigidity of American foreign policy and its unswerving concentration on the creation and maintenance of oversea markets and sources of raw materials as a continuing cause of world tension. Even during World War II American peace objectives were largely determined by economic considerations, as Gabriel Kolko has pointed out (see item 1481, v. 5, no. 4 of this bibliography). Another student of American revisionism, Ekkehart Krippendorf (see the current issue of this bibliography) claims that the essence of American postwar strategy has been security achieved through worldwide economic penetration and that this, not ideology, has been the source of confrontation. Unless the emphasis on economic advantage of American foreign policy is abandoned, the danger exists that with the demise of the old anti-Communist thesis, hastened by the revisionists, ironically there will arise a new concept of the inevitability of international confrontation.

99
Löbl, Eugen. [HUMANISM--BASIS FOR A NEW FOREIGN POLICY] Humanität--Grundlage für eine neue Aussenpolitik. Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, July 1971: 32-34. illus.
AP30.E78, v. 11

The United States should adopt a humanistic foreign policy, for it would either evoke reciprocity or expose and weaken the Soviet Union. This American policy would have to embrace in principle and practice the right of self-determination, renunciation of intervention, and a proscription on the stationing of military forces on foreign soil. The loss of prestige that the United States has suffered since World War II is a direct result of the contradiction between its theoretical foreign policy and its democratic tradition of social justice. The Socialist world is no monolith, and a contradiction exists there between the "antihumanist" elements in power and a rising class of intellectuals. The exercise by the United States of a humanist foreign policy would deprive the Soviets of any justification for their power politics and encourage humanist groups within the Soviet bloc. Should the Soviet Union still persist in its imperialist policies it would become evident that no arrangements for peace and disarmament are possible anyway, regardless of the policy pursued. To remain a superpower the Soviet Union has had to base its foreign policy on the concept of spheres of influence, and any democratization of the Soviet Union would lead to its dissolution and to that of the entire Soviet bloc. On the other hand, the United States can lose its world-power status if it does not change its spheres-of-influence policy. By adopting a humanistic role in its relations with all states, the United States can regain its role in the world.

100
Malcuzyński, Karol. FOREIGN POLICY UNCHANGED. Polish perspectives, v. 14, June 1971: 3-8.
DK401.P7947, v. 14

Poland's foreign policy is the one area of public life whose direction has not been challenged since the replacement of Gomułka. The new First Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Edward Gierek, made clear on taking office that Polish foreign policy will continue unswervingly along the same course that it has followed. The cornerstone of that policy is alliance, friendship, and cooperation with the Soviet Union. An important supporting pillar has been the securing and consolidation of the western frontier along the Oder-Neisse Rivers. The two principal objectives of Polish foreign policy are disarmament and the convocation of a European conference for security and collaboration. The Rapacki Plan, the Gomułka Plan, and the 1964 initiatives for a security conference attest to Poland's consistent efforts.

101
Mansfield, Mike. THE NIXON DOCTRINE; DIVERGENCIES, DIGRESSIONS, DODGES & DELAYS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, May 1, 1971: 418-421.
PN6121.V52, v. 37
"Delivered at the Begole-Brownell Lecture at Olivet College, Olivet, Mich. March 29, 1971."

The Nixon Doctrine was greeted with widespread approval at its issuance. Advocating neither retreat into a neo-isolationist shell nor an ubiquitous presence, the doctrine heralded a realistic United States position in Asia and throughout the world. A lower military profile in Asia, settlement of Okinawa's status, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and, most important, Vietnamization, all indicated that America's international role was being readjusted to the good. Since the 1970 Cambodia incursion, however, the doctrine's application appears to have faltered. The Indochina war has been widened and the United States has taken on major obligations in Cambodia. A final Okinawa agreement has been delayed and commercial relations with Japan cause injurious squabbling. America's China policy is in need of clarification. The Administration is reluctant to deal with the oversized U.S. military presence in Western Europe. This procrastination abroad has played a part in exacerbating domestic problems and delaying adoption of new priorities.

102
Marko, Ján. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT. International affairs (Moscow) no. 5, May 1971: 44-51.
D839.I465, 1971
"Reprinted, with minor abridgements, from the Czechoslovak journal, Nova Mysl, No. 2, 1971."
HX8.N57, 1971

History of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy from 1918 through the post-World War II "policy of al-

liance and friendship with the Soviet Union" to the present. Czech independence and security have been achieved only by alliance with the Soviet Union since World War II, according to Marko, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs. Along with the other fraternal Socialist states, Czechoslovakia supported the Warsaw Treaty in order to oppose NATO's aggressive policies with a unified foreign policy front. Certain rightwingers attempted to revise radically Czech foreign policy by splitting the Soviet alliance in the late 1960's. Marko explains how near-civil war necessitated the entry of allied troops in favor of socialism. He concludes that "mutual confidence has been completely restored in our relations with the other socialist countries," while the task to be completed is "the total defeat of the ideological platform of the Rightwingers."

103
Mehrish, B. N., comp. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS. Indian journal of political science, v. 32, Apr./June 1971: 244-259.
JA26.I5, v. 32

Unannotated bibliography of English-language materials dealing with India's foreign relations with the nations of Asia. Mehrish arranges approximately 300 items in three categories: primary sources (broken down into parliamentary debates, official government publications and documents, and nonofficial documentary collections), books, and articles. Entries within these headings and subheadings are listed alphabetically by author, with no arrangement as to subject matter.

104
Meissner, Boris. [FOREIGN POLICY AT THE PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU] Die Aussenpolitik auf dem Parteitag der KPdSU. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, June 1971: 333-350. D839.A885, v. 22

An examination on the basis of the texts of the 24th Congress of the Russian Communist Party of Soviet foreign policy toward Germany and the Berlin question, the United States, the disarmament problem, and the relationship of peaceful coexistence to the ideological struggle. Meissner analyzes Moscow's policy as a blend of détente and confrontation, with its coexistence line more on the offensive in Europe and the Levant than in Asia. The main focus of the 14-point program enunciated at the Party Congress is on disarmament. Meissner concludes that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in partial disarmament measures, for Moscow is faced with the old dilemma of "guns or butter."

105
Morgan, Roger. WASHINGTON AND BONN: A CASE STUDY IN ALLIANCE POLITICS. International affairs (London) v. 47, July 1971: 489-502.
JX1.I53, v. 47

". . . part of a study of 'The United States and Germany, 1945-1970' now in progress . . . ."

Outlines the post-war relationship between the United States and West Germany. Morgan analyzes the basic factors that have disrupted basic harmony of this relationship and offers some conclusions about the nature of bilateral alliances in general. Discord in the Bonn-Washington relationship has come from pressures within the political and economic systems of both partners, from dissension about the allocation of burdens, specifically the problem of offset costs, from differing responses to third parties within the alliance, in this case Kennedy's and Adenauer's responses to de Gaulle, or from dissimilar views on coping with the presumed enemy, the Soviet Union. The author concludes that since the raison d'être of an alliance is the existence of an enemy, the major influence in changing the nature of a partnership would be each ally's perception of the adversary. Morgan suggests that a systematic classification of the potential factors of discord and agreement in a bilateral relationship would be a useful framework for the study of other cases of alliance politics.

106
A NEW CHAPTER IN FOREIGN POLICY. China news analysis, no. 852, Aug. 20, 1971: 1-7. illus.
DS777.55.C4469, 1971

The policy of China in the wake of American withdrawal from Asia is uncertain, but the prospect is for a major power readjustment throughout the continent. The future of the small Asian nations is cloudy, particularly the status of Taiwan. Communist China seems to triumph in the present situation, while the Nationalist regime is shunted aside, for no one knows what Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai may have agreed upon in their July meeting. China's territorial claims, its undiminished hatred of Japan, and its rivalry with India portend future difficulties with this growing nuclear power, whose military runs the country and whose goal is world revolution. Although no longer isolated from the world, China still keeps herself apart from the Communist world. The new relationship with the United States signifies that China's ambition is to become a major force in world affairs, a superpower, despite its assertions to the contrary. The recent increase in diplomatic relations and the friendly, polite approach to foreigners that abruptly replaced the defiance of the cultural revolution are part of this drive. Little coverage has been given inside China to President Nixon's forthcoming visit. "The only thing that Peking explains at home and to her two communist neighbors, North Vietnam and North Korea, is that China's fundamental anti-US and anti-imperialist principles have not changed."

107
Nixon, Richard M. WORLD AND U.S. PROBLEMS: FREEDOM, OPPORTUNITY AND CONCERN. Vital speeches of

the day, v. 37, Aug. 1, 1971: 611-615.
PN6121.V52, v. 37

"Delivered to Midwestern Newspaper Executives, Kansas City, Missouri, July 1, 1971."

Priority must be given equally to America's foreign policy and to its domestic problems. Americans should be careful not to let contemplation of Vietnam obscure their awareness of the rest of the world. "The American involvement [in Vietnam] is being ended," so it is time to look beyond. In today's world there are five great power centers--the United States, Western Europe (including Britain in the Common Market), Japan, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Western Europe and Japan are "potent competitors" with the U.S., even though allies. As a policy of negotiations gradually succeeds, the Soviet Union too will become economically competitive with the United States. Similarly, ending the isolation of Communist China will allow that country to step up its "economic challenge" to the world. In order to maintain a position of world leadership in all this competition, the U.S. must retain economic health and preeminence. Its problem of wage-price escalation cannot be solved by wage and price controls, for "you cannot have wage and price controls without rationing." Five years from now the United States can still be the richest and strongest nation in the world if it remains healthy, optimistic, and faithful.

108
Oksenberg, Michel. THE STRATEGIES OF PEKING. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct. 1971: 15-29.
D410.F6, v. 50

The reentry of the People's Republic of China into the international sphere and its willingness to consider relaxing Sino-American tensions can alternatively be explained as a basic change in foreign policy, as one of many fluctuations in policy, or as a response to a change in United States policy. Each explanation is probably partially correct. Chinese foreign policy oscillates, as does American, from moderate to obstinate as a function of economic, political, and sociological pressures. In the past the two countries have often been out of phase. Current escalation of good feeling may indicate newly overlapping cycles; "the task for Washington in the future, in the current idiom, will be to swing with the Chinese." At the same time underneath the fluctuations may lie an unyielding core of that ideology adherents of which believe will endure throughout time to outlast China's enemies. United States policy must be formulated with "self-awareness, realism, flexibility, imagination, [and] sensitivity." It should be concerned not with enhancing the American image, but with understanding Chinese perceptions of the United States and finding ways to accommodate the different social and cultural systems. "Washington's minimal goal should be to remove the rancor from, and introduce mutual respect into, what probably will remain an adversary relationship."

109
Pachter, Henry. THE NEW SHAPE OF FOREIGN POLICY. Dissent, v. 18, Oct. 1971: 435-449.
HX1.D58, v. 18

Predictions about the future shape of world politics based on an analysis of possible degrees of United States involvement in international affairs. The current trend toward neo-isolationism or disengagement is reflected in President Nixon's Guam Doctrine. At the same time, some decline in Soviet influence can be observed, so the era of bipolar control by the superpowers is passing. A more powerful role will then be assumed by countries like Japan and a possible United States of Europe. After these new arrangements the Soviet Union will eventually be the world's greatest power and the United States will "find itself as one of four more or less equal powers." Pachter emphasizes that any stability that will exist in such a system will be due not to the cooperation of states but to the rivalries among them. He hopes to see a decline in the importance of governments as more issues concerning all the world's peoples, like the exploitation of energy sources, traffic by sea and air, money management, health services and environmental conservation, are taken over by international agencies and boards. As governments erode, their power will drain off and flow out to the people.

110
Palmer, Norman D. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SOUTH ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 351-380.
D839.068, v. 15

Summarizes the political and economic situations in India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Ceylon; the relations of these countries with the major powers; and the future course of United States foreign policy in South Asia. Palmer notes that since President Nixon has been forced to give more attention to the crises in Indochina and the Middle East, South Asia has been somewhat neglected. He speculates that while attention will be focused on Vietnam and the Middle East, U.S. relations with Communist China, Japan, and India will become increasingly important, giving South Asia a priority second only to that of East Asia.

111
Paul, David W. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. International studies quarterly, v. 15, June 1971: 159-202.
D839.B2, v. 15

Includes tables.

"This paper was originally prepared for a graduate seminar at Princeton. . . ."

Analyses Soviet foreign policy-making process between January 6 and August 21, 1968, prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The framework of the study is the pattern of five variables defined

by James N. Rosenau as determining the nature of foreign policy in any state. Paul concludes that the most important variable in the Soviet foreign policy-making process is the "unofficial" pressure which the elites and special interests exert on the Politburo and the resulting need for reconciliation of opinions among Politburo members to reach a consensus. The most important determinant of the Politburo's ability to reach consensus is the level and imminence of the threat perceived to the Soviet Union or to the Warsaw Pact nations. The methodology used here to study the policy-making process was a data analysis of the fluctuation in elite attitudes toward the Dubček regime in official Soviet newspapers in the eight months prior to the invasion. Paul demonstrates quantitatively the growing unpopularity of the Dubček regime among the elite and the fact that the bureaucracy's newspaper, Izvestiia, was the only neutral press organ prior to the invasion. Paul concludes that the government leaders had grave doubts about the wisdom of an invasion and had to be pressured by other Politburo members to agree to military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

112
[PEKING-WASHINGTON: MOSCOW'S REACTIONS BETRAY UNEASINESS] Peking-Washington: Moskauer Reaktionen verraten Unbehagen [by] FCA [Forschungsdienst China-Archiv] China-Analysen, v. 10, June 1971: 11-13. DS701.C356, v. 10

The Sino-American conspiracy frequently conjured up by Soviet propagandists in their anti-Chinese tirades has acquired more credibility in Moscow as signs of a Peking-Washington rapprochement unfold. This unexpected turn has generated considerable apprehension and shattered the Brezhnev policy toward China, which called for shelving the Chinese question, letting the conflict lie dormant without settling its causes, and forcing China to yield without making return concessions. Closer ties between China and the United States will result in tighter Soviet control over the satellites and intensified efforts to court China back into the fold. In this connection, the Soviet Union has already been rebuffed. Moscow's invitation to Peking to participate in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was declined. Moscow's uneasiness over China's growing power has also resulted in the demotion of pro-Peking officials, including Aleksander Shelepin of the Politburo.

113
Peterfi, William O. UNITED STATES-VATICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S. America, v. 125, Aug. 21, 1971: 89-93. illus. BX801.A5, v. 125

Disappointed by the results of United States-Vatican collaboration in World War II, Pope Pius XII concluded that future Vatican international policy must be utterly independent to ensure complete freedom of action and uncompromised moral authority. His successors have adhered to this principle, which has won international recognition of the Vatican's serious commitment to world peace. Due to recent setbacks to its claims to moral leadership, the United States has begun to renew its association with the Vatican to benefit from the Papal See's moral prestige. But Washington will have to deal with the Vatican as an equal and put peace above national self-interest if it wants meaningful cooperation for world peace. The Vatican no longer needs U.S. support to expound its message. Pope Paul VI believes that the United States must end the Vietnam War and bring about a Middle East settlement before it can concentrate on disarmament and economic development, the two bases of world peace. America has begun treating the Vatican as an equal, but balks at the prospect of subordinating national interest to the papacy's concept of peace. "At present, the Vatican cannot benefit from the current position of the United States in the world, but the United States can benefit from its relation to the Vatican." U.S.-Vatican relations do not mean collaboration, but insofar as both share the ultimate goal of world unity, they will continue to work together.

114
Possony, Stefan T. THE USSR: BEYOND ITS ZENITH? Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 87-103. D839.068, v. 15

Among the political, economic, and cultural changes that have taken place inside the Soviet Union during the past decade, the weakening--in emotional intensity, not in outlook--of the present leadership's commitment to world revolution is a major one. That the present Soviet leaders are as "hard" as ever is witnessed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the penetration of the Mediterranean, and the negotiations with Bonn, but they realize that world rule is impractical. Their experience with Communist China has taught them that conflicts can occur between Communist countries and that the dream of a Communist-dominated world is far from reality. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet dispute has been the most ominous development for Soviet security in two decades, and a solution to the rift is not yet visible. Meanwhile, China has become the third player in the nuclear game, albeit the weakest one, and the game will become more complicated when Japan and Germany find that their vital interests are at stake.

115
Ravenal, Earl C. APPROACHING CHINA, DEFENDING TAIWAN. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct, 1971: 44-58. D410.F6, v. 50

The relationship between the United States and the two governments of China could take several forms, none of which is completely satisfactory. The United States favors a "version of dual identity" under which it could deal with Peking to negotiate arms control and trade, while retaining

defense commitments to Taiwan. However, the People's Republic cannot tolerate U.S. involvement in the security of Taiwan; if attempted, the arrangement would prove unstable. Disentanglement from the alliance with the Republic of China would, in the long run, prove beneficial to the United States. There would be no threat to U.S. defense capacity, since Taiwan is relatively unimportant militarily. Such action would also "accelerate the disintegration" of other U.S. treaty alliances in East Asia. In practice this would represent a turning away from the policies of treaties and containment and eventually a "repudiation of the obsolescent wisdom of collective security." There would be time then for observation "to discern and react to Chinese intentions" in a realistic fashion.

116
Riemer, Reynold A. A MISSION UNACCOMPLISHED; SOME THOUGHTS ON AN ORGANIC ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Foreign service journal, v. 48, Sept. 1971: 18-20, 44. illus.
JX1.A53, v. 48

American foreign policy after World War II was excessively influenced by the military, while the Department of State steadily lost influence and now offers but one of many inputs to the President's formulation of foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy itself is only one aspect of the larger concept embodied in the term "national security policy." State is guilty of not having adequately opposed the influence of the military establishment on American foreign policy. The arguments for peaceful resolution of conflict have been under-represented too long. The Department must establish for itself "a real organic purpose, a purpose which is political and not merely functional, and have that purpose accepted and understood by the President, the Congress, and the people as a whole." The Department should assume the role of primary advocate of peaceful resolutions to foreign policy problems in our councils of government.

117
Rogers, William P. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE. [Made before the 12th meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on January 26, 1971, at Washington, D.C.] Dept. of State [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1971] 12 p. (Dept. of State publication 8571. General foreign policy series 252)
Q127.U6R56

Discusses U.S. foreign policy in a technological age, focusing on the roles of science and technology in such areas as economic development in the Third World countries, protection of the world's environment, and international cooperation.

118
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 104-117.
D839.068, v. 15

Analyzes Soviet policies toward the developing states in the next decade. Rubinstein contends that future Soviet policies toward these countries will be determined by a "forward strategy" designed to maximize Moscow's presence in an expanding network of areas and relationships. The challenge from Communist China is a major factor in endangering this strategy. Rubinstein notes that although ideology is important as a medium for communication within the Communist international system, it is subordinate to the practical politics of Soviet policy formulation toward developing nations. He concludes that despite the headway Moscow has made in the Third World, it faces serious problems in the 1970's as a result of its involvements in Third World politics.

119
Saianov, O. EUROPE AND THE USSR-FRG TREATY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1971: 44-47.
D839.I465, 1971

The signing of the treaty of August 12, 1970, between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany marked a change in post-war German foreign policy in regard to the Soviet Union. The treaty will ensure peace through its "recognition of the inviolability of European borders and of the territorial and political realities in Europe." The call for disarmament and reduction of troop strength in Central Europe is forwarded by the agreement to refrain from the use of force to settle disputes between the two states. The treaty establishes the political foundation for future treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and other Socialist nations, and it promotes the potential for economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between the signers. Opponents to ratification of the treaty in Germany perpetuate tension by their insistence on linking ratification of the treaty to a settlement on West Berlin. This approach will not succeed. When the treaty is ratified there will be a new political atmosphere in Europe. Peace and security will be strengthened for the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and consequently for all of Europe.

120
Sanakoev, Sh. SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY: COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 6, June 1971: 8-15.
D839.I465, 1971

Emphasizes the importance which the Soviet Communist Party attaches to coordinated foreign policy efforts among all Socialist states. Coordination of foreign policies is necessary for the joint protection of revolutionary gains and to consolidate the international position of the Socialist states. "The coordination of foreign policy activity in no way infringes upon the sovereignty and national interests of any fraternal

country." Sanakoev concludes that the coordination of Socialist foreign policy is completely unlike that practiced in the West, where coordination means simply that all Western countries adapt their foreign policies to the aggressive imperialist policies of the United States.

121
Schenke, Wolf. [TO SEE NIXON'S WHITE RABBIT IN PERSPECTIVE] Nixons weisses Kaninchen in Perspektive sehen. Neue Politik, v. 16, July 24, 1971: 3-4.
H5.N377, v. 16

President Nixon's surprise announcement of a visit to Peking may be likened to an intermission performance, with the magician seeking to appease a dissatisfied audience. The American President is up for reelection next year, and a dramatic act with fruitful results is required to give him a winning position. This fact is not lost on the Chinese whose position is strengthened by Nixon's needs for results. The two most important concessions that Nixon will have to make are ending the Vietnam War by May 1972 in a manner acceptable to both Hanoi and Peking and facilitating Peking's entry into the United Nations. China's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union will also be strengthened through a Sino-American rapprochement. All that the Russians can hope for now is that the Americans exhibit their customary lack of skill in dealing with the Chinese world. The success of Nixon's new China policy in terms of his own goal--reelection--will be known when the electoral votes are counted. It seems likely, however, that the Peking-Washington relations will not return to what they were before Nixon's decision to visit the People's Republic. The over-optimistic would do well, however, to recall how the expectations stemming from the Ribbentrop-Stalin meeting were belied.

122
Schmidt, Helmut. GERMANY AND HER EASTERN NEIGHBORS; THE STABILIZATION OF PEACE. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, May 15, 1971: 459-463.
PN6121.V52, v. 37
"Delivered at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, April 21, 1971."

German Ostpolitik is an effort to achieve a détente which, in combination with a continuing security policy, will advance the cause of peace. Vital for its success are the maintenance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the continuing American commitment to NATO, close cooperation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and further steps toward European integration. The recent major negotiations, agreements, and proposals aimed at détente are all interrelated, and their success depends on the preservation of the current security balance. The Soviets have found that the improvement of domestic conditions through reduced defense expenditures and the ability to meet the challenge of China on all fronts require a meaningful détente in Europe. To secure the renunciation-of-force treaty with the Federal Republic, the Soviets have had to take some political risks with East Germany, forego the propaganda tool of revanchist West Germany, and make concessions on the Federal Republic's rights in international law. Germany looks to the United States for continued mutual support. As long as the West recognizes the realities of Soviet power and the necessity of ensuring its own interests, it will be possible to work toward a stable peace in Europe.

123
Scribner, Jeffrey L. SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP: A NEW DIMENSION IN FOREIGN POLICY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 53-62. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

The Soviet Union has now completed its latest phase of diplomatic and military consolidation and is entering a new period of expansionism. Having achieved nuclear parity with the United States, it feels confident it can renew the game of power politics with far less risk that a confrontation will lead to general war. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, by preventing the recrudescence of an arms race that the Soviet Union knows it could not win, offer a means of preserving this favorable situation indefinitely. From the Soviet point of view, the talks also have an important political function, which is to serve as the prototype for a superpower world directorate. The Soviet Union's strategic posture is still largely defensive, and will remain so, but below the strategic level the Soviet Union has developed a variety of new capabilities for projecting its power abroad. The Soviet leaders would like to resume the advance that was stymied in the forties and fifties by superior U.S. power. This time, a direct challenge to its rival will not be necessary. As the United States pulls back from its defensive positions abroad, the Soviet Union can step in to fill the vacuum.

124
Shizuo, Maruyama. THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND PING-PONG DIPLOMACY. Japan quarterly, v. 18, July/Sept. 1971: 266-272. DS801.J274, v. 18

Some observers anticipate that the Nixon Doctrine will lead eventually to a complete withdrawal of American troops from Asia. Others believe that the United States, though refusing over-involvement, cannot risk losing an Asian role. In theory the Nixon doctrine should operate to promote national self-determination and cooperative aid among equals. In fact it is a scheme for military withdrawal from Vietnam, and China understands this. Thus the Nixon doctrine has invited ping-pong diplomacy, since both countries want to see American troops depart from Vietnam. Diplomatic smiles may ease American fears at home about the danger of withdrawal; cordial dealings with

China also open the door to three-power relations including Japan or the Soviet Union. The advantage then is that "two parties can line up in such a manner as to coerce the third into following a policy favorable to either party, or at least into neutralizing actions which pose a threat to either party." Such interaction would seem to serve the American goal of preventing "the emergence of a single great power in Asia," and might encourage "normalization of Sino-Japanese relations."

125
Slapnicka, Harry. [PRAGUE'S MOSCOW-ORIENTED FOREIGN POLICY] Prags Aussenpolitik auf Moskauer Kurs. Osteuropa, v. 21, July 1971: 517-524.
DR1.08, v. 21

The major stumbling block to the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and the German Federal Republic is the 1938 Munich Agreement. Prague demands Bonn's invalidation of this agreement as the price of improved relations. Party chief Husak has complicated the issue, however, by adding to his demand the words "with all the resulting consequences." Invalidation itself may not be significant, for the Czech population is scarcely affected nowadays by that accord nor have border questions been raised. "The resulting consequences," however, could have serious legal and financial effects whose international repercussions are incalculable. Moscow's manipulation of Czech foreign policy, including the invalidation demands, is clearly evident.

126
Snow, Edgar. CHINA WILL TALK FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. Life, v. 71, July 30, 1971: 22-26. illus.
AP2.L547, v. 71

One of Chairman Mao's thoughts: "good can come out of bad," may partially explain why the Chinese leaders are willing to receive President Nixon for discussions. Two major issues must be faced: the role of Chiang Kai-shek's government in the United Nations and in relation to mainland China, and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. If progress on these issues is made, the way will be paved for establishment of formal diplomatic relations. The Chinese are willing to assimilate Taiwan peacefully and might let Chiang stay on as a local governor. In Vietnam a negotiated settlement between Hanoi and Saigon might be acceptable and would preserve for awhile some vestige of non-Communist government there. In China Mr. Nixon will encounter the team of Mao-Tse-tung and Chou En-lai; while Chou will handle the detailed work, Mao will make the final decisions. Chou respects Henry Kissinger as "a man who knows the language of both worlds." While the visit may create a friendly spirit, no one should expect the Chinese to stop being Communists or to stop seeking change through revolution. However, a period of détente would be welcome for all concerned.

127
Spanier, John W. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II. 4th rev. ed. New York, Praeger [1971] 318 p.
E744.S8 1971
Bibliography: p. 299-310.

Updates a general historical analysis first published in 1960 of postwar U.S. foreign policy. "Because, as a result of the war in Vietnam, the role of the United States in the contemporary international arena has been increasingly questioned, this new edition focuses upon this role, particularly the extent and manner of America's adjustment to the 'necessities' of international politics during the last three decades, the impact of this role upon this country domestically, and, finally, some thoughts about the consequences of American opinion on the future conduct of American foreign policy."

128
THE STATE OF NIXON'S WORLD. Foreign policy, no. 3, 1971: 2-61.
N&CPR

Contents.--Half past Nixon, by Zbigniew Brzezinski.--The political-military gap, by Earl C. Ravenal.--Pragmatic conservatism in the White House, by Pierre Hassner.

Three assessments of the foreign policy and foreign policy doctrine of the Nixon administration. Brzezinski challenges the very notion of a "Nixon doctrine," calling it no doctrine at all but rather "a continuous process of redefinition of American foreign policy in the light of new domestic and international circumstances." He finds that in some areas--notably, in relations with the Soviet Union and in the approach to the problem of the Middle East and strategic arms control--the Administration has been doing extremely well, but in others--for example, the Third World--it remains "the prisoner of both history and of its somewhat narrow horizons." Ravenal sees U.S. policy as passing through a transition into a Byzantine era of increasing consolidation, political sophistication, military parsimony, social welfare, more settled mercantilism, and executive centralization. He warns that the Administration now has no choice left open to it but that between "a grudging, baleful retreat" from present positions and "a tolerant concession to the condition of America's prospective long haul: the abandonment of the principle that this nation has a privileged purpose that it must impress on the rest of the world." Hassner believes that the policy reflected in the President's state of the world message adopts the proper attitude toward the European allies and the Soviet Union, but ignores the needs and aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe and the Third World. It is not enough, he argues, to aim at stability alone; unless it gives some vision of a better future, the value of the message remains in doubt.

129
Steltzer, Hans G. [CULTURAL FOREIGN POLICY AS A POLICY OF PEACE] Auswärtige Kulturpolitik als

Friedenspolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, June 1971: 321-332. D839.A885, v. 22

The German Federal Republic has restructured its cultural affairs program and made it one of the major pillars of West German foreign policy. No longer concerned only with improvement of the national image, the new cultural foreign policy is designed to establish long-term cultural and social relations with all nations and thereby to serve the cause of world peace. Attuned to the world's interests and motivated by the desire to broaden the social benefits of technological progress, the policy lays stress on current problems, internationality, exchanges of experience and information, and cultural collaboration in broadly defined terms. It is a two-way policy, for its aim is not just to make Germany known abroad but to acquaint Germans with the world beyond their borders.

130
Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey [editorial] DANGEROUS CONFUSION OVER GERMANY. East-West digest, v. 7, Aug. 1971: 225-230. N&CPR

Despite Chancellor Willy Brandt's efforts, ratification of the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland has been delayed until a settlement on West Berlin is reached by Western and Soviet representatives. The failure to achieve ratification is evidence of the failure of Germany's new Ostpolitik. In June 1970, with the announcement of President Nixon's intention to seek agreement with the Soviet Union on a reduction of armed forces in Europe, Brandt suddenly became aware of the danger which has frightened Germans since World War II, that is, a "bilateral agreement between the two 'super-powers' over the head, and at the expense of West Germany which would destroy the basis upon which he tried to build his Ostpolitik: protection by American troops in Europe." Brandt's sudden recovery from his fright when Ulbricht was prematurely retired shows how muddled and dangerous his Ostpolitik really is. Ulbricht's successor, Honecker, is a politically pliable tool of Moscow and will be used for cutting up Germany into small powerless Soviet domains. The vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Herbert Wehner, who is the only clear-headed advocate of German Ostpolitik, recommends transforming the European Economic Community into a politically open force striving for an all-European association.

131
Thomas, John R. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW. Current history, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 210-214, 243-245. D410.C82, v. 61

The major problem of Soviet foreign policy today is the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Peking, although ideologically speaking, the conflict is ironic. At the recent 24th Party Congress Premier Brezhnev "was forced to abandon an ideological context and bluntly to assert in traditional power terms the Soviet determination to defend Soviet national interests at all costs against any Chinese encroachment." He failed to receive majority support from the foreign parties in attendance, thus demonstrating the decline in the Soviet position in the Communist world. At the same time China has been improving its relations with East European countries and encouraging the expression of anti-Soviet sentiments. In response the Soviets have become more rigid and more resistant to territorial concessions or negotiations. The important question for the future is whether the Soviets will be pushed to the point where they think that force is their only alternative.

132
Trager, Frank N. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 381-402. D839.068, v. 15

Offers three possible futures for mainland Southeast Asia that include protracted insurgency and an improbable major-power agreement that would guarantee the territorial integrity of the mainland Southeast Asian states. Trager concludes that the United States must examine its interests and policies in this region and advocates a Pacific and Indian Ocean Defense Agreement to work toward peace and stability.

133
TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Sept. 7, 1971: 5-6, 9. D839.C87, v. 23
Treaty translated from Pravda and Izvestiia, Aug. 10, 1971. Slav Rm

Complete text of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of India signed on August 9, 1971 in New Delhi followed by excerpts from speeches by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Indian Minister of External Affairs Singh (translated from Pravda, Aug. 10, 1971) that laud the re-affirmation of Soviet-Indian friendship and the promise held by the treaty for strengthening world peace. An editorial (translated from the Aug. 11, 1971, issue of Pravda) praises the treaty. The text of the joint Soviet-Indian statement on Foreign Minister Gromyko's official visit to India summarizes results of the talks held in August 1971.

134
Trukhanovskii, V. THE LENINIST POLICY OF PEACE AND COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 4, Apr. 1971: 1-9. D839.I465, 1971

The Soviet Union has operated on the basis of the Leninist policies of peace and cooperation for over fifty years and is constantly adjusting them to existing international conditions. The policy of peaceful coexistence implies absence of war as well as cooperation between states in the political, scientific, technological, and cultural fields. These policies have yielded favorable results in Europe for the Soviet Union. The aggressive actions of the imperialist states led by the United States are aimed at preventing progress in the relaxation of international tensions and run counter to the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. The imperialists fail to see that peaceful coexistence "is both a form of cooperation between states with different social systems and a form of struggle between them."

135
Trukhanovskii, V. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, June 25, 1971: 5-17. DK266.A2R37, v. 12

Translated from Politicheskoe samobrazovanie, no. 2, 1971. Slav Rm

In this period of a heightening historical confrontation between socialism and capitalism, the Soviet Union continues to build its foreign policy on the bases of the fundamental interests of the Communist construction of the Soviet Union and the peoples' struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism. The Soviet Union is guided by the theory of modern international relations worked out by Lenin, in the assurance that fidelity to these Leninist principles ensures an inevitable triumph. The aggressive capitalist states continue their feverish efforts to overcome the internal contradictions of a dying imperialism by new machinations and provocations. Imperialism's attempts to bore the Socialist system from within were frustrated in Czechoslovakia. The normalization of Sino-Soviet relationships would require a Chinese goodwill that has not been demonstrated, but the treaty with Bonn, the proposal of a European security conference, and the support given the Arab states are evidences of the success of Soviet foreign policy. The readiness of the imperialist powers to enter into negotiations on the problem of disarmament is a tacit recognition of the Soviet Union's powerful world position. The success of these negotiations will depend on whether the American side is capable of taking a realistic position. Though the United Nations has not always realized its possibilities, the Soviet Union continues to attach great importance to its operations.

136
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971. Hearings. Part 1. Ninety-second Congress, first session. Apr. 27-29 and May 4-6, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. KF27.F6, pt. 1, 1971

Testimony, statements, memorandums, tables and charts submitted by officers of the Departments of State and Defense, the President's Task Force on International Development, and the Agency for International Development to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in regard to United States foreign economic and military aid for the 1972 budgetary year.

137
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session, on a message from the President of the United States: United States foreign policy for the 1970's--a new strategy for peace (House Document 91-258) Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 119 p. KF27.F6 1970c

Hearings held May 25-27 and June 9, 1970.

Testimony given by Averell Harriman, George Ball, Paul Warnke, and William Rogers to enable the committee "to determine better the adequacy or inadequacy of existing [U.S.] policies and what the alternatives to such policies are." The testimony concentrates on the President's message to Congress, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's--A New Strategy for Peace, and explores in detail the assumptions and premises of U.S. foreign policy with respect to Southeast Asia, Soviet-American relations, Sino-American relations, European security, and arms control and disarmament. Paul Warnke contends that the most important current development on the international scene is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

138
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA FOR THE SEVENTIES. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970 [i.e. 1971] 361 p. KF27.F625 1970c

Hearings held Mar. 17-Dec. 3, 1970.

Testimony from academics, Government officials, journalists, and labor leaders to determine whether or not adequate solutions have been formulated or are being formulated in connection with future U.S.-African relations. The hearings include statements by Franklin Williams, William Attwood, Elliott Skinner, Victor G. Reuther, Oliver S. Crosby, William E. Lang, Carl T. Rowan, and Charles W. Yost. Tables including presentation of the total value of U.S. direct investment in Africa by region are given. An article by Ruth S. Morgenthau entitled "Africa in the 1980's" is appended.

139
Vladimirov, IU. SOVIET-FRENCH COOPERATION: STEADY PROGRESS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1971: 69-71. D839.I465, 1971

Since 1965, when the foreign ministers of the two states first exchanged visits, Soviet-French relations have been advancing along a new road.

Soviet-French cooperation is a significant factor in maintaining European and international security. Both states are pledged to cooperate to achieve East-West détente. Following the 24th Party Congress, Maurice Schumann and the Soviet leaders held talks in Moscow under the Protocol of October 13, 1970 which provides for regular meetings between foreign ministers. The discussions focused on European problems, the four-power talks on Berlin, and the preparations for an all-European conference and a five-power nuclear disarmament conference. A settlement of the Middle East situation and further economic and trade cooperation between the two nations were also considered. The results of this meeting have attracted much attention to the upcoming Soviet visit to France in November 1971 and guarantee that prospects for continuing Soviet-French cooperation are good.

140
Wagner, Wolfgang. [THE BERLIN PROBLEMS AS THE CARDINAL POINT FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN WEST AND EAST IN EUROPE. THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS OF GERMAN OSTPOLITIK] Das Berlin-Problem als Angelpunkt eines Ausgleichs zwischen West und Ost in Europa. Die Berlin-Verhandlungen und die Aussichten der deutschen Ostpolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, June 10, 1971: 375-382.
D839.E86, v. 26

Although the Soviet Union appears ready to meet many Western conditions for a settlement of the Berlin problem, its concessions on the two crucial issues of access routes and intracity movements would not be made in its own name. Rather the Soviet Union would simply inform the Western Powers that the German Democratic Republic is prepared to conclude appropriate agreements with the "interested parties," presumably meaning the German Federal Republic and the West Berlin Senate. Western acceptance of this arrangement would signify that in future disruptions of Berlin traffic West Germany would be forced to negotiate with East Germany. If a satisfactory accord on Berlin is to be reached, the Western Powers will have to continue to insist that the Soviet Union maintain in principle the responsibility for free and unhindered access to West Berlin, although they may allow the West and East Germans to work out technical details of transit procedure. In view of the basic differences in approach, no early settlement of the Berlin problem should be anticipated. This delay will postpone any further West German initiatives for détente, since ratification of the Treaty of Moscow is dependent on a favorable outcome of the Berlin negotiations. The deadlock on Berlin may adversely affect East-West discussions at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and on the Middle East and Vietnam. It may also block the convocation of the European security conference so earnestly desired by the Soviet Union.

141
Whitlam, Gough. [COEXISTENCE POLICY IN THE PACIFIC AREA. AN OFFICIAL AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY VISIT TO PEKING] Koexistenzpolitik im pazifischen Raum. Eine offizielle Delegation der australischen Labour Party besuchte Peking. Zukunft, no. 15/16, Aug. 1971: 12-17. H5.Z85, 1971
German version of three articles copyrighted by The Sunday Australian.

In its Weltanschauung the new China is Chinese, Maoist, and Communist in that order. Experience counts for more in Chinese political thought than ideology. The memories of European imperialism, the war with Japan, and the break with the Soviet Union dominate Chinese thought and explain Peking's international behavior and its apprehensions regarding the Soviet Union and Japan. There are no insurmountable barriers in the way of improved relations between Peking and Washington, especially since the Americans do not evoke in the Chinese the fear and mistrust that the Russians and Japanese do. Australia's role in the Pacific should be to reduce the danger of a war between China and the United States or Japan and, as a complement to this role, to assist in raising the living standard.

142
Wolfe, Thomas W. SOVIET GOALS AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1970] 27 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-4472)
AS36.R28 no. 4472
"Paper . . . prepared for presentation at a conference on the Middle East at Brandeis University, November 22, 1970."
Includes bibliographical references.

Traces the Soviet penetration of the Middle East and analyzes some of the basic factors bearing upon Moscow's present policies and goals in the area. Wolfe contends that barring catastrophic domestic problems, the Soviet Union will stay in the Middle East. He concludes that in view of the Soviet behavior in the Suez cease-fire violations and the tank invasion of Jordan it is difficult to determine whether the Russians will pursue a radical and high-risk policy or a moderate and cautious one.

143
Ziebura, Gilbert. [GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS SINCE 1945. MYTHS AND REALITIES] Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945. Mythen und Realitäten. [Pfullingen] Neske [1970] 200 p.
DD259.4.Z48
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--Teachings of history.--The initial situation in France in 1945.--Reluctant accommodation.--Europe as a sheet anchor.--The salutory crisis of the EEC.--Phase of constructive rapprochement.--A Paris-Bonn axis.--Conflict of goals and interdependence.--France, the German Federal Republic, and Europe.--Notes and further bibliographic references.--Appendix: the Monnet Memorandum of May 3, 1950.

Analyzes the political relations between France and West Germany during the last quarter-century and refutes the myth of their historic enmity. Ziebura stresses the need for an improvement in those relations beyond matters of direct bilateral concern so that Paris and Bonn contribute to a peace order in Europe that will see more freedom, security, and justice. What has negatively influenced relations during much of the last 25 years is that France sought to keep West Germany politically powerless while West Germany, under the stewardship of Adenauer, did not develop a constructive policy toward Eastern Europe and, hence, an all-European perspective. The present is auspicious for the two countries to collaborate with one another and other West European countries toward a common European concept. France has finally abandoned its Gaullist visions and West Germany is now rejecting the illusion of reunification.

TENSION AREAS

144
Adam, Werner. [PAKISTAN AS A DIVIDED NATION] Pakistan als gespaltene Nation. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Aug. 1971: 493-502.
D839.A885, v. 22

Although President Yahya Khan sincerely intended to lead Pakistan back to parliamentary government, Islam proved inadequate to bridging the differences between ethnic groups, with the result that there is no longer a Pakistani nation. The importance of the East Pakistani secession, its suppression, and the consequent flight of refugees into India extends well beyond the borders of Pakistan. India sympathized from the beginning with the East Pakistanis, not alone for humanitarian reasons but for the political fact that any weakening of Pakistan is advantageous for New Delhi. The Soviet Union immediately supported India's anti-Islamabad policy, seeing an opportunity to block China's goal of opening a way to the Indian Ocean and improving its own long-range plans in the area. Peking, on the other hand, supported Islamabad in the hope of facilitating--quite as Moscow suspected--its access to the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea. The Chinese are not unmindful, however, of another option that they feel time will bring. If secession were to succeed, the crowded and hungry East Pakistani would probably turn to China; and Peking would have an even less circuitous route to the Indian Ocean.

145
Aleksandrov, I. SLOGANS AND DEEDS OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 24, Sept. 28, 1971: 1-6.
D839.C87, v. 23
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 4, 1971.
Slav Rm

Considers the increasing divergence of Maoism from Marxism-Leninism in the last fifteen years. The author expresses satisfaction that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government have not yielded to Chinese provocations. Recent developments in Chinese foreign policy as regards the anti-imperialist struggle and the United States demonstrate that Maoism and Marxism-Leninism are more squarely at odds than ever before. Maoism obstructs the true interests of world socialism and the revolutionary national liberation movements. Maoism is essentially an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet effort which seeks "to break up the international Communist movement, to create in Peking a center counterposed to that movement" and to promote Chinese aspirations for great-power hegemony. The peoples of the Soviet Union are asking whether Peking and Washington are "preparing a behind-the-scenes deal against socialism, a deal at the expense of the interests of the peoples who are struggling for national independence and freedom?" None of Mao's principles on the foreign or domestic fronts has withstood practical tests, so it can only be dangerous for China to achieve leadership in the Communist movement. While he disparages the Chinese fear of a "mythical" invasion from the north, Aleksandrov says that the Soviet Union is engaged in the ideological-political struggle to return China to the Socialist camp and to the ranks of the anti-imperialist movement.

146
ARABS UNDER ISRAEL. Economist, v. 240, July 24, 1971: 41-43. illus.
HG11.E2, v. 240

Residents of Palestine's West Bank, under threat as much from Jordan as from Israel, are "sitting it out" and trying to retain a calm status quo in a potentially explosive situation. Since their economic situation is sound, they have time to contemplate the unlikely formulation of an "autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank." By contrast, residents of the Gaza Strip resist occupation and refuse to imitate normality; terrorist violence is commonplace. Although Isreal seeks to improve conditions, despair and frustration, with resultant aggression, continue.

147
Bailey, Sydney D. CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS. World today, v. 27, Sept. 1971: 365-372.
D410.W63, v. 27

Recounts past efforts to seat the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and poses some of the problems that its entry might introduce. Should Peking become a member of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Big Four would expand to the Big Five, with immediate consequences for the Middle East talks. A Chinese veto on substantive issues like South West Africa, Rhodesia, apartheid, and Cyprus cannot be discounted. On the other hand, Bailey continues, with Peking occupying a seat the United Nations "would become the natural forum for dealing with

problems which will follow the withdrawal of U.S. forces [from Southeast Asia]." China, he speculates, would seek to identify itself with militant policies and thereby undermine Soviet standing in the Third World, while continuing to decry a Soviet-American conspiracy.

148
Baldwin, Hanson W. THE STAKES ARE OIL. Army, v. 21, Aug. 1971: 10-15. illus.
U1.A893, v. 21

Middle East oil is vital to neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, but Japan imports 90 percent of its oil needs and Western Europe imports 75 percent, so the need for Middle East oil is crucial. The Soviet Union understands the dependence of Japan and Western Europe on the oil fields of the Middle East. "The Soviet Union's strategic interest in the oil of the Middle East--that is, 'the ability to threaten or cut the supply of Middle Eastern oil to the free world'--is more important than the direct economic interest" which it has in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has already begun to undermine Western companies in pursuit of its ultimate objective, which is to "destroy Western influence in the Middle East." It is time the United States recognize the ultimate stakes involved in the Middle East and prepare to use its influence to counter the Soviet initiative.

149
Barnds, William J. PAKISTAN'S DISINTEGRATION. World today, v. 27, Aug. 1971: 319-329.
D410.W63, v. 27

The December 1970 Pakistan elections and the ensuing chaos demonstrated that religious unity is an inadequate foundation for statehood when not accompanied by economic and cultural equity. Although President Yahya was ready to tolerate a considerable degree of autonomy, his own concept of national integrity, East Bengali intransigence, and the west-wing party leader Bhutto's obstinacy born of ambition doomed any peaceful settlement. Government forces put down the revolt with dispatch, using terror to offset numerical inferiority amidst a hostile population. Yahya's regime is now faced with four major tasks, which taken together may be impossible of solution: elimination of the resistance remnants, restoration of administrative services, selection of mutually acceptable Bengali leaders, and maintenance of a firm power base in West Pakistan. The result will most likely be a stalemate, with the Bengalis remaining unreconciled to West Pakistani rule but unable to do anything about it. India is confronted with the dilemma of suffering an indefinite presence of West Pakistani military forces in the volatile eastern part of the subcontinent or risking the perils that intervention entails. The Soviet Union has endeavored to restrain both Pakistan and India, whereas China has openly supported the Yahya regime. American ambivalence on continuing its military aid brought in return a Pakistani threat to seek that aid in Peking.

150
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [TWO LEVELS OF SOVIET NEAR EAST POLICY] Zwei Ebenen sowjetischer Nahostpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, June 1971: 317-320.
D839.A885, v. 22

The Russians are plying two levels of policy in Egypt. On the one hand, they are supporting Arab nationalism; on the other, they are grooming selected Arab politicians to assist in the long-range conversion of the Islamic Middle East to communism. They are doing the first to participate in an anticolonial confrontation with the West and the second in support of long-term ideological aims. This two-level policy was demonstrated in the Sabri-Sadat affair. For the Soviet Union Sabri was the most important man in Egypt. He mirrored perfectly the Communist line, unlike the victorious Sadat, who carefully differentiates between the coincidental identification of foreign policy and military goals and foreign ideological penetration into Egypt's domestic politics. Sadat needs the Russians, nevertheless, and they need him. He has committed himself to a reopening of the Suez Canal, a primary goal of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. For Sadat, however, the primary goal is to tie the opening of the Canal to a definite timetable for a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. He can succeed only with American help in the form of pressure on Israel. So great is his commitment that if he fails, he will fall.

151
Campbell, John C. IS AMERICA'S LONE HAND PLAYED OUT? New Middle East, no. 36, Sept. 1971: 11-15.
DS63.1.N48, 1971

Reviews the background of United States involvement in settling the Arab-Israeli dispute, particularly the boundary dispute with Egypt, and appraises its current awkward position between the two opposing forces. Campbell expects the Soviet Union to become more actively concerned, particularly if it really wants an open Canal, and suggests that the Soviets might have some persuasive influence on Egypt. Further, "a greater measure of Soviet-American understanding can help defuse the Middle East whether or not there is a formal settlement of the local conflict." He also anticipates an extension of interest from Western Europe and a greater development of its interests in the Middle East.

152
Chen, Lung-chu. A U.N. PLEBISCITE FOR TAIWAN. Christian century, v. 88, Aug. 11, 1971: 952-953.
BR1.C45, v. 88

There is no uncertainty about who rules China; the real problem is who should rule Taiwan. Al-

though both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung claim that Taiwan belongs to China, the Taiwanese people disagree thoroughly and affirm an independent identity. A plebiscite sponsored by the United Nations should be held to determine objectively the wishes of the Taiwanese people regarding the claim of both Nationalist and Communist China. The result is easily predicted. "Given a free and honest election, the overwhelming majority of the people of Taiwan would vote to establish an independent state of Taiwan, free of foreign domination, Chinese or otherwise." Thus two states, Taiwan and China, but not two Chinas, would enter the U.N.

153
CHINA AND JAPAN. International journal, v. 26, summer 1971: 457-581. D839.I5, v. 26

Contents.--Great power rivalry in East Asia, by John F. Melby.--Marginal diplomacy in East Asia, by Douglas M. Johnston.--Japan's role in the Pacific and China's response, by William Saywell.--Foreign contacts and industrialization, by Thomas G. Rawski.--Maoist utopianism and the future of Chinese society, by Maurice Meisner.--The Sino-Soviet split--the withdrawal of the specialists, by Mikhail Klochko.--Canada-Japan relations, by Lorne Kavic.

Essays on international politics in the Far East. The complex web of relationships between Communist China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Chinese and Japanese use of nondiplomatic instrumentalities in the conduct of their diplomacy, Japan's growing economic and political power and its increasing weight in the Pacific security equation, Chinese and Japanese patterns of adaptation to Western influences and industrialization, the application of Maoist utopianism to Chinese society, the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and Canadian-Chinese relations are among the matters discussed.

154
Chopra, Pran. EAST BENGAL: A CRISIS FOR INDIA. World today, v. 27, Sept. 1971: 372-379. D410.W63, v. 27

East Bengali refugees in India create for New Delhi some monumental domestic and international problems that are further exacerbated by the geopolitical maneuvering of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The internal problems are demographic and financial. The refugees, mostly Bengali Moslems, threaten to upset the delicate communal balance in India's ethnically and religiously explosive northeastern provinces. The burden of caring for these refugees amounts to some $2.5 million a day. Does India have the right to intervene to stop the oppression causing this exodus? The United States and the Soviet Union say no, although "political theorists have never yet had to grapple with the question whether it is interference in the internal affairs of a neighbor to dump one's unwanted millions upon it." President Nixon's initiative to China has made it impossible for the United States and the Soviet Union "to continue to carry India on one shoulder and Pakistan on the other." Although Washington did not deliberately select Pakistan, its choice of China against the Soviet Union has had that result. Likewise, Moscow's support for India is a counterbalance to offset any Chinese advantage. Under these circumstances should hostilities break out between New Delhi and Islamabad, the scope of the fighting would be determined not by the participants directly involved but by Moscow and Peking.

155
Curtis, Michael. SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 403-427. D839.068, v. 15

The settlement of the Middle East crisis, which, in view of the Soviet Union's behavior in the region is essential not only to Israel's security but to the maintenance of world peace, must include the resolution of the territorial, security, and refugee questions. For its part, the United States must adopt a firm policy, making it clear to Moscow that the Brezhnev Doctrine is not acceptable in the Middle East and that America is prepared to use its Security Council veto against a Soviet-Arab solution unacceptable to Israel. Washington, which must convince Moscow that peace is essential in the area, can emphasize, among other things, the economic benefits of a peace settlement, the potential for a greater conflagration without a peace settlement, or the lack of progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks without Soviet cooperation. Because the Soviet Union's penetration of the Middle East has worsened the politicomilitary situation there, the United States must play a strong role to prevent a catastrophe.

156
Divine, Robert A., comp. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1971. 248 p. E841.D5
Bibliography: p. 247-248.

Contents.--The crisis.--Initial reactions to the crisis.--The problem of Soviet motivation.--The continuing debate.--Bibliography.

Presents interpretations of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, arranged in roughly chronological order, to illustrate the evolution of opinions as to its meaning. Following Divine's own account of the events, the selections illustrate the general approval immediately given President Kennedy's handling of the incident, and the then current analyses of the motives behind the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba. The last phase of the evolution of opinion is demonstrated by post-1965 reevaluations questioning whether the final outcome was actually a resounding success for the

United States. Divine notes that by convincing the Soviet Union that its nuclear inferiority had caused a diplomatic humiliation that it must not again suffer the long-term effect of the crisis "may well have insured a further escalation of the deadly arms race."

157
Duncanson, Dennis J. WHITHER INDOCHINA? Asian affairs, v. 58, June 1971: 131-139.
DS1.R6, v. 58

"Based on a lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 3, 1971."

North Vietnam's 1968 Tet offensive ended in dismal failure. The 1970 allied incursion into Cambodia dealt a further setback to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese as the attackers cannot be permanently repelled without a counterattack on the North itself, a strategy ruled out by the danger of Chinese intervention. Thus the military position of South Vietnam, confronting hostile forces across all borders, is disadvantageous. Other factors--China's perception of its interests, the collapse of Western resolve, the South's economic expectations as inflated by the American presence, and the fractiousness of its nascent democratic politics--are also working against South Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia cannot function alone while Communist troops remain. "What political settlement could, ideally, be worked out for Indochina? It should perhaps be borne in mind that none ever has been in the past." China considers a Communist North vital to her interests, so a united Vietnam must be a Communist Vietnam, leaving Laos and Cambodia no hope for a viable independence. Chinese and North Vietnamese hostility toward the United Nations will prevent its assumption of a peace-keeping role. America's experience in Vietnam makes it or any other Western power unlikely future defenders of a small nation fighting Communist aggression, a situation that will encourage the revolutions which American intervention was meant to discourage.

158
THE EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS. Pakistan horizon, v. 24, no. 2, 1971: 170 p.
DS376.P32, v. 24

Contents.--Political background of the East Pakistan crisis, by K. Sarwar Hasan.--Indo-Pakistan relations: a general survey, by Aftab Husain Syed.--India's role in the East Pakistan crisis: legal aspects, by Kamal A. Faruki.--East Pakistan crisis: international reactions, by Mehrunnisa Ali.--Chronology.--Documents.

Presents the situation in East Pakistan and India's role in the conflict. According to Hasan, the developments in East Pakistan are another attempt by India to destroy the state of Pakistan. Syed concurs, noting that India's unchanging policy toward Pakistan since 1947 has been predicated on reunification. Faruki summarizes India's alleged violations of international law in the crisis. Ali describes the reactions to the conflict in India, China, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Moslem countries. A chronology of events and relevant Pakistani government documents are included.

159
Elkordy, Abdul-Hafez M. CRISIS OF DIPLOMACY: THE THREE WARS AND AFTER. San Antonio, Naylor Co. [1971] 296 p. illus.
DS119.7.E425

Bibliography: p. 245-260.

Contents.--pt. 1. The first war: Background to the crisis: The diplomacy of alienation. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: The diplomacy of partition. The partition resolution. The United Nations truce supervision organization: The diplomacy of peace-observation.--pt. 2. The second war: The United Nations Emergency Forces: The diplomacy of peace-keeping.--pt. 3. The third war and after: The third war: The diplomacy of "peace" through conquest.--Bibliography.--Appendices.

An historical and analytical study of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Elkordy investigates the origins of the dispute in the local conditions and the role of the great powers in shaping its course. Beyond the dispute itself, he is principally concerned with elucidating the dynamics of nuclear age diplomacy "as practiced, directly or indirectly, by the Great Powers, and as 'controlled' or 'rationalized,' effectively or ineffectively, by the new developments in both international politics and international organization." As steps toward a solution, he calls for rejection of any alleged rights of military conquest, the containment of Israel, implementation of the U.N. General Assembly resolution that called for the compensation or repatriation of Arab refugees, and the creation of a territorial Palestine.

160
Forsythe, David P. THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. World affairs, v. 134, fall 1971: 132-142. JX1901.W7, v. 134

Reviews Soviet policy in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967, focusing on the Soviet attempt to gain substantial influence over Arab decisionmaking by extensive military aid to the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Syria. Forsythe supports his contentions with charts showing Soviet arms shipments (1967-1970) to the three Arab states, Soviet military personnel and installations in the United Arab Republic as of 1970, and the sources of arms and income for each of a dozen Palestinian guerrilla outfits. He concludes that although the Soviet Union cannot count its policy in the Middle East as a success, it will not alter its course because of the fundamental importance of the United Arab Republic and the Suez. Soviet military aid has not produced a commensurate political influence over Algeria, Syria or Iraq, and

the 1971 treaty of friendship with the United Arab Republic does not increase Soviet influence over U.A.R. policies. The Suez is not yet reopened, and the Israelis have not yielded the occupied territories. The Palestinian guerrillas remain outside the sphere of influence of the Soviets.

161
Halliday, Fred. EGYPT MOVES WEST. Ramparts, v. 10, Aug. 1971: 41-44. illus.
AP2.R19, v. 10

Reviews recent Egyptian history and the Nasserite system, discussing the position of the Soviet Union with respect to Egypt and Israel. The Soviets "need a continuation of the conflict with Israel to ensure Egypt's dependence, but they want peace with Israel in order to open the canal and lessen their expenditures." Since Nasser's death Sadat has gradually shifted principles, seeking to rejuvenate the bourgeoisie and to eliminate threatening political rivals. Although Sadat may display a "tactical swing to the left," Halliday predicts an eventual accommodation with the United States leading to some agreement with Israel.

162
Hatz, Oskar. [BERLIN REALITY?] Realität Berlin? Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, Aug. 1971: 4-5.
AP30.E78, v. 11

Should Washington consent, in the four-power Berlin negotiations now underway, to an international legal identity for the western half of the city, the relegation of problems of access to negotiations between the two Germanys and the establishment of a Soviet consulate, it would indicate that the United States is beginning to abandon its long policy of support for democracy and justice. The psychological consequences of such an accord would reverberate far beyond the limits of Berlin. In the course of these negotiations Anglo-Saxon pragmatism has conceded to the Soviets half of the substantive issues, those deriving from the status of Berlin. When the history of these negotiations is written, there will be revealed, on the one hand, a continuity of Soviet firmness and success and, on the other, a Western position that degenerated from good faith to weakness and finally to irresponsibility.

163
Hecht, Rudolf. [FLEET CONFRONTATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN] Die Flottenkonfrontation im Mittelmeer. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, May/June 1971: 170-172. illus.
U3.034, v. 9

Compares the naval strengths of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. More a political than an operative factor, the Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean nonetheless inhibit the operational security and freedom of movement of the more powerful American units. The Soviet fleet is handicapped by insufficient air cover and resupply problems. On the other hand, Soviet political maneuvers have deprived American and NATO units of the use of almost the entire North African littoral. The Soviets are now seeking naval rights in Alborán and Malta. The Sixth Fleet has been assigned the missions of access control, support in the defense of Italy, Greece, and Spain, and crisis management. There is little that the Fleet can do, however, to prevent Soviet ingress into the Mediterranean in peacetime or to assist the three NATO Mediterranean states in a situation short of actual aggression. The Soviets are not immune to setbacks, the author concludes, and a change in Arab policies or governments could make the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean untenable.

164
Heradstveit, Daniel. ARAB DEMANDS AND DESIRES IN THE CONFLICT WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1971: 115-135.
DL55.C66, 1971

This study, which is based on a series of interviews conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in March-April 1970, focuses on Arab attitudes towards a negotiated settlement with the state of Israel. The Arab world, it appears, is divided into those who want to liberate Palestine while rejecting negotiations, and those whose main concern is to liberate the territories occupied in the 1967 war, viewing negotiations as useful to this end. With many factors difficult to assess in terms of their relative importance and weight, the outcome of the struggle for the upper hand between the adherents of the two strategies becomes even more uncertain. Both strategies, however, are deeply rooted in the Arab world. Because of this, it is also concluded that a negotiated settlement, along the lines of the UN resolution of November 1967, would not be a basis for lasting stability in the area, notwithstanding its reducing the likelihood of new local wars. (Abstract supplied)

165
Hinton, Harold C. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE BREZHNEV ERA. Current history, v. 61, Sept. 1971: 135-141, 181. D410.C82, v. 61
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Presents the course of Sino-Soviet relations since 1964 and demonstrates the strength of the ideological disputes between the two countries. Hinton also analyzes the effect of the conflict on the Warsaw Pact states. His current appraisal is that some diplomatic progress may be expected, but party-ideological improvements are unlikely. Although possible, no dramatic changes in Sino-Soviet relations are anticipated.

166
Hottinger, Arnold. THE SOVIET FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 21, Aug. 1971: 4-5. illus.
D839.S9, v. 21

The buildup of Soviet naval bases in the Mediterranean could have an important effect on political decisions reached by the region's developing countries. Malta, which has abrogated its military base agreements with the West, is already seeking to exploit the situation in the Mediterranean by selling to the highest bidder the use of its bases. With the Russians as possible buyers, this poor and overpopulated island "could easily take a 'neutralist' course, leaning toward Moscow." Other countries in the area like Greece, Spain, and Turkey may in the long run suffer the same fate. The Mediterranean itself, however, is not the Soviet Union's final objective. The region represents "merely a way-station along a route of penetration which runs through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea and on to the Indian Ocean." One solution to Soviet expansionism is more active economic assistance from Europe. A prosperous Mediterranean might become an unrewarding political objective for Moscow.

167
[Kimche, Jon] ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS--NEW DIRECTIONS. New Middle East, no, 35, Aug. 1971: 3-5. DS63.1.N48, 1971

Emphasizes "Great Power exploitation" of Palestinian issues as a key factor delaying settlement of the problem. Chronologically, Britain, Russia, Egypt and perhaps Israel itself have found it convenient to avoid a political settlement. However, the apparent shift in American foreign policy with its easing of Sino-American relations has required those concerned to reexamine their positions. Israel, meanwhile, has come forward with some suggestions about partial and permanent solutions. The author points out that the "Israeli initiative" has been made possible partly by the changing attitude of the Palestinians on the West Bank who are beginning to think of self-determination and rapprochement with Israel. That attitude is reflected in three pieces in the same issue which are written by "representative spokesmen" of the West Bank: "Palestinian Future--New Directions," by Jamil Hamad; "The Palestinian Demand. . . .," by Aziz Shihadeh; "Amman's Twisted Logic," by Ahmed Barham; and "Three Bases for Palestinian Action," by Isam al-'Anani.

168
Kimche, Jon. WHAT IS A PRO-ARAB POLICY? Asian affairs, v. 58, June 1971: 140-146. illus. DS1.R6, v. 58
"Address to the Royal Central Asian Society on January 20, 1971."

The assumption that a pro-Arab policy is automatically an anti-Israeli or anti-American policy, is not wholly unjustified, but also is far from entirely correct. The Arabs themselves are constantly divided on what a pro-Arab policy is. Nations and corporations following a seemingly pro-Arab line are in reality working to advance a policy of self-interest. When measured against Arab interests, these policies are usually found wanting. Ostensibly pro-Arab and pro-Israeli policies have done great harm to the interests of both sides, for their proponents bear no direct, personal consequences for the policies they advocate. "My own impression . . . is that a pro-Arab policy today is one that would seek the return of most of the occupied Arab territory by Israel to its owners; in the case of the West Bank, this would be the Palestinians rather than the Jordanians." Going beyond the peace settlement, development and modernization of the entire Near East are needed, for a true pro-Arab policy must be in the area's interests, not in those of outsiders.

169
Konzelmann, Gerhard. [NO ONE SPEAKS OF PEACE. BETWEEN THE FRONTS IN THE NEAR EAST] Vom Frieden redet keiner. Zwischen den Fronten im Nahen Osten. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt [1971] 270 p. illus. DS119.7.K63

Contents.--Ambitious goals.--The extreme left of the PLO.--Hussein holds his ground.--Al Fatah, the "upright" commandos.--Palestine for the Palestinians.--George Habbash declares war on America.--Syria on the sidelines.--The national socialists.--Financial backers of the revolution.--I, Abdel Nasser, am not the Pétain of Egypt.--Iraq: a government fights for its existence.--The faces of America in the Arab world.--Abdel Nasser strikes out on his own.--Half-time in Arabia.

Interviews and off-the-record conversations with leading Arab personalities on the subjects of the Arab-Israeli conflict and their own internal dissensions. The author, a member of a German news team, reports the aims of the various Resistance groups and the official positions of the governments involved and recounts his own experiences in the chief Arab capitals.

170
Palmer, Norman D. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN. Current history, v. 61, Sept. 1971: 148-153. D410.C82, v. 61
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Overview of the current situation in the "Asian triangle" formed by China, India, and Pakistan, with some historical explanation of its evolution. Palmer suggests that "China seems to be interested in using Pakistan as a counterweight to India, and in exploiting intraregional rivalries and differences." He comments that tensions will continue to be strong and that shooting is possible in this uncertain atmosphere. China will be watching for ways to "take advantage of India's distress."

171
Prlja, Aleksandar. ARAB UNIONS. Review of international affairs, v. 22, May 5, 1971: 12-14. D839.R4, v. 22

A new federation of Arab states was initiated last spring despite the failure record of previously attempted alliances. Libya, Syria, and the United Arab Republic have agreed to unite their military forces in mutual security obligations, pool their leaders into a joint presidency that will elect a president of the federation, and gradually associate their market and tariff policies. The resort to confederation, with all its potential problems, is spurred on by Israel's firm refusal to withdraw from all Arab lands. The clear implication is that the new tripartite confederation will not contribute to an Arab-Israeli settlement, but will "struggle" for the recovery of occupied land, since its leaders doubt that a final political solution is likely. "This is just the kind of conclusion that is most alarming in respect to the latest plan for an Arab union, especially since today, unfortunately, no one can challenge the realism of such a conclusion."

172
THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1971. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin; a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 19, Sept. 4, 1971: 225-232. DD259.A35, v. 19

English-language texts of the statement of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany made on September 3, 1971, on the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and of an address delivered by Chancellor Willy Brandt on the occasion of this agreement. The government's statement points out that the Berlin accords have not changed the basic legal relationships between Bonn and West Berlin, which are governed by German constitutional law and Allied reserved rights. Chancellor Brandt sees these accords, negotiated from a view of the situation as it is, as part of the Federal Republic's overall policy for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

173
Roll, Christian. [THE REDISTRIBUTION OF CHINA'S POPULATION] Die Umverteilung der Bevölkerung Chinas. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, July 1971: 435-440. D839.A885, v. 22

The greatest problem for the People's Republic of China is the population growth that totals 15 to 20 million annually. While it is customary to give China's population as 700 million, the figure in reality is far closer to 800 million. Comparison of the official figures for the 1953 census with those recently tallied for individual provinces makes it clear that a massive redistribution of population has been taking place to shift the population balance and increase the population density in the border provinces. For example, the population of Sinkiang rose from 4.8 million in 1953 to 8 million in 1970 and that of Kirin from 11.3 million to 20 million. This redistribution is a measure to secure the border areas against the Soviet Union.

174
Schloss, Rolf W. [MOSCOW'S GLOBAL, STRATEGIC ADVANCE] Moskaus globalstrategischer Vormarsch. Schweizer Rundschau, v. 70, July/Aug. 1971: 273-276. AP32.S5, v. 70

The Soviet weapon and military infrastructure buildup in the United Arab Republic is out of proportion to Egyptian requirements in the Israeli confrontation and indicates the real intent of Soviet policy in the Middle East: an expansion of political and military influence along the northern littoral of the Mediterraenan and into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. America's long preoccupation with Vietnam and Western Europe's euphoria over détente can be blamed for their failure to foresee and defeat the Soviet strategy. It now remains to be seen whether the belated augmentation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet will suffice to deter further realization of Soviet ambitions in the area. Verification of Soviet determination may be found in the obstinacy with which the Soviet Union meets American proposals for a settlement of Arab-Israeli differences.

175
Schofield, B. B. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN OCEANS. Revue militaire générale; general military review, July 1971: 186-195. U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in French and German.

Soviet maritime expansion, the closing of the Suez Canal, and the steady increase in world trade have made the great ocean areas of the southern hemisphere strategically important. Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf areas is increasing, and it is a potential threat to Europe's vital oil supplies. In the Indian Ocean the political situation in the strategically important countries of Madagascar and Mauritius, which have defense arrangements with France and Great Britain respectively, is such that these countries could go Communist. This development would seriously affect the strategic situation in the whole area. The major maritime countries involved in the region, including Great Britain, France, New Zealand, and Australia, ought to get together to discuss the security of the southern ocean regions and to coordinate measures for their defense.

176
Schütze, Walter. [THE MAGHREB IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD OF FORCES] Der Maghreb im internationalen Kräftefeld. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, June 10, 1971: 383-395. D839.E86, v. 26

France's design to maintain economic hegemony over the Maghreb states as a substitute for the political control de Gaulle was forced to concede and therewith to attain for Paris primacy in the Western Mediterranean has miscarried. The Evian agreements of 1962, which had spun an artificial web of mutual rights and obligations in effect

binding Algeria to France, are moribund. After some initial differences among themselves the Maghreb states discovered that they shared more than a common geography and a common people. They found that they had common problems, chief of which was economic dependence on their former overlord. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are now seeking other markets and the French are finding themselves to be minority stockholders in Maghreb-owned enterprises. French disappointment in de Gaulle's grand design will probably result in a reevaluation of Paris' entire relationship with North Africa. The spring of 1971 will probably become a caesura for the Maghreb states, a break with postcolonial dependence and the beginning of a period of greater freedom of action. What the results will be for the Mediterranean area and its relations with Western Europe cannot be anticipated.

177
Serong, F. P. THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. New York, National Strategy Information Center [1971] 67 p. (Strategy papers, no. 8)
DS557.A68S65

Contents.--Introduction.--The terminal phases of the war.--South Vietnam-United States relations.--South Vietnam and her neighbors.--South Vietnam's relations with North Vietnam.--Internal political pressures.--Resources and management.--The frontier.--Strategic posture.--Building the new Vietnam.

Weighs the problems and prospects for South Vietnam in the postwar period. Brigadier Serong believes that the Vietnam War is over, but has not been won by either side. He envisions political and economic development taking place in a situation of "continuing hostile operations in Laos and Vietnam; an unnegotiated end to the actual shooting; and an imminent possibility of further outbreaks launched, inspired, or supported from Hanoi."

178
Sibirzev, IU. [EUROPE'S ACUTE PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED] Die akuten Probleme Europas sind lösbar. Sowjetunion heute (Vienna) v. 17, Aug. 1, 1971: 26-27. DK266.A2S784, v. 17

Europe's political barometer indicates a decided thaw in relations between East and West. Contributing to this favorable climate have been the improvement in Franco-Soviet relations, the signing of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, the Soviet-initiated four-power talks on Berlin, discussions by representatives of the two Germanys on questions of interstate traffic, and West German-Czech negotiations to invalidate the Munich Agreement. The negative position of the United States beclouds an otherwise politically favorable horizon. Washington fears that a relaxation of tensions will strengthen the centrifugal forces acting in Western Europe and exclude American participation in the solution of European problems. American business interests fear that an era of détente will weaken their hold on the European economy. Among the problems urgently awaiting solution are the reduction of forces in Central Europe, a general European security agreement, international legal normalization of relations between the two Germanys, ratification of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw by the Federal Republic, and the final renunciation of the Munich Agreement. The Soviet Union maintains that these problems can be solved parallelly and concurrently without preconditions and artificially relating one problem with another.

179
Singh, Lalita P. [THE THREE HIMALAYAN KINGDOMS IN THE TENSE AREA BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA] Die drei Himalaja-Königreiche im Spannungsfeld zwischen Indien und China. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, May 25, 1971: 363-374. D839.E86, v. 26
Bibliographical references.

Recounts the efforts of the strategically located kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim to extricate themselves from the suzerainty India has been exercising since the British withdrawal. At that time these three buffer states relinquished varying degrees of their autonomy, especially in the fields of foreign affairs and defense, in treaties with India. By its astute political maneuvering between India and China, Nepal has won completely independent status, prestige in the international community, development assistance, and a seat in the United Nations. Bhutan and Sikkim likewise are seeking greater international recognition and the economic aid that accompanies it. India will be forced to grant concessions to these two states, Singh concludes, but it will nonetheless continue to exercise decisive influence in spite of countervailing Communist Chinese efforts.

180
Stern, Sol. MY JEWISH PROBLEM--AND OURS. Ramparts, v. 10, Aug. 1971: 31-40. illus.
AP2.R19, v. 10

Examines the background of current Arab and Israeli positions and explains how the International Left has shifted from defense of Jewish nationalism to advocacy of Palestinian democracy. "Instead of seeing the Palestine-Israel struggle as a tragic and destructive struggle between two nations fighting over the same turf," the leftists describe the Palestinians as anti-imperialistic and the Zionists as lackeys of imperialism. Stern attempts to present a clearer perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to emphasize the revolutionary nature of early Israeli nationalism. He also analyzes the division of feeling between Jewish radicals and conservatives in America.

181
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East. THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second

session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 383 p. KF27.F6485 1970
Hearings held July 21-30, 1970.

Testimony from scholars and representatives of interested organizations and the business community on the Near East conflict. The background, Arab and Israeli views (and differing opinions within those views), importance of the Palestinians and the role of the guerrilla groups, U.S. policy and its future role, Soviet involvement, and possibilities for settlement are among the topics discussed. Landrum R. Bolling, John S. Badeau, Isaiah L. Kenen, Harry N. Howard, John H. Davis, Alvin Cottrell, Marver Bernstein, Charles C. Bonin, William A. Wexler, Herman Edelsberg, Robert I. Brougham, and Harold B. Scott were among those testifying on July 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, and 30, 1970.

182
Waines, David. THE UNHOLY WAR: ISRAEL AND PALESTINE, 1897-1971. Foreword by Maxime Rodinson. Wilmette, Ill., Medina University Press International [1971] 208 p.
DS126.W28 1971
Includes bibliographical references.

Traces the history of the Arab-Israeli War (1967) and discusses the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

183
Watt, D. C. TOWARDS A NEUTRAL BALKANS? World today, v. 27, Aug. 1971: 359-364.
D410.W63, v. 27

A neutral alinement of the Balkan states may be in process, bringing with it a variety of rapprochements that transcend traditional amities and enmities and ideological irony. Romania, former Entente ally of Yugoslavia, recently sent its defense minister to Belgrade at a time when Bucharest was under fire from Moscow and Yugoslavia was voicing suspicions of Soviet foreign policy. Yugoslavia and Albania, long at odds with one another over Albanian minorities in Kossovo province, have reestablished diplomatic relations. Even stranger are the relations between a Greek military government that had seized power in order to resist communism and its Balkan neighbors. Athens and Bucharest have signed cooperative protocols, and Belgrade has furthered its ties with the Greek government. Although Bulgaria has endeavored to improve its relations with its neighbors, Sofia is intimidated by the Soviet Union and is an object of suspicion among the other Balkan states. "The ground gained by China in her relations with the Balkan states and with the United States" is responsible for this new Balkan grouping insofar as it imposes restraints on the Soviet Union that heretofore were absent.

184
Wettig, Gerhard. [THE MOSCOW TREATY AND THE USSR AND THE GDR] Der Moskauer Vertrag zwischen UdSSR und DDR. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, June 1971: 351-362.
D839.A885, v. 22

Claims that the Bonn-Moscow Treaty serves Soviet global and long-term interests more than the interests of the German Democratic Republic and so reduces the stature of East Germany in its bid for international acceptance. Since Ulbricht could not openly challenge the treaty, he has sought to restructure its interpretation to permit a continuing confrontation with the Federal Republic with the purpose of introducing conditions contradictory to the general purpose of the treaty. The new leadership in East Germany can be expected to follow Ulbricht's policy. Wettig calls attention to the influence this East German policy can have on the continuing negotiations on West Berlin.

185
Zador, Heinrich. [STATE VISITS IN THE NEAR EAST] Staatsbesuche im Nahen Osten. Wehrkunde, v. 20, July 1971: 337-340.
U3.W396, v. 20

Secretary of State Rogers' Egyptian mission was destined to fail, despite the advantages for the Soviet Union of a reopening of the Suez Canal and Sadat's receptivity. President Podgorny's subsequent state visit to Cairo ensured its failure. For the Soviet Union, the Arab-Israeli conflict is only a means to the realization of a strategic goal: neutralizing the U.S. Sixth Fleet and securing the Mediterranean, the southern flank of the Soviet Union. That goal cannot, however, be achieved until the Soviets have air parity, if not superiority, in the area. To offset the Mediterranean squadron's lack of aircraft carriers, the Soviets are establishing a massive network of air bases and facilities in Egypt. The Soviet Union has, therefore, no interest in a solution to the Middle East conflict and prefers to let the conflict simmer just below the threshold of confrontation until the air power buildup is completed. At that time the comforting thought that neither superpower will risk a confrontation in the Middle East may prove false. Although the U.S. Defense Department is aware of this Soviet strategy and its implications, the State Department mysteriously fails to perceive it. Even should Sadat be amenable, he remains in power at the sufferance of his benefactors. In the meantime, Israel continues to bolster its military efficiency and looks to a perilous future. It is not just Israel's fate that is at stake.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

186
Ahmad, Eqbal. THE THEORY AND FALLACIES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY. Nation, v. 213, Aug. 2, 1971: 70-85. illus. AP2.N2, v. 213

Counterinsurgency, defined as a "multifaceted assault against organized revolutions," is practiced by the United States in Vietnam and elsewhere. There are two major models of attack--the "conventional establishment" and the "liberal reformist." The former prefers the traditional tactics of large troop deployments, massive civilian displacements, large military fortifications, free-fire zones, and set battles. The liberal reformist provides counterinsurgency with its doctrine by speaking of "freedom" and "self-determination" and employing "mercenaries, psychological warfare, counter-terror, and above all pacification." Because the success of the revolution depends ultimately on the support of a majority of the population, counterinsurgency should win people away from the revolution; in practice, however, it often makes more enemies than friends. "More than ever before, pacification now stands for massive reprisals and regimentation of the population." It is the civilian who suffers from totalitarian controls, relocation, bombing, napalm and defoliation. The pursuit of counterinsurgency also has serious consequences for the practitioner. It "erodes the democratic processes," reinforces the executive and secret services, and ultimately "politicizes the military and encourages its intrusion into civilian life."

187
Cherednichenko, M. [BASIC FEATURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR] Grundzüge der Entwicklung der sowjetischen Kriegskunst nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, v. 10, no. 4, 1971: 389-403. D25.Z4, v. 10

"This essay is a slightly abbreviated translation of M. Cherednichenko's contribution . . . taken from Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6, 1970: 19-30." RC970.V55, 1970

Traces Soviet military thought and strategy since World War II on the conventional and nuclear forces of Soviet ground, naval, air, air defense, and missile units. The author divides the period under discussion into prenuclear (1945-1953) and nuclear phases (1954-present) and stresses and exemplifies the changes in strategy and tactics resulting from modern technology. "In the determination of the methods for carrying on general nuclear war, Soviet strategy is guided by the fundamental concept that the military, political, and strategic goals of such a war can be attained only through the elimination of the defense economy potential of the aggressor, the disorganization of his command system, the destruction of his strategic nuclear resources, and the simultaneous shattering of his armed forces in the shortest order." Massive nuclear strikes by the strategic missile units, nuclear submarines, and the long-range bombing forces will be decisive in such a war. Soviet military science, the author concludes, has kept pace with scientific and technological progress, although the day of the pushbutton war has not yet arrived and strategy has not been replaced by purely technical procedures.

188
Mikheev, V. APOLOGISTS OF IMPERIALIST WAR. New times, no. 39, Sept. 1971: 18-20. illus. D839.N483, 1971

While a careful analysis of history will prove that wars are "caused by the striving of the exploiting propertied classes to increase their wealth, to strengthen their power, and to suppress the national-liberation and revolutionary movements," the American imperialists claim that war is firmly rooted in human nature. The most recent imperialist interpretation of the cause of war, that by Ralph K. White in his book Nobody Wanted War, stresses its essentially psychological nature. White claims wars begin because neither side is realistic in its perception of what is in the other's mind. The real cause of war, however, lies in the capitalist system of production and in the greedy pursuit of profit by the military-industrial complex. Imperialist politicians have sought to cover up the real war makers by raising the entirely mythical "Soviet threat" to justify their continued financing of military industries.

189
THE WARS YOU DON'T HEAR ABOUT. Economist, v. 240, Aug. 7, 1971: 16-17. illus. HG11.E2, v. 240

Points out several enduring but unpublicized military actions or wars with "a specific and recognizable aim." Included are clashes in Chad, Southern Sudan, Dhofar, Burma, Thailand and Malaysia, and the Philippines. "There are fashions in wars," and some seemingly interminable conflicts become boring to reporters and editors.

WEAPONRY AND TECHNOLOGY

190
Ashkar, Riad, and Ahmed Khalidi. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES. [Beirut] Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. 86 p. illus. (Institute for Palestine Studies. Monograph series, no. 27) UA853.I8A8

Describes in detail the weapons and equipment of the Israeli Army, Navy, and Air Force.

191
Braganza, A. J. THE FUTURE INFANTRY RIFLE. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 100, July/Sept. 1970: 292-300.
U1.U5, v. 100

For infantry ammunition, NATO has decided on a round requiring a weapon too heavy for effective use by the soldier. Trends in new sporting arms have produced weaponry efficient in the infantry soldier's expected operating range. The future infantry rifle will be a light, small-caliber weapon, firing a small bullet with a high muzzle velocity, maximizing combat effectiveness.

192
Branfman, Fred. THE WILD BLUE YONDER OVER LAOS. Washington monthly, v. 3, July 1971: 28-43. illus. E838.W37, v. 3

The war in Indochina has become an automated war in which the human spirit is pitted against an ever advancing military technology. As the American ground troops wind down their operations in Vietnam, the American "blue machine" steps up the aerial war which has been quietly waged in Laos since 1968. The air war over Laos will certainly continue for some time to come because the American public is largely unaware of the massive suffering of civilians who are the victims of indiscriminate bombing. Since the Laotian air war provides real-life opportunities for development and testing of sophisticated new weaponry, the military favors its quiet continuation. Despite the wastefulness and inefficiency of the bombing, the Air Force continues to acclaim the air war for forcing the enemy to "pay the price" for his conquests. Ideology, politics, and economics are now secondary concerns since American objectives are primarily technological in the areas of weaponry and defense. The war has progressed not by a series of planned decisions but rather by the momentum of technological developments in armaments. The fact that the Indochina war is increasingly an automated war portends a major change in the psychology of warfare. Machines, not men, have become the killers.

193
Committee for Environmental Information. Nuclear Weapons Subcommittee. THE STATE OF THE BOMB. Environment, v. 13, July/Aug. 1971: 38-43. illus.
UF767.S33, v. 13

An updated summary of previous articles on the state of nuclear technology as it relates to the superpower balance of power. The report describes the methods and techniques used to produce nuclear explosives and discusses U.S. military expenditures, arms control efforts, and policy alternatives with respect to nuclear weapons systems. The committee contends that extension of the 1963 partial test ban treaty to include underground tests would have avoided the present controversial questions of ABM and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The committee advocates that the United States accept an ABM ban without MIRV at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and build its deterrent force around a long-range underwater missile system.

194
Engdahl, E. R. EXPLOSION EFFECTS AND EARTHQUAKES IN THE AMCHITKA ISLAND REGION. Science, v. 173, Sept. 24, 1971: 1232-1235. illus.
Q1.S35, v. 173
"References and Notes": p. 1235.

Microearthquakes were monitored by a network of seismographs located on Amchitka and nearby islands; the nature of earthquake activity in this region was found to be consistent with the hypothesis of underthrusting of the Aleutian arc by a rigid lithosperic plate. Seismic effects of the nuclear explosion Milrow were small, of short duration, confined to the region immediate to the explosion, and were apprently independent of this geotectonic mechanism. (Abstract supplied)

195
Federation of American Scientists. Ad Hoc Committee on Military R&D. IS THERE AN R&D GAP? In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on military posture and H.R. 3818 and H.R. 8687 to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the selected reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Ninety-second Congress, first session. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] p. 4696-4744. illus.
KF27.A7 1971a, v. 2
Reproduction of manuscript text.
Includes bibliographical references.
At head of title: May 6, 1971.
Committee members: Marvin L. Goldberger, Richard R. Nelson, George W. Rathjens, Frederic M. Scherer.

Attacks John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, for maintaining that the Soviet Union is outspending the United States in

research and development, a situation which Foster says will lead to Soviet technological superiority if allowed to continue. Foster's judgment is described as based on selectively released evidence, shifting and arbitrary standards of measurement, and conclusions for which evidence is impossible to come by. His fear of technological surprise ignores the fact that only one fourth of the research, development, test, and evaluation budget is devoted to maintaining the U.S. technology base and that there is no evidence that the Soviet Union is spending more for its own purposes. Development of a large number of prototypes, the Soviet practice, is not synonymous with technological advance, but can instead mean considerable waste. The primary source of technological surprise has been research and development by the Americans, whose intense drive to stay ahead of the Soviet Union has ensured that developments feared in the arms race actually occur. Foster equates Soviet spending with Soviet progress. Even if the Soviets were catching up with the United States, it would be far more difficult for them to gain superiority. Foster ignores the relevance of the unmistakable U.S. lead in related civilian fields like computer technology. Comparison of the numbers of scientists and engineers produced by the United States and the Soviet Union is not enough. The quality of training, organization, and research facilities must also be taken into account.

196
Franz, Herbert. [NAVAL ARMAMENT PROBLEMS IN THE 1970'S] Marinerüstungsprobleme der 70er Jahre. Marine Rundschau, v. 68, Mar. 1971: 133-145.
V3.M3, v. 68

Shortened and revised version of an address given West German naval officers at a training session in Hanover on October 8, 1970.

The peacetime planning of the defense of the German Federal Republic is anchored in the framework of NATO, and the overall wartime operational command of West German forces will likewise be the responsibility of that organization. The maintenance of operationally ready naval forces is, however, the responsibility of the Federal Republic. West German naval and naval-air units share with their Danish counterparts the mission of asserting naval supremacy in the narrows separating the Baltic and North Seas. Based on the assumption of a conventional attack in this area, NATO planning foresees West German units as engaging in strategically defensive counterattacks launched from areas secured by minefield barriers. To carry out this mission, effective naval hardware is required, and ship designs must be drawn in accordance with military requirements. Here the problem is that the warship--an integrated weapon and carrier system--is at best a compromise. Naval design and construction are beset with the problems resulting from competing jurisdictional hierarchies. The West German Navy is lagging in surface weapons, especially ship-to-ship missiles and electronic guidance systems. What is required is a central authority responsible for the planning, design, construction, and acceptance-testing of warships in order to meet effectively the demands of the NATO mission.

197
Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Abteilung Wehrtechnik. [ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, 1969 AND 1970] Jahresbericht der Wehrtechnik, 1969 und 1970. [Bonn] 51 p. illus.
U3.G45, 1969/70

Annual. Began with vol. 1968/69.

Contents.--Introduction.--Military technological research.--Military technological development.--Administrations, planning, and organization of military technology.--Military technology and the budget.--International collaboration.--Appendixes.

Comprehensive review of military research and development and a discussion of current problems for the report years. Problems facing military research and development in the Federal Republic, the report discloses, are of an organizational, budgetary, and personnel nature. The ability to support the development of future generations of weapon systems will depend on the degree to which these problems are solved.

198
Holloway, David. TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 44 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 76) U162.A3, no. 76

Interest in automation of military decisionmaking and management is high in the Soviet Union. Economics, sociology and Operations Research are also being called upon. Complementing the interest in automated troop control is an increase in technologically skilled officers, some of whom have concerned themselves with establishing quantitative relationships between military capability and security. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are relevant in this connection and serve "as an integral element in Soviet military-technology policy, as a way of exploring the relationship between Soviet security and numbers of armaments." This suggests that the Soviets attend the talks not so much to achieve an agreement as to explore American thinking and evaluate their own policies. Technologists are also considering a potential "launch-on-warning" system with a correlated military alert pattern. Although such planning might increase the potential power of the military, there seems little doubt that the country's leadership will remain firmly in the hands of the Communist Party. Of importance are indications of "Soviet anxiety about the possibilities of actually using in a controlled and directed way, the immense military power which their armed forces possess."

199
Lincoln, James B. TRENDS IN THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 40-52. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Describes the weapons acquisition process in the Department of Defense. The roles of the defense contractor, the project manager, the Department, and the Congress are analysed. Contracting policies, including the fixed price contract and the total package procurement concept; cost overrun problems and their solution; the use of the development concept paper; the role of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council; and recent organizational changes are discussed. Significant improvements in the acquisitions process have been made, but the problems change and grow, and keeping on top of the situation requires continuous innovation and adjustment.

200
Lipton, Nancy, and Leonard S. Rodberg. THE MISSILE RACE--THE CONTEST WITH OURSELVES. In The Pentagon watchers; students report on the national security state. Edited by Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970: 293-321. UA23.P44
"Notes": p. 318-321.

When the missile gap of the early 1960's failed to materialize, the United States exploited the advantage to develop a commanding lead in strategic missiles. The justification for this, the "greater than expected threat," has become an established principle of strategic planning. By emphasizing the possibility of what an opponent can do over considerations of probability, the "greater than expected threat" has brought forth weapons systems for which there is no apparent need. This deliberate overemphasis, combined with a desire for absolutely certain strategic superiority, the momentum of technological innovation, and disregard of Soviet inability to match U.S. developments, has meant, "as Jerome Wiesner put it, that '. . . we are running an arms race with ourselves.'" The history of the generations of Minuteman shows that serious consideration was not given to cost in developing a weapon to meet a hypothetical threat. The development of the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) is a result of the "greater than expected threat" principle and technological impetus. Though the anticipated Soviet development by which MIRV was justified has not occurred, deployment will continue, giving the United States a first-strike capacity. Missile refinements will undoubtedly go on for the foreseeable future, increasing the vulnerability of land-based strategic forces. Minuteman, MIRV, and the antimissile defense system will be made obsolete. Although the logical step would be to opt for an impregnable sea-based force, the Air Force is pressing forward with plans to pretect its land-based missiles.

201
Marriott, John. DETECTING THE LONE SUBMARINE. New scientist and science journal, v. 50, June 3, 1971: 567-570 illus. Q1.N52, v. 50

Assesses present capabilities in antisubmarine warfare and concludes that despite technological advances the advantage still lies with the Polaris-type nuclear submarine. Even with a three- or four-fold increase in sonar range, or the deployment of an airborne sonar capability, the submarine would be discouragingly difficult to locate. What is needed is a means of detecting at long range the passage of a submarine through the earth's magnetic field. None of the suggestions seem even remotely practicable, however, so that the submarine apparently is well on its way to becoming master of the seas.

202
Overend, William. ANALYSIS OF A DREAM TANK. Nation, v. 212, June 14, 1971: 755-756.
AP2.N2, v. 212

Progress is stalled on a new tank announced for cooperative construction by West Germany and the United States for use against possible aggression by the Warsaw Pact nations. The tank, to be named the Eisenhower, would be stronger and faster than present models and armed with the Shillelagh antitank missile. A year ago, however, Germany dropped out of the project, creating serious doubts about the utility of the tank. Doggedly the Pentagon continues to seek funds for continued tank development, but, in a break with tradition, Congress has already cut millions and indicates that it may cut the whole project.

203
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [FRANCE'S NEW WEAPONS] Frankreichs neue Waffen [by] J. Pergent. Wehrkunde, v. 20, July 1971: 354-358.
U3.W396, v. 20

Inventories new weapons and weapons systems for the French Army, Navy, and Air Force, including missile and tactical nuclear systems, and furnishes technical and descriptive data. Aside from the two superpowers, most states today must join in international development, production and marketing ventures to offset the ever-growing costs of arms production. These costs are due in part, the author explains, to the five-to-eight year development cycle required to produce weapons systems that may have even a shorter life. French weapon planners are displaying a new tendency, he continues, to place greater value on performance and adaptability than on technical sophistication.

204
Possony, Stefan T., and J. E. Pournelle. THE STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY; WINNING THE DECISIVE WAR.

[Cambridge, Mass.] University Press of Cambridge [c1970] xxxii, 189 p. illus.
U104.P83
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by Craig Hosmer.--Preface.--The technological war.--The present conduct of the technological war.--The nature of the technological process.--Strategic analysis.--Surprise in modern war.--Assured survival.--The nuclear technology race.--Small wars.--The prevention of war.

Examines the nature of technological competition and its impact on the security of nations and warns the United States against the dire consequences of losing out in its race for advanced military technology with the Soviet Union. Barring the application of totalitarian methods of control, the advance of technology is inexorable, and ill-advised attempts to bring it to a halt can only add to the sum of human misery and undermine national security. The United States must begin to exploit its technological capabilities to the full through organization, planning, and an integrated strategy of technology. It must take seriously the technological race with the Soviet Union, and it must win that race, if it intends to survive with its freedom intact and without resort to nuclear war.

205
Rice, Berkeley. THE C-5A SCANDAL; AN INSIDE STORY OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1971. 238 p.
TL686.L6R5
Includes bibliographical references.

Details the development for the Air Force of the C-5A Galaxy jet cargo aircraft by Lockheed-Georgia, and the public controversy which has grown around it. Rice believes that the C-5A's "troubles had little to do with the plane itself" but were instead "the natural result of the military-industrial-congressional system that produced it."

206
SAFEGUARD SURVIVES ANOTHER ATTACK, by our Washington correspondent. Nature, v. 233, Oct. 8, 1971: 368-369. Q1.N2, v. 233

The ABM has gained strength in the Senate "because it is claimed to be essential to the negotiation of an agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]" and, to a lesser degree, because the Senate Armed Services Committee has cut the Administration's budget by $161 million and has restricted ABM deployment in 1972 to the two sites of Grand Forks and Malmstrom. Although an agreement limiting ABM deployment is reportedly around the corner, the major obstacles appear to be the number of ABM's to be allowed under the agreement and America's unwillingness to enter an agreement applying only to ABM's. However, the Department of Defense is beginning to share some of the skepticism of Safeguard critics and is anxious, in view of the unanswered questions on Safeguard's technical viability, for a SALT agreement that would prevent complete deployment of the system.

207
Scott, Fraser. THREE DIMENSIONAL WARFARE. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, Sept. 1971: 43-47. illus.
U1.R8, v. 116

Studies the possibilities of using helicopters in a future European land war and the response to be expected from opposing ground forces on the example of the Vietnam experience. The extraordinary maneuverability of the helicopter in all three dimensions makes it a most versatile delivery system. Scott is certain that helicopters will be used in future wars, but that enemy response will be more sophisticated than in the Asian conflict. He discusses the tactics of helicopters in a "three dimensional conflict" and the defense against a helicopter assault.

208
Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. [IS THE WORLD POLICEMAN UNBUCKLING HIS LOAD? NAVAL ARMAMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CLASH BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND FISCAL ECONOMY] Schnallt der Weltpolizist ab? Maritime Rüstung der USA im Widerstreit zwischen Modernisierung und Sparpolitik. Marine Rundschau, v. 68, Jan. 1971: 17-33.
V3.M3, v. 68

Details by ship type the shrinkage of the U.S. Navy and discusses its fading role as an instrumentality of a world power. The U.S. Navy no longer outnumbers the Soviet Navy and its inventory is obsolete, with 58 percent of its ships more than 19 years old. The author attributes the American cutback in naval funding to a rearrangement of priorities emphasizing domestic projects and to the natural rise in costs. The U.S. naval decline has already reached a point where security is imperiled. Terzibaschitsch warns that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to honor such a voluntary or involuntary American disarmament by taking similar action.

209
Taubinger, L. M. von. [THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RED CHINESE AIR FORCE] Die Entwicklung der rotchinesischen Luftstreitkräfte. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 137, Aug. 1971: 543-545. U3.A43, v. 137

After years of dependence on the Soviet Union for aircraft, China places great emphasis on its fledgling aircraft industry. The Sino-Soviet rift cut off the supply of planes and spare parts and denied access to training programs in the Soviet

Union. These two setbacks resulted in the grounding and idling of many aircraft and in the purge of many Soviet-oriented pilots. The Chinese aircraft industry, mainly located around Shenyang, produces between 300 and 400 MiG 17's and MiG 19's a year. Although the Chinese have duplicated the MiG 21, the general staff apparently is not interested in high-altitude operations. Currently the Air Force has about 2800 aircraft organized into 34 divisions and six independent regiments. Only about 18 divisions, however, are combat ready. A major problem is the inadequate supply of aviation fuel compounded by a poor distribution system. The Air Force is regarded as the weakest of the Communist Chinese Armed Forces, inferior to the Japanese and even to the Nationalist Chinese in certain respects.

210

Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. [NAVAL ARMAMENT AS REFLECTED IN TECHNICAL LITERATURE] Maritime Rüstung im Spiegel der Fachliteratur. Marine Rundschau, v. 68, Feb. 1971: 83-97. illus.
V3.M3, v. 68

Outlines the 1970 developments in naval armaments in 33 countries, including the major naval powers. The introduction cites as the year's most significant developments NATO efforts to develop an effective ship-to-ship missile system for employment on smaller naval vessels, the British decision to retain two large aircraft carriers in service and the continuing British-American planning for an economical system of deploying vertical-takeoff aircraft on less complicated carriers. That NATO is often forced to give assistance to "less democratic partners" such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and South Africa for the sake of increasing the West's warship inventory should not be the cause of excessive anguish, the author holds. NATO security needs must take priority over morality.

211

Tunstead, J. ADVANCES IN MARINE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: DEFENCE ASPECTS. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, Sept. 1971: 13-22. U1.R8, v. 116
Includes graphs and tables.
"A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 24th March 1971 . . . ."

Noting the rapidly progressing technology of marine science, Tunstead compares the resources NATO states allocate to research in this area and then examines several aspects of marine research which have defense implications. Some developments are "stimulated by the civil economy and defence must adapt itself to the changing situation" while in other cases "the emerging technology awaits decisions on the part of defence planners before it can grow further." Tunstead cites advances in the construction of the large tankers on which the West will depend for its future oil supply. In the event of war, the installation of helicopters or VSTOL aircraft on tankers or the building of nuclear submarine tankers could solve the problem of defending huge tankers. Tunstead notes progress in building hovercraft and deep-diving offensive submarines and stresses their importance in future naval planning. The implications of the developing technology for international law are briefly discussed.

212

U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM--1971. Hearing, Ninety-second Congress, first session on Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Testimony of Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover. March 10, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. xxvi, 278 p.
KF25.A8 1971a

Testimony of Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover along with documents and correspondence regarding operation of United States nuclear warships, Soviet naval and submarine capacity, possible directions of the U.S. naval nuclear program and recommendations. Admiral Rickover "described clearly and forthrightly the rapidly expanding Soviet naval threat and the rapidly declining naval strength of the United States relative to the threat."

213

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee. INVESTIGATION INTO ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD PROGRAM. Hearings. Ninety-first Congress, second session. Nov. 18, 19, and 24, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 221 p. illus.
DLC

Statements from military officers concerning the "electronic battlefield," that is, "the many and varied types of equipment whose mission is to detect and locate enemy troops." In particular, the subcommittee wished to learn about the cost, operation, and effectiveness of sensor surveillance equipment used in Vietnam to detect enemy forces. The reports were generally favorable. Also presented are details of the IGLOO WHITE program which involves computer-dispatched weapons responding to sensor signals.

214

Weiss, George. THE F-111: THE SWING-WING MAY SURPRISE YOU YET. Armed Forces Journal, v. 108, July 19, 1971: 22-25. illus.
U1.A66, v. 108

Defends the record and capabilities of the all-weather tactical fighter F-111. Weiss rates the F-111 as superior to the Soviet "Foxbat" fighter in the low altitudes where combat will occur, observes that the plane's accident rate is the low-

est of all the Century series fighters, and credits it with a high degree of strike accuracy in bombing attacks. He notes that the F-111 has been given a strategic NATO commitment with conversion of the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing at Upper Heyford Air Force Base in Great Britain. "Despite the cost and problems associated with the F-111 it still stands alone as the best aircraft yet developed for night and bad weather attack missions deep inside enemy territory." He maintains that these features give it an advantage of 80 percent over other aircraft operating in the climatic conditions of Europe.

215
Westmoreland, William C. THE ARMY IN TRANSITION. Ordnance, v. 56, July/Aug. 1971: 35-37.
UF1.067, v. 56

The size of the United States Army is being steadily decreased as involvement in Vietnam is reduced. The Soviets, on the other hand, "continue to spend record amounts for their armed might" suggesting potential confrontation in many sensitive areas of the world. To compensate for less manpower, the U.S. Army must operate with greater efficiency and versatility and an adequate supply of modern weapons. Army planning currently stresses modern equipment and operational concepts that will "meet the longer range implications of the Nixon Doctrine." Such concepts include new mixes of forces and the airmobile techniques developed in Vietnam. Among the innovations planned particularly for NATO are the Tricap project; the evaluation system, MASSTER; antitank weapons, TOW, DRAGON, and LAW; the Cheyenne attack helicopter; and the Logistics Offensive Program. Realizing the need to attract recruits, the Army will attempt to improve service life and silence traditional complaints without relaxing high standards. Public support for the Army's program of transition is essential and should be "visible, audible, and tangible."

216
Wiener, Friedrich. [THE ARMED FORCES OF THE 1970'S; OVERALL MILITARY PICTURE, ORGANIZATION, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT] Die Streitkräfte der siebziger Jahre; Kriegsbild, Organisation, Waffen und Gerät. München, Lehmann [1971] 192 p. illus. (Truppendienst-Taschenbücher)
UA10.W47
Bibliography: p. 179.

Contents.--Preface.--Political situation.--Overall military picture.--Organization.--Weapons and equipment: Infantry weapons. Armored vehicles. Artillery weapons. Air defense weapons. Means of reconnaissance. Engineer equipment. Communications equipment. Motor vehicles. Air mobility of the army.--Tactical air forces.--Means of mass destruction.--Bibliography.--Glossary of terms.--Supplementary material.

Intended for officers and military scientists as a descriptive and pictorial orientation manual focusing on the ground forces and, to a lesser degree, on the tactical air forces of the United States and the European states. Weapons and equipment to be introduced by 1975 are emphasized. Wiener foresees a continuation and intensification of political tensions and a concomitant necessity for increased armaments.

DEFENSE POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

217
Anand, Mulk R. WILL THE INDIAN OCEAN DEVELOP INTO "THE POWER VACUUM" OR AREA OF PEACE? Indian & foreign review, v. 8, May 15, 1971: 9-10.
D839.I453, v. 8

India must fill the power vacuum left in the Indian Ocean in the wake of the British withdrawal from East of Suez and declare that region an area of peace. New Delhi must protect its interests in this area by establishing a defensive military force from its own resources and by warning those who seek to introduce armaments and military bases into the region on the grounds of protecting trade routes. This self-sufficiency would help India to assume the position of a dignified member of the international community.

218
Barclay, Cyril N. BRITAIN'S CHANGED DEFENCE POLICY. Revue militaire générale; general military review, June 1971: 28-42. U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in French and German.

Outlines British military history, the implications of the withdrawal from the area East of Suez, current manpower problems, and present and future defense policies and programs. Barclay presents the two sides of the conscription issue, noting that a return to the National Service is unlikely in view of Great Britain's long standing tradition of volunteer and professional forces. Future defense policy, according to the author, will be focused on maintaining European security in the wake of Britain's reduced and dwindling military presence East of Suez.

219
Bex, John E. THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL IN PERSPECTIVE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Sept. 1971: 91-95. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Looks at the findings of the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's study of organization and management in the Department of Defense (DOD). As Bex sees it, the thrust of the panel's recommendations is against the "ratchet process," or the disposition of bureaucracies to irreversible growth. The panel's findings pinpoint serious

flaws in DOD organization and management, and its recommendations deserve respectful consideration. The difficulty, as always, will be in the implementation.

220
Booth, K. N.A.T.O. GROUND FORCES AND THE SOVIET THREAT. Army quarterly, v. 101, July 1971: 426-436. U1.A85, v. 101

An inquiry addressed to Britain's military requesting, for the confused British public, a clear presentation of Britain's defense needs as regards its major military commitment, that is, its contribution to NATO and the defense of Europe. Booth states that whether the military advocates a NATO strategy of flexible response or reliance on tactical nuclear weapons largely depends upon its "estimate of the political feasibility of increasing the defense budget and, especially, re-introducing conscription" at home. "A public opinion educated in defense matters is an important need for Britain as it enters the potentially dangerous 1970s." The military should formulate and present to the public an honest, professional calculation of military needs so that the public can see what is needed and calculate the price of any adjustments in military preparedness made "on the grounds of economic stringency or political consideration." Booth elaborates on the approach such a professional calculation of British military needs might take by outlining an examination of NATO strategy from the point of view of the enemy's national interests in order to evaluate the range of possible Soviet military threats.

221
Brosio, Manlio. WILL NATO SURVIVE DÉTENTE? Atlantic community, v. 9, summer 1971: 143-155. D839.A85, v. 9

Address by the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in English on April 22, 1971 in Bonn to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. German version in Europa-Archiv, v. 26, May 25, 1971: 341-352. D839.E86, v. 26

The answer to the question of whether NATO can survive a détente presupposes a common definition of the means and aims suggested by the query. The Soviets, however, do not ascribe the same meaning to "peaceful coexistence" that the West generally does. For Moscow it is a selective means of continuing the class struggle and pursuing national interests short of general war, with the aim of dismantling NATO and effecting a withdrawal of American forces from Europe. In view of Soviet objectives, the West should view détente as the intensification of efforts to improve existing relations, economic collaboration, and cultural exchange based on the security afforded by the Atlantic Alliance, the unity of the West, and the continued participation of the United States. The Atlantic Community can best contribute to détente and to a settlement of East-West differences by maintaining its alliance and a balance of forces vis-a-vis Eastern Europe.

222
Bu, Peter. [NONVIOLENT DEFENSE--DREAM OR STRATEGY?] Gewaltlose Verteidigung--Traum oder Strategie? Wehrkunde, v. 20, July 1971: 340-347. U3.W396, v. 20

Recommends nonviolent defense as an addition to the number of defense strategies available to a state or society. Admitting that this type of unarmed opposition cannot now replace a weapon-based defense, the author claims that it can be effectively combined with conventional armed defense measures, that it sometimes has more advantages, and that it will become increasingly more useful in conflict whether limited or global. The Czech use of nonviolent defense during the Soviet intervention shows that it can be effective against military aggression. Popular refusal to cooperate and the withholding of vital skills and services, especially when this noncooperation is universal and prolonged, can force a modification of the aggressor's policy. If he were certain beforehand that he would meet this type of opposition, it might even deter him. Prerequisite to the use of this defensive strategy is some degree of mutual relationship between aggressor and defender, but this is always present, for no one attacks another without purpose. That purpose can sometimes be stripped of its meaningfulness through the nonviolent opposition of the intended victim. Additionally, the author concludes, nonviolent defense thrusts upon the opponent a set of adversary conditions not of his own choosing.

223
Buckley, James L. THE EROSION OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH: CAN THERE BE PEACE WITHOUT POWER? Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, Aug. 15, 1971: 642-644. PN6121.V52, v. 37

"Delivered at a luncheon of the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., July 14, 1971."

Drastic cutbacks in military spending have not "simply cut the fat out of military budgets," but are "hacking away at the sinews and muscles as well." Reportedly the U.S. deterrent capacity is dropping while Soviet strategic and conventional forces are growing, so that soon Washington may not be able to face Moscow in a confrontation. Since the Soviets continue to deploy ICBM's even as they participate in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, it would seem unwise for the United States to put much faith in security through negotiations. In particular, the United States should emphasize the defense of its cities and the development and deployment of advanced ABM systems. In addition, the Sixth Fleet should be modernized and sophisticated weapons should be provided to Israel so that the Soviets cannot foreclose on American options in the Near East.

224
Chapman, George. REAPPRISAL OF THE FLEET: CARRIERS + AIR CAPABLE. Navy, v. 14, June 1971: 7-12. illus. VA49.N28, v. 14

Reports on the debate within the U.S. defense establishment over the future of the aircraft carrier. Most Navy men favor retention of the carrier in its role as the nucleus of U.S. fleet operations for some time to come. Opposition to these expensive vessels is strong outside the Navy, however, and there is even some criticism inside the service from those who feel that priority should be given to a balanced fleet, even if this means imposing some sacrifices on the carrier force. Meanwhile, new carrier construction has been caught in the current budget squeeze and the general reaction against U.S. military commitments abroad.

225
THE CIA--AN ATTACK AND A REPLY. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Oct. 11, 1971: 78-82, 84. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

Contents.--A former staff officer criticizes CIA activities, by Edward K. DeLong.--A former CIA executive defends its operations, by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.

Two views of the Central Intelligence Agency--the first, a report of an interview with a top ex-official of the Agency, Victor Marchetti, who resigned from his post recently becauseof his disagreement with Agency policy; the second, a reply to Marchetti by the Agency's former executive director-comptroller. Marchetti fears that the Agency has fallen too much under the influence of the military, become too large for its own and the nation's good, and begun to turn inward against domestic "enemies." To correct this situation, he recommends that greater civilian control--both executive and legislative--be exerted over the intelligence community as a whole. Kirkpatrick offers a point-by-point rebuttal of these charges.

226
Cimbala, Stephen J. NEW MYTHS AND OLD REALITIES: DEFENSE AND ITS CRITICS. World politics, v. 24, Oct. 1971: 127-157. D839.W57, v. 24

Dissects three accounts of the causes and solutions of American defense problems: Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War, by Seymour Melman; What Price Vigilance?: The Burdens of National Defense, by Bruce M. Russett; and How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. Rejecting much of the recent material on the military-industrial complex as "uninformed, naive, biased, and even nonsensical," Cimbala critically analyzes these works which have attempted to raise "the level of discussion by considering the defense problem as a matter of allocative theory and decision." Disappointed that their cumulative impact does not outline a general scientific theory of defense politics, he evaluates them as individual approaches to the problems of defense policy.

227
Cohen, Irvine. CHANGED SUEZ SCENARIO--NOT BY PHANTOMS ALONE. New Middle East, no. 36, Sept. 1971: 8-9. DS63.1.N48, 1971

Speculation over Israel's supply of F-4 Phantom fighter bombers has tended to obscure the dimensions of Israel's current tactical thinking. The Israeli army is geared for ground fighting "west of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez." Improved troop carriers have increased Israel's ability to cross the Canal and the Gulf, new artillery has improved the army's firing power, and assault helicopters are available to land troops as desired. Israel could launch several diversionary attacks against Egypt at once, disguising for a time the "main blow." In the future Israel will not resort to a drawn out series of commando raids and air strikes, but will employ a speedy and intensified attack using a variety of amphibious, land, and air weapons.

228
Cohen, Samuel T. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 178-193. D839.068, v. 15

If the United States continues to emphasize NATO's conventional capabilities and to ignore the significance of improving the alliance's tactical nuclear posture while the Warsaw Pact's tactical nuclear buildup continues "a time will come when the outcome of a ground war will appear decidedly in favor of the Warsaw Pact." The possibility of a Soviet full-scale attack against NATO, once the Soviet Union achieves tactical superiority in Europe, cannot be ruled out. Although the United States would never permit itself to be second in strategic nuclear power, it is risking a future for Western Europe that it would not risk for itself by failing to provide the alliance with the weapons it needs to deter a tactical nuclear attack.

229
Cordes, Harry N. THE STRATEGIC THREAT. Air Force magazine, v. 54, July 1971: 51-55. illus. UG633.A65, v. 54

Soviet strategic offensive and defensive capabilities are overtaking and passing those of the United States. The expanding Soviet ICBM force could reach the 2,000-mark by the middle of the 1970's. A recently noticed slowdown in ICBM deployment could foreshadow emplacement of a newer, better missile. The United States still maintains the edge in submarine-based strategic missiles,

but the Soviets are closing the gap. Reductions in the Soviet strategic bomber force have been minimal. Soviet air defenses are heavily equipped with extensive warning systems, numerous and varied fighter-interceptor aircraft, and thousands of surface-to-air missiles. Soviet antisubmarine and antimissile capabilities are growing. This increasing power is backed up by a dynamic research and development effort which is outstripping that of the United States. Communist Chinese forces, although slight in comparison with the Soviet arsenal, pose a coming threat. These developments constitute a growing strategic danger for the United States.

230

Dodd, Norman L. [RECRUITMENT OF VOLUNTEERS FOR THE BRITISH ARMY] Die Freiwilligenrekrutierung des britischen Heeres. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Aug. 1971: 424-427. U3.W396, v. 20

Details the new recruiting efforts of the British Army in the light of its needs and a falling national birth rate. The army, which traditionally except in the two World Wars met its manpower requirements through voluntary enlistments, has launched a new recruiting program using carefully selected recruiters, modern public relations techniques, and the mass media. The program appears to be succeeding. Detractors, however, attribute the increased enlistments to the rising unemployment. More informed circles credit the upswing both to the new recruiting efforts and the enhanced role of conventional forces. The irony of the new recruiting program, Dodd claims, is that, although both major political parties are against peacetime conscription, the overwhelming majority of British public opinion supports some form of service obligation.

231

Donnelly, C. L. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THE DESANT. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, Sept. 1971: 52-55. illus. U1.R8, v. 116

A study of Soviet High Command plans to use desant forces in future war, based on examination of recent Soviet military exercises "in which desant operations always feature prominently and which receive very full coverage in the Soviet military press." Donnelly stresses the significance of desant operations in the Soviets' concept of modern war and emphasizes the necessity for Western understanding of this essentially unfamiliar tactical and strategic concept. He presents brief outlines of the techniques of modern tactical airborne and naval desant operations.

232

Drachkovitch, Milorad M. THE SELLING OF THE SOVIET PENTAGON. National review, v. 23, June 29, 1971: 694-696. illus. AP2.N3545, v. 23

Writing separately on the eve of the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, four top Soviet military leaders conveyed a uniform message about the Soviet military's wishes to the delegates. Reversing recent pronouncements on the possibility of avoiding war, they sound the theme of a world war brought on by unchanging imperialist aggressiveness. This conflict will be an international class war fought with the most modern weapons available, with which, it is boasted, the Soviet Union is well equipped. In contrast to the hopelessly low morale in imperialist forces, they see Soviet troops as heavily imbued with ideological confidence. The implications of one remark suggesting "the expansion of the USSR armed forces' international tasks" caused concern in Yugoslavia, which noted that the Soviet line had shifted emphasis from Socialist armed strength to the increasing imperialist threat. Hatred of the enemy, the value of discipline, and the pursuit of victory in war, opinions denied American military leaders, are openly put forth by the Soviet leaders. While what is policy and what is propaganda in these exhortations is not yet known, the evidence is that the Cold War is alive and well at the very pinnacle of the Communist military.

233

Duchêne, François. A NEW EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct. 1971: 69-82. D410.F6, v. 50

Analyzes possible defense strategies for Europe and probes security needs for the current age of negotiations, a period that seems indicative of a general settling down brought about by cooperation rather than force. From one point of view "Western strategies must not drop security for cooperation but seek to combine the two." Another hypothesis suggests that as civilian and political concerns come to predominate, mutual force reductions will be possible until the cold war is abandoned and a strong Europe looms large as a zone of peace in a world characterized by superpower confrontation. "The difficulty with this relatively serene picture is that détente has such a different impact on Eastern and Western societies that it may actually stimulate the dangers of conflict." At the same time Western confidence in its ability to meet unexpected crises would decline. To maintain confidence Duchêne advocates planning and discussions among the Western states to devise mutual defense. Political interaction will proceed most effectively when backed by the knowledge that enough military force is available to deal with sudden threats.

234

Elble, Rolf. [MOBILIZATION AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM--EXEMPLIFIED BY THE MOBILIZATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE SUMMER OF 1939] Mobilmachung als politisches Problem--gezeigt am Beispiel der Mobilmachung des deutschen Heeres im Sommer 1939. Wehrkunde, v. 20, July 1971: 365-373. U3.W396, v. 20

Calls attention to the relevance of the study of mobilization measures to peace and conflict research. To illustrate, the author traces the mobilization steps undertaken by Germany in 1939. Mobilization is generally the result of a sudden attack against one's own country or that of an ally, a slowly developing crisis or a rapidly worsening situation, or one's own aggressive intentions. The political and military problems attending mobilization today, he concludes, are far more complicated than in 1939, for account must be taken of the deterrent effect which demands a high level of deployment readiness, while in itself a substantial contribution to the maintenance of peace.

235

Etheredge, Lloyd. U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENTS, WITH A DESCRIPTIVE LISTING OF THEM FOR THE AMERICAS, EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA. [Washington, Conn.] Center for Information on America [1971] 18 p. (Grass roots guides on democracy and practical politics, booklet no. 43)
UA23.E8
Bibliography: p. 18.

Outlines U.S. defense treaties, resolutions, declarations, and executive agreements around the world. The members and the date entered into force of each commitment are given and comments made on its origin and significance.

236

Fox, Douglas M. CONGRESS AND U.S. MILITARY SERVICE BUDGETS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD: A RESEARCH NOTE. Midwest journal of political science, v. 15, May 1971: 382-393. illus.
JA1.M5, v. 15

Data indicate that the military services have had a "privileged position" in obtaining appropriations from Congress. The military fares better than the State Department and domestic agencies in securing budget increases from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. However, the military is less likely to receive year-to-year increases in its appropriations than either the State Department or domestic agencies. "The military budget, then, seems to be more volatile than the budgets of these other . . . agencies." Of the three services, the Air Force has been most successful in obtaining desired funds, with the Navy a close second and the Army a poor third. The military does better in the House than in the Senate. Republican-controlled Congresses are less generous to the military than Democratic-controlled Congresses, but the State Department does far worse by comparison.

237

Geisenheyner, Stefan. NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK--VITAL BUT INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE. Air Force magazine, v. 54, July 1971: 56-61. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

The situation on NATO's northern flank is just as serious as in the Mediterranean. Warsaw Pact forces far outnumber NATO's. The northern anchor of the flank, the North Cape region stretching in an arc from Narvik to the Norwegian-Soviet border, cannot be successfully defended without continuous logistic support. In the event of war, NATO could not prevent Soviet naval forces from breaking out of the White Sea and destroying the NATO ships protecting the supply lanes. The southern anchor of the flank, the narrow approaches to the Baltic Sea, is faced by massive Soviet forces which could easily overwhelm NATO's defenders and quickly overrun Denmark. The Baltic is in effect a Russian lake. The big question mark is strictly neutral but well-armed Sweden. Its strategic location almost guarantees that Sweden would become involved in the outbreak of war. The northern flank depends on holding out until help arrives. If its defenses are not strengthened soon, they will become militarily useless.

238

Gelber, Harry G. THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 118-133.
D839.068, v. 15

In the near future Communist China and the Soviet Union may be expected to continue their search for improved relations. In the long run rapprochement seems likely to encounter the many difficulties stemming from ideological hostility, mutual vulnerability, and concrete differences. Whatever the course of Sino-Soviet relations, they have had and will continue to have an important influence on American policies toward Asia. A Sino-Soviet conflict would adversely affect Soviet-American relations and could create great dangers of a larger war involving Europe as well as America. A Sino-Soviet rapprochement, on the other hand, would create parallel anti-American postures, free some Soviet forces for deployment elsewhere, and either cause Japan to become more dependent upon the United States or favor compromises with Peking and Moscow. For the United States the best situation is Sino-Soviet tension and suspicion short of armed conflict. Under these conditions, the United States can seek to improve relations with China, while attempting to a very limited degree to strengthen Peking's hand against Moscow. The major problem with this model, however, is that Moscow and Peking will look for ways to negate its effects by improving relations. The world balance in such an eventuality remains to be seen.

239

Goldwater, Barry. THE PERILOUS CONJUNCTURE: SOVIET ASCENDANCY AND AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 53-64.
D839.068, v. 15

The balance of power between the superpowers is shifting radically away from the United States. How far the Soviet Union will pursue its objective

of undisputed domination of the world will depend upon the success or failure of the powerful isolationist bloc in Congress and the degree of military and strategic superiority the Russians are able to achieve. The Soviet foreign policy of aggression will change little during the 1970's: Moscow will continue to intensify its pressure against the free world at every possibly rewarding tension point and strategic location in the world. The growing Soviet naval strength, which frees the Soviet Union from its previous geographical restrictions and which is an essential arm of diplomacy, is offensive in nature and does not foreshadow any reduction of the Soviet ambition to dominate the world. Unless the isolationist impulse in the United States is resisted, America is going to be in deep trouble. Americans should seriously begin to think what Soviet "brinkmanship" might be like if Moscow achieves strategic superiority in the coming decade. "It is already later than [Americans] dare to think."

240

Gottlieb, Sanford. A STATE WITHIN A STATE: WHAT IS THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX? Dissent, v. 18, Oct. 1971: 492-502.
HX1.D58, v. 18

The military-industrial complex, spawned in the twentieth century, is an intricate interweaving of government and business, a new form of corporation, a "government-created, government-subsidized hybrid earning private profits from the tax coffers and unprepared to compete for commercial markets." The extent of its impact on the United States economy is not yet fully understood. Citizens' groups have recently begun to speak out against unbridled military spending, but Congress, despite some token cuts, generally agrees to defense budget requests. A strategy for reducing the weight of the military-industrial complex will depend on civilian efforts to sway voters. Pressure for conversion of defense firms to domestic plants must be steadily applied and cannot be postponed. "Unless the nation is demilitarized in the coming decade, its problems may well be insoluble."

241

Graham, John R. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE MILITARY DRAFT. Minneapolis, Ross & Haines [1971] 147 p. UB343.G68
Bibliography: p. 146.

Combines an analysis of contemporary draft problems with a brief history of conscription in America giving particular attention to differing interpretations of the Constitution. Graham is also concerned with the definition of the role and rights of a conscientious objector. Although the modern draft system has many flaws and inequities, he thinks it less fearsome than an all-professional army watching over a citizenry which is being steadily disarmed by gun-control legislation. As an alternative to either practice, Graham proposes a return to the plan outlined in the Constitution with its separate army and militia and control distributed between federal and state levels of government. He doubts that a modern legislature could come up with "a more masterful accommodation of all practical realities connected with a military establishment than that contained in the Constitution."

242

Guarghias, Aloysius. [THE CHINESE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY--YESTERDAY AND TODAY] Die Chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee--gestern und heute. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, May/June 1971: 165-169. illus.
U3.034, v. 9

From its genesis within the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army at the Whampoa Military Academy in 1929 to its current position on the threshold of nuclear status, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has tested itself in a number of campaigns against a variety of opponents and has undergone a strategic reorientation. Its most victorious action was the campaign against India during the border war where it showed itself capable of conducting and coordinating modern warfare on a wide and distant front. A weakness common in East Asian armies, the internal factionalism based on personality, geography and history, exists within the PLA and could impair its efficiency in the future. Most of its three million regular troops are assigned either for defense against the Soviet Union or against the United States (Taiwan and other "Western states"). Before the cultural revolution the deployment ratio was 50 to 55 percent along the border with the Soviet Union and 45 to 50 percent facing West. Since the cultural revolution and the wind-down of American involvement in Vietnam, this strength ratio has changed markedly: 72 percent of the PLA now oppose the Soviets. Simultaneously with these defense measures, however, a new strategy has developed: "defend the North while pushing South." The opponent in the North is too strong and the land he occupies too vast and hostile. To the South there are the advantages of small weak states, a favorable climate, and friendly resident Chinese. The goal is the Indian Ocean where China's first intercontinental missile will be tested in 1971. In the meantime China is continuing its war preparations: the development of defense facilities in the military regions of Wuhan, Tshengtu, and Kunming, survey work along the borders, transfer of defense industries from the coastal regions into the interior, and the strengthening of coastal defenses and militia units. China is rapidly becoming a military bureaucracy dominated by the PLA, with military men holding prominent positions in party and government offices.

243

Harding, Harry, and Melvin Gurtov. THE PURGE OF LO JUI-CH'ING: THE POLITICS OF CHINESE STRATEGIC PLANNING. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, 1971.

63 p. ([Rand Corporation. Rand report] R-548-PR)
AS36.R3 R-548
"Prepared for United States Air Force Project Rand, contract no. F44620-67-C-0045."

Examines the 1965 purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing, then Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), in light of evidence which appeared later during the Cultural Revolution. Harding and Gurtov interpret this new documentation as showing that domestic political considerations are not infrequently the major determinant of strategic policy in China. The authors state that Lo desired a readjustment of national priorities and a military buildup to deal with what he felt to be the likelihood of American attacks on China as a consequence of direct American intervention in the Vietnam War. "Our main conclusion is that these proposed defense preparations, because they required a number of domestic policy decisions inconsistent with Mao's plans and the interests of other groups, represented the single most important reason for Lo's purge." Harding and Gurtov draw conclusions that they believe will be useful in planning U.S. strategic policy toward China, where bureaucratic interests play a greater role in formulating defense policy than has hitherto been realized. Domestic priorities carry considerable weight in selecting from alternative defense policies. Maoist doctrine places greater importance on the domestic political role of the PLA than on its purely military functions, and only a grave, immediate security threat will prompt an overt military response from China. Chinese strategy remains oriented toward defense, not offense, in line with Mao's recent dictum that Chinese troops will never leave Chinese soil to fight elsewhere.

244
Helms, Richard. GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE; THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, May 15, 1971: 450-454.
PN6121.V52, v. 37
"Delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1971."

The Central Intelligence Agency is not, as some assert, an "invisible government" acting without control and contrary to the democratic system. It was created to bring order to the numerous intelligence operations maintained by the Government. The agency has no domestic powers and in the field of foreign policy operates as an information-gathering, not policy-making, instrument. Its interests cover a broad and detailed spectrum of contingencies. Without intelligence resources for inspection, verification, and enforcement, a meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement would be impossible. Indeed, accurate intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities is necessary for conduct of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and its acquisition is one of the CIA's duties. "Intelligence collection, then, is essential to the maintenance of our defenses, but let me repeat once more my conviction that intelligence at the same time makes a major contribution to the much more attractive proposition of living in peace." The CIA employs a sizeable number of highly qualified specialists to scrutinize every speck of potentially useful information. While the agency is closed to public examination, its activities are closely checked and monitored by Congress and the executive.

245
Höpker, Wolfgang. [WORLD NAVAL POWER; THE SOVIET UNION ON THE WORLD'S SEAS] Weltmacht zur See; die Sowjetunion auf allen Meeren. [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald Verlag [c1971] 211 p. illus. (Militärpolitik, 6)
VA573.H64

Contents.--From coastal defense to global strategy.--Inland seas and littoral seas.--Atlantic power shifts.--Power vacuum in the Indian Ocean.--Littoral power or dominant power in the Pacific?--Trade, fishing, research--continuous maritime expansion.--Dominion of the seas: Moscow's great challenge.--Appendix.

Warns that the strategic balance now ensuring world peace is imperiled by the increase in Soviet naval armament. The author traces Russian naval concepts from the Czars to today's Communist bid for dominion. This new Russian imperialism combines expansion with détente, with the latter serving as the deceptive handmaiden for a policy of aggrandizement. Höpker concludes that the United States must launch so large a naval program that the Soviets will never attain parity, much less superiority. The appendix contains comparative tables of naval strength and maps showing Soviet naval activity from 1960 through 1970.

246
Hoffmann, Heinz. THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 4, 1971: 289-299.
DD261.4.D353, v. 10

The military defense program of the German Democratic Republic as guided by the Socialist Unity Party is oriented toward "frustrating every form of imperialist aggression" and cooperating with the armed forces of allied Socialist states. Since its founding more than 15 years ago as a defensive response, the National People's Army (NVA) has developed an advanced Socialist officers' corps and a technical competence to meet the revolutionary requirements of modern military science, especially in rocket technology. The Socialist Unity Party has contributed to the changing relationship of forces in the world and, with the decisive efforts of the Soviet Union, to the long peace enjoyed by Europe. The NVA cannot, however, lessen its efforts to attain a still higher degree of combat capability, for West Germany's new eastern policy is only a mask for its unaltered imperialistic aims.

247
Hoffmann, Heinz. [SOCIALIST NATIONAL DEFENSE. FROM ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS 1963 TO FEBRUARY 1970] Sozialistische Landesverteidigung. Aus Reden und Aufsätzen 1963 bis Februar 1970. Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1971. 2 v. (976 p.)
UA719.3.H64

A selection of addresses and essays on the National Peoples Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic. Included are the principal pronouncements of the Socialist Unity Party and the East German Government relative to military policy, historical documents, military and political situation estimates with the conclusions to be drawn for the NVA and discussions of application of Soviet military science to East German forces.

248
Holbrook, James R. VOLUNTEER ARMY: MILITARY CASTE? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 91-95. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

How much danger is there that an all-volunteer, professional army would develop into an isolated and alienated military caste? Social science research since World War II indicates that the chances of this happening would be very small indeed. There is no reason to believe that a professional force would either want or could afford to be cut off from the civilian population, which would still be its source of technical knowledge, personnel, and inspiration. All in all, an efficient, professional army, tailored to the needs of a post-Vietnam U.S. security policy that will have to live with limited conflict and limited victory, would pose less of a threat to civilian institutions and the national welfare--foreign and domestic--than the present, much less efficient arrangement.

249
Hudson, G. F. TURNING TO MOSCOW; TAIWAN'S RADICAL ALTERNATIVE. New leader, v. 54, Sept. 20, 1971: 11-13. illus. HX1.N37, v. 54

In the not unlikely event that the United States gradually puts aside its alliance with the Chinese Nationalists, Taiwan might choose to seek assistance from the Soviet Union. Traditionally the Soviets have shown some interest in the Nationalist government, perhaps as a hedge against the threat posed by a strong China united under communism. In return for protection the Soviets would gain the use of military bases 100 miles off the coast of South China. Essentially the threat would be a greater one for the People's Republic than American presence in the area, for China would then be encircled "by a power that already presses on her land borders to the north and west." Sino-Soviet tension may work to Taiwan's advantage by providing an alternative to American protection.

250
IAkubovskii, I. ON GUARD OVER THE GAINS OF SOCIALISM. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 12, June 25, 1971: 57-62.
DK266.A2R37, v. 12
Translated from Pravda, May 14, 1971.
Slav Rm

The Warsaw Treaty Organization has become an important instrument for the coordination of the foreign policy of the fraternal Communist parties and states. Its historical achievements include the prevention of the nuclear arming of West Germany and the strengthening of the international position of the German Democratic Republic and the Arab states. Capitalist imperialism, whose chosen instrument is NATO, seeks to foment armed conflicts to destroy the Socialist states and reverse the course of history, although the Socialist countries have repeatedly declared their readiness for the abolition of military blocs. Thanks to the zeal and foresight of the central committees of their parties and governments, the armed forces of the Socialist states now have available everything required to rebuff any provocation. The decisions adopted at the 1969 Budapest Political Consultation Committee meeting mark a further step in the consolidation of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. As Brezhnev eloquently told the 24th Party Congress of the Soviet Union, "the armed forces of the allied powers are in a state of high readiness and are capable of guaranteeing the peaceful endeavours of the fraternal peoples."

251
Ilsemann, Carl-Gero von. [THE BUNDESWEHR IN DEMOCRACY. ERA OF INTERNAL LEADERSHIP] Die Bundeswehr in der Demokratie. Zeit der inneren Führung. Mit einer Einfuhrung von Johann Adolf Graf Kielmansegg. Hamburg, v. Decker's Verlag. Schenck [1971] 335 p. (Truppe und Verwaltung, Bd. 17)
UA712.I42
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by J. A. Count Kielmansegg.--Aughor's foreword.--pt. 1. Internal leadership as a whole: Origin of the notion. On the principles. Missions and organization. Bundeswehr school for internal leadership.--pt. 2. Areas of effectiveness of inner leadership among troops: Education and training. Intellectual armament. Inner discipline. Pay, allowances, and welfare. The significance of personnel in internal leadership.--pt. 3. Internal leadership and the ministry.--pt. 4. View beyond [our] borders. --pt. 5. Criticism of internal leadership. Dispute with the criticism of internal leadership.--pt. 6. Inventory and summary.--Appendix.

Surveys the problems of leadership in the Bundeswehr in the context of democracy and the forces of socio-political change and evaluates Bundeswehr leadership principles as sound. Many of the inadequacies in the West German armed forces are erroneously or maliciously attributed to its leadership, when in fact they stem from growing pains of

a new organization. Current Bundeswehr problems dealt with by its leadership by means of education and training, inner discipline, and command information include rapid changes in outlook in the civilian sector, youthful disregard of authority, especially military authority, foreign policy changes, the position of the Bundeswehr within the Atlantic Alliance, and its future role in an integrated Western Europe. The special problem of the right of free discussion within the military has been successfully resolved. The Bundeswehr leadership, Ilsemann concludes, has given many young men a clearer perspective of justice, freedom, the dignity of man, and the responsibilities of citizenship. A chapter on foreign armies examines leadership and its problems in 13 other countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic.

252
Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF INSPECTION AND INVESTIGATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OKINAWA. Japan socialist review, July 1, 1971: 9-19.
HX9.J3, 1971
"Reporter--Hiroshi Osanai."

There are at most 1,000 nuclear weapons, ranging in power from 0.5 to 1,000 kilotons, installed in Okinawa at the present time. Delivery systems for these weapons are available. Ammunition storage facilities for them certainly exist. The very existence of such accommodations indicates the presence of nuclear arms. Some of these "special facilities" are being strengthened at a time when the reversion of Okinawa to Japan has already been scheduled for 1972. Reorganization of U.S. global military strategy under the Nixon Doctrine means greater emphasis on nuclear weaponry. "Since U.S. strategy rotates on the pivot of nuclear weapons, it would be extremely difficult for it to divest nuclear weapons of Okinawa, which holds an important place in U.S. Eastern strategy." Movements of weapons around the island by U.S. authorities indicate that these armaments remain. Because of the Nixon Doctrine's deemphasis of ground force, the U.S. Army's tactical nuclear weapons may be removed, but those of the Navy and Air Force must definitely be retained.

253
JAPAN'S DEFENSE. [Tokyo] Japan Defense Agency, 1970. 63 ℓ. UA845.N5313
Includes charts.

Contents.--On the occasion of publication of "Japan's Defense," statement by JDA Director General.--pt. 1. Meaning of defense in present-day society.--pt. 2. Way for Japan's defense.--pt. 3. Present state and various problems of the Self-Defense Forces.

Advocates a defense plan for Japan as a "non-nuclear, middle class nation" and a great economic, though not military, power. Yasuhiro Nakasone, State Minister and Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, stresses the "importance of the three points--diplomacy, civilian control (meaning that politics will lead military affairs) and the people's cooperation" to the development of Japan's "defense policy for peace" which he calls a part of her larger effort to defend mankind against nuclear war. Nakasone emphasizes the need to inspire Japan's defense policy with the consciousness of its coresponsibility with other states for the "defense of mankind" rather than for the defense of Japan alone. The appended charts outline the organization of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, summarize post-war international collective security agreements, and enumerate armaments and defense expenditures of various states.

254
Kapur, Ashok. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: A PERSPECTIVE. World today, v. 27, Sept. 1971: 379-389. D410.W63, v. 27

In New Delhi it is no longer a question of whether or not to sign the nonproliferation treaty but whether or not to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The underlying cause for this shift is India's perceived need for security against a nuclear-armed China and the desire to keep up with Peking. The strategic importance accorded to China by the United States and the Soviet Union and Indian fears that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will not immediately retard the nuclear arms buildup have strengthened the position of those in New Delhi who wish to go nuclear now. On the other hand, the case against an Indian deterrent rests on internal constraints on the Indian technological and industrial infrastructure and external constraints on China's behavior. This case is not completely effective. It would not work if Peking should develop medium or intermediate range ballistic missiles at a time when New Delhi is still relying on conventional defense mechanisms or if external constraints on China were not applied because of failure on the part of the United States to perceive the threat. India's general apprehension about American policy in Asia was underscored by its decision "to sign a security pact with Moscow rather than Washington." To restore Indian confidence in the United States, Washington would have to clarify its South Asian policy, recognize the importance of India in world affairs, and upgrade its style of negotiating with India.

255
Knoll, Erwin. A BRAND NEW "MISSILE GAP." Progressive, v. 35, Oct. 1971: 24-26. illus.
AP2.P8655, v. 35

In a time of national budget cutting, the military has been exempted. Defense spending is going up, with increases channelled into expensive new weapons systems. "Despite Washington's occasional hopeful allusions to the languishing strategic arms limitation talks, America is embarked on a

new round in the arms race." The justification proffered for this escalation is an alleged "research and development gap" in which the Soviets are outspending the United States in weapons technology. This gap differs from the past strategic "gaps" in that its existence is seriously questioned at the time it is advanced. The General Accounting Office and the Federation of American Scientists have put forth telling arguments against the Pentagon's case. Congress' exposure to such expert opinion has improved the level of debate on defense, but unfortunately there seems to have been no corresponding change in voting habits.

256
Kock, F. H. C. PROBLEMS OF COMPARING FORCE LEVELS. NATO letter, v. 19, Mar./Apr. 1971: 19-22. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 19

Too often the military strengths of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are wrongly compared by counting each side's ground combat divisions. The Warsaw Pact maintains smaller, more uniform divisions with a stronger concentration of armor and airborne units than does NATO. The Warsaw Pact has lower manning levels in divisions and its ratios of equipment to men are lower than those of NATO. Organization of support and service functions, operational readiness, and training levels are also factors to be considered. The Warsaw Pact has achieved greater equipment standardization and possesses the advantage of unbroken internal lines of communication. In evaluating the air and sea power of the military blocs, it is not enough to count planes and ships. The composition and capabilities of the air forces and their support have to be considered. Amphibious forces must be seen in relation to the types of formations and lift capabilities, with control of the seas vital for mission success. Too great a reliance on any one factor will inevitably result in a misleading comparison.

257
Kohler, Foy D. THE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE. Ordnance, v. 56, Sept./Oct. 1971: 118-120.
UF1.067, v. 56

A perceptive interpretation of current Communist literature would substitute "communism" for "peace" in order to make clear the goals of the Soviet Union. Also essential is an understanding of the anxiety reflected in each Russian's "deep sense of the historical insecurity of this great open land mass on which he lives." Because of this pervasive insecurity, the Soviets are concerned with defense systems and would not agree on an opening date for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks until they had matched or perhaps surpassed the American ICBM capacity. The Soviets are unwilling to take part in negotiations that might freeze them into a "position of inferiority."

258
Kühn, Alfred G. SOME MOVEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL FIELD DURING FIRST YEAR OF UN'S DISARMAMENT DECADE. NATO letter, v. 19, Mar./Apr. 1971: 23-27. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 19

The NATO states have a continuing interest in current efforts to achieve arms control. The Seabed Treaty is an advance welcomed by NATO and its members. The constant activity of the NATO Council and Political Committee and other alliance functions reflects the organization's genuine concern for devising workable arms limitation agreements. In 1970 the Political Committee's semiannual meetings with disarmament experts centered on "control of biological and chemical weapons, an 'organic' comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament, and exchanges of seismic data in connection with a possible comprehensive test ban." The group made visits to a seismic array installation in Norway and a nuclear plant in Belgium. NATO's Disarmament and Arms Control Section has been connected with these activities, but currently its main interests are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and mutual balanced force reductions.

259
Laird, Melvin R. FISCAL YEAR 1972-76 DEFENSE PROGRAM AND THE 1972 DEFENSE BUDGET. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Mar. 9, 1971. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 191 p. DLC

Contents.--The Secretary's summary.--pt. 1. Toward a strategy of realistic deterrence: Strategic overview. Concepts for defense planning. The threats to free world security. Force planning under the new strategy.--pt. 2. Toward better management of human, material and economic resources in the Department of Defense: Organization and management in the Department of Defense. Department of Defense manpower objectives. Defense and the economy.

Statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird outlining the Administration's Five-Year Defense Program and fiscal year 1972 defense budget request, delivered to the House Armed Services Committee on March 9, 1971. The Five-Year Defense Program will put into practice the Administration's new strategy of realistic deterrence, which calls for the adoption of "a prudent middle course between two policy extremes--world policeman or new isolationism," and "the maintenance of a strong Free World military capability as the essential foundation of deterrence." The budget request is another step forward in "the transition from an era of confrontation to an era of meaningful negotiations." The proposed budget entails some risk, "for it continues the downward trend in overall Defense Department purchasing power at a time when the threats . . . face[d] around the world continue to increase, not diminish."

260
London. International Institute for Strategic Studies. THE MILITARY BALANCE 1971-1972. London [1971] 83 p. illus.
N&CPR

Contents.--pt. 1. Countries and principal pacts: The United States and the Soviet Union. The European balance. The Middle East and the Mediterranean. Sub-Saharan Africa. Asia and Australasia.--pt. 2. Tables: Estimates of comparative strategic strengths. Nuclear delivery vehicles. Defence expenditure and national economies. Comparative defence expenditure, Gross National Product and manpower figures, 1951-1970. Tank characteristics. Overseas deployment of forces. Major identified arms agreements, July 1970-June 1971. Secondary arms' producers.--Appendix: The military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. --Index.

Survey of strategic and conventional force relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the military strength of all national forces except those of Latin America. The Institute finds that the strategic forces of both superpowers exceed those necessary for mutual deterrence to "the point of offering some prospect of limiting the damage which either side would suffer should a strategic nuclear war occur." The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have not yet generated any formal agreement, although both sides speak hopefully of an accord even this year to limit antiballistic missile systems and to take certain steps regarding offensive weapons. In the meantime both powers continue to expand and modernize their strategic forces. In deterrence planning, China is a secondary object of increasing significance. China may have sufficient fissionable resources to produce about 1,200 fission/fusion weapons, the Institute reveals, adding that China has about 30 Tu-16 medium bombers as delivery vehicles.

261
McIntyre, William D. BRITAIN, NEW ZEALAND AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN THE 1970'S. Wellington, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1969. 31 p. illus. (NZIIA pamphlets, 5) UA647.M24

Traces the reasons for Great Britain's decision to withdraw from East of Suez and criticizes Prime Minister Holyoake's Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, which sought to map out future defense policies and programs in response to the British withdrawal. McIntyre is dismayed by the report's omissions, namely, the failures to mention the roles of nuclear weapons in power politics, the part played by New Zealand and Australia in encouraging stability in Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Security Treaty (1951), which McIntyre thinks is New Zealand's ultimate safeguard. He concludes that despite Holyoake's report New Zealanders are still waiting for a comprehensive statement about the priorities and purposes of New Zealand's policy for the 1970's.

262
Miners, N. J. THE NIGERIAN ARMY 1956-1966. London, Methuen [1971] 290 p. illus. (Studies in African history 5) UA869.N54M5
Notes: p. 238-273.
"Sources and Select Bibliography": p. 274-283.

Contents.--Introductory survey.--The Nigerian military forces in 1956.--Nigerianizing the officer corps, 1949-1960.--Handing over the army, 1956-1960.--Cameroons, Congo, Tanganyika, Tiv.--Changes in the army, 1960-1965.--Nigerianizing the officer corps, 1960-1965.--Politics and violence, 1960-1965.--The military coups of 15 and 16 January.--The first four months of the Ironsi regime. --The May decrees, the riots and the July counter-coup.--Postscript.--Appendix.--Notes.--Sources and select bibliography.--Index.

Surveys the Nigerian army from the beginning of pre-independence British withdrawal to the eve of the civil war. Miners traces the British failure to "Nigerianize" the army and notes that there were no tribal animosities within the officer corps before independence. Eastern officers' fears of being replaced by Northern officers contributed to the January 1966 coup. Miners finds that "tribal and sectional loyalties had disintegrated the old Nigerian Army" to such an extent that "the counter-coup of July 1966 marks a more violent break with the past than any which occurred at the time when the Army passed from British to Nigerian control." The role of Nigerian troops in the Congo peacekeeping operation of 1960-1964 is discussed.

263
THE MISSING SUPERPOWER. Economist, v. 240, July 31, 1971: 14-15. illus.
HG11.E2, v. 240

Due to its own rapid growth and the shifts of American policy, Japan is being propelled towards increased militarism and the attainment of a nuclear capability. Already the Japanese are utilizing nuclear power for peaceful purposes and are building rockets resembling those that carry nuclear warheads for America. Also planned is an increase in submarine production to defend the large Japanese merchant fleet. These signs of rearmament and eventual nuclear capability are accepted by the Japanese public with "neither enthusiasm nor revulsion, but a sense of inevitability: the feeling that massive rearmament is going to come anyway." What role Japan would play as the world's fifth great power is unclear, as are its relations to the other powers--America, Russia, Europe, and China. "The rules of the international game would probably resemble those of nineteenth-century Europe rather than those of the Dulles era."

264
Mommsen, Ernst W. [interview] [A UNITED EUROPE AFFORDS NATO NEW STRENGTH] Ein vereintes Europa gibt der NATO neue Kraft. Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, Aug. 1971: 8-10.
AP30.E78, v. 11

Outlines the need for the standardization of NATO armaments to reduce costs while at the same time enhancing the Alliance's fighting capability. Obstacles to standardization, Mommsen points out, are national differences in military concepts, political and economic interests, technical capabilities, obsolescence deadlines, and weights and measures. Nonetheless, limited steps are being taken, and the rising costs of new weapons systems will provide the incentive for greater standardization efforts. Although the Western European states are economically capable of developing their own weapons systems, major projects are often undertaken in partnership. This European capability should not, however, lead to an autarchy in weapons vis-a-vis the United States. In fact, the Americans have recently shown an interest in using European capabilities. Mommsen warns that as long as one part of the world continues its armaments buildup, the other must strive to maintain the balance.

265
Moore, William C. VIEW FROM THE BLUE. Air Force magazine, v. 54, Sept. 1971: 76-78, 80-81.
UG633.A65, v. 54

It is technologically feasible to station aircraft in the air for extended periods of time. The Air Force has failed to realize the potential of a comprehensive air strategy that uses aerial task forces as ships are used in established naval strategy. "The Air Force should think of using the air in terms similar to those that Alfred Thayer Mahan applied to the sea." The principle of this air strategy is that control of the world's trade routes, lines of communication, and centers of civilization is the key to control of land areas. This control is achieved through concentration of forces at vital spots. After establishing mastery in its medium (a "blue-air" phase, like the blue-water phase of naval strategy), air strategy would then utilize its superiority to apply force against an enemy through and from the air. Ideally, air strategy will work in tandem with naval strategy to create a powerful, flexible strategic and tactical force. The Air Force has carried out operations and has worked on weapons related to this concept. The Air Force must devise tactics and systems to make full use of the potential of aircraft, bearing in mind that missiles are not substitutes for airplanes but weapons to be utilized in implementing the total design. The Roman legions became traveling fortresses, an innovation which later was applied to sea warfare. The time has come logically to extend this doctrine and to send it airborne.

266
Morris, C. E. PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. Army quarterly, v. 101, July 1971: 396-401.
U1.A85, v. 101

North Atlantic Treaty Organization members have until this year disregarded American warnings of a reduction in ground troop strength and of the reversion to Europeans of a greater portion of the burden of defending Europe. Only after the American decision to go was announced did the European states awake to the implications of that departure on the future credibility of NATO strategy and European defense. The doctrine of flexible response is viable with present force levels but it will lose its credibility as American withdrawals lower force levels. Because European military budgets have been decreasing in proportion to gross national products--a factor which is reflected in reduced military manpower and equipment--indications are that "any American reduction in strength is unlikely to be matched by self-help on the part of the Europeans in order to make good the gap." If American reduction creates an unfillable gap in European defense, NATO will have to reformulate its strategy. A possible NATO strategy for the seventies involves a shift from territorial defense to smaller, highly-trained, locally mobilized forces to form the core of a resistance movement in the case of invasion.

267
Muckerman, Joseph E. HEDGING ON A STRATEGIC GAMBLE. Army, v. 21, Sept. 1971: 10-16. illus.
U1.A893, v. 21

In response to the rapid buildup of Soviet strategic weapons the United States could delay a decision to resume the production of nuclear weapons while negotiating for nuclear sanity; maintain a sufficiency in nuclear weapons by further hardening missile silos and deploying ABMs, an underwater long-range missile system, and a supersonic bomber; or attempt to restore nuclear supremacy. None of these alternatives, however, fulfills U.S. security requirements and objectives for the coming decade. Instead, the United States should rely on mobile sea and land missiles to ensure an assured destruction capability, together with a "thin" missile defense system to prevent nuclear accidents or blackmail by Communist China. Aside from the strategic advantage of this policy, it would also enable U.S. negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to seize the initiative by proposing the inactivation of land-based missiles, establishment of a ceiling on ABM, and creation of restricted zones for ballistic missile submarines.

268
NATO AND SECURITY IN THE SEVENTIES. Edited by Frans A. M. Alting Von Geusau. Other contributors: François Duchêne [and others] Leyden, A. W.

Sijthoff, Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath and Co., 1971. 158 p. (Publications of the John F. Kennedy Institute Center for International Studies, no. 5) UA646.3.N242

Includes papers presented at the 5th International Colloquium of the John F. Kennedy Institute.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--NATO and security in the future: a long range view, by Louis J. Halle.--NATO's ability to deal with developing crisis situations, by François Duchêne.--NATO and the Mediterranean situation, by Stefano Silvestri.--NATO and developments in Eastern Europe, by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau.--NATO and the sub-regional approach to European security, by Nils Ørvik.--Planning ahead: security and cooperation in the seventies, by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau.--Annexes.--Index.

Discusses NATO's problems and prospects, focusing on the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe and on their effect, in terms of the alliance's ability to handle crisis situations, on the security of the organization and the precarious politicomilitary balance on the European continent.

269
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND DEFENCE POLICY. Indian & foreign review, v. 8, July 15, 1971: 4-5. D839.I453, v. 8

Although India has no designs on any other nation's territory and believes in the peaceful settlement of disputes, it continues to reinforce its security through military preparedness mainly because of the threats posed by Communist China and Pakistan. China's growing nuclear arsenal has become a matter for serious concern to its neighbors, including India. Pakistan, which has committed aggression against India three times, is being supplied with sophisticated military hardware by the United States. India continues to work for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the peaceful application of nuclear energy, but in order to meet the threats from its two neighbors it has begun a long-term defense program that will employ such modern techniques as systems analysis, operational research, project management, and value engineering.

270
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 157-177. D839.068, v. 15

"Based on a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in Los Angeles, California, in September 1970."

The evolving strategic balance between the superpowers and the anticipated reduction in U.S. defense commitments to Europe and other areas of the world symbolized by the Nixon Doctrine have "heightened the urgency of steps toward the Europeanization of Western Europe's defenses." If the United States reduces its forces in Europe there will be a need for not only modernizing NATO capabilities and improving the flexible response strategy at the tactical level but for strengthening strategic theater forces to deter the Soviet intermediate and medium range ballistic missile (I/MRBM) threat. The creation of a credible European strategic force under European control which would allow NATO eventually to assume the major burden of neutralizing the Soviet I/MRBM threat would enhance the strength of Western deterrence as well as preserve U.S. strategic sufficiency. An Anglo-French force contributed to by all the West European states should not be considered a substitute for the U.S. nuclear guarantee but rather as the first stage toward a European political union possessing a unified command. The organizational, technical, and financial problems of such a force will make shifting a portion of the U.S. defense burden to Europe very difficult. However, this is a requirement if European security is to be achieved in an era of declining U.S. commitments around the world.

271
Pierre, Andrew J. AMERICA DOWN, RUSSIA UP: THE CHANGING POLITICAL ROLE OF MILITARY POWER. Foreign policy, fall 1971: 163-187. N&CPR

While the United States is seriously questioning the usefulness of military force for the attainment of political ends, the Soviet Union looks increasingly to military power for support of its foreign policy. The American reappraisal stems from the stalemate in the Vietnam War, the lack of clarity in foreign policy, and the domestic constraints on the military. Military power, therefore, is not "likely to translate into political power for the United States as readily as was assumed in the past." The Soviet Union, on the other hand, as an authoritarian state not subject to popular domestic constraints, is expanding its forces and penetrating remote areas of the world as it moves from a continental to a global status. The codification of parity to which the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are leading will have little influence on this "show-the-flag" power diplomacy of the Soviet Union, for parity can confer confidence or over-confidence. The United States will become, however, more cautious in the use of its military forces abroad, and the "threshold of involvement will be higher than in Vietnam."

272
Polmar, Norman. SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT. Navy, v. 14, July/Aug. 1971: 6-13. illus. VA49.N28, v. 14

Assesses the extent of the Soviet submarine threat and the adequacy of the U.S. response. In recognition of the new importance of the submarine, the U.S. Navy has raised the status of its submarine forces, giving their commander a greater

voice in the decisionmaking process at the Chief of Naval Operations level. In addition, various new programs are under consideration that would greatly strengthen the undersea arm. A tight budget leaves little room for new procurements, however, and the U.S. submarine fleet, never the equal of its Soviet counterpart in overall numerical strength, now faces the loss of its longtime supremacy in technological sophistication and nuclear power.

273
Rao, P. V. R. THREATS TO INDIA'S SECURITY IN THE SEVENTIES. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 100, Oct./Dec. 1970; 447-456, 506. illus. U1.U5, v. 100

Views India's future security in light of the global situation and notes that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to be a threat since both seem intent on avoiding confrontation. Among India's neighbors Pakistan with its constant territorial claims is the most threatening. Rao also reviews the history of India's relationship with China which, though friendly at times in the past, is now "very bitter." Finally he surveys internal conditions and notes tribal and rural groups that might be urged to violence by the "country's two enemies--Pakistan and China." Rao warns that "in speculating about the future, both the neurosis of fear and an unwillingness to face unpalatable facts should be avoided."

274
Reinicke, Adolf. [ON THE TENSION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMY AND AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY] Zum Spannungsverhältnis Armee-Industriegesellschaft. Wehrkunde, v. 20, July 1971: 349-353. U3.W396, v. 20

Contrasts the increasing demands for restraint and conformity imposed by technology and military service with the expectations of the individual in a democratic industrial society in order to analyze the tensions existing between the military and society. Highly industrialized societies have generated a technological order regulating nearly all phases of life. The military, itself subject to that order by virtue of its dependence on modern weaponry, has its own traditional rules of order regulating the behavior of its members. On the other hand, the citizen's exposure today to total communications, complete mobility, and better education contradict the increasing need for an ordering of society. Modern educators seek to remove all potentially repressive elements from the experience of youth. The result is, the author holds, varying degrees of unsuitability for the demands of life and the requirements of the military. The state and the military, he concludes, must be more than the expression and reflection of the will of an acquisitive society; rather they must form a constructive counterbalance to the political saturation natural to men living in prosperity. Otherwise the society in question will be delivered to the outside political forces that wait for the breakdown attending this kind of disequilibrium.

275
Rhee, T. C. JAPAN: 'SECURITY' AND 'MILITARISM.' World today, v. 27, Sept. 1971: 390-400. D410.W63, v. 27

Tokyo is devoting increased attention to the desirability of reshaping national security policies to keep pace with Japan's near-superpower status and the changed international environment. An enhanced military posture is thought necessary to maintain the economic boom and a defense capability against the potential threats of a nuclear-armed China, and to adjusting to an Asia without an American military presence. It is likely that Japan will in the near future take certain cautious steps to promote its military posture: continued expansion of the Self-Defense Forces, continued missile and nuclear-weapons research, preparation for an expansion of the armaments industry, and a propaganda campaign to convince the Japanese people of the need for these steps. Within Japan, however, there are two major constraints on remilitarism; the peace constitution and low defense expenditures. More than offsetting these constraints are the facts that continuing economic growth is leading many to believe that Japan can afford both guns and butter, a new generation has come into being that does not know war, and the American withdrawal from Asia may leave Japan defenseless and at the mercy of old distrusts. In short, "a general feeling of national confidence has accompanied [Japan's] economic boom, and there is a distinct danger of rising chauvinistic nationalism."

276
Rolbant, Samuel. THE ISRAELI SOLDIER; PROFILE OF AN ARMY. South Brunswick, T. Yoseloff [1971, c1970] 353 p. illus. UA853.I8R64

Contents.--The development of the Israeli armed forces.--The structure of the army.--The sociology of the army.--The mind of the army.--Basic elements in military thinking; the logic of war.--Index.

A history and evaluation of the armed forces of Israel. Rolbant describes manpower policies, makeup, and organization, examines the military life and mentality, and depicts the armed forces' relation to Israeli government and society. He concludes with an exposition of Israeli defense thought in a geopolitical context. Rolbant's opinion is that "the real subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the continued existence of Israel." He feels that the Israelis, "a numerically small but highly organized national group, cemented by centuries of persecution and discrimination, steeled by the experience of the European holocaust and toughened by twenty years of threats of

annihilation" have been militarily superior because, by contrast, in Arab society "not only State purposes, but the State as such, was superimposed on a people who were incapable of any deep sense of solidarity, and for whom political sovereignty had no practical meaning."

277
Ruge, Friedrich. [ALLIANCES PAST AND PRESENT WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NATO, EEC AND THE WARSAW PACT] Bündnisse in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von UNO, NATO, EWG und Warschauer Pakt. Frankfurt am Main, Bernard & Graefe, 1971. 173 p. illus. JX4005.R84
Bibliography: p. 173.

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. Bases of alliances.--pt. 2. Examples from history.--pt. 3. After World War II.--Postscript.

Analyzes the purposes, structures, and prerequisites of alliances, past and present, and examines current alliances for both defense and cooperation on the basis of this analysis and cites testing crisis situations. Ruge maintains that while cooperation among states is indispensable in the age of nuclear weapons there has actually occurred a setback in truly international collaborative efforts. He warns that overoptimism and neglect weaken and destroy alliances. The movement toward an integrated Europe within the North Atlantic Alliance runs the peril of bogging down in bureaucratic detail. Absent in that movement today is the driving genius of Truman and Marshall or Adenauer and Schuman. If the integration movement can start moving again, Ruge concludes, Europe faces a prosperous future to the extent that the nuclear question can be solved.

278
Sawyer, Robert K. SHAPE: BULWARK OF DEFENSE--A LESSON IN COOPERATION. Revue militaire générale; general military review, July 1971: 145-164.
U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in French and German.

History of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Command established in 1951 as an integrated military command. SHAPE continues to carry out planning activities in connection with training, deployment and employment of forces, contingency situations, logistics, and similar areas of staff interest. Sawyer notes that SHAPE's primary significance has been its contribution to European security and the maintenance of peace. He thinks it specially significant that an integrated command was created and has been maintained during a prolonged period of peace.

279
Scheider, Armin. [DEFENSE PLANNING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH] Verteidungsplanung und Operations Research. Darmstadt, Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft [1971] 114 p. illus. (Beiträge zur Wehrforschung, Bd. 22) U104.S32
Bibliography: p. 110-112.

Contents.--Fundamentals of its application.--Terms and goals.--OR's performance capabilities and performance areas.--Planning and OR in execution.--Performance limitations.--Appendix: OR wargaming.--Conclusion.--Bibliography.--Glossary.

Asserts that the use of operations research (OR) in the Bundeswehr's planning process is a new way of solving complex problems and obtaining a spectrum of alternatives in decisionmaking. Scheider advocates that all levels of military command acquaint themselves with OR uses and potentialities. Planning for the armed forces requires a total system in which practical approaches proceed as part of the larger political and military decisionmaking process. The necessity for modern scientific planning aids, Scheider says, is pointed up by the changed planning environment, particularly the increasing complexity of problems, increasing influence of costs, and absence of areas for experimentation. OR has freed planning to a large degree from the perils of improvisation, chance, and false intuitive estimates, but OR cannot effectively assimilate qualitative data nor replace human reason.

280
Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaut. [PRESENT AND FUTURE FRENCH MILITARY ACCOMPLISHMENTS] Réalisations militaires françaises présentes et futures. Revue militaire suisse, v. 116, Aug. 1971: 353-371.
U2.R5, v. 116

Outlines the three major components of the French military program, the strategic nuclear force, the conventional land, sea, and air forces, and the territorial defense forces. Schneider notes that because of successive reductions in its defense budget France ranks among those countries that spend least on defense. He concludes that in the present technological and geopolitical context the defense of France by its Armed Forces at their present level is not possible. However, the unreliability of these forces could be reduced by their coordination within the framework of greater European political cooperation.

281
Silber, Howard. ALPHABET SOUP MEANS NUCLEAR PUNCH. V.F.W. magazine, v. 58, July 1971: 16-18. illus.
E181.F7, v. 58

The Single Integrated Operations Plan, written and maintained for all U.S. strategic forces by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, originated in the nuclear weapons buildup of the early 1960's in response to the Soviet nuclear threat, when the need for complete coordination of these weapons was recognized by high military officials. Whether or not this highly secret war plan, which

is a joint effort of the branches of the U.S. military and is consistently updated every six months, is publicly known, it means security for all Americans.

282
Sixsmith, E. K. G. MILITARY HISTORY OR WAR STUDIES? Army quarterly, v. 101, July 1971: 437-444.
U1.A85, v. 101

Criticizes the change in the British Staff College examination in which war studies replace military history. Sixsmith objects to the new reading list which contains "so many attempts to 'think about the unthinkable.'" He prefers the study of the mind of the commander and the reasons for his actions in the circumstances of military history. Abstract studies of war are valuable only after the scholar has a solid grasp of military history. The author concludes with a proposition to reform the present syllabus of war studies by reinstituting a syllabus of military history. The reading list for the war studies syllabus is appended.

283
Smart, Ian. FUTURE CONDITONAL: THE PROSPECT FOR ANGLO-FRENCH NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION. London. Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 45 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 78) U162.A3, no. 78

Examines "the reasons which may, in an expanded European Community, prompt the British and French governments to pursue the course of nuclear cooperation," suggests "some of the ends which such co-operation must serve and some of the forms which it might take," and indicates "some of the very serious technical, economic and, above all, political problems which any co-operative effort must face." France's more receptive attitude toward British entry into the Common Market has opened the way politically for Anglo-French cooperation in the strategic weapons field. The motive for cooperation is fear that the withdrawal of U.S. conventional forces from Europe will undermine the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and that the superpowers, as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, will try to thwart the further development of independent nuclear forces. Of course, neither country acting alone has the technical or economic capability to develop and produce a new generation of strategic weapons.

284
[SOCIETY AND DEFENSE; CONCEPT, WORLD STRATEGY, BUNDESWEHR] Gesellschaft und Verteidigung; Idee, Weltstrategie, Bundeswehr. Hrsg. von Emil Obermann unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Fachleute aus Forschung, Politik, Verwaltung und Bundeswehr. Stuttgart, Stuttgarter Verlagskontor [c1971] 892 p. illus. U21.2.02 1971
Bibliography: p. 858-861.

Contents.--pt. 1. Principles: The free and democratic basic order. War and the defense of freedom in the European conception. Communist teachings on war and peace. New weapons. Strategic maxims in the nuclear age. Question and protest of sciences, churches and the human conscience. The military, the state and society in Germany. Rearmament and military policy of the German Democratic Republic. The security and peace policy of the Federal Republic.--pt. 2. Distribution of power in the world: The United Nations--U.N. Nuclear and nonnuclear powers. The militarily bipolar and politically multipolar world. The military power of the United States. The military power of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact--WP. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization--NATO. Security and détente in Europe.--pt: 3. Bundeswehr [Federal armed forces]: The defense concept of the German Federal Republic. Political and legal bases of the Bundeswehr. Social and moral bases of the Bundeswehr. The soldiers of the Bundeswehr. The defense organization of the Federal Republic. Defense planning--armament--financing. The army. The air force. The navy. Other Bundeswehr institutions.--Appendix: Civil defense. The Federal Border Guard.--Additions and corrections.--Name and subject index.

Registers in text form the relevant facts and doctrines found in the defense environment from the intellectual, social, political, and military viewpoints. Obermann states that current problems must be solved with the means made available by the real situation, adding that the development of a self-defense capability is one of those means. "The motive for [West Germany's] defense efforts is the contractually announced purpose to contribute all in [its] power to maintain the difficult--and yet flexible--balance in Europe." This equilibrium is the sine qua non for success in stabilizing and scaling down armaments in Europe.

285
Speed, F. W. THE NEW SHAPE OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. Army quarterly, v. 101, July 1971: 420-425.
U1.A85, v. 101

In a period when British and American forces are withdrawing from East Asia while simultaneously the Soviet Union, China and Japan are establishing their presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans, Australian defense policy is being oriented to the new premise that Australians "must be able to influence more independently the course they are taking, less as a supporter of the commitments of major powers, more as a partner with the regional powers." Speed explains how the new approach to Australian defense policy is affecting the navy, army and air force.

286
Stehlin, Paul. [EUROPEAN DEFENSE: IN PERSPECTIVE OF A WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES] La défense de l'Europe: dans la perspective d'un retrait des

forces américaines. Revue militaire générale; general military review, July 1971: 196-212.
U2.R48, 1971

Includes summaries in English and German.
Reprint from a conference of the Union interalliée, May 4, 1971.

Traces the events leading to the creation of the Atlantic Alliance and speculates on the effect of an American troop withdrawal on Europe's defense. Stehlin contends that a withdrawal will place Europe in situations like those experienced in the course of two world wars. He concludes that collective defense, not an independent nuclear force, is required for France's security.

287
Sullivan, A. E. CONSCRIPTION: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY. Army quarterly, v. 101, July 1971: 465-474.
U1.A85, v. 101

Traces the history of compulsory military service, beginning with the first modern experiment in conscription by France in 1688 and emphasizing the German use of conscription for conquest in the 19th century and the subsequent German influence on Russian and Japanese conscription policies. After other European states and the United States had adopted conscription in World War I, Britain finally sacrificed its policy of voluntary recruitment for compulsory service. Sullivan concludes that though distasteful to the British conscription is basic to the existence of democracy.

288
Swamy, Subramanian. CHINA'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 100, Oct./Dec. 1970: 464-474.
U1.U5, v. 100

Presents data on Chinese nuclear capability and sources of supply, and speculates about Peking's nuclear strategy. Tables give the location and chronology of "Chinese Nuclear Facilities" and "Chinese Missile Facility." A discussion of Chinese weapons development touching on resources, leadership, and imports is included. Swamy concludes that China does not now have a realistic first strike capacity. Its second strike capacity, however, is adequate to destroy three American cities by utilizing fallout as well as explosive impact. This is a possible loss that United States strategists would call "sufficient deterrent." China thus maintains "deterrence with self-reliance."

289
Tarr, Curtis [interview] AS DRAFT IS RENEWED--. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Oct. 4, 1971: 30-32. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

Responds to questions about recent changes in the selective service system. Tarr, who is Director of Selective Service, discusses rates of call-up, the lottery system, educational and occupational deferments, the conscientious objector, the role of the local draft board and several other matters relating to the draft. He also assesses the probable impacts of the delay by Congress in passing a new draft law and of the recent military pay increases on the Army's manpower situation in the coming months.

290
Taylor, Maxwell D. NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY. Ordnance, v. 56, July/Aug. 1971: 30-31.
UF1.067, v. 56

The Williams Address delivered at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the American Ordnance Association.

The national security needs of the United States have grown increasingly complex since World War I. Today, security, which depends on deterrence of nuclear war, is being threatened from within. "The outstanding lesson of the Vietnam war has been the vulnerability of the sources of our power at home to subversive attack." Unwittingly, perhaps, the publicity media aid the subversive element through attacks on the President and the war. Popular support for defense needs has been undermined by the communications media which "have combined to flood the American public with truths, half-truths, untruths, and rumors, to the destruction of the critical judgment of most of those who have been subjected to bombardment." National unity, pride, and morale must be defended and restored as components of American defense.

291
Telpukhovskii, B. S. BUILDING THE DEFENSE POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 13, Aug. 20, 1971: 36-54.
DK226.A2R37, v. 13

Translated from Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 5, 1971. Slav Rm

The Communist Party is constantly attentive to the maintenance of defense strength, in accordance with Lenin's injunction that peace requires defense preparedness. Development of military security has been correlated with an upswing in technological capacity and an improving economic situation. As the "social, ideological and political unity of Soviet society is further consolidated," so support for the defense effort increases. To guard against possible attack from "imperialist aggressors," the Soviet Union employs strategic rocket forces, tactical nuclear weapons for the armed forces, modern radar-controlled artillery, early warning devices, supersonic fighters, and atomic submarines. In addition, great emphasis is given to the development of well-trained superior personnel. Cooperation with the Warsaw Treaty countries also enhances military security. Past improvements in defense solidarity will be reflected in future awareness of the need for constant defense strength to discourage aggression and turn away military threats.

292
Thiel, Elke. [FOREIGN CURRENCY OFFSET AND BURDEN SHARING IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE] Devisenausgleich und Lastenteilung im Atlantischen Bündnis. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, May 25, 1971: 353-362.
D839.E86, v. 26

The American balance of payments deficit incurred by stationing forces in Europe needs to be examined in light of the curious disequilibrium resulting from Western Europe's military and political dependence on the United States and its growing economic independence. Offset agreements only fractionally make up for this loss. Increased domestic requirements on the American national budget have accented this deficit and resulted in public demand to reduce the U.S. military commitment to Europe. It came then as a great surprise to Europeans, who were prepared to offer another offset agreement, when President Nixon announced his preference for a program of burden sharing. A sort of "Nixon Doctrine for Europe," the program calls for an intensification of European defense efforts. This multilateral approach will not have as its immediate result a strengthening of Western European military forces but rather the further development of infrastructure facilities, participation in American armament projects, and possibly economic and military assistance projects within NATO. Burden sharing may in the future replace the bilateral agreements between the United States and the German Federal Republic.

293
Trewhitt, Henry L. MCNAMARA. New York, Harper & Row [1971] 307 p. UA23.T74

A history of the defense secretaryship of Robert S. McNamara (1961-1968). Trewhitt analyzes McNamara's career in terms of the policies and issues of his tenure. The author believes that "above all, it was Vietnam that tested the Secretary and extracted its toll" and led to his eventual departure from office.

294
Uhlmann, Ernst. [ISOLATED ARMY?] Isolierte Armee? Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 51, July 1971: 240-243.
AP32.S47, v. 51

It is fashionable to make the military the scapegoat for the inadequacies of government, and Switzerland is no exception to the fashion. The Swiss Army has become the target of a radical minority which seeks to create a rift between the people and the army and to encourage young people to refuse to carry out their service obligations. Those responsible for maintaining a sound military establishment have been far too patient in the face of malicious criticism, for this type of an attack has its limits even in a democracy. The injustice of this minority's polemics, however, in no way relieves the Swiss Army from the duty of looking critically at itself and undertaking necessary reforms. Of paramount importance now are reforms in training, as outlined in the Oswald Report, for which the necessary finances should be granted.

295
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. HEARINGS ON MILITARY POSTURE AND H.R. 3818 AND H.R. 8687 TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1972 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES AND TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE DUTY COMPONENT AND OF THE SELECTED RESERVE OF EACH RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Ninety-second Congress, first session. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] 2 v. (2317-4777 p.) illus. (H.A.S.C. No. 92-9)
KF27.A7 1971a
Hearings held Mar. 9-May 12, 1971.

Hearings on the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1972. Those testifying include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Testimony given by several nongovernmental witnesses on March 23-24, 1971, opposes or suggests alternatives to many of the policies and programs desired by official spokesmen.

296
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. HEARINGS ON MILITARY POSTURE AND LEGISLATION TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1971 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE SELECTED RESERVE OF EACH RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Ninety-first Congress, second session. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970] 2 v. (1857 p.) illus.
KF27.A7 1970a
"H.A.S.C. no. 91-53."
Hearings held Feb. 27-Apr. 8, 1970.

Hearings on the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1971. Those testifying include the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The entire range of U.S. military activities and concerns is covered, including the strategic capabilities of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, the weapons systems programs, and U.S. chemical and biological agents.

297
U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on United States Involvement in Southeast Asia. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; report, to-

gether with supplemental views (pursuant to H. Res. 976). [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970] 164 p. (91st Congress, 2d session. House of Representatives. Report no. 91-1276)
KF32.5.U5 1970

Committee report on recent developments in Southeast Asia, particularly the extent of U.S. military and economic involvement. "The committee talked not only with U.S. military and civilian personnel of most ranks . . . but also with South Vietnamese civilians, Koreans and Thai military personnel, South Vietnamese civilians in all walks of life, provincial, district and village representatives." It concludes that the American withdrawal from South Vietnam will adversely affect the Vietnamese economy and that the Vietnamese government must begin to improve Vietnam's military capabilities and economic conditfon so that it will be able to cope with the effects of withdrawal. Supplemental views of individual committee members are included.

298
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommitte on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 28 p. KF31.F684 1970
At head of title: Committee print.

Reviews the escalation of United States treaty commitments and defense activities. "By the mid-60's the United States was firmly committed to more than 43 nations by treaty and agreement and had some 375 major foreign military bases and 3,000 minor military facilities spread all over the world." The report illustrates the deteriorating quality of these defense arrangements. In some cases "even high-ranking military officers" do not know how many tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed by the U.S. in the country in which they were stationed, and they are unsure about the locations. The report indicated that Congress had not been sufficiently curious about growing U.S. commitment; when it did set out to explore, it found that precise information was difficult if not impossible to obtain. Classification and secrecy have hindered Congressional attempts to investigate defense programs.

299
Vander Els, Theodore. THE IRRESISTIBLE WEAPON. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 80-90. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Evidence from recent military history proves conclusively that airpower is incapable of waging a successful independent, or auto-strategic, interdiction campaign. Proponents of airpower have argued that an enemy can be forced to yield by the measured application of aerial bombardment alone, or, as it is sometimes put, that one can eliminate "the evil at its source with all the remote impunity of a surgeon severing a cancerous tumor." This is an illusion and a dangerous one. Airpower is indispensable for the conduct of surface operations, but wherever it has been deployed as an independent strategic force--notably, by both Axis and Allied powers in World War II, and by the United States in Vietnam--it has failed to live up to its promise. The cost of this kind of campaign is just too great when compared with the superficiality of the result. Furthermore, close air support capability suffers when available air resources are diverted to strategic missions.

300
Vigor, P. H. SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, Sept. 1971: 23-29. illus.
U1.R8, v. 116
"A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 31st March 1971 . . . ."

Surveys Soviet military land exercises at Dnieper in 1967 and Dvina in 1970 and naval exercises at Sever in 1968 and Okean in 1970. Vigor draws conclusions concerning the reasons for, and the effects of, Soviet military exercises. He asserts that there are certain stereotyped battle procedures which both the land and naval forces practice repeatedly. He finds these exercises benefit the Soviets in three ways. The military benefits by subjecting its equipment and personnel to battle conditions. The publicity is enormously valuable for the military and government. Vigor states that the Soviets did not use the exercises to threaten the West, but rather to publicize Soviet military might among the peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. In addition, the Party leaders use military exercises as a means to court support of the Soviet armed forces.

301
Warnock, John W. PARTNER TO BEHEMOTH; THE MILITARY POLICY OF A SATELLITE CANADA. Toronto, Chicago, New Press [1970] 340 p.
F1029.5.U6W3
Bibliography: p. 329-336.
"This study was first prepared as a doctoral dissertation presented to the School of International Service, The American University, in Washington, D.C."

Contents.--Canada and the Cold War.--Was NATO necessary?--The impact of the Korean War on NATO. --Decision-making in NATO.--Canadian-American defence cooperation.--The rationale for defence integration.--Canada and the Cuban missile crisis.--The debate over nuclear weapons.--The introduction of the anti-ballistic missile.--Problems raised by the armaments industry.--Canada's role in international peacekeeping.--Conclusion.--Appendix.--Bibliography.--Index.

Critically examines the postwar defense policies of Canada as "a junior partner in the world-wide anti-communist crusade" of the cold war, which "has been a disaster to Canadian nationhood." Warnock describes most Canadian governments as eager to stay on good terms with Washington and avoid irritating American leaders. He illustrates his argument by the Liberal Party's reversal of its position on American nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and the government's silence when the Safeguard antimissile defense system was being debated by the U.S. Senate. He sees Canada's role in international peacekeeping as minor and considers NATO to be, behind the rhetoric of consultation, a means of American control over smaller states like Canada.

302
Weinstein, Martin E. JAPAN'S POSTWAR DEFENSE POLICY, 1947-1968. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971. 160 p. (Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University)
UA845.W4
Bibliography: p. [143]-150.

Contents.--Introduction.--The geographical and historical setting.--The origins and basic conception of Japan's postwar defense policy.--Defense policy and the 1951 Security Treaty.--Security Treaty diplomacy, 1952-1957.--Defense policy and the 1960 treaty.--Defense policy and the self-defense forces.--Conclusion.--Appendices.--Bibliography.--Index.

Origin and development of Japan's defense policy. Weinstein concentrates on the course of the Japanese military arrangement with the United States, whose defense commitment and military presence in Japan are the keystones of Japanese security. In this context the author also examines the evolution of the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Weinstein concludes that the postwar concept of Japanese defense "was not cooked up in Washington and swallowed whole in Tokyo," but rather has been based from the outset on the clear perception by Japanese leaders of their nation's security requirements. The texts of the 1951 Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty and the 1960 Japanese-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security are given in the appendix.

303
[WHAT DO THE SWISS THINK ABOUT THEIR NATIONAL DEFENSE?] Wie denkt das Schweizervolk über die Landesverteidigung? Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 137, Sept. 1971: 590-592, 597-598, 601-602, 605-606, 609-612. illus.
U3.A43, v. 137

Survey of Swiss public opinion on the usefulness of the Swiss Armed Forces. Detailed questionnaires sent to representative segments of the population by the Verein zur Förderung des Wehrwillens und der Wehrwissenschaft (Association for the Promotion of Military Preparedness and Military Science) revealed that the majority of the Swiss people feel that Switzerland will not become involved in a war in the next decade, that Switzerland must maintain an army, that an aggressor using conventional weapons can be repelled, and that military service has a salutatory effect on the character of those performing it. The survey is broken down by age, sex, and language.

304
Whetten, Lawrence L. A EUROPEAN VIEW OF NATO STRATEGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Sept. 1971: 25-37. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Thoughts on a new strategic doctrine for NATO. Whetten briefly surveys earlier approaches to the Western security problem and recapitulates the steps leading to the present impasse. It is imperative that something be done to reduce the historic conflicts in security interests that still bedevil the alliance. New doctrine will have to concede a less dominant role to the United States, putting the emphasis instead on European contributions in "economic resources and military concepts." It must also look to the improvement of Western capabilities for defense against limited, localized aggression, the most likely form of attack.

305
Wolfe, Thomas W. THE SOVIET UNION'S STRATEGIC STAKE IN THE G.D.R. World today, v. 27, Aug. 1971: 340-350.
D410.W63, v. 27

The Soviet Union's excessive military presence in Eastern Europe and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) since the end of the Second World War reflects a policy in which Europe is regarded as the key to world affairs. This presence serves military, disciplinary, and political purposes. Poised in a forward position, Soviet troops are ready for offensive action and the territory they garrison provides a wide security belt on the western frontier. The disciplinary function of these Soviet forces was recently illustrated by their incursion into Czechoslovakia. Their political function is to maintain the division of Germany. Geography, politics, and strategy have combined to make the GDR the sine qua non of Soviet security in Europe. Of the Warsaw Pact forces, those of the GDR are second only to those of the Soviet Union, but it is unlikely that the Soviets would entrust them with major defensive responsibilities. While Soviet nuclear capability in intermediate range missiles has obviated the need for a massive conventional presence in Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet Union may wish to maintain this double insurance for future bargaining, although the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have given no hint that these missiles are a subject for negotiation. In spite of the many good reasons why the Soviets might wish to reduce their force levels in Europe, "twenty-five years of

post-war history argue against any imaginative reversal of Soviet policy."

306
Yale, W. W. THE CLIMATE'S ALL WRONG. National review, v. 23, June 15, 1971: 651-652, 665.
AP2.N3545, v. 23

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force concluded that enough men would volunteer because of pay incentives. But pay alone will not be sufficient to attract the most desirable candidates, the hardy young men in search of adventure, status, and glory, if the abuse and vilification being heaped on the military from all sides continue. An all-volunteer force will have to solve the problems of removing aging and incompetent personnel and ensuring a reliable supply of casualty replacements. One possibility would be establishment of all-volunteer combat units, with service and supply branches filled by conscripts. Reform of physical standards would substantially increase the manpower pool for these noncombatant duties. Relaxing discipline and adding amenities will remove the challenge of military life for those men whose ambition is to be warriors. Above all an all-volunteer force to succeed must exhibit a high degree of personnel stability and low turnover. "The dilemma of the draft lies in the fact that while it is unpopular today and unsuitable for tomorrow's crises and mobile wars, the alternative--the all-volunteer force--is a vital necessity and totally unfeasible in the present anti-military climate."

307
Zumwalt, Elmo R. [interview] WHERE RUSSIAN THREAT KEEPS GROWING. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Sept. 13, 1971: 72-77. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 71

Responds to questions concerning comparative U.S. and Soviet naval strength. The discussion encompasses Soviet naval strategy in the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean; U.S. intentions in the same areas; the usefulness and alleged vulnerability of the U.S. attack carrier force; the nature and extent of the Soviet submarine threat; Soviet activity in Cuba and the Caribbean; the impact of the establishment of an all-volunteer army on Navy recruiting; the post-Vietnam War domestic environment; the future of overseas bases; and the application of the Nixon Doctrine in the South Pacific. Zumwalt warns that if current trends are allowed to continue, the Soviet Union will soon have a superior naval force and pose a threat to U.S. control of the seas.

308
Zwenig, Frances A. THAILAND: OUR TROUBLED ALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. [Washington, Student Advisory Committee on International Affairs] 1970. 12 p.
(Studies in American foreign policy, no. 1)
E183.7.S75
Includes bibliographical references.

Scrutinizes relations between the United States and Thailand in terms of defense needs, military aid, the presence of U.S. troops, and the future of Thailand. The author examines the background of American involvement, noting that "what commenced as a 75-man advisory group and $10 million in 1950 now embroils policymakers in an eternal debate over the presence of 42,000 U.S. troops on eight bases and U.S. responsibilities for the Thai economy when the troops are withdrawn." The troops are concerned primarily with the Vietnam War and do not participate in Thailand's defense, although United States influence "has contributed to the development of the military sector in their society at the expense of the civilian sector." As U.S. withdrawal becomes more probable, the Thais have signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Romania. At the same time, relations with Japan are likely to improve. "Thailand may find the stance of a nonaligned nation to be very attractive."

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

309
AEC BRUISED BUT NOT CUT, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 232, July 30, 1971: 290-292.
Q1.N2, v. 232

Analyzes Congressional action on the Atomic Energy Commission's fiscal year 1972 budget request in light of public criticism of the Agency by environmentalists. This criticism seems not to have influenced the Congress, which authorized funds in excess of those requested, the chief beneficiaries of this largess being the Nerva nuclear rocket program, gaseous diffusion research, and the Plowshare project for the extraction of natural gas by means of nuclear explosions. Funds for another nuclear weapons test, the purpose of which is to monitor the x-ray spectrum of the Spartan warhead, were also approved, despite warnings that the test might trigger an earthquake, vent radioactive debris, or sabotage the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. These risks would be incurred for the dubious purpose of developing a potentially destabilizing and therefore very dangerous weapons system.

310
Baer, Daniel J., and Victor F. Mosele. POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF CATHOLICS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR. Journal of psychology, v. 78, July 1971: 161-164.
BF1.J67, v. 78

For a sample of 688 adult Catholics, significant associations were found between a Likert-type

statement concerning support of American commitment in Vietnam and other political and religious beliefs. Ss who favored involvement in Vietnam more likely felt a greater need for independence from government controls, reported that tax revenues should remain within local government, and rejected the suggestion of forming a common market with Europe. With regard to religious beliefs, supporters of official American policy less likely felt that clergy should marry, that fasting laws of the church should be relaxed, or that contemplative religious orders are no longer needed. It appears that acceptance of religious orthodoxy is related to conservative political views. (Abstract supplied)

311
Bletz, Donald F. AFTER VIETNAM: A PROFESSIONAL CHALLENGE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 11-15. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Professional military men ought to give more attention to the problems they are going to face in the post-Vietnam domestic environment. Isolationism and its corollary, antimilitary feeling, will be widespread. The services will have to accept large cuts in defense spending. Almost certainly, they will be saddled with a major share of the blame for the war in Southeast Asia. To accept this situation philosophically or pass it off as the responsibility of the civilian authorities will not do. The problem must be faced squarely. It has received a degree of attention at the highest levels of command already, but this is not enough. What is needed is concern at every level. The issues are a legitimate subject for study at the war and staff colleges. Beyond that, they ought to "be as much a subject of professional military shoptalk as hardware, organization, and doctrine."

312
Brown, Sanborn C., and Brian B. Schwartz, comps. SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER; A DILEMMA FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press [1971] 180 p. (M.I.T. Report no. 22)
Q149.U5B7
A restructured summary of discussions which took place at a symposium held May 12 and 13, 1970, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Bibliography: p. 175-178.

Contents.--Introduction.--Manpower projections.--National planning.--Research and university finances.--The student and the information process.--Implications for graduate education.--Selected references.--Index.

"An edited and restructured summary" of the proceedings of a symposium on the employment situation for scientists and engineers with graduate degrees. Attending were 79 participants from academia, government, and industry, including 19 invited speakers. Emphasis is placed on the impact on graduate education of the apparent surplus of scientific and engineering manpower. The causes of the situation, including the effects of federal funding for research and development in the defense and aerospace industries and in the universities, are discussed. Brown and Schwartz feel that the report "clearly points to the urgency of manpower planning on a national scale and the necessity for universities to restructure their graduate programs toward a much greater sensitivity to society's utilization of the products of their educational programs."

313
Davis, Kenneth S., comp. ARMS, INDUSTRY AND AMERICA. New York, H. W. Wilson, 1971. 232 p. (The Reference shelf, v. 43, no. 1)
UA23.D28
Bibliography: p. 224-232.

Contents.--Preface.--The rise of American militarism.--The military-industrial complex: critical descriptions.--In defense of the military-industrial complex.--The struggle for control.--Bibliography.

A selection of reprinted articles, book excerpts, and essays designed to answer the question whether arms and the armament industry can be brought under control. Davis feels that the prospects for that control are brighter than in the past, for there is "an increasingly wide recognition that what we are faced with is a monster whose continued growth out of control threatens not just our freedoms but our very lives."

314
Dowd, Douglas F. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR. Nation, v. 212, June 28, 1971: 811-814. illus.
AP2.N2, v. 212

Argues that "as matters now stand the United States does in fact have a large, and potentially immense, economic stake in getting its way in Indochina." Dowd predicts that the Nixon Administration will not end the American presence in Vietnam; rather, the Government will give the impression of withdrawal by concealing its activities there and repressing opposition at home. During the early period of American involvement the primary economic influence came from military spending for construction and materials. More recently general commercial and industrial developments, like the plants set up by Coca-Cola and Ford, have been observed. The most tenacious economic ties are suggested by the speculation about offshore oil deposits near South Vietnam and Cambodia. If they are to pursue new oil investments, American companies need the support of stable, pro-American governments in Indochina.

315
Gray, Colin S. ACTION AND REACTION IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. In U.S. Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Aug. 1971: 16-26. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

The action-reaction theory of the strategic arms race is dangerously mechanistic. It prevents the analyst from giving due weight to the role of domestic politics in determining security policy; assumes, quite erroneously, that the adversary's reaction patterns are readily understandable or determinate; encourages the belief that the technical aspects of arms limitation can be decoupled from politics; and, in general, oversimplifies an extremely complex process. To tell the truth, the theory has little explanatory value at all, a fact, incidentally, that has not impaired its usefulness as a polemic device for critics of the ABM and multiple warhead. The point really is that "although an action-reaction chain can be made to fit the arms race of the 1960's, it would be a mistake to confuse strategic logic for the messy and ambivalent reality of defense politics." Not that the bureaucratic model of defense decision-making is by itself any more realistic. The real world encompasses both bureaucratic process and external sources of influence.

316
Hunt, Raymond G., and Gregory W. Hunt. SOME STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, AND THEIR PRINCIPAL CONTRACTORS. Social forces, v. 49, Mar. 1971: 414-431.
HN51.S5, v. 49

From a social-psychological viewpoint comparative temporal trends in contracting relations between private industrial organizations and NASA and the Defense Department are examined. Evidence is presented of stable and strongly convergent tendencies in the working relations among these parties, but accompanied by noteworthy variations in pattern as between NASA and Defense Department relations with their industrial contractors. The former exhibits more concentration but less stability than the latter, but gives evidence of moving in the direction of increased stability whereas the latter shows opposite tendencies. The findings are analyzed in terms of Galbraith-Weidenbaum "convergence hypotheses" and it is concluded that they are suggestive of the operation of a "mastery motive" working, under specified conditions, to both sustain and dissipate exchange relations. (Abstract supplied)

317
Hutchings, Raymond. SOVIET DEFENCE SPENDING AND SOVIET EXTERNAL RELATIONS. International affairs (London) v. 47, July 1971: 518-531. illus.
JX1.I53, v. 47

Evaluates Soviet defense spending in terms of the changes over time in absolute size as percentages of the total budget and the relation of these changes to Soviet foreign policy. Between 1940 and 1971 Soviet defense allocations "trace out a kind of quadruple wave movement, with major peaks in 1944 and about 1969 and a minor peak or plateau in 1952-55." As a percentage of the total Soviet budget, defense spending has declined in post-war years, although it has risen in absolute terms. This decline, Hutchings thinks, shows a tendency to dampen the arms race rather than to accelerate it, as would be suggested by absolute figures. Hutchings concludes that defense spending rises and falls depending on the level of international tension. When defense spending has declined long enough in their opinion, the defense interests will attempt to increase it at the first opportunity. Hutchings suggests that it would be unwise for the Western powers to overreact to increases or decreases in Soviet defense spending.

318
Kaufman, Richard F. THE WAR PROFITEERS. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill [1970] 282 p.
UC267.K34
Bibliography: p. 245-270.

Studies the profits earned from military spending and seeks criteria to determine if these gains are reasonable or excessive. After a brief historical review, Kaufman analyzes defense budgets and the defense industry, working through many cases of complicated contractor and subcontractor relationships. He concludes that while some excessive profit making involves illegal acts, there are many legal ways of earning high returns in the defense market. "So long as military spending is kept at wartime levels and so long as the present contract system is used to meet military requirements, the problem of profiteering will remain and grow worse."

319
Kennedy, Edward M. INDOCHINA: A SLAUGHTER OF INNOCENTS. Nation, v. 212, June 28, 1971: 806-808. illus.
AP2.N2, v. 212

The civilian war victims of Indochina are regularly overlooked in the rhetoric of official Washington. "And, more than our government cares to admit, American military activity--especially the unrestricted air war--is contributing heavily to this growing human toll." Official statistics probably underestimate the numbers of civilian dead, disabled, uprooted, widowed, and orphaned. A similar picture of civilian casualties is seen in Cambodia and Laos. United States bombing of Indochina has reached nearly three times the tonnage of bombs dropped by the United States in World War II. By determined employment of modern military technology "we have over the years destroyed the very land and people we had set out to save." It is the responsibility of the United States to contribute greatly to the healing and rehabilitation of the innocent victims of its war.

320
Melman, Seymour. ALL THE MUSCLE AT ONE-THIRD THE COST. Saturday review, v. 54, Oct. 9, 1971: 26-27, 54.
Z1219.S25, v. 54

Analyzes defense spending and suggests that the United States defense budget can be trimmed by $50 billion which could be diverted to the moral and economic restoration of the country. Melman believes that the "security of American society is diminished by policies that aim at worldwide hegemony based upon military power, with the assumption that the wealth of this country is virtually unlimited." To achieve savings he would surrender the capacity to fight "a nuclear war and two other wars at the same time." Defense would be adequately served by a three-part program that would deter nuclear attack, protect the coastlines of the United States, and allow participation in international peacekeeping. The present Polaris submarine fleet is enough for deterrence, even without multiple warheads. Land, air, and sea forces primarily stationed in and around the United States would provide shoreline defense and be adequate also for peacekeeping, although not for wars of intervention. If the Soviets refuse to practice similar capacity reductions, Melman invites them to continue to build up overkill capacity and risk the economic consequences.

321
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm. [THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE] Die zivile Seite des Nordatlantischen Bündnisses. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Aug. 1971: 394-396.
U3.W396, v. 20

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is more than a military alliance. The 15 member states collaborate in a variety of activities of a political, economic, scientific, and cultural nature. The North Atlantic Council, for example, is the chief forum for political consultation on such issues as East-West relations and disarmament. Since the efficiency of the military forces fielded by NATO is directly dependent upon the economic health of the individual member states, there is great impetus for close economic consultation and cooperation either through the Economic Committee of the Council or organizations outside of NATO. Scientific collaboration takes the form of scholarships and research projects. Cultural collaboration is aimed at creating a sense of communality among the member states. NATO collaboration in the civilian sector is exemplified by the creation of a committee on the problems of modern society, among whose pilot projects were studies on air and water pollution and catastrophe assistance. NATO's ability to solve problems of a nonmilitary nature strengthens the organization from within, thus adding to its cohesion and indirectly to its defense capability.

322
Nydal, Reidar, Knut Lövseth, and Oddveig Syrstad. BOMB ^{14}C IN THE HUMAN POPULATION. Nature (London) v. 232, Aug. 6, 1971: 418-421.
Q1.N2, v. 232

Reports the results of a study of carbon-14 concentrations in the human body. The authors reject the argument that because of its long half-life carbon-14 from nuclear weapons tests, even in the relatively low concentrations in which it occurs in the body, represents a serious genetic hazard. Instead, they advance the proposition that "the only ^{14}C hazard from previous tests which should be taken into account is attributable to a total genetic dose (D) of the order of 10 mrad, received in a period of about 30 yr.," which dose, however, is "negligible compared with the dose received from natural sources, which constitutes about 100 mrad per yr."

323
Pierce, Allan D., Joe W. Posey, and Elisabeth F. Iliff. VARIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION GENERATED ACOUSTIC-GRAVITY WAVE FORMS WITH BURST HEIGHT AND WITH ENERGY YIELD. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, July 20, 1971: 5025-5042.
QC811.J6, v. 76

A formulation of a method for synthesizing theoretical infrasonic far-field pressure wave forms generated by nuclear explosions is described which differs from that described by Harkrider in 1964 primarily in the method by which the source presence is incorporated. The rationale of the model is described and a number of predicted wave forms created by the detonation of nuclear explosions in temperature-stratified and wind-stratified atmospheres are presented to illustrate the effects of winds and the effect of the varying energy yield and of the height of burst. Theoretical wave forms are compared with a number of observed wave forms previously exhibited by Harkrider. Discrepancies are pointed out among the predictions of Scorer, of Weston, of Hunt, Palmer, and Penney, and of Harkrider as to the effects of height of burst. Our formulation predicts the early portion of wave forms received on the ground to be nearly proportional to yield and to increase slowly with height of burst up to a height of the order of 40 km (which depends on yield) and then to decrease rapidly with further increasing height. These predictions are explained in simpler terms if the early portion of the wave form is assumed to be carried in a single composite guided mode analogous to that predicted by Lamb for the isothermal atmosphere. (Abstract supplied)

324
PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES: DUTY--OR DISCRETION? Michigan law review, v. 69, June 1971: 1312-1346.
LL
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Analyzes questions involved in the interpretation and application of the Geneva Conventions. The particular concern is that one of the key witnesses of the My Lai events was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. The author asks whether this "exercise of prosecutorial discretion [has] violated the obligation of the convention to prosecute war criminals?" He further examines the question in the light of several provisions of the

Conventions, American legal thought, and international practice, which he finds generally in support of discretionary factors. Since the testimony was essential for an understanding of events in My Lai, the decision to grant immunity "is consistent with national norms regulating the practice." In considering the larger problems of war crimes tribunals the author concludes that "the common interests of all nations would be served by the creation of a deliberative body less susceptible to national bias with the power to impose on nations standards of conduct preservative of life in the face of armed conflict."

325
Reich, Michael, and David Finkelhor. CAPITALISM AND THE "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX": THE OBSTACLES TO "CONVERSION." Review of radical political economics, v. 2, fall 1970: 1-25.
HC101.R43, v. 2

This essay appears also as chapter 6, "The Military-Industrial Complex: No Way Out" in Tom Christoffel, David Finkelhor and Dan Gilbarg (eds.), Up Against the American Myth (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.)
HN59.C74

Both liberals and radicals agree that the military and defense industries control too large a portion of the American economy and divert resources from basic social needs. The positions which each political viewpoint represents in regard to the military-industrial complex are quite divergent, however. While liberals argue that it is possible, with resolve, to "'convert' our national priorities from weapons to socially useful purposes without rearranging or too drastically upsetting the institutions basic to our economy and government," the radicals reply that conversion is not possible without a social revolution to establish the Socialist society that is the only way to eliminate militarism, the essential cause of economic imbalance. The liberals would resolve the problem of the military-industrial complex by legislating the military budget into socially useful programs. The radicals, on the other hand, envision no such simple conversion of resources. They think the military-industrial complex is a phenomenon of our capitalist economy. Domestic as well as international capitalism depends on military spending for its continued growth. The only way to realine our national priorities in favor of socially beneficent goals is to "challenge the legitimacy and structure of basic capitalist institutions and overthrow them."

326
Richman, Alvin, and Harry R. Targ. THE IMPACT OF INSTRUCTION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS ON STUDENT ORIENTATIONS AND OPINION CONSISTENCY CONCERNING THE VIETNAM WAR. Sociology of education, v. 44, spring 1971: 151-169.
L11.J76, v. 44

"Revised version of a paper presented at the Midwest Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society in Lafayette, Indiana, April, 1970."

Reports the results of an experiment to determine whether international relations instruction or external events has the greater impact on the attitudes of college students toward the Vietnam War. Identical tests were administered at the beginning and end of the spring 1968 semester to two international relations classes at Purdue University, one taught by a supporter, the other by a critic, of the Vietnam War. Control classes in psychology and sociology were also given the tests. The results indicate that external events have the greater impact in changing student attitudes and engaging their interests.

327
Rodberg, Leonard S., and Derek Shearer, comps. THE PENTAGON WATCHERS; STUDENTS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970. 416 p. UA23.P44

Papers based on research conducted by students in the summer, 1969 under the title, National Security Summer Research Project, sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington.
Bibliography: p. [399]-409.
Notes at the end of each paper.

Contents.--Introduction, by Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer.--pt. 1. State power: The making of the national security state, by Robert Borosage. The Kennedy hawks assume power from the Eisenhower vultures, by Marcus G. Raskin. The Pentagon propaganda machine, by Derek Shearer.--pt. 2. Intervention: The will to intervene, by William Stivers. The capacity to intervene, by Tom Klein.--pt. 3. Arms and industry: Spoon-feeding the military--how new weapons come to be, by David E. Sims. The manned bomber--a mystique in search of a mission, by Mary McCarthy. The missile race--the contest with ourselves, by Nancy Lipton and Leonard S. Rodberg. Buck Rogers is alive and well--and doing R&D for the Pentagon, by Marc Kramer. The coming arms race under the sea, by Sam Baker and Kerry Gruson.--Appendix: Research/action groups related to military and foreign affairs. How to research the military.--Bibliography.--A course outline.

Investigates aspects of American foreign and military policy. The project that produced these papers "was suggested by the experience of the law students called 'Nader's Raiders,' who spent a summer looking closely at the Federal Trade Commission." Part 1 recounts the growth of the national security establishment and the concomitant withering of internal restraints, part 2 examines the development of the philosophy and means of American intervention in the postwar world, and part 3 explores elements of the military-industrial complex, with emphasis on weapons development.

328
Rogers, William P. SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 1: THE DUTY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, July 19, 1971: 78-82.
JX232.A33, v. 65

States the Administration's view of the conflict between the "duty of the executive branch to protect the national security and the rights of a free press." The problem has been posed by the release to the public of information contained in the so-called "Pentagon papers" and by a Supreme Court ruling that the Government, in its bid to prevent release of further information, had failed to meet the "heavy burden" of justifying a prior restraint on publication. The Secretary expresses the hope that "the press will recognize an obligation to refrain from the publication of information which would harm the security of the United States" and offers assistance "in identifying any documents which if disclosed would result in such harm." Current classification procedures are under review, and it is the policy of the Administration "to find ways to protect the orderly processes of government, safeguard our national interests, and deal on a basis of confidentiality with foreign governments consistent with the rights and obligations of a free press."

329
Rosenberg, Milton J., Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse. VIETNAM AND THE SILENT MAJORITY; THE DOVE'S GUIDE. With a postscript for peace workers, by Ralph K. White. Foreword, by George McGovern. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 162 p. (Har/Row books) DS557.A68R68
Bibliography: p. [157]-159.

Contents.--Foreword, by George McGovern.--The public and foreign policy.--The silent majority: myth and reality.--Group differences in Vietnam opinion.--Changing attitudes on the war: some practical theory.--Beyond Vietnam.--A postscript for peace workers: some concrete advice, by Ralph K. White.--Bibliography.--About the authors.

Analyzes the nature of public opinion on the Vietnam War to offer practical guidelines for use in changing prowar attitudes or working in a political campaign for a peace-oriented candidate. Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse contend that opinion on the war is multifaceted and that discontent with official policy does not necessarily translate into effective opposition, strengthen the peace movement, or produce antiwar voting behavior. They examine "hawks" and "doves" in terms of age, sex, economic class, educational background, and other group factors, to indicate opportunities and difficulties in reshaping attitudes. The authors propose approaches for altering individual beliefs through understanding of the psychological and cultural underpinnings of prowar attitudes. They close with an evaluation of American foreign policy in light of the experience in Vietnam and call for a reformulation of outlook and policy. White's postscript offers pointers for campaign workers based on material presented earlier.

330
Schoenau, Karl L. von. [THE ISOLATED SOLDIER] Der vereinsamte Soldat. Kampftruppen, no. 3, May/June 1971: 74-75. N&CPR

Resignation or aggression is the sociopsychological outgrowth of the isolation of the soldier from the civilian community. Society is the loser; for, in the one case, he will not fight to protect that society and, in the other, he will fight to destroy it. It is imperative that civilian-initiated action be taken to heal the widening gap between the German civilian population and the Bundeswehr. Time was when the German soldier was welcome and respected in the German community. Today he is the object of indifference, ignored or rejected in a pluralistic society of which he no longer feels a part and which itself is divided. If soldier-citizen integration efforts are not begun, the further ostracism of the German soldier may eventuate in his resignation or aggression.

331
Sobik, Erich. [THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES] Der XXIV. Parteitag und die sowjetischen Streitkräfte. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 137, July 1971: 482, 485-486. U3.A43, v. 137

Evaluates the significance of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the continuing development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The interests of the Soviet military were more than adequately represented at the Congress. Although Brezhnev stood for "political" solutions to international problems, the Party leadership ensured the necessary resources for military solutions. That means that the Soviet Armed Forces will continue to maintain their numerical strength, modernize, emphasize strategic forces (missile units and naval forces), and aline themselves still more closely with the Party. The author concludes that by reason of the military strength reinforced by the Party Congress, the Soviet Union will be unyielding in its negotiations with the West.

332
Stepan, Alfred. THE MILITARY IN POLITICS; CHANGING PATTERNS IN BRAZIL. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971. 313 p. illus. UA619.S7
Bibliography: p. 277-295.

Examines the political and economic conditions in Brazil from 1945 to 1968 that supported or eroded different patterns of civil-military relations. Part 1 sets forth data on the organizational and institutional features of the Brazilian military; part 2 illustrates "the fact that the role of the military as a 'moderator' of politics in the Brazilian system before 1964 had roots in civilian perceptions concerning the proper function of the military in society;" part 3 investigates the political process by which attitudes and assumptions that supported the moderating pattern of civil-military relations were eroded; and part 4 describes the additional political requirements of the military in its new role as a director of Brazil's political system. A note on sources and field techniques employed during the research for this study is appended.

333
Stivers, R. E. ROTC; DAMAGE CONTROL REPORT. Navy, v. 14, July/Aug. 1971: 24-29. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Gauges the impact of student demonstrations and other forms of campus protest on the Naval Reserve Officer Training Program. Stivers finds that despite some disruptions and a few cancellations, the program is still in good health, and he predicts that it will continue to be a major source of new officers for the Navy. The worst is now over for the program, as students and administrators take a more moderate attitude and seek compromise solutions. Termination of the draft would be a damaging blow, making recruiting more difficult and having an adverse effect on the quality of new officers.

334
Taylor, Telford. NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY. Chicago, Quadrangle Books; distributed by Random House [1970]
JX6731.W3T38
"A New York Times book."
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--War crimes.--Superior orders and reprisals.--Just and unjust wars.--Nuremberg.--Aggressive war, Vietnam and the courts.--War crimes: Son My.--Crime and punishment.--War and peace.

An examination of the principles of law and ethics on which the Nuremberg and other war crimes trials of World War II were based, the contribution of the trials to the further development of these principles, and the applicability of these principles to U.S. military operations in Vietnam, and, particularly, to such events as the massacre at My Lai. Taylor charges that by its actions in Vietnam the United States has shown that it did not itself learn the lessons about international behavior that it tried to teach the rest of the world at the war crimes trials. On the contrary, it has invoked the very principles announced at Nuremberg and elsewhere to justify the destruction of a small country and its people. This is the "American tragedy."

335
Telegadas, K. THE UPPER PORTION OF THE HADLEY CELL CIRCULATION AS DEDUCED FROM THE 1968 FRENCH AND CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, July 20, 1971: 5018-5024.
QC811.J6, v. 76

French and Chinese nuclear testing in 1968 provided an opportunity for studying stratospheric transport processes. The French tests of August and September 1968 and the Chinese test of December 1968 provided radioactive tracers to follow air motions in the lower stratosphere of each hemisphere. The two sources are readily distinguishable by fission product ratios (e.g., Zr-95/Ce-144). Information on interhemispheric exchange in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere has been developed by the analysis of air-filter samples obtained by aircraft and balloons. The meridional transport of radioactive debris into the lower equatorial stratosphere from two sources is qualitatively explained by a mean meridional circulation superimposed on large-scale mixing processes. It is further suggested that the mean circulation is an extension of the tropospheric Hadley Cell into the lower stratosphere. (Abstract supplied)

336
Terman, Frederick E. SUPPLY OF SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING MANPOWER: SURPLUS OR SHORTAGE? Science, v. 173, July 30, 1971: 399-405. illus.
Q1.S35, v. 173
"References and Notes": p. 405.

Student interest in engineering and physical and mathematical science degrees has been falling off in recent years. Apparently there will be enough scientists and engineers holding B.S. degrees to satisfy minimum national needs. Yet a greater proportion must earn graduate degrees to ensure an adequate number of quality professionals. The expanded quantity of new Ph.D's during the 1960's responded to the growing demand in academia and defense-space industries, where almost all scientists and engineers holding doctorates were employed. But in 1969-1970, with the leveling off of the number of science and engineering students and of government support for academic research, university openings for new Ph.D's dropped. Few new positions in defense-space research and development are available due to the slowdown of Government funding and program cutbacks. The need for new Ph.D's is felt now in applied research for industries that are not defense- and space-related, not in teaching and basic research. Yet the education of new Ph.D's continues to emphasize old academic and defense-space priorities. Industrially-funded research will not grow enough to accommodate the Ph.D supply. New fields of science and engineering employment must be found to maintain the educational plant the nation now possesses.

337
Vought, Donald B. OUR MILITARY, A TARGET FOR CRITICS. VFW magazine, v. 58, Aug. 1971: 13-15. illus.
E181.F7, v. 58

Castigation of the military is no new phenomenon in American life. There has been a definite and constant antimilitary bias throughout American history. It is based on deep philosophical grounds and on habit. One reason is the American faith in the perfectability of man, and the military becomes visible evidence of the failure of that faith. Another is the religious absolutism that ends in pacifism. Habitual antimilitarism originated with the colonists from England, where the military was ill-esteemed, and from subsequent immigrants who in many cases fled Europe to escape military service. Nonetheless, the world position

of the United States requires military forces as an instrument of policy, from which perspective they must be viewed.

338
THE WAR AND SOCIAL WELFARE: FOUR PERSPECTIVES; PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM. Held in Syracuse, N.Y., Nov. 16, 1970. Presented by the Central New York Chapter, National Association of Social Workers. [Syracuse, Central New York Chapter, National Association of Social Workers, 1971] 23 p.
HV91.W28 1970
Max Casper, editor.

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction, by Max Casper.--Social and economic results of the war, by A. Dale Tussing.--The responsibility of the social worker for the conditions with which the client must cope, by Reuben Bitensky.--The effect of the war on the poor, the black, the youth, by Solon Ice.--The effect of the war on the delivery of health services, by Peggy Wood.

Papers on the impact of war, and especially the Vietnam War, on social welfare and the provision of social services in the United States, presented to a symposium sponsored for the purpose of providing factual materials and a focus of concern for social workers, whose direct experience in social work has made them aware of the social costs of the Vietnam War and who desire to take concerted action in support of peace.

339
Weiss, Edward S., and others. THYROID NODULARITY IN SOUTHWESTERN UTAH SCHOOL CHILDREN EXPOSED TO FALLOUT RADIATION. American journal of public health, v. 61, Feb. 1971: 241-248.
RA421.A41, v. 61

Clinical investigation of the hypothesis that children of Nevada and Utah show a higher than normal incidence of thyroid damage attributable to iodine-131 from the fallout of nuclear weapons testing. The investigators concluded that they could find "no evidence that children of Southwestern Utah and adjacent areas of Nevada near the test site have received enough radiation from radio-iodine to produce significant thyroid disease." The desirability of follow-up studies to assess possible long-term effects is stressed.

340
Weyel, Volker. [UGANDA: ONE MORE MILITARY REGIME] Uganda: Ein Militärregime mehr. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Mar. 1971: 294-309. D839.B57, v. 16

Charges that the January 1971 overthrow of the Obote government in Uganda was a carefully engineered plot headed by General Amin, supported by feudal landlords, entrepreneurial factions, and the army leadership, and designed to put an end to Obote's Socialist-oriented policies. Weyel indicates that the Israelis also had a hand in the putsch. As advisors to Ugandan military forces, they feared Obote's anti-imperialist policies and his hardening stand toward the Israeli-supported South Sudanese rebels. The author finds the far-reaching causes of the tragedy in the colonial system of divide-and-conquer which Uganda inherited from the British. With the demise of Obote, Uganda is taking the road of Ghana and reverting to neocolonial dependence on Great Britain.

341
Wrong, Dennis H. WAR CRIMES AND POLITICS. Dissent, v. 18, Aug. 1971: 327-329.
HX1.D58, v. 18

The question of American guilt for war crimes is real, but it cannot be handled effectively by legal trials. The two key problems are the definition of genocide and the location of responsibility. The United States did not set out intentionally to destroy large numbers of Vietnamese citizens, so that calling such killing genocide is a "form of rhetorical overkill." Similarly, it is impossible to allocate individual guilt--one lieutenant leads to a captain, to a general, a president, a cabinet, a congress, "all of us." The effect of any trial would be to divert attention from realistic appraisal of what the United States has done in Indochina, to "endless diversionary litigious wrangling." A proposed hearing before a United Nations tribunal involves similar drawbacks, and it is not clear that foreign appraisal would "bring Americans to a full realization of the evil their government has wrought in Indochina." The best course is to call for a commission report and aroused public debate so that the publicity spotlight may restrain the United States from violation of the laws of war.

342
Young, Louise B., and William J. Trainor, comps. SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY. Prepared by American Foundation for Continuing Education At Syracuse University. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1971. 626 p. illus.
Q171.Y69
Includes bibliographical references.
"Preparation of this volume has been supported by a grant from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace."

Partial contents.--pt. 3. The development of atomic energy. Prologue, by Eugene Rabinowitch.--The development of atomic theory. Early atomic theory, by Theodore A. Ashford. Explaining the atom, by Selig Hecht. Penetrating rays, by Alfred Romer. Rutherford's theory of the nuclear atom, by Theodore A. Ashford. Explaining the atom, continued, by Selig Hecht.--Atomic weapons. Letter to President Roosevelt, by Albert Einstein. The first self-sustaining chain reaction, by Selig Hecht. Selections from an eyewitness account of the first atomic pile. Atomic bombs are made, by Selig Hecht. Alamogordo: selection from an interview with Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell.

The decision to use the atom bomb, by Henry L. Stimson. Destruction unlimited, by Eugene Rabinowitch. The theory of thermonuclear weapons, by Theodore A. Ashford. Secrecy and scientific progress, by Eugene Rabinowitch.--pt. 4. Some problems of the atomic age.--Introduction. Decisionmaking in the nuclear age, by Hans J. Morgenthau.--The dangers and benefits of nuclear testing. Can genetic damage be proved? by Garrett Hardin. Radiation and human mutation, by H. J. Muller. The scientists' petition to the United Nations, by Linus Pauling. The compelling need for nuclear tests, by Edward Teller and Albert Latter. The facts about fallout, by Linus Pauling. What is the harm of nuclear testing to human inheritance? by Barry Commoner and Richard Daly.--The hazards and potentialities of the peaceful atom. The peaceful atom, by Arnold Kramish.--Science and politics. Modern science and political power, by Hans J. Morgenthau.

"The readings in this volume are intended as an introduction to some of the fundamental ideas of contemporary science and technology, and to a few of their international political implications." Part 3 surveys nuclear theory and the development of nuclear weapons technology. Part 4 examines the social ramifications of nuclear technology.

INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

343
Butler, William E. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA. Baltimore, London, Johns Hopkins Press [c1971] 245 p. illus.
JX4411.B84
Selected bibliography: p. 203-215.

Contents.--Preface.--General introduction.--The legal regime of territorial waters.--The legal regime of internal sea waters.--The closed sea.--The legal regime of the continental shelf.--The legal regime of the deep seabed.--The legal regime of the high seas.--Conclusion.--Selected bibliography.--Table of statutes and orders.--Table of treaties.--Index.

Investigates the origins and development of tsarist Russian and Soviet doctrines and practices as they relate to the international law of the sea. The Soviet Union has moved from the protective, security-oriented maritime policy of tsarist days to one that emphasizes freedom of navigation in keeping with the expanded role of its navy and merchant fleet. "On the whole," Butler indicates, "Soviet practice reveals a pattern of realistic, rather traditional, often sensitive appraisals of the existing state of international law by Soviet authorities." The differences between Socialist and Western approaches to the law of the sea, he concludes, do not seem insurmountable, since there is apparently no distinctly Marxist-Leninist ideological approach to maritime law.

344
Conference on Contemporary Problems of the Law of Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1969. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS; [report] New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1971. 119 p.
JX4521.C65 1971

Contents.--Preface, by Joseph E. Johnson.--List of participants.--A reconsideration of the law of armed conflicts; report prepared for the conference, by Denise Bindschedler-Robert.--Summary record of the conference, by Lucius Caflisch.

A general survey of the present status and chief problems of the laws of armed conflict, prepared for the use of the conference in its deliberations, together with a summary of the proceedings. The laws governing armed conflicts have suffered severe erosion in recent years, largely because "new means and new methods of warfare and new types of conflicts have rendered much of the existing law obsolete, and obsolescence has become a constant pretext for the evasion of rules and an obstacle to the more effective application of the law." It is a matter of some urgency, therefore, that members of the international community "examine the present legal situation in order to identify the weaknesses in the existing laws and to inquire if and how the situation can be improved."

345
Emerson, Rupert. SELF-DETERMINATION. American journal of international law, v. 65, July 1971: 459-475. JX1.A6, v. 65
"This article is one of the by-products of the Panel on Self-Determination organized by the American Society of International Law."

Probes the international legal significance and practical political consequences of the right of national self-determination when exercise of that right takes the form of automatic and often ill-considered national independence. As currently construed, self-determination applies only to peoples inhabiting areas held by colonial powers and not, for example, to the Armenians, Balts, or Koreans. Emerson points out that once an independent state emerges as a result of decolonization and self-determination a further act of self-determination like secession is not considered tolerable, no matter how diverse the state's ethnic composition may be. Citing the political nonviability and military defenselessness of many of the small states produced by self-determination and the possibility that more such states may yet emerge, he questions the practicality of national independence as the only logical sequence to self-determination. As alternatives he sees association or integration with more powerful states or an agency of the United Nations, which would furnish counsel and facilities to peoples who are midway between dependence and independence.

346
Gandolfi, Alain. [INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: FIRST YEAR] Institutions internationales: première année. Paris, Masson, 1971. 204 p. illus. (Premier cycle. Droit, Sciences économiques)
JX1995.G32
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--The evolution of international institutions.--Contemporary international society and its law.--The state.--Structure of the interstate system.--The life of the state.--The sources of international law.--The organs of relationships between states.--The means of settling conflicts between states.--International organizations.--Generalities.--The United Nations.--Specialized agencies of the United Nations.--European organizations of cooperation.--The European communities.--Non-European regional organizations.--The maintenance of peace by the international organization.--Aid to developing countries.

Textbook survey of international relations that focuses on the nation state, international and regional organizations and their specialized agencies, and international law within the context of the maintenance of world order and stability.

347
Ihmels, Karl. [ON THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE "CLAIM OF SOLE REPRESENTATION" AND THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS"] Zur politischen Funktion des "Alleinvertretungsanspruchs" und der "besonderen Beziehungen." Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Mar. 1971: 237-246.
D839.B57, v. 16
Includes bibliographical references.

Urges the German Federal Republic to drop the juristic fictions by which it denies full international legal recognition to the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic's claim to be the successor state of the German Reich and, therefore, the sole international representative of Germany is patently without legal foundation. The reestablishment of German statehood, i.e., the continuation of the Reich, could take place only to the extent that the Allies renounced their exercise of the jurisdiction assumed in 1945. As long as the Federal Republic does not recognize the Soviet Union's renunciation of its occupation zone, it denies itself the sovereignty it asserts over the territory of the Democratic Republic. On the other hand, should the Federal Republic take cognizance of the Soviet declaration, it would in effect have to accept the sovereignty of its East German neighbor. If the Federal Republic persists in claiming for itself the right of succession, that claim can apply only to the territory currently administered by Bonn. Ihmels holds that the "sole representation" theory is based on political objectives aimed at isolating the Democratic Republic from the non-Socialist world and eventually "liberating" the "Soviet zone." Similarly, the current theory of "special relationships" excludes the unconditional recognition of the Federal Republic as a state fully equal with every other within the context of international law. The juristic arguments now being waged by Bonn are, however, only rear-guard actions. What is needed, the author concludes, is less continuity on the part of Bonn and more of a beginning.

348
Kussbach, Erich. [THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW--A PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS] Die Weiterbildung des Völkerrechts--eine friedenserhaltende Funktion der Vereinten Nationen. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 11, no. 2, 1971: 67-84.
DB47.043, v. 11

The United Nations provides the instrumentality for furthering the development of international law and contributing to the maintenance of peace, for it is in that body that international law and international politics have the closest reciprocal relationship. In the postwar years two factors have had the greatest influence on the development of international law: the technological revolution and decolonization. The United Nations has played a significant role in shaping that influence within the parameters of its peacekeeping goal. It has done so by establishing new international legal norms in these two fields through broad-based multilateral treaties, in which compromise and group interest have superseded narrow and special privilege, and through the creation of new precedent. Examples of such treaties include the test ban, nonproliferation, and seabed agreements. The declaration on the independence of colonial peoples and subsequent resolutions point up the establishment of precedent.

349
Lehmann, Horst. [THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES] Das interamerikanische System zur friedlichen Beilegung von Streitigkeiten. [Bonn, 1969] xxxix, 236 p.
F1415.L43
Inaug.-Diss.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. vii-xix.

Examines the efforts of the American states to establish a regional system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Lehmann discusses the various treaty arrangements, mediation procedures, and international courts used for that purpose. He finds that the Treaty of Bogotá (1948), which established the Organization of American States and sought to substitute a uniform procedure for the varied treaties then existing, has not been successful.

350
Lewan, Kenneth M. [HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED AREAS] Die Menschenrechte in den von Israel besetzten Gebieten. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, June 1971: 625-636.
D839.B57, v. 16
Bibliographical footnotes.

Charges Israel with the violation of the human rights of Arab civilians in the occupied areas. These charges are based on reports released by Amnesty International, the Red Cross, and a special investigative committee of the U.N. General Assembly. They include specifically the use of torture to elicit information, destruction of private property, and expulsion of the Arab population. These acts violate the U.N. declaration on human rights and the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The author maintains that these acts are part of the Israeli policy of using brutal means to eliminate the Arab population.

351
Osakwe, Chris. CONTEMPORARY SOVIET DOCTRINE ON THE JURIDICAL NATURE OF UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. American Journal of international law, v. 65, July 1971: 502-521.
JX1.A6, v. 65

Soviet international legal doctrine is divided into two schools. The Tunkin school concedes to a

varying but limited degree that international bodies possess an international personality. This is the prevalent legal opinion in the Soviet Union, but it involves an uncomfortable contradiction. International personality for an international body suggests a common will, but Communist tenets disallow any measure of compromise with imperialist powers in ideology. Therefore, definitions in the Tunkin school variously ascribe to international organizations an autonomous but nonsovereign will or no individual will independent of that of the participating states. The Tunkin school stresses the derivative and secondary nature of international personality. The Modzhorian-Shurshalov school rejects the international personality altogether and derogates to international bodies the position of mere agents for the states which they represent. Soviet doctrine still does recognize nongovernmental international legal entities or physical persons as subjects of international law. The Soviet Union should grant full legal personality to international organizations. A move in that direction will be difficult as long as international law is a convenient tool of the foreign office.

352
Schweitzer, Michael, comp. [INTERNATIONAL PEACE LAW] Friedensvölkerrecht. Mit einer Einleitung von Walter Rudolf. Bad Homburg v. d. H., Athenäum Verlag, 1970. 523 p. (Athenäumtexte, Bd. 4)
JX173.S34
Bibliography: p. 22-35.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Man in international law: Human rights. Minorities.--pt. 2. Area in international law: Rivers and lakes. Canals and straits. Coastal waters and the High Sea. Space. Neutrality and neutralization.--pt. 3. Interstate relations: Diplomats and consuls. Treaties of international law. International collaboration. Prevention of war. Peaceful settlement of disputes.--Appendix.

A collection of German-language texts of documents previously unavailable to those professionally or privately interested in international relations. Included are representative bilateral agreements, worldwide or regional treaties, and some unilateral acts of international relevance like the Swiss declarations of neutrality and the Austrian neutrality law.

353
Steinberger, Helmut. [INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET TREATY OF AUGUST 12, 1970] Völkerrechtliche Aspekte des deutsch-sowjetischen Vertragwerks vom 12. August 1970. Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, v. 31, June 1971: 63-161.
K1.U753, v. 31
Bibliographical footnotes.

Seeks to identify some of the legal parameters of German Ostpolitik in terms of the Moscow Treaty and its related instruments. The author emphasizes as decisive that while the treaty is more than a gentleman's agreement it is not a peace settlement or the instrument of a security system. It does not provide for territorial guarantees nor does it legitimatize existing frontiers. The treaty's purpose is rather to initiate a process of mutual détente. "Whether in view of the undiminished ideological conflicts," he concludes, "it will contribute to the establishment of a sincere peace remains to be seen."

354
Sundberg, Jacob W. F. PIRACY: AIR AND SEA. De Paul law review, v. 20, winter 1970: 337-435.
LL
"This article was prepared for publication in Bassiouni and Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on International Criminal Law (in print, 1972) . . . ."

Examines a wide variety of historical and contemporary examples of air and sea piracy to explore facets of relevant international law and conventions that have evolved in the absence of law. Sundberg observes the similarities of piracy, privateering, and guerrilla warfare, as well as the latter's distance from "classic European war." Similarly, insurgency is many levels removed from the influences of international law. Sundberg cautions that "the likely disorders of the future are not war or military attack between states, but subversion, revolution, insurrection and civil war." His conclusion advocates establishment of an international criminal court as originally proposed in 1937, and presents the conventions designed then.

355
Weber, Hermann. [THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, BELLUM LEGALE? THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATES UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER'S PROHIBITION OF FORCE] Der Vietnam-Konflikt, bellum legale? Die Rechtspflichten der Staaten unter dem Gewaltverbot der UN-Charta. Hamburg [Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg] Frankfurt, A. Metzner in Kommission, 1970. 336 p. (Werkhefte der Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, Heft 6)
JX1573.W37
Bibliography: p. 292-336.

Contents.--Introduction to the problem.--pt. 1. The legal obligation under the general presumptions of the confrontation existing between North and South Vietnam: Are the disputes between North and South Vietnam the conflict between two "states"? Is the U.N. Charter's prohibition of force valid for de facto states? The concept of interstate force in the U.N. Charter. Is the U.N. Charter's prohibition of force valid as international customary law?--pt. 2. The legal obligations under the special presumption of the inner political situation of South Vietnam: Does the Vietnam conflict relate to a civil war in South Vietnam? Is the participation of third states in the South Vietnamese civil war included in the prohibition of force?--pt. 3. The legal obligations in the stage of military escalation (the air

attacks against North Vietnam): The political-historical background of the escalation. The increased intervention of North Vietnam in South Vietnam as the bases for the bombardment of North Vietnam. The question of accountability. The air attacks and the prohibition of force.--Summary.--Abbreviations.--Bibliography.

Examination of the applicability of international law to the actions of the states, parties, and groups involved in the Vietnam conflict. Since the National Liberation Front (NLF) did not have an international legal personality until 1969, the intervention of North Vietnam in behalf of the rebels, insofar as they can be proved to be an "armed" group, can be interpreted as a violation of the U.N. Charter prohibition of the use of force. In the same interpretation American actions in South Vietnam are not regarded as a violation, since the government in Saigon requested the American intervention. Weber rejects this interpretation as based on 19th-century law. The political realities of 20th-century revolutions point up, however, the dubiousness of this interpretation. Weber holds that in the early years of the civil war the NLF convincingly demonstrated its claims to international personality. American air attacks against North Vietnam changed the nature of the conflict and brought on the direct confrontation between the United States and North Vietnam. By acting more strongly than warranted by the provocations, the United States committed an act of international aggression exceeding any perpetrated by Hanoi.

356
Whiting, Allen S., ed. DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 14, Dec. 1970: 443-554. JX1901.J6, v. 14
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--In memoriam: Quincy Wright, 1890-1970--a symposium, by Allen S. Whiting.--The heritage of Quincy Wright, by Inis L. Claude, Jr.--The personal impact of a great teacher, by Abdul M. Abbass.--Quincy Wright's contribution to the study of war, by Karl W. Deutsch.--Policy and theory in Quincy Wright's international relations, by Kenneth W. Thompson.--Wright on war, by Robert C. North.--Historical periods, trends, and cycles in international relations, by Frank L. Klingberg.--Field and environmental approaches to world politics: implications for data archives, by Raymond Tanter and James N. Rosenau.--From "A study of war" to peace research: some criteria and strategies, by J. David Singer.--Quincy Wright on war and peace: a statistical overview and selected bibliography, by Clinton F. Fink and Christopher Wright.

Issue in memoriam of the late Quincy Wright, a founder of the contemporary study of international relations and one of the preeminent peace researchers of this century. The papers present an overview and critical assessment of Quincy Wright's life work as a teacher, scholar, author and theoretician. His contributions to the study of international relations and, particularly, to the study of war are evaluated for their significance today and their meaning for the future.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

357
Ago, Roberto. [THE UNITED NATIONS 25 YEARS AFTER] Les Nations Unies vingt-cinq ans après. Genève, Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1970. 23 p. (Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales. Collection Conférences, no. 7) JX1977.A655

Summarizes some of the activities of the United Nations during the past 25 years, concentrating on its role in maintaining world peace and security and ensuring the progress of humanity. Ago cites several examples of the United Nations' mediating capability in such local conflicts as Indonesia (1947) and the Middle East (1948). He discusses the organization's inherent weaknesses and its difficulties in achieving its major goals of peace and security and notes that the chief obstacle to the realization of these objectives is the arms race. A global strategy for social and economic development in which the international community would renounce competition among the states and begin an action program executed on a truly international level is advocated.

358
Boyd, Andrew K. H. FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG; A HISTORY OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL. New York, Stein and Day [1971] 383 p. illus. JX1977.B597
Includes bibliographical references.

Examines the work of the United Nations Security Council since 1946. In reference to arms control and disarmament, Boyd finds that the Security Council has abdicated its charter rights under Article 11 to the General Assembly, although retrieving them briefly in 1968 to handle the nonproliferation treaty.

359
Fabian, Larry L. SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES; PREPARING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING. Washington, Brookings Institution [c1971] 315 p. JX1981.P7F3

Contents.--From collective security to peacekeeping.--Preparedness for United Nations peacekeeping: the setting.--The League and before.--Beyond San Francisco: the early years.--Hammarskjöld, middle powers, and the Nordic response.--The wider fellowship.--Perspectives on preparedness.--The shape of future preparedness.--Appendix: synopsis of United Nations peacekeeping missions. National participants in peacekeeping missions.--Selected readings.--Notes.--Index.

Explores the problems and prospects for strengthening and making more effective U.N. peacekeeping capabilities. Fabian analyzes the

reasons underlying the lack of improvement in international peacekeeping institutions and describes some of the efforts improvised to build peacekeeping institutions despite the persistent controversy over the United Nations' role and responsibilities in this area. He speculates about what must be done if improved peacekeeping mechanisms are to emerge in the future.

360
Hottelet, Richard C. WHAT NEW ROLE FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA? Saturday review, v. 54, Sept. 18, 1971: 27-30. illus.
Z1219.S25, v. 54

"Peking's approach to the United Nations suggests that it now prefers to enter the conventional game of international politics." Preoccupation with internal affairs had resulted in international isolation and loss of international prestige. Two developments contributing to China's emergence from isolation are the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 and the threat of a Soviet preventive strike on Chinese nuclear installations following the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. The United Nations became the obvious forum "for international visibility, instant multilateral contact, and access to world opinion." China, which will almost certainly be seated in the 26th General Assembly, will use the United Nations as an instrument in the interest of its political objectives in Africa, the Middle East and East Asia. China and the United Nations will have a mighty impact on each other, but "the only certainty is that the United Nations will not be the same."

361
Jacob, Philip E. ORGANIZING NATIONS IN THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 28-52.
D839.068, v. 15

The coming decade will see international organizations play a critical role in reconciling political pluralism with technological and social interdependence in the international community. Multilateralism will harmonize the actions of states, regulate their interchange, and manage resources for human development; it will also play a large role in seeing that the ocean floor and outer space are preserved for the benefit of all mankind. What remains is to find a strategy that will improve the international organization's capacity to carry out these future tasks. Present proposals for structural reform only confuse the essentially consensual nature of these organizations. A "consortium of the concerned" strategy, which would be completely consensual and would report to and work through the United Nations, would "allow members to act when they share a common concern, even if they cannot persuade the entire organization to go along." Multilateral cooperation must promote intergovernmental relations so that states can survive in a world where they can no longer afford to live by themselves.

362
Jessup, Philip C. THE BERLIN BLOCKADE AND THE USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct. 1971: 163-173.
D410.F6, v. 50

Reviews the history of the Western reaction to the Berlin blockade of 1948 and how the United States and Great Britain agreed, over the objections of France, to submit the problem to the United Nations even at the risk of being forced to accept an undesirable solution. Jessup notes in conclusion the wisdom of trusting the opinion held by a majority of nations and the folly of assuming that the United States can decide on solutions to the world's problems by itself.

363
Kutakov, L. N. THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. U.N. monthly chronicle, v. 8, June 1971: 88-101.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 8

A role for the United Nations in strengthening international security would be welcomed by many states. The Soviet-initiated "Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security," adopted almost unanimously by the 1970 General Assembly, is "one of the most important and far-reaching documents to emerge in the United Nations since the Charter of San Francisco." It reaffirms the fundamental Charter principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, self-determination, and pacific settlement of disputes, and calls on all states to work for effective U.N. powers aimed at achieving international security based on these goals. Members should adopt policies to implement the declaration. Some hopeful steps have already been taken, notably in the area of disarmament, which many members in debate related directly to prospects for increasing international security. Important developments are the seabed treaty, the revived 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the proposed five-power nuclear disarmament conference, and the new German Ostpolitik. U.N. efforts are continuing on strengthening peacekeeping, defining aggression, and eliminating colonialism and apartheid. The newly inaugurated regular meetings of the Security Council are a good sign. The continuing efforts of all members are imperative if the aims of the declaration are to be realized.

364
Lotze, Herbert. [THE TERRITORIAL INHERITANCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ON THE PROBLEM OF A TRANSITION OF THE AREA-RELATED RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN AREAS WITH INTERNATIONAL STATUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION] Das territoriale Erbe des Völkerbundes; zum Problem eines Übergangs gebietsbezogener Verantwortlichkeiten des Völkerbundes in Gebieten mit internationalem Status auf die Organisation der Vereinten Nationen. [Münster] 1970. xxvi, 287 p.
JX4021.L66
Inaug.-Diss.--Münster.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. vii-xxiv.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The area-related tasks of the League of Nations.--pt. 2. The fate of the areas with international status under League of Nations participation up to the dissolution of the League of Nations and the problems resulting from this dissolution.--pt. 3. The problem of an ipso facto transition of League of Nations tasks in areas with international status to the United Nations Organization.

Investigation of some of the territorial problems left over as a result of the dissolution of the League of Nations in the framework of the larger question of the continuity of responsibility between one world organization and its successor. Problems discussed include those of the mandated areas, Danzig, the Saar, the Aaland Islands, Alexandretta, and Southwest Africa. Lotze sees a successful peace order as one wherein there is a logical transfer of responsibilities.

365
Mennicken, Jan-Baldem. [THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OCEAN RESEARCH AND EXPLOITATION] Die zwischenstaatliche Kommission für Ozeanographie und die jüngste Entwicklung im Meeresforschung und -ausbeutung. Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, v. 31, June 1971: 344-366. K1.U753, v. 31
Bibliographical footnotes.

Report on the purpose and limitations of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). The purpose of the IOC is to further scientific study "with the view of learning more about the nature and resources of the oceans through the concerted action of its members." This purpose is purely scientific, the author points out, for the member states entertain different views on questions relating to the use of the oceans. Although the commission is not a legal entity, it was established within the framework of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and has a structure similar to that of international organizations.

366
Meyer, Wolfgang. THE JUBILEE SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 2, 1971: 108-123. D261.4.D353, v. 10
Includes bibliographical references.

Utilizes the occasion of the 25th anniversary session of the United Nations to evaluate the U.N. role from the Socialist viewpoint. Meyer cites important new documents adopted at the session and calls upon the member states to follow the principles of universality. The major contributions of the United Nations toward preventing a third world war are due, Meyer asserts, to the change in the international relationship of power in favor of the forces of peace and Socialism. The obstructionism of some non-Socialist countries was evident again in the "imperialist" efforts to emasculate the four documents adopted at the 25th session: the declaration of peaceful coexistence, the anniversary declaration on equality and self-determination, the international development strategy, and the consolidation of international security. There is great need for universality of membership. A most important step in that direction is the admission of the two Germanys, although Bonn is trying to sabotage East Germany's entry through a policy of discrimination. The United Nations did, however, take heed of Walter Ulbricht's message on this problem.

367
Morozov, Grigorii I. [INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; THEIR ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGING THE INTERNATIONAL CLASS STRUGGLE RELATIONSHIP] Internationale Organisationen; ihre Rolle im Prozess der Veränderung des internationalen Klassenkräftenverhältnisses. [Übers. von Wolfgang Eckstein] Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1971. 178 p.
JX1995.M69315
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The rise of international organizations.--The study of international organizations.--International interstate and governmental organizations.--International nonstate organizations.

Analyzes from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint questions of the theory and methodology of international organizations and suggests a classification system encompassing all categories of international bodies, both governmental and nongovernmental. Morozov holds that the study of international organizations is of great significance for the ideological struggle and the shaping of world public opinion.

368
[PEKING BEFORE THE U.N. GATES/SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN DILEMMA?] Peking vor den Toren der UN/Lösung des Taiwan-Dilemmas? [by] FCA [Forschungsdienst China-Archiv] China-Analysen, v. 10, June 1971: 16.
DS701.C356, v. 10

As the Germans, Swiss, and Chinese know, nonmembership in the United Nations is no great handicap to participation on the world scene; in fact, it may even enhance maneuverability by obviating the necessity for taking embarrassing stands on delicate questions. Should there be no compromise readily forthcoming on the Taiwan question, Peking may opt to wait somewhat longer for U.N. membership and a seat on the Security Council rather than make any concessions. One reason for the lack of haste may be that the Chinese Communists need more time for preparations and the selection of a competent delegation. Peking's entry into the United Nations will undoubtedly block or complicate the compromise solution of certain issues. One of these issues is the Middle East problem, which would be further exacerbated by Peking's presence in the United Nations and its continued support of the Palestinian guerrillas.

369
Šahović, Milan. THE UN CHARTER AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS REVISION. Review of international affairs, v. 22, June 20, 1971: 28-31.
D839.R4, v. 22

Surveys interpretations of the U.N. charter noting "changes which are gradually effected in practice," even though no formal changes are registered. The many declarations dealing with topics like rights, nonintervention, and racial conflict have "significantly enriched" the charter. Progress has also been made against colonialism, so that some chapters of the original charter are no longer needed. On the other hand, the problem of peacekeeping requires more study for charter revision; "the broad area of economic and social activity needs to be elaborated." The author reviews other possible revisions dealing with international law, human rights, and organizational and administrative problems. He points out, however, that enthusiasm for change is greater among the small nonalined countries than among the major powers.

370
Schneider, Heinrich. [THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD--PROSPECTS AND THREAT] Die Zukunft der Welt--Chancen und Bedrohung. Wissenschaft und Weltbild, v. 24, Mar. 1971: 42-67.
AS141.W5, v. 24

The ever more rapid tempo of technology and production, the continuing growth in population, and the rising role of social services do not augur an era of individualism but rather point to a more closely knit interdependence of men and their organizations. Since technological and social changes have not taken place at the same pace throughout the world, the incipient North-South conflict will become urgent and possibly eclipse the current East-West conflict of civilizations. If the industrialized states fail to extend appropriate programs of assistance to the Third World, "a class struggle of peoples" will eventuate. When its peoples attain the technological capability, the disadvantaged South will use its numerical superiority to compensate itself at the expense of the Northern industrial states. Of transcending importance, however, is the maintenance of world peace in the nuclear age. The current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are geared only to the consolidation of deterrent systems and to an increase in their credibility and reliability at lower costs. To safeguard the world from self-destruction what is required are not piecemeal steps like SALT, test bans, or nonproliferation accords, but rather a supranational world authority endowed with an effective weapons monopoly as Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker has suggested. However, Weizsäcker's model of a world peace order stresses only the negative side, degrading a supranational body into a mere police command post. Survival depends on creating a dynamic organization capable of "promoting, directing, and channelizing the world's social and political development and operating a positive policy of peace (not just a negative one of preventing acts of force)." States must come to know that even the institutionalizing of an international or supranational body is ineffective, if the states do not assign to it the necessary policy planning responsibilities and executive authority. To survive, mankind must make an extraordinary political effort which requires individual changes in political awareness.

371
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 8, July 1971: 68-77.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 8

Transcript of Secretary General U Thant's press conference held on June 3, 1971, at the annual luncheon of the United Nations Correspondents Association in New York. U Thant answered questions concerning the Middle East, Chinese U.N. representation, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Europe, and East Pakistan, among others. He endorsed the Finnish offer of a meeting site for preliminary talks of the proposed European security conference, and welcomed the Brezhnev proposals for mutual balanced force reductions. The Secretary General said that he had privately suggested that it would "be appreciated by the entire membership if the United States and the Soviet Union were to inform the General Assembly every year of the progress or lack of progress of the SALT talks--not for discussion, but for information."

372
SOVIET AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS; A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs. New York, New York University Press, 1971. 211 p.
JX1977.2.U5S6

Contents.--The United Nations in the world outlook of the Soviet Union and the United States, by Robert G. Wesson.--The superpowers, the U.N. and disarmament: a view from the Third World, by Arthur Lall.--Decolonization, by Harold K. Jacobson.--Economic development: the great powers and the sea bed, by Daniel S. Cheever.--Keeping the peace: an interpretation of Soviet and American security policies, by James P. Sewell.--The rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes, by Edward McWhinney.--Postscript or prologue? by George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Analyzes the interaction of Soviet and American policies in the United Nations during the 1945 to 1970 period with respect to disarmament, economic development and the seabed, international security, decolonization, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Wesson studies a generation of interaction within the framework of the cold war and détente and explores the linkages between Soviet and American behavior in the United Nations. Lall examines Soviet and American objectives and methods of operation in the realm of disarmament while Jacobson focuses on decolonization, particularly

its impact on the superpowers and the United Nations itself. Cheever inquires into the regulation of the seabed and its effect on the development in the Third World countries. Sewell traces the factors that comprise the peacekeeping complex and McWhinney "reveals the long road that is yet to be traversed until law can be utilized to regulate the behavior of the superpowers."

373
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA; AUGUST 20, 1971. Peking review, v. 14, Aug. 27, 1971: 5-6.
DS701.P42, v. 14

On August 17, 1971, the United States representative to the United Nations notified the U.N. Secretary General that his Government supports representation for both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, the Chiang Kai-shek "clique." The Chinese Government and people are unalterably opposed to this "two Chinas" scheme. There is only one China, the People's Republic is its only government, and Taiwan is incontestably one of its provinces. The U.S. position flies in the face of the U.N. Charter, which forbids outside intervention in internal matters. The People's Republic, as the only government of China, is entitled to the seat reserved for China in the U.N. "The restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from that organization are two inseparable aspects of the same question." The draft resolution introduced by Albania, Algeria, and 16 other countries will do this, and the Chinese Government expresses its thanks to these 18 nations for taking this step toward eventual triumph.

374
Thant, U. PEOPLE ARE ASKING "WHY?" U.N. monthly chronicle, v. 8, June 1971: 82-87.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 8
"An address to the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago" delivered on May 5, 1971.

Discusses several major international issues from the point of the United Nations' possible contribution to their solution. Secretary General Thant renews his call for a meeting of the leaders of the five nuclear-armed powers, suggests nuclear disarmament as their first order of business, and offers the United Nations' good offices in achieving success. He hopes that his study for the General Assembly will contribute to a solution of the worldwide arms race and calls for increased public discussion to encourage agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The fact that not all parties with interests in Vietnam, including the People's Republic of China, are U.N. members deters attempts to end the fighting there. The Secretary General concludes that "I am convinced that, if these problems are to be satisfactorily resolved, the United Nations must be enabled to play a part in their solution."

375
Thant, U. THE UNITED NATIONS AS SCAPEGOAT. War/peace report, v. 11, Mar. 1971: 8-11. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11
"U.N. Secretary General U Thant delivered this address on December 3, 1970, in New York City to the News Media Seminar, sponsored by the Stanley Foundation."

The public does not understand that the United Nations has no sovereignty of its own and little authority for initiating action. It is blamed for failing to achieve solutions for explosive or knotty problems dumped on it by states unable or unwilling to undertake the necessary hard steps toward resolution. The United Nations then becomes a scapegoat, criticized for not exercising authority it does not possess in circumstances in which no sovereign state is prepared to act itself or to back the United Nations's efforts. Because the Nigerian civil war was an internal affair, the United Nations could do nothing without the approval of the Nigerian government, yet it was criticized for not bringing a halt to the suffering of the Nigerian people. In some quarters, the United Nations was held responsible for the outbreak of the 1967 Middle East war when it withdrew the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) from its outposts. "It was apparently easier to pretend that UNEF was an enforcement operation which could, and should, have prevented by force the movement of Egyptian troops on Egyptian sovereign territory, than to face the tough realities of the Middle East situation and the true nature of UNEF as a peacekeeping instrument which had no right to use force and which, from the beginning, had operated entirely on the basis of the consent of Egypt to its presence."

376
Theobald, Robert. THE CHALLENGE OF A DECADE; GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OR GLOBAL BREAKDOWN. [New York, United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information, 1969] 32 p. HN17.5.T47
Prepared for the United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information.

Series of essays in the form of future news stories that depict riots, epidemics, the collapse of the U.N. system, and other doomsday disasters. The purpose of these papers is to alert the reader to the need for a cooperative effort toward worldwide social and economic development to avoid a global breakdown.

377
Vratuša, Anton. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD. Review of international affairs, v. 22, May 20, 1971: 6-9.
D839.R4, v. 22

Modern production and communication have created a world in which no country can remain isolated. This interdependence, however, must not be allowed to permit "domination of the mightier upon the weaker." It is time for states to give over their power-oriented policies and work together for

"equality, independence, and mutual interest." Multilateral international activities based on cooperation for mutual assistance should be encouraged. New institutions are needed to advance cultural, educational, scientific, and professional progress. The U.N. charter provides guidelines that could make international cooperation toward the goal of a "world community without war and threats of war" possible.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

378

Boyd, James M. UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A MILITARY AND POLITICAL APPRAISAL. Foreword by Leland M. Goodrich. New York, Praeger [1971] 261 p. (Praeger special studies in international politics and public affairs) illus.
JX1981.P7B7
Bibliography: p. 245-252.

Contents.--Introduction.--The background of selected peace-keeping efforts.--Alternatives to United Nations intervention.--The legal basis for United Nations peace-keeping operations.--Pattern of peace-keeping operations.--Problems of force creation.--Force composition and organization.--Command and control.--Preventive diplomacy: political, legal, and financial problems.--Military readiness.--Implications for the future.--Appendix.--Bibliography.--Index.

Examines the historical, legal, military, political, and organizational aspects of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Boyd, who served as Deputy U.S. Air Force Representative and Chief of Staff, U.N. Military Staff Committee, disagrees with the opinion that future missions are unlikely. If political considerations make it necessary, peacekeeping operations will be repeated.

379

CYPRUS: SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS STATIONING OF PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. U.N. monthly chronicle, v. 8, June 1971: 3-21.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 8

Summarizes the Security Council proceedings of May 26, 1971, on retention of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in place for another six months, until December 15, 1971. The Secretary-General's report on the current situation and the debates and statements of the principals and the Security Council members are included. The text of the continuing resolution is appended.

380

Knorr, Karl-Ernst. [THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR TO U.N. TROOPS] Die Anwendung des Kriegsrechts auf UNO Truppen. [Köln] 1970. xxii, 169 p.
JX1981.P7K58
Inaug.-Diss.--Cologne.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. vi-xix.

Seeks to ascertain the extent to which United Nations military forces, when acting as organs of the U.N. and not as national contingents, are subject to the laws of war. After establishing that the existence of hostilities between states is no longer a precondition for their applicability, Knorr argues that U.N. forces are subject to and bound by the rules and customs of war, at least during actual hostilities. The fact that U.N. troops are deployed against perpetrators of illegal activities does not justify discrimination in observance of the laws of war. While the U.N. does not enjoy all the qualities of a state, Knorr concludes, it is competent to assume the rights and obligations prescribed by the laws of war.

381

Prokofiev, B. IMPORTANT DECISIONS, NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS (RESULTS OF THE 25TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY). International affairs (Moscow) no. 4, Apr. 1971: 32-37. D839.I465, 1971

On the conclusion of the 25th U.N. General Assembly, the Soviet Union analyzes the activities of the recently ended session and reflects on the quarter century record of that body. Since the main task of the United Nations is to assure international peace and to strengthen international security, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries initiated the adoption of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, which would improve the international situation in view of the imperialist aggression in Indochina. Another achievement of Socialist foreign policy was the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution condemning Israeli aggression and its supporters. Numerous other proposals promoting peace presented by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries were adcpted in spite of the opposition of the United States and its allies. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said, "The Soviet Union believes in the possibilities of the United Nations and its ability to promote the strengthening of peace." A major conclusion drawn from the perspective of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations is that the Soviet Union and the states of the Socialist community have been involved and responsible "in all the good things the UN has done."

OTHER MEANS

382

Baskin, Samuel J. REPORT FROM VIENNA: THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY--A PROJECT FOR WORLD PEACE. Illinois bar journal, v. 59, July 1971: 898-903. illus. LL

The first sessions of the International Peace Academy were held on an experimental basis to determine "whether the arts and skills of peacemaking could be taught to those professions involved in the maintenance of peace." It is hoped that the program can eventually produce experts in violence control and the techniques of mediation, arbitration, or conciliation. Two sessions have

been held, one for novices and another for experienced personnel. Of primary interest were "students" already engaged in peace pursuits, such as ambassadors, diplomats, negotiators, U.N. representatives, or military officials. Selection of participants emphasized "objective neutrality" so that the Academy would not become a propaganda agency. The courses were "intensive exercises in combining the research of the theoretician and the experience of the peace practitioner." The Academy supports the ultimate evolution of a full-scale peace profession whose members would be as skilled in their way as medical, legal, or military professionals in theirs.

383
Carter, April. DIRECT ACTION. 1st ed. reprint; with an introduction by George Lakey. London, Housmans, 1970. 35 p. (Peace news pamphlet)
HM278.D35 1970

"Examine[s] non-violent methods of opposing war, tyranny and other forms of oppression [and] . . . outline[s] what Non-Violent Action is, where it has been used, how it works, and why it is relevant to [people] now."

384
Dougall, Lucy. THE WAR/PEACE FILM GUIDE. Berkeley, Published for the World Without War Council of Greater Seattle by the Inter-Council Publications Committee, 1970. 50 p.
U21.2.D58 1970

Contents.--pt. 1. Short films: The human cost of war. Psychological and social roots of war. Nonviolence and personal witness. Conscientious objection and the draft. The arms race and the effects of nuclear war. International organization and world law. World development and world community. U.S. foreign policy. Area studies.--pt. 2. Feature films.--pt. 3. Program development guide.--pt. 4. Planning aids and sources.

An annotated bibliography of films concerned with war, peace, disarmament, international law and organization, economic development, the draft, and related issues, together with information on how these films can be obtained, a bibliography of books on similar themes, a sample program guide, and other materials of use to program chairmen and teachers who deal with war and peace issues.

385
Ferber, Christian von. [POWER IN POLITICS. DISPUTE WITH MAX WEBER] Die Gewalt in der Politik. Auseinandersetzung mit Max Weber. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz, Kohlhammer [1970] 119 p. (Urban-Taschenbücher, Bd. 804. Reihe 80)
JC263.F45
Bibliography: p. 104-107.

Contents.--pt. 1. Power in politics as a scientific problem.--pt. 2. Science and politics in Max Weber.--pt. 3. Max Weber's notion of the political.--pt. 4. Criticism of the theory of the "political act."--pt. 5. Criticism of Max Weber's principal concepts.--The "political deformation" of the "social act."--Bibliography.--Notes.

Analyzes and rejects Max Weber's concept that power is an elementary category of every social institution and that an institution predictably carries out its original mission and makes use of force, when necessary, from its legitimate available means. Von Ferber calls for a new program of sociology allowing for the many-faceted politization of a society wherein theoretical positions can be politically effective.

386
Hattis, Susan. THE BI-NATIONAL STATE AND THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORY. New Middle East, no. 35, Aug. 1971: 24-27.
DS63.1.N48, 1971

Explains the difficulty of achieving a workable system of cohabitation for such bitterly opposed national groups as the Arabs and Israelis. Three alternatives are possible: exclusive control by one side with minority status for the other, partition or physical separation of the two groups, or a binational or unitary state defined by a constitution that represents each side equitably. Hattis reviews the history of planning and discussion for a binational Jewish-Arab state, plans the Arabs rejected. Today with the Jews in control of the whole of mandatory Palestine "it is the weaker Arabs who now speak of binationalism." However, the deep enmity and absence of common interests between the two groups make that alternative impossible. Hattis concludes that "as long as there is no external factor of any importance which may form a common denominator and both peoples are ready to fight one another, bi-nationalism is not a solution to the present situation."

387
Hubbard, David G. THE COMING REVOLUTION AGAINST WAR. War/peace report, v. 11, Mar. 1971: 14-16.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

In the course of several centuries, man withdrew the absolute governing authority from the hereditary rulers and established the right to rule himself through representative democracy. A similar revolution in man's thinking and conduct is coming in which he will withdraw from his governments the right to wage war. The revolution is already under way. "Just as the word 'freedom' long preceded representative government, so, too, has the word 'peace' long been with us." It is heard frequently in prison, for those jailed for opposing government policies are harbingers of change, as Ghandi and King were. By nature man may well be unalterably aggressive, but it does not necessarily follow that this aggressiveness has to be reflected in the actions of his institutions. Governments are by nature non-innovative, reacting against the social disruption produced by revolutions in thought. In past situations the reaction has led to violent revolution before man's relationship to his government could be changed. The real solution lies not in governments but in the mind of man.

388
Lawson, Don, comp. TEN FIGHTERS FOR PEACE; AN ANTHOLOGY. New York, Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co. [1971] 157 p. JX1963.L377

Contents.--Advice to a draftee, by Leo Tolstoy. --"Let the President remember he sits where Washington sat," by Abraham Lincoln.--My country right or wrong, by Mark Twain.--The last stand against war, by Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette.--On war and nonviolence, by Jeannette Rankin.--Why we refused to register for the World War II draft, by Donald Benedict.--Moratorium in Washington, by Lawrence M. Warner.--Thinking is doing, by Tom F. Driver.--Selections from Daybreak, by Joan Baez.--On civil disobedience, by Charles E. Wyzanski.

Selections from the writings of ten men and women who have contributed over the last hundred years to the advancement of the cause of pacifism. Each of the ten selections is prefaced with remarks placing it in its context of time and place and the development of the author's total thought.

389
Libby, Frederick J. TO END WAR: THE STORY OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR. Nyack, N.Y., Fellowship Publications [1969] 188 p. JX1908.U6N572

Sketches the highlights of the activities of the National Council for Prevention of War from 1921 to 1946. Part of a peace movement that began in America after World War I, the Council ceased active work in December 1954.

390
Merhav, Peretz. ARABS AND JEWS IN PALESTINE: ALTERNATIVES FOR SOVEREIGNTY. War/peace report, v. 11, Aug./Sept. 1971: 14-15. illus. JX1901.W38, v. 11

"This article is reprinted from New Outlook, published in Tel Aviv." DS41.N5

A "binational state" is one in which two peoples contribute jointly to the full character of the state. But even in a situation where one people possesses all minority rights, the state is "uninational" if the other people defines the standards of national life in its own terms. Neither the "Greater Israel" of the Jewish rightists nor the "Greater Palestine" of the guerrillas would create binational states, only uninational ones. The binational state plan of the Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party in the 1940's attempted to solve justly the problems of Arab-Israeli relations, but failed because both sides accepted the inevitability of conflict. The lesson of the Middle East is that supranational arrangements like binationalism cannot succeed without first satisfying the national aspirations of all parties. Binationalism must be worked for gradually, for no state would consent to an immediate settlement at the cost of its sovereignty, nor would such a scheme meet the existing aspirations of the subject people. Given the current situation in the Middle East, "the only suitable form of 'binationalism' is peaceful coexistence, cooperation and confederation between two neighboring sovereign national states, on the basis of equality," in other words, a "bi-state" approach.

391
Merton, Thomas. THOMAS MERTON ON PEACE. With an introduction by Gordon C. Zahn. New York, McCall Pub. Co. [c1971] xli, 269 p. JX1963.M549 1971

Partial contents.--Principles of peace: Peace: Christian duties and perspectives. The Christian in world crisis: reflections on the moral climate of the 1960's. Breakthrough to peace. Christian ethics and nuclear war. Christianity and defense in the nuclear age. Peace: a religious responsibility.--The nonviolent alternative: man is a gorilla with a gun. Saint Maximus the Confessor on nonviolence. A tribute to Gandhi. Faith and violence. Blessed are the meek: the Christian roots of nonviolence. Christian action in world crisis. War and the crisis of language.--Incidental writings.

Selections on war and peace from the writings of Thomas Merton. From a Catholic Christian perspective, Merton explores a variety of issues relating to the ethics of human conflict, including pacifism, Gandhian and other forms of nonviolence, arguments for the just war, nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War, civil disobedience, and, above all, Christian obligation in light of the very real possibility that man will annihilate himself through nuclear war. Merton concluded that every Christian is obliged to join the struggle to abolish war and destructive violence.

392
Pearson, I. B., and F. A. Jenner. LITHIUM IN PSYCHIATRY. Nature (London) v. 232, Aug. 20, 1971: 532-533. Q1.N2, v. 232

A survey of recent findings regarding the use of lithium salts for the treatment of manic-depressive disorders and certain other forms of mental illness. Therapeutic results and speculation concerning the biochemical mechanisms by which this chemical operates are examined, with the conclusion that further research is needed in both areas. It has been suggested that lithium might be used to control human aggression.

393
Picht, Georg, and Wolfgang Huber. [WHAT DOES PEACE RESEARCH MEAN?] Was heisst Friedensforschung? Mit einem Vorwort von Heinz Eduard Tödt. Stuttgart, E. Klett [c1971] 74 p. JX1963.P5857
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by Heinz Eduard Tödt.--What does peace research mean? by Georg Picht.--Peace research--basic principles and models, by Wolfgang Huber.--The role of the church in an international

strategy of peace, by C. Pieter van Andel.--The peace research project of the Evangelical Study Seminar, by C. Pieter van Andel.--Studies on peace research--introductory commentaries.

Essays on the nature of peace and peace research and the contributions theology can make to the attainment of peace. According to Picht, peace is made up of three inseparable components: protection against internal and external force, protection from want, and protection of freedom. These are not definitions of peace, he adds, but its constituent elements, for peace can be defined only in its realization. In discussing the Evangelical Study Seminar's project on how church and religion can contribute to peace research, Huber asserts that the church as a non-governmental, universally oriented organization can make significant contributions by elucidating and disseminating peace strategy by the methods of scientific peace research. Recognizing that peace and conflict need not be mutually excluding concepts, van Andel says that the latter can even be the opposite of war. Conflict exists because of the difference between what is and what should be. Awareness of this conflict situation can lead to the creation of new relationships and the acquisition of new political perspectives. What this means for the church is the assumption of the mission of forming a comprehensive campaign for peace not unlike the manner in which political pressure groups operate.

394

Roth, Karl-Friedrich. [POSSIBILITIES AND WAYS FOR PEACE EDUCATION. THEORETICAL AND ACADEMICALLY PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CONFLICT INSTRUCTION] Möglichkeiten und Wege der Friedenserziehung. Theoretische und schulpraktische Überlegungen zur Konfliktpädagogik. [Essen, Neue Deutsche Schule Verlagsgesellschaft, 1970] 32 p.
LB880.R62
Includes bibliographical references.

Outlines definitions of peace and peace research, their parameters and preconditions, and considers theoretical and practical aspects of peace education including problems of curriculum and presentation. While peace may be primarily a task for diplomats and politicians working in their economic, legal, and cultural environment, if they are to succeed a public opinion oriented toward peace by strong academic preparation is necessary. Roth, citing Hartmut von Hentig, says this education should include sensitivity to injustice, the reality of war, the insecurity, doubt and mistrust accompanying a false peace, readiness to accept difference in preference to war, and political education. All regular school subjects offer opportunities for the development of these themes. Roth claims that positive results can be expected if this academic campaign becomes a permanent part of the educational system.

395

Scheel, Walter. EUROPE ON THE MOVE. Foreign policy, fall 1971: 62-76.
N&CPR

Western Europe is moving from a decade in which "technocratic" collaboration overshadowed disappointing progress toward political union into a decade which promises to give European integration efforts back to the man in the street. The turning point was the 1969 Hague convention when the heads of state and government of the Six agreed "to seek greater political union, and thereby rescued Europe from continuing world decline by attrition." What form European integration will take should be guided by pragmatism, not theory. The most reasonable course toward federation may be via confederation. As Europe moves in that direction, the European Economic Community of Six or Ten must concentrate on integrating the various national technologies. Since the global balance of power is likely to endure, free Europe must continue to maintain its defense links with the United States and Canada. The European aim is not superpower or bloc status. Rather Europe seeks good relations with the United States as its political partner and not as a "troublesome economic competitor." The political integration of Europe will contribute to world stability.

396

Schmid, Hans H. [PEACE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS. THE MEANING OF THE TERM "SHALOM" AS A FOUNDATION FOR A THEOLOGY OF PEACE] Frieden ohne Illusionen. Die Bedeutung des Begriffs "schalom" als Grundlage für eine Theologie des Friedens. Zürich, Theologischer Verlag [c1971] 64 p.
BS1199.P4S28
Bibliographical references: p. 63.

Presents the relevance of the Old Testament in general and the concept of "shalom" in particular to modern-day peace research.

397

Swift, Richard N. THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS; STATUS AND PROSPECTS. New York, New York University, c1970. 47 p. (New York University. Center for International Studies Policy. Papers, v. 3, no. 5)
JX1981.P7S95

Discusses the activities of the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations or, as it is popularly known, the "Committee of 33," which is at present drawing up a report on the constitutional questions that stymied the United Nations in 1965 with respect to peacekeeping operations.

398

Timmler, Markus. [THE PEACEFUL CHALLENGE TO SOUTH AFRICA] Die friedliche Herausforderung an Südafrika. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, July 1971: 401-411.
D839.A885, v. 22

For the last two years leading African statesmen have been reviewing the possibility of taking a new and non-interventionist approach to the racist policies of South Africa and substituting dialog for confrontation. New dimensions were given to this approach earlier this year when Houphouet Boigny, president of the Ivory Coast, unveiled a

broad concept of African neutrality. Based on the Swiss model, it rests upon the principles of internal peace within each African state, peace between each of the African states, and peace between the African states and the other states of the world. Houphouet Boigny fears that interventionist and confrontation policies vis-a-vis South Africa will involve the two power blocs in a struggle in which all Africans will lose. A dialog with the leaders of South Africa, the Ivory Coast president holds, can help in gradually solving the problem of apartheid. The industrial powers, both East and West, have withheld comment on this new concept, prefering to wait to see what African reaction will be. Although some states have supported Houphouet Boigny's concept, Tanzania and Zambia lead a group unequivocally opposed to any softening of policy toward South Africa.

399

[UNARMED BETWEEN THE FRONTS. PEACE EDUCATION ON THE ROAD TO REALIZATION] Waffenlos zwischen den Fronten. Die Friedenserziehung auf dem Weg zur Verwirklichung. H[ans] O[tto] Franco Rest [Hrsg.] [Graz, Wien, Köln] Verlag Styria [1971] 347 p.
JX1963.W13
Bibliography: p. 299-311.

Contents.--pt. 1. Education and the project of peace in past and present.--pt. 2. Peace education in theory and practice.

A two-part collection of source materials, commentaries, and articles on historical, recent, and current contributions to peace education. Part One, concerned primarily with past and recent efforts, offers selections from Baldesàr Castiglione, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich W. Foerster, and A. S. Neill, along with commentaries. Among the contributors to Part Two on various aspects of peace education are Gisela Rest-Hartjes, Wilfried Kuckartz, Walter Rest, Friedrich Hacker, Horst Scarbath, Ulrich Sprenger, Arno Klönne, and Carl-Peter Klusmann. The editor's introduction to Part Two states that if the theories of peace education, as presented in this collection, seem to predominate it is because the problems of practice have been halfway solved in those cases where theory has been widely elucidated.

400

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING; report, pursuant to H. Res. 109. . . Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 24 p. illus.
KF32.F663 1971
At head of title: [Committee print]

An overview of U.S. military assistance programs in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia, presenting the dimensions and locations of the program. The report affirms the concept of supplying military training to friendly countries, but points out that in practice the program has shortcomings and limitations. Nevertheless, the program has not given rise to the problems that some critics predicted. There is no proof that military training has contributed to overthrow of governments by American-trained troops or that an appetite for increasingly sophisticated weapons has been stimulated among recipients. However, the program cannot demonstrate solid achievement of its goals, imparting military "professionalism" and building goodwill for America. Continuation of the program is urged and specific recommendations for improvement are offered.

ARMS CONTROL: GENERAL DISCUSSION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

401

Burns, Richard Dean. REGULATING SUBMARINE WARFARE, 1921-41: A CASE STUDY IN ARMS CONTROL AND LIMITED WAR. Military affairs, v. 35, Apr. 1971: 56-63.
E181.M55, v. 35

Traces the history of international efforts to prohibit underwater warships from the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 through the submarine code incorporated in the 1930 London Naval Conference Treaty and ultimately to the 1936 British-sponsored submarine protocol. The protocol was intended to limit underwater warfare and, thereby, to humanize naval combat. That all the major powers adopted it and that all renounced it when World War II began leads Burns to conclude that any future limitation on underwater warfare should be based on the lesson of the failure of the 1936 protocol. "First, any arms control agreement which functions properly must either square with military doctrine or it must be accepted by all parties as a modification of this doctrine. . . . Second, statesmen and military professionals must accept the responsibility and the risks of their decisions."

402

Chatfield, Charles. DISARMAMENT AND THE DEVIL THEORIES. In his For peace and justice; pacifism in America, 1914-1941. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press [1971] p. 143-167.
JX1961.U6C5

After World War I the peace movement began working to limit the military. After the 1921-1922 Washington Conference, the National Council for Prevention of War and the Navy League competed in Congress for many years over naval armaments. Compulsive military training in education was challenged on school campuses. "In one respect, at least, the disarmament campaigns were useful: they were fulcrums from which pacifists organized segments of the public and developed political leverage." In the 1930's pacifist lobbying of Congress utilized experience gained in the disarmament campaigns of the 1920's. The outcome of the 1931 London Conference disappointed many pacifists, who desired the abandonment of parity formulas and the achievement of true naval disarmament. In the early 1930's a measure of unity prevailed among pacifist groups on the disarmament issue, but this harmony broke down as collective security emerged as an alternative American policy. "Pacifist agitation for disarmament continued, but increasingly it was subordinated to support for neutrality." Pacifists' initiatives were instrumental in launching the Nye Committee investigations of the armaments industry, which popularized the devil theory of a cabal of weapons manufacturers and financiers conspiring to produce America's entry into World War I.

403

York, Herbert F. A LITTLE ARMS CONTROL CAN BE A DANGEROUS THING. War/peace report, v. 11, Aug./Sept. 1971: 3-7. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

Not one of the six arms control treaties signed since 1959 has been designed to reverse the momentum of the arms race. An analysis of the history of the arms race, beginning with the Manhattan Project, leads to the conclusion that "if we merely limit something and do not follow through with further actions designed to really roll back the arms race . . . then we will have accomplished very little." The test ban treaty of 1963 prohibits atmospheric testing but allows underground tests, so that it is tantamount not to a disarmament measure but to the "first environmental control measure." Fears of cheating, fears of technological breakthroughs, and fears of the political significance of new technology haunt U.S. efforts at disarmament negotiations. If a no-ABM agreement is reached at the SALT talks, such an agreement would be useful only as a stage for setting up the machinery to reverse the arms race. The steps after any possible SALT agreement are doomed to the same limitations as previous arms control treaties unless they reverse the momentum of the arms race.

GENERAL ANALYSES

404

Becker, Benjamin M. THE MYTH OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 5-8, 45-48. illus.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

Warns of the dangers of the spiraling nuclear arms race, noting that the superpowers could reach a point of no return in their nuclear arms competition by virtue of the growing sophistication of nuclear weaponry; discusses the fundamental obstacles to effective arms control like America's obsessive fear of communism, the worldwide arms traffic, and America's image as a militaristic nation; and contends that the lack of mutual trust "may hold the key to effective arms control, disarmament, and peace." Becker argues that although the nuclear test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty are important first steps toward disarmament, they have failed to inhibit either superpower in the technological improvement of existing nuclear weapons. Since the vicious action-

reaction cycle of nuclear weapons production has brought the world closer to nuclear suicide, security for the superpowers as well as for the rest of the international community must be sought apart from the escalating arms race or the quest for nuclear superiority. Becker suggests that in order to break the deadlock of distrust and clear the path toward effective arms control, the United States should renounce its containment policy, reduce its military commitments near the Soviet and Chinese borders, and maintain the present levels of its nuclear capability. Further, President Nixon might announce that the United States would, among other things, renounce the use of nuclear weapons for a first strike, place an embargo on arms shipments to any country except in cases of self-defense, and undertake unlimited scientific and cultural exchanges. Becker advocates the creation out of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. commission to provide a forum where such policies could be announced as evidence of peaceful intentions. He concludes that although there is no guarantee as to what the Russian response will be, the choice is between a spiraling nuclear arms race and "endeavoring to hew a path toward comparative peace through mutual trust."

405
Brennan, Donald G. SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 218-231.
D839.068, v. 15

Opposes America's assured destruction policy, favoring instead an increasing emphasis on defensive strategic weapons and a corresponding reduction in strategic offensive missiles. Brennan discusses the basic factors involved in the relationship of the United States to European security and its implications for such arms control issues as mutual balanced force reductions, nuclear proliferation, demilitarization of Central Europe, and a joint Moscow-Washington no-first-use declaration. He contends that a mutual assured destruction policy insures that the outcome of a nuclear war would be unmitigated disaster for everybody and that such a "Sword of Damocles, hang[ing] forever over our heads, by our own design and efforts . . . is too likely to fall." He lists some of the factors that argue for and against continued American support for Western Europe and advocates a second-use nuclear guarantee to Europe, a reduction of American troops in Europe, European participation in U.S. national security planning, and technical assistance to a European nuclear force.

406
Dougherty, James E. ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, spring 1971: 194-217.
D839.068, v. 15

The prospects for arms control in the coming decade will depend upon a variety of factors affecting the United States and the Soviet Union and their relations with each other as well as with other countries in the international community. The superpowers are constrained by the possible effect of arms limitation agreements on their alliance systems and on the future behavior of other great powers like West Germany, Japan, and Communist China. While the United States has had to consider the reaction of its NATO allies toward any arms control treaty it might make with the Soviet Union, Moscow has been preoccupied with the behavior of West Germany and China. Despite these constraints the superpowers are engaging in arms limitation negotiations. It is in their interest as well as that of the rest of the world to continue these negotiations even though the prospects of ABM, SS-9, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle deployments make agreement very difficult. If the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were to collapse, competition in military research and development could be stepped up. Further, progress at SALT will determine to a large extent whether the near-nuclear powers will go ahead with their nuclear weapons acquisition programs. It is hoped that the Soviet Union will be satisfied to accept crude parity as a permanent part of its relationship with the United States. Any attempts on Moscow's part to seek a decisive advantage could only adversely affect superpower relations and hence the prospects for a SALT agreement.

407
Gabelić, Andro. GENERAL, NOT BLOC APPROACHES. Review of international affairs, v. 22, July 5, 1971: 25-27. D839.R4, v. 22

Since the non-bloc states have as much at stake as the superpowers in the event of nuclear war, negotiations concerning reduction of arms and disarmament should include the non-bloc and nonalined states as well. The great powers do not have an exclusive interest in disarmament. Europe lies divided between the United States and the Soviet Union and forms the center of military strength for both blocs. The nine nonalined states which have close to one million troops and budget considerable sums for the military every year would like to participate in a disarmament conference. A bloc dialogue, however, would be less useful than an all-European disarmament conference, since the ultimate goal is to eliminate the blocs which serve only to perpetuate the precarious balance of military powers at a reduced level of intensity.

408
Geneste, Marc E. A COMMON WESTERN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Sept. 1971: 3-12. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Proposes changes in Western strategy governing the use of nuclear weapons. Geneste concludes his wide-ranging discussion of nuclear parity, the "trigger" or nuclear decisionmaking problem, tactical doctrine, and other aspects of European security with the argument that since nuclear weap-

ons provide "the necessary military and psychological shield behind which such risky political undertakings as SALT, detente, Ostpolitik, and mutual balanced force reductions can be safely pursued," arms control negotiators ought to deal first with conventional weapons, conserving the reduction of nuclear arsenals for last.

409
Halperin, Morton H. DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR THE SEVENTIES. Boston, Little, Brown [1971] 149 p.
U162.H27

"Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University."
Bibliography: p. 141-145.

Contents.--The role of force in the nuclear age.--Warfare in the nuclear age.--Quantitative and qualitative research methods.--The evolution of American military strategy.--Soviet military strategy.--Chinese military strategy.--General war: the strategy of sufficiency.--Limited war: the nature of the limiting process.--Deterrence and defense in Europe.--Deterrence and defense in Asia.--Arms control: SALT and NPT.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Analyzes the behavior of nations in the nuclear age within the framework of efforts to maintain the strategic balance under potentially destabilizing politicomilitary developments. Halperin contends that the threat of nuclear war remains significant in international politics and that total war continues to be a distinct possibility. Preventing nuclear proliferation will be easier if there is an arms limitation agreement between the nuclear powers and a complete test ban and cutoff in fissionable material production. Halperin reviews the criteria by which the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to evaluate an arms control agreement, considers the potential benefits of such an agreement, and examines the kinds of agreements that may come out of the present arms limitation negotiations.

410
Hunter, Robert E. TROOPS, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY. Nation, v. 212, June 21, 1971: 776-780. illus.
AP2.N2, v. 212

An era of defense-oriented politics is about to end in Europe and important changes are possible if the United States avoids high-handed actions. Military preparedness and defense will be of less concern in alliance politics and economic relations of more. The United States can contribute to this transition by assuring its allies of its continued commitment to their future. It can do this by working with NATO nations in planning troop withdrawals so that there will be no appearance of retreat or desertion and no panic or crisis. At the same time, discussions of mutual balanced force reductions between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations should reduce defense anxiety and lessen the likelihood that a European defense community would take shape around Anglo-French nuclear deterrence. Such talks might also provide a suitable site for the discussions of the forward based systems that the United States has been reluctant to include in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks because NATO defense was involved. It may be that the United States will cease to play a dominant role in its relations with its allies; in any event, these relations will be defined by trade and economic considerations rather than by the "military diplomacy of the moment."

411
Janowitz, Morris. SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON ARMS CONTROL. American sociologist, v. 6, June 1971: 23-30.
HM9.A713, v. 6

Examines the work of social scientists in arms control and disarmament to determine the extent of their contribution to practical progress in these fields and the course to be taken if they are to play a more significant role in the future. Janowitz finds much that is wrong with social science research in this area, but concludes nevertheless that it has made some worthwhile if not dramatic contributions, among them a better understanding of the social context of planned interventions, a more enlightened attitude on the part of men of affairs, a greater awareness of the overriding significance of organizational aspects of the arms control problem, a wider public sensitivity to the issues, and a more balanced, long-term commitment to arms control and disarmament. The task now is not merely "to stimulate research and thinking on topics labeled arms control and disarmament," but to "inject into sociology--from the study of small groups to the analysis of international organizations--a theoretical reconceptualization that sees the world as a social unit and is concerned with the basic transformation in the role of force within and between nations." The question whether social scientists are willing to shoulder this responsibility remains unanswered.

412
Kluss, Heinz. [PEACE RESEARCH AND SECURITY POLICY] Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik. Wehrkunde, v. 20, June 1971: 301-307.
U3.W396, v. 20

Chides peace researchers and youthful protesters for their well-intentioned but unrealistic efforts to bring about peace. Disagreements and disputes cannot be exorcized from the world scene, but new and better ways can be found for settling them. The pacifists and protesters should come down from their ivory towers and in from the streets to seek out these ways and work for their realization through the political process. However abhorrent the strategy of nuclear deterrence may be, Kluss holds that it has prevented the world from embarking on a major war. Perhaps the technology that made that strategy possible can assist in defusing its potentiality for world destruction. If the concentration of resources that perfected the nuclear offensive capability were brought to bear on developing a truly effective antiballistic missile system, the author reasons, the world would bene-

fit from a peace based on a defensive checkmate and from the unlikelihood of civilization's total destruction. A system based on defense and not retaliation offers these advantages: elimination of the need of a second-strike capability, smaller warheads, the more wholesome rationale of an antiweapon defense rather than an antipeople offense, and the partial humanization of armaments and security policies.

413
Leonard, James F. U.S. STATES VIEWS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINTS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Sept. 20, 1971: 309-315. JX232.A33, v. 65

Statement before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Aug. 26, 1971, outlining U.S. views on conventional arms limitations. Leonard explains why, in the opinion of the United States, conventional arms restraints have received so little attention from the international community in recent years, argues for an "intensified discussion and exploration of these matters," and examines various proposals advanced by the United States and other countries to deal with the problems in this area. Paying more attention to conventional armaments does not represent a reordering of priorities in the arms control field, nor need it interrupt the vigorous efforts being made to deal with weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. preference for a regional approach is perfectly compatible with a concurrent global approach. Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe and conventional arms transfers are matters of special concern to the United States.

414
Roberts, Chalmers. THE ABCS OF FBS AND SALT AND MBFR AND CES (ESC). Survival, v. 13, Sept. 1971: 303-306. U162.S9, v. 13
Reprinted from The Washington Post, May 29, 1971. N&CPR

Examines the relationship between forward-based systems (FBS), the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the problem of mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) and their relationship in turn to the proposed European security conference. Roberts points out that FBS has been divorced from SALT and that in all likelihood it will be tied to MBFR. He concludes that protracted MBFR talks could result in an understanding of each side's approach and thinking, followed by an agreement. It remains to be seen, however, whether domestic pressures in the United States for force reductions in Europe can be held off long enough to reach such an understanding.

415
Shevchenko, A. DISARMAMENT: A PROBLEM THAT CAN BE SOLVED. International affairs (Moscow) no. 5, May 1971: 66-72. D839.I465, 1971

The history of Soviet efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament since 1955. Though the Soviet Union presents a powerful military challenge to the capitalist states, it is working actively for a solution to the arms race which threatens the lives of all the world's people. That the forces of socialism are turning the tide against the arms race initiated by the imperialist states is due to their success in achieving limited steps towards disarmament in recent treaties banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere and the sea and prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is of the utmost importance that all nuclear states participate in any disarmament talks. Shevchenko stresses that the small nonnuclear states must not be excluded from talks on disarmament.

416
Taylor, Michael. REVIEW ARTICLE: MATHEMATICAL POLITICAL THEORY. British journal of political science, v. 1, July 1971: 339-382. illus. JA8.B7, v. 1
Bibliography: p. 372-382.

Surveys current developments in the quantitative measurement and explanation of political behavior. The last two sections discuss "some mathematical theories which are especially relevant to international politics," namely "theories of two-person zero-sum games" and "theories of arms races and arms control." Taylor finds the first quantitative model of arms races in Lewis F. Richardson's Arms and Insecurity of 1960 and summarizes that author's model. Much subsequent theoretical work is variation and modification of Richardson's work. Taylor says Richardson's model is unique in following neither a rational choice nor an economic model. However, he says, it has been easy to reformulate the model in rational choice terms and thereby introduce economic constraints. Many rational choice models of arms races and disarmament utilize game theory. Taylor's bibliography lists roughly 200 items concerning the mathematical political theories discussed.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

417
Arkadev, N. IN THE INTEREST OF GENERAL SECURITY. New times, no. 38, Sept. 1971: 4-5. D839.N483, 1971

Ever since Lenin called disarmament an ideal of socialism, the Soviet Union has endeavored to realize that ideal. Events since the 24th Party Congress serve to reinforce the sincerity of these endeavors. The Soviet Union has proposed a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament, as well as a conference of all peaceloving states to discuss general disarmament. Both proposed conferences are realistic programs for action, not propaganda slogans, as some Western critics complain.

418
Fîntînaru, Ion. CONSTANT, PERSEVERING CONCERN WITH DISARMAMENT. Romania today, no. 7/200, 1971: 32, 57. DR201.R78, 1971

As a member of the Geneva Disarmament Committee Romania has constantly advocated the adoption of concrete disarmament measures. What international steps have been taken are only of a preventive and restrictive nature and "have not reduced the stockpiles by a single atom bomb." An advocate of the concept of general disarmament as a "radical" measure for ending the arms race, Romania believes that this goal can be best achieved by taking initially more modest measures. One such is the freezing and reduction of the military budgets of all states. Other measures are the establishment of a "universally compulsory instrument" pledging the renunciation of the use of force, the creation of nuclear free zones, a treaty banning underground nuclear tests, progressive reduction and eventual liguidation of nuclear stockpiles, and the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Since the relaxation of tensions is prerequisite to progress in disarmament, Romania urges agreement to ban the establishment of new military bases and the further placing of nuclear weapons on the territory of other states. It also urges dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, the withdrawal of troops behind their national frontiers, and the abolition of military blocs.

419
Radovanović, Ljubomir. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 22, June 5, 1971: 7-9. D839.R4, v. 22

Most notable of the recent developments relevant to disarmament was Brezhnev's suggestion of East-West negotiations to reduce armed forces in Central Europe. His proposal was particularly noteworthy for its lack of preliminary qualifiers or conditions. A second development was Senator Mansfield's proposal that part of the American troops in Europe be withdrawn. The plan's reception was generally unfavorable in the United States and the NATO nations. At the same time, there is an unspoken awareness that troop reductions are probably inevitable. A third development, agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union about the subjects to be negotiated at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, might open the way for negotiations about mutual force reductions. However, it is difficult to isolate an area like troop withdrawals from related problems such as Berlin or the Mediterranean. Since the whole European system is involved, broader discussion may be needed, perhaps at a general European conference.

420
STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA; JULY 30, 1971. Peking review, v. 14, Aug. 13, 1971: 5. DS701.P42, v. 14
"Hsinhua News Agency dispatch, August 7."

The Soviet Union has proposed a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. The Chinese Government believes in the equality of all states, regardless of size. Since the existence of nuclear weapons poses a danger to all nations, the nuclear powers have no right to make judgments affecting the well-being of all without the participation of all. Recent history has shown the impossibility of the nuclear powers achieving nuclear disarmament by themselves. None of the agreements reached in the 1960's has slowed the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. China has embarked on a nuclear weapons program to defend herself against the imperialist nuclear threat. However, "at no time will China ever agree to participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries." The Chinese government therefore rejects the Soviet government's proposal. The Chinese government reaffirms its clearly known position that all nuclear weapons should be prohibited and destroyed, that China will never use nuclear weapons first, and that a conference of all nations should be called to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union should pledge never to use nuclear arms first and should remove all nuclear facilities and weapons from foreign territories to demonstrate their real willingness to disarm. The Chinese people will remain faithful to the struggle to prohibit and destroy all nuclear weapons.

ARMS CONTROL: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR

421
Borowik, Genrich. [UNMASKING THE AGGRESSOR] Die Entlarvung des Aggressors. Sowjetunion heute, v. 16, July 1, 1971: 28-29.
DK266.A2S784, v. 16

The publication of the "Pentagon Papers" has shocked those many Americans who quite naturally held that their political leaders are at least relatively honest. What they discovered, however, is that President Johnson had decided on an escalation of the Vietnam War five months before the "Gulf of Tonkin incident." The present administration in Washington no longer speaks of escalation but rather of Vietnamization. This is, in effect, a continuation of the aggression and of the war. The goals of American policy did not change with the advent of the Nixon administration, but only the means of realizing them. The publication of these heretofore secret documents has undermined the reputation of the U.S. Government.

422
VIETNAM: WHICH WAY TO PEACE? A discussion by Roger Hilsman [and others. Chicago] University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study [1970] 27 p.
DS557.A63V53

Transcript of a discussion of the problems and prospects of the Vietnam War in light of the American invasion of Cambodia by Hans Morgenthau, Morton Kaplan, Harold Hinton, and Roger Hilsman. Hilsman and Morgenthau argue against the war, contending that it has been both a mistake and a failure in the political as well as moral sense. Kaplan stresses that the war must be terminated for domestic political reasons, while Hinton poses several problems that the United States may face during and after its withdrawal from Indochina.

423
Waldheim, Kurt. [THE AUSTRIAN WAY. FROM ISOLATION TO NEUTRALITY] Der österreichische Weg. Aus der Isolation zur Neutralität. Mit 12 Dokumentarbildern und 4 Kt. Wien, München, Zürich, Molden [1971] 326 p. illus.
DB91.W34
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--Birth from chaos.--Struggle for existence.--A state is extinguished.--War's end and a new start.--The fight for the state treaty.--Austria and perpetual neutrality.--Foreign policy vis-a-vis the four major powers.--Austria and European unity.--South Tyrol.--Politics in the Danube area.--Austria and the United Nations.--Development aid--a challenge of the time.--A foreign policy concept for Austria.--As a neutral sees the world.--Notes.--Index of names.

Evaluates the special geopolitical position of Austria as a neutral state between two worlds and elaborates on the significance of neutrality. Instrumental in shaping some of the policies he discusses, Waldheim emphasizes the necessity for a close interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy. Although he traces the history of Austrian foreign policy since 1918, his main emphasis is on Austria's position following the Second World War. He thinks the United Nations' most valuable role is that of a forum for international contact. Nuclear war between the two superpowers may be likely because of the actions of third parties, he suggests, pointing to the Middle East as a case in point.

424
Wriggins, Howard. HEADING OFF A NEW ARMS RACE: LET'S TRY TO NEUTRALIZE THE INDIAN OCEAN. War/peace report, v. 11, Aug./Sept. 1971: 7-11. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

The Indian Ocean has been among the freest of the seas, in the sense that it has hitherto not been the scene of significant naval activity by any state. U.S. policy has so far recognized that this state of affairs best serves American interests, and the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been minimal. In view of the Soviet fleet buildup there, "the best way to avoid a new arms race in the Indian Ocean would seem to be to negotiate a formal neutralization agreement among the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the littoral states," and, if possible, Communist China. If this cannot be done, a naval limitation agreement for the area might be feasible. There must be no single preponderance of naval power in the Indian Ocean. The United States does have an indirect interest in the area due to the clear importance of Indian Ocean affairs to the security of some of its allies. Soviet actions have given no indications that the increased presence means an attempt to exercise complete control over the area. As its nonmilitary maritime activity grows, the Soviet Union should acquire a greater interest in ensuring freedom of the seas. Development of Soviet naval strength could, for example, induce the Japanese to begin major naval rearmament or even to acquire nuclear weapons, a development harmful to Soviet interests. To allay possible Soviet fears over a strategic threat to its south, the United States should propose that the Indian Ocean be made a nuclear-free zone from which all

nuclear-armed vessels would be barred. There will be time for the United States to respond if the Soviet buildup continues, but at present an American buildup would be premature.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

425
Christie, Michael J. THE SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENTS: BRITAIN'S DEFENCE AND THE SALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA. London, Africa Bureau, 1970. 23 p.
DA47.9.A4C5
Includes bibliographical references.

It is argued that Britain must resume the sale of arms to South Africa because of the 1955 Simonstown Agreements. Not an alliance, the agreements are at most a limited naval pact, intended to defend southern Africa from extracontinental aggression. Internal security is specifically left an internal affair, yet most of the weapons sold before and after 1963--the end of any contractual obligation to Johannesburg--were ideally suited to domestic use. The political and strategic situations of both countries have changed since 1955, but no British Government has chosen to renegotiate the agreements. South Africa's defense policies are clearly oriented toward the African continent rather than the Indian Ocean. Because of Johannesburg's already large defense budgets, additional weapons supplies could set off a continental arms race. The fact that only a small fraction of British trade travels the Cape of Good Hope route minimizes the need of a commitment to protect shipping. An Anglo-South African naval force would be insufficient to meet the improbable Soviet threat. The Simonstown naval base itself is of little strategic value. Resumed arms sales may mortally wound the Commonwealth. Britain would gain little commercially while endangering its more important economic stake in black Africa.

426
Newcombe, Hanna. THE CASE FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO. War/peace report, v. 11, Mar. 1971: 17-19.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

The Middle East is locked in a spiraling arms race that builds tensions that further heat the arms race and increase the probability of another war. An arms cutoff is the most direct way to bring about a halt. Needed is a simultaneous, and therefore negotiated, arms embargo by the major suppliers supervised by the United Nations and applied to Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and the Palestinian liberation organizations. States considered likely to transship arms they receive from the great powers would be required to pledge not to do so. Because of supervision and inspection difficulties, small arms would not be included in the embargo, creating, in effect, a partially disarmed zone in the Middle East. "The continued absence of nuclear weapons from the area is, of course, of crucial importance and should be explicitly stressed." Because Israel, for one, can produce its own heavy weapons, provision must be made for an inspected cutoff of domestic arms production. This will require that the Middle East countries become signatories to the agreement.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

427
Delcoigne, Georges, and Georges Rubinstein. [THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS OF CONTROL] Non-prolifération des armes nucléaires et systèmes de contrôle. (Bruxelles), Éditions de l'Institut de sociologie [de l'] Université libre de Bruxelles, (1970). 214 p. illus. (Études de science politique) JX1974.7.D43
Bibliography: p. [211].

Contents.--Abbreviations.--Signatories of the nonproliferation treaty.--Introduction.--Data and dimensions of the problem.--The nuclear fuel cycle and its industrial infrastructure.--International cooperation in the peaceful applications of atomic energy.--Collateral measures of nondissemination. --International agreements on nonproliferation.--The technical problems of control.--General problems of application.--Texts of the principal legal instruments.--Bibliographic guide.

Survey of international and national efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main emphasis is on peaceful applications of nuclear energy, establishing nuclear-free zones, and the problem of technical control and of the enforcement of a safeguard program.

428
International Atomic Energy Agency. THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND STATES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ([Vienna] IAEA, 1971.) 29 p. (Its INFCIRC 153)
HD9698.5.A25 no. 153

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Basic undertaking. Application of safeguards. Co-operation between the Agency and the state. Implementation of safeguards. National system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. Provision of information to the Agency. Agency inspectors. Privileges and immunities. Termination of safeguards. Non-application of safeguards to nuclear material to be used in non-peaceful activities. Finance. Third party liability for nuclear damage. International responsibility. Measures in relation to verification of non-diversion. Interpretation and application of the Agreement and settlement of disputes. Final clauses.--pt. 2. Introduction. Objective of safeguards. National system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. Starting point of safeguards. Termination of safeguards. Exemptions for safeguards. Subsidiary arrangements. Inventory. Design information.

Information in respect of nuclear material outside facilities. Records system. Reports system. Inspections. Statements on the Agency's verification activities. International transfers.--Definitions.

Recommendations drafted by the Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the guidance of the Agency's Director General in the negotiation of safeguards agreements with the nonnuclear weapon states that are parties to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The basic undertaking of the safeguards agreement is "to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices."

429
Palsokar, R. D. MINIMUM DETERRENT: INDIA'S NUCLEAR ANSWER TO CHINA. Foreword by D. K. Palit. Bombay, Thacker [1969] xviii, 158 p.
UA840.P26
Bibliography: p. 157-158.

Proposes a strategic doctrine for India by which to meet the Chinese nuclear threat. The doctrine consists of a deterrence policy and a limited as well as total war strategy and takes into account a study of the behavior of Communist China in nuclear and foreign policies. Palsokar traces the evolution of the superpowers' deterrence policies from the postwar period to the present phase of near parity. He describes the Chinese threat, noting that it stems mostly from Mao Tse-tung's ideological belief in a Communist-dominated world and presents several scenarios depicting Chinese nuclear attacks against India. The moral and economic problems involved in acquisition of nuclear weapons are examined. Palsokar contends that the possession of nuclear weapons is not immoral but would be in keeping with Gandhi's principle of self-defense. It would be highly immoral, however, for India to seek safety under the nuclear umbrella of other states. The text of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is appended.

430
Ungerer, Werner, and others. SAFEGUARDS: FIVE VIEWS. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 13, no. 3, 1971: 2-13.
QC770.I4955, v. 13

Discussions by West German, Japanese, Soviet, British and U.S. representatives on the International Atomic Energy Agency's Safeguards Committee of aspects of the Committee's work in drafting recommendations concerning the structure and content of agreements to be concluded between the Agency and the nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Recommendations broadly acceptable to the members of the Committee were worked out in negotiations from June 1970 to March 1971 and forwarded to the Agency's Board of Governors, which has since requested that the Director General use them as a basis for negotiating the safeguards agreements called for by the treaty. The five "unofficial" views published here stress political aspects of the safeguards problem.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

431
Aleksandrov, L., and V. Shestov. IMPORTANT INITIATIVE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. International affairs (Moscow) no. 7, July 1971: 88-91.
D839.I465, 1971

Outlines the Soviet initiative in presenting a Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins and on their Destruction to the Geneva Disarmament Committee in March 1971. The authors urge the adoption of this convention. The prohibition of chemical means of mass destruction is left for negotiation at a later time.

432
Leonard, James F. U.S. AND U.S.S.R. TABLE DRAFT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of STate bulletin, v. 65, Aug. 30, 1971: 221-226.
JX232.A33, v. 65

Statement made before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Aug. 5, 1971, outlining U.S. views on the draft convention approved by U.S. and Soviet negotiators to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and effect the destruction of stockpiles already existing, together with the text of the draft convention, which was submitted to the converence on the same day. The bulk of Leonard's statement is an article by article commentary on the provisions of the draft convention, which will serve as focus for the work of the conference on the problem of controlling chemical and biological weapons. A convention of this type, which aims to deal with biological and toxin weapons independently, "is not a complete solution to the problem of chemical and biological warfare," but "it does . . . represent a solution to an important part of that problem--the control of weapons which are by far the deadliest and most indiscriminate of the chemical and biological methods of warfare."

433
Lohs, Karlheinz. [FRITZ HABER AND CHEMICAL WARFARE] Fritz Haber und der chemische Krieg. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, v. 10, no. 4, 1971: 432-445.
D25.Z4, v. 10

Recounts the life of Fritz Haber, celebrated chemist, Nobel prize winner, and founder of modern chemical warfare, to illustrate the scientist's need for moral responsibility toward society. The

type of society that prevails, the author adds, is the factor determining the purpose for which scientific knowledge and its derivatives will be used. In a Socialist society, the scientist and his work will not be misused, for the state harnesses all knowledge to the well-being of society. In a capitalist environment, however, the scientist runs the risk that he and his work will be exploited for nonpeaceful purposes. That this problem and that of chemical warfare still exist are exemplified in the American use of poisonous agents in Indochina. Article 17 of the constitution of the German Democratic Republic forbids the application of science against the interests of peace, international understanding, or the life and dignity of man.

434
Whiteside, Thomas. DEPARTMENT OF AMPLIFICATION. New Yorker, v. 47, Aug. 14, 1971: 54, 56-59. AP2.N6763, v. 47

Charges that the United States, on the recommendation of a special advisory committee established by the National Academy of Sciences, is about to lift the ban it has imposed on military and civilian uses of the herbicide 2,4,5-T. Whiteside warns that if this happens, the military in Vietnam will have a free hand to resume defoliation and crop destruction operations that some have characterized as a form of chemical and biological warfare, the chances of this chemical's being restricted for good by the international community will be permanently undermined, and unborn children, in the United States and elsewhere, will be exposed once again to the danger of serious genetic malformations. Whiteside further accuses the U.S. military and the chemical companies that produce 2,4,5-T of already having circumvented Presidential restrictions on the defoliation program by substituting other chemicals and by keeping alive enough support in the Congress to prevent cutoff of funding.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

435
Bebler, Aleš. SALT TALKS AND THE PUBLIC. Review of international affairs, v. 22, June 5, 1971: 6-7. D839.R4, v. 22

Decries the shortage of hard information being disseminated from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The nations of the world have more than a mere casual interest in these superpower negotiations, for "a nuclear duel between just the two of them could have catastrophic consequences for all the other countries, for the population of our entire planet." A report ought to be submitted soon to the U.N. General Assembly. Although the questions are complex, it seems that an agreement of what will be negotiated "is a surprisingly meagre result of the talks after nearly two years." The United Nations, whose concern is the promotion of world peace and cooperation, should have more influence in the talks.

436
Bottome, Edgar M. LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS: CAN THE U.S. TAKE UNILATERAL STEPS? Current, June 1971: 60-63. AP2.C9259, 1971

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will succeed only if the United States abandons current political and military policies, or the Soviet Union agrees to accept permanent nuclear inferiority, or the two powers together forget their differences in order to collude against China. Since none of this is likely, some other escape from the balance of terror must be found--one that will not depend upon mutual trust between the powers or require them to accept security risks. This is the plan: let the United States announce an immediate freeze on multiple warhead and ABM deployment and begin a program of destroying 100 missiles (or bombers) per month for the next 24 months. It would make clear that these steps are taken independently of any Soviet action, but also that should the Russians decide to cooperate with a comparable reduction program of their own, all strategic delivery systems except 10 Polaris submarines would be destroyed. At that stage, the United States and the Soviet Union would meet together to consider further steps. Once it has developed a minimum deterrent force, China could also be brought into the arrangement. But this plan will not be adopted, of course. U.S. imperialism, backed by powerful domestic forces, cannot be turned back. The commitment to arms control is a myth.

437
Brezhnev, Leonid. SOVIET STATEMENT ON DISARMAMENT. Current history, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 240. D410.C82, v. 61

Excerpts from an address to an election meeting in Moscow, June 11, 1971.

The key to negotiation success in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is the principle of equal security for both sides. The coin's other side is the "renunciation of attempts to secure any unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side." The United States claims to champion these principles, but in practice Washington is trying to build up its strategic forces while denouncing the Soviets for any defense measures they apply. Similarly, the U.S. refers to the Soviet navy as a threat in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean, but considers it "normal and natural" for its own fleet to be in such waters. The U.S.S.R. is willing to reduce the problem by an "equal bargain." In fact, the Soviet Union "is ready to discuss any proposals" in the light of the equality principles just mentioned. It would also like to convene a meeting of the five nuclear powers, but has heard no reply to that proposal.

438
Dougherty, James E. MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF CONFLICT: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL. In

his Contending theories of international relations [by] James E. Dougherty [and] Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Philadelphia, Lippincott [1971] p. 254-278. JX1395.D67
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Examines nuclear deterrence in terms of the balance of power, flexible response, tactical weapons, and arms control and poses some specific questions to which the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are giving rise. None of the five nuclear powers shows any consistent evidence of favoring total nuclear disarmament as a desirable security measure. Dougherty notes that even the two superpowers display a certain cautious conservatism and a reluctance to "move away from an international political-military environment in which the conditions of the 'equilibrium game' have been relatively familiar toward a radically transformed and less predictable system of 'disarmed' states." The major problem facing arms limitation is the geostrategic asymmetry of the two superpowers that makes it "impossible to reduce military security requirements to formulas of mathematical parity." This problem is further complicated by the psychological and political advantages that one of the two powers may enjoy. Nuclear deterrence presupposes a high degree of rationality on the part of the nuclear powers, Dougherty comments, a sort of Hobbesian realism wherein the two superpowers seek peace because of mutual fear. The very rationality required in nuclear deterrence may be a weakness, although the United States and the Soviet Union have exercised judgment and restraint in their deterrent roles. Among the specific questions which Dougherty raises in regard to SALT are: the effect of their failure on the nonproliferation treaty, the position of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the connection between concessions and the bargaining process, and the real reasons in view of the fact that neither power really fears a deliberate attack by the other. Dougherty concludes that more study will be required before the impact of nuclear technology on foreign-policy decisionmaking can be adequately understood.

439
Gabelić, Andro. AGREEMENT ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS. Review of international affairs, v. 22, June 5, 1971: 10-12. D839.R4, v. 22

Comments on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the order for discussion of relevant topics. First will be the ABM's, costly weapons but of "lesser 'effectiveness'" and therefore perhaps more easily dispensed with. However, the United States is moving slowly, wondering if an ABM defense against a potential Chinese nuclear attack is necessary. A further complication comes from the definition of strategic weapons. Even missiles of approximately the same size and in the same quantity may differ significantly in megaton power. The author concludes with the hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will stop watching "the third future superpower out of the corner of their eye" and carry out their talks.

440
Gabelić, Andro. ARMS RACE INDICATORS. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Jan. 20, 1971: 23-25. D839.R4, v. 22

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks could not have begun without a tacit understanding that the two superpowers held approximately equivalent military capabilities. The optimism at the close of the third round of SALT "declined tangibly" from that which marked the end of the second round. The reason for the diminishing prospects for agreement lies in the fact that the United States believes that with its new systems of superweapons with multiple warheads it now has the advantage over the Soviet Union in the arms race. The history of the arms race indicates that when one side or the other feels it has achieved superiority the arms race accelerates to a new, higher level of armament on both sides.

441
Kharich, V. THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN THE U.S.A.: RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR MIGHT. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Aug. 10, 1971: 7, 11-12. D839.C87, v. 23
Condensed from Krasnaia zvezda, July 16, 1971. Slav Rm

Describes present and proposed U.S. weapons systems and notes competition among Army, Navy, and Air Force to build up bomber strength. Kharich argues that the distinction between tactical and strategic bombers is blurred, so discussion of United States forward based systems should be included in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. He also berates the Pentagon for seeking steady increases in nuclear, missile-carrying submarines and warns of the dangers created by increased spending for systems like a Poseidon missile with multiple warheads.

442
Kharich, V. THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN THE U.S.A.: SHUNNING A REALISTIC APPROACH. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Aug. 10, 1971: 6-7. D839.C87, v. 23
Condensed from Krasnaia zvezda, July 13, 1971. Slav Rm

Reports conflicting American opinions about the arms race and quotes from commentators on both sides. Defense Secretary Laird speaks ominously of the "Soviet threat" and urges development of new deterrent systems. Such statements are not consistent with the spirit of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Kharich warns, and may prove harmful. Although a few American observers look with alarm at this expensive and profitless defense buildup, many more from the military-industrial complex advocate U.S. missile superiority as a bargaining tool to use against the Soviet Union. That tactic will fail, since the Soviet Union will increase its own defensive strength before it will allow another country to become its military superior.

443
Kraft, Joseph. IN SEARCH OF KISSINGER. Harper's, v. 242, Jan. 1971: 54-61. illus.
AP2.H3, v. 242

Profile of Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Kraft credits Kissinger with developing a distinct Nixon administration position on arms control that contrasts with that of the previous administration. The Johnson administration proposals were dropped when President Nixon decided on deployment of the Safeguard antimissile defense system, which had been redesigned from the Sentinel system by Kissinger. The Pentagon then began pushing for a comprehensive system. "With pressure on the Russians thus mounted, Kissinger moved to channel it toward negotiations." He established an interagency Verification Panel, refuted Pentagon arguments on the dangers from Soviet subterfuge, and so put together the American negotiating package being discussed at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

444
Lambeth, Benjamin S. MOSCOW AND THE MISSILE RACE. Current history, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 215-221, 242.
D410.C82, v. 61

Background of arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and survey of history of current issues. "The overall thrust of the Soviet Union's recent force expansion cannot meaningfully be understood apart from the larger United States-Soviet strategic relationships." Although past talks have often featured large demands and small concessions from the Soviets, current talks seem businesslike, serious, and dedicated to solution. It is significant that this interest in negotiations comes as the United States and the Soviet Union approach military and strategic parity. Lambeth concludes that Soviet interest in arms equilibrium is genuine, and that the Kremlin stands to gain in terms of released resources and reduced conflict potential. As the United States concentrates on solving domestic problems, the Soviets may find "new inroads through which to expand their influence and presence."

445
Orr, Samuel C. DEFENSE REPORT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL NETWORK GIVES WHITE HOUSE TIGHT REIN OVER SALT STRATEGY; SLOW PACE OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS PROMPTS PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN U.S. POSITION. National journal, v. 3, Apr. 24, 1971: 877-886; May 1, 1971: 947-959. illus.
JK1.N28, v. 3

The National Security Council (NSC) controls U.S. participation in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) through its Verification Panel. Other NSC bodies supplement the group's work. Intelligence is collected and evaluated by a variety of Government agencies. NSC sees its role as analysis rather than advice. The Pentagon tends to prevail in technical assessments. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concentrates on gaining influence within the Government, seeing a public-oriented role as self-defeating. Critics believe the NSC system for formulating strategic arms policy has many shortcomings. Because of SALT's slow progress, the administration is being urged to change its negotiating posture. Administration strategy involves negotiating on specific issues while continuing weapons research and deployment. A number of negotiating options were considered. Compliance verification is at the heart of policy disputes, but critics challenge the administration on all facets of its approach to SALT. Congress has, with exceptions, gone along with administration strategy. Funding increases are planned for U.S. weapons programs, not only to spur Soviet negotiators, but also to keep strategic options open, for some feel that the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities could lead to a Soviet advantage.

446
Panofsky, W. K. H. ROOTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE: AMBIGUITY AND IGNORANCE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, June 1971: 15-20. illus.
TK9145.A84, v. 27
"Adapted from a paper presented at the Council for the Advancement of Science Writing seminar on February 22, 1971 in Washington, D.C."

There is no point looking for a scapegoat to blame for the arms race, since its true cause is the built-in deficiencies of military decisionmaking. National decisionmakers, in performing the necessary task of weighing the risks of the arms race against those of military unpreparedness, tend always to "play it safe" by deciding for more armaments, a proclivity that is strongly reinforced by uncertainties about the enemy's technical capabilities, his strategic doctrine, and his intentions. Improvements in intelligence capabilities can and have done much to alleviate the first of these difficulties. A more realistic scenario for nuclear war would greatly reduce the ambiguities surrounding strategic doctrine, particularly those introduced by the pursuit, at one and the same time, of the contradictory strategies of deterrence and damage limitation. Multiple warheads and ABM, of course, are the very embodiments of strategic uncertainty; deployed separately or together, they raise the incentive for, and hence the fear of, striking first. Since the United States is still far ahead in the development of both these weapons, it has the responsibility for taking the initiative in bringing them under control. Some argue that the advance of military technology is inexorable, but the limited test ban treaty proves the contrary. Technology can be controlled by the political process, and to think otherwise is not only false thinking but a danger to man's very existence.

447
Perle, Richard N. SUPERPOWER POSTURES IN SALT: THE LANGUAGE OF ARMS CONTROL. Center for Policy

Study, University of Chicago, 1971. 23 p. (Arms Control and Foreign Policy Occasional Paper)
DLC

Arms control policy must be judged according to its contribution to stable deterrence and hence strategic stability. The question in regard to any arms control proposal is whether or not it narrows the difference between the consequences of striking first and striking second, the key element in stable deterrence. Technological advances certainly have an impact on stability, but not all advances are destabilizing. A good arms control program will distinguish between the advances that are and are not destabilizing and seek to promote agreements that will retard the former and encourage the latter. Constrained systems should be highly visible to some scheme of inspection, but an uncritical application of this criterion may lead to the limitation of systems that contribute to stability. Low visibility systems should be constrained only if the impact of a violation would be slight. Of course, the more comprehensive the agreement, the more difficult it becomes to control the low visibility system. These systems can best be controlled at the periphery of the strategic balance, in situations where they are permitted to exist in large numbers, or when the control agreement permits confidence-building technological innovation. This is an example of how freedom to innovate technologically can be stabilizing.

448
Rathjens, George W. A BREAKTHROUGH IN ARMS CONTROL? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, June 1971: 4-5. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 27

The negative U.S. reaction to the Soviet offer of a draft treaty to limit ABM systems is disturbing in itself and difficult to reconcile with the Administration's own proposals and its bargaining chip theory of arms control. The main difference between U.S. and Soviet proposals is over offensive missile limitations, a matter of little urgency compared with ABM. Trivial differences should not be allowed to stand in the way of agreement; compromise is called for, whether it takes the form of mutual restraint in the deployment of offensive systems or an agreement with a specific termination date in the event of no subsequent limit on offensive missiles. An ABM treaty would itself remove much of the incentive to increase offensive forces or deploy multiple warheads. Among the details, the most important is that neither side be allowed to make widespread deployments of phased array radars, a potential source of much anxiety. If an agreement cannot be reached now, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ought to be called off; over the long haul, the bargaining chip theory of arms control is liable to prove too costly.

449
Smith, Gerard C. U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BEGIN FIFTH PHASE OF SALT TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, July 26, 1971: 98. JX232.A33, v. 65

Statement of July 6, 1971, on the opening two days later of the fifth phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. It will be the task of this fifth phase to translate into a concrete agreement the intention announced by both parties on May 20 to "concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of antiballistic missile systems together with agreement on certain measures with respect to limitation of offensive strategic weapons."

450
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization. ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DEFENSE BUDGET. Hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first session. June 16, 17, and July 13, and 14, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 295 p. illus.
DLC

Hearings exploring the effects of modern weapons systems on the arms race, especially as related to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The first two days of hearings deal with the composition of the U.S. strategic deterrent of land- and sea-based missiles and manned bombers, and the last two days with the impact of antimissile defense and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle systems deployment. Those testifying include Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., former Assistant Director of Science and Technology of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and David Packard, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Paul C. Warnke, and Dr. Herbert F. York, other present and former military and Defense Department officials, as well as academic scholars and interested officials.

451
Viktorov, V. SOME RESULTS AND PROSPECTS--ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, Aug. 3, 1971: 1-3, 11.
D839.C87, v. 23
Translated from Pravda, July 7, 1971.
Slav Rm

The strategic arms negotiations being undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States are attracting interest and attention that testify to their importance. Agreement on an agenda that will first discuss ABM deployment and later offensive weapons is a hopeful sign of a successful outcome. Less promising indications come from American military circles calling for increased military appropriations and active deployment of ABM's to strengthen the United States bargaining position. The same partisans are sharply critical of Russian defense programs and find them threatening to the success of the talks. "It is high time to abandon two different yardsticks, or a double standard, in evaluating one's own actions

and the actions of the other side." The Soviet Union desires peaceful coexistence and effective curtailment of the arms race on a sensible and just basis. It is committed to the principle of "equal security of states and renunciation of attempts to obtain any kind of one-sided advantage at the expense of others."

452
Vukadinović, Radovan. THE FOURTH ROUND OF SALT COMING UP. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Jan. 20, 1971: 21-23.
D839.R4, v. 22

"The arms limitation talks are basically concerned with a host of political problems from the totality of U.S.-Soviet relations," the solution to which depends on the sincerity of motivation of the Soviet Union and the United States. Three rounds of talks have produced several questions, however, concerning the sincerity of the motives of the two states. Both the Soviet Union and the United States agree that the continuation of the arms race could lower their standards of living and adversely affect their national interests, yet both states have under construction massive new armament systems. The Pentagon does not favor an agreement with the Soviets and the Senate could hardly be expected to ratify an agreement which would close down the vital defense industries in many states. While the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks may not achieve an arms limitation agreement it should lead to an improvement in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations.

453
WILLIAM BUNDY, A LEADING POLICY-MAKER ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, TALKS TO DAVID WILSON ABOUT CHINA [interview] Listener, v. 86, July 22, 1971: 111.
AP4.L4165, v. 86

"From the 'Analysis' (Radio 4) of 2 July [1971]."

The Chinese do not see the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as a Soviet-American collusion against them, unless steps are taken that might be interpreted as being specifically anti-Chinese. For this reason it is good that Congress did not approve funds for expanding antimissile defense. Looking at Chinese nuclear power as it may develop over ten years, "at no point would it cause either the United States or the Soviet Union to change the plans they might develop for reduction under SALT."

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

454
Almersleben, Busso von. [NATO AFTER LISBON] Die NATO nach Lissabon. Kampftruppen, no. 3, May/June 1971: 70-71. N&CPR

Two events of great concern immediately preceded the series of NATO conferences that culminated in the foreign ministers' gathering in Lisbon. One was Senator Mansfield's motion for a reduction of American forces in Europe; the other, Brezhnev's "echo from Tiflis" expressing willingness to discuss mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) in Central Europe. Although the Mansfield bill was defeated, the result, nevertheless, is uncertainty about the future American presence in Europe. This gloomy possibility has ushered in a new spirit of collaboration among Europe's NATO members. MBFR "appears at first glance an enticing prospect, but the devil himself is hidden in every detail" by virtue of the imbalance in power relationships and in geography. NATO strength has already dropped to the absolute minimum, and even the slightest proportionate reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would work to the disadvantage of the West. The West must take into account political realities, one of which is that Western public opinion, especially in the United States, is inclined toward unilateral force reductions. The months ahead will test the mettle of the Alliance. Unity in times of tension is no uncommon phenomenon. The test is whether NATO can survive a real relaxation of tensions or the show of it, for so great is the public will for détente that it often confounds the latter with the former.

455
Bardin, Bogdan. [EUROPEAN CONFERENCE--AN OFFERING OF THE HOUR] Europäische Konferenz--ein Gebot der Stunde. Sowjetunion heute, v. 16, July 1, 1971: 26-27. DK266.A2S784, v. 16

When NATO speaks of détente and establishing lasting peace in Europe, it is only paying lip service to the hopes of most Europeans. In reality, NATO is expanding its military potential, intensifying military preparations in the Mediterranean area, and exhorting its European members to make greater military outlays. Forced into a defensive position on the convocation of a European security conference, NATO has singled out the Berlin negotiations as its pretext for delay. The ruling circles of the Western alliance have accused the Socialist states of refusing to recognize the realities of Europe. They are, however, the ones who ignore the realities of the German Democratic Republic and the legal position of West Berlin. NATO circles, especially in Washington, have a vested interest in maintaining tension in Europe, for an end to the American presence on the continent would mean a regrouping of European interests and the gravitation of the Western European states toward the Soviet Union. To counter this eventuality, NATO Secretary-General Brosio has endeavored to convince the states of the alliance that an increase in their military commitments is a constructive step in forming a basis for realistic negotiations on the concrete problems of European security. Such attempts to thwart the conference are doomed, for not all NATO states share Washington's negative position.

456
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [EAST-WEST DISCUSSION ON MBFR] Ost-West-Diskussion über MBFR. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, July 1971: 381-384.
D839.A885, v. 22

Although Soviet calls for disarmament negotiations are not new, Moscow's recent series of initiatives, stemming from the 24th Party Congress and quickened by the progress in the four-power talks on Berlin, may reflect a change in position. Contributing to that change is the recognition that armaments are not the cause of confrontations but rather their consequence, i.e., political problems are not automatically solved through disarmament. An easing of the political confrontation through settlement of the Berlin problem would, according to this logic, improve the chances of arms negotiations. The change in Moscow's position is also apparent in its unprecedented readiness to discuss mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR). MBFR is complicated, however, by the geographic asymmetry of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, which means that in any reduction of forces the Americans would have to pull back beyond the Atlantic and the Soviets just behind the Bug. The Soviets see MBFR as part of an overall arms reduction program embracing nuclear weapons and naval units. They are pressing their nuclear aims at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and would like to reach an agreement with China. Brezhnev's recent call for a reduction in naval units seeks only to limit the activities of the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets. The Soviet Union has chosen a time for its arms limitation offensive that coincides with mounting public opinion in the United States for a partial withdrawal from Europe and similar demands in the Soviet Union for meeting pressing domestic demands.

457
Bildungswerk Europäische Politik. [BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] Bibliographie zur europäischen Integration. 3d ed. Köln, Europa-Union Verlag [c1970] 299 p.
Z2000.B5 1970

Contents.--pt. 1. Idea and bases of European unity.--pt. 2. European organizations and institutions.--pt. 3. The position of individual states, parties, and associations on European integration.--pt. 4. Foreign relations of European organizations.--pt. 5. Problems of the economic integration of Europe.--pt. 6. Bibliographies and catalogs, reference works, periodical publications.--Title index.--Author index.

Annotated bibliography intended as a handy reference work on European integration. In addition to general works on the topics listed in the contents, the bibliography lists works on the prerequisites and consequences of the integration process.

458
Columbia University. Southern Asian Institute/East Asian Institute. INDIA AND JAPAN: THE EMERGING BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL, 1970-1975. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. New York, Columbia University, Apr. 1971. 4 v.
DLC

"ACDA/IR-170."

Contents.--v. 1. Summary report.--v. 2. Arms control report.--v. 3. India country reports.--v. 4. Japan country reports.

Explores the possibility that India and Japan would adopt certain arms control agreements if the United States policies in Asia were to remain the same or change in the period 1970-1975. The work is largely two parallel studies of Indian and Japanese security problems in the context of the potential Asian balance of power in the five-year period 1970-1975. The study projects the changes that will occur over that period and speculates how Indian and Japanese policymakers will determine whether progress towards arms control in Asia will be made. An analysis is presented of the security threats to both states and their probable reaction, given the domestic political situation and available resources. Special attention is given to the question of the feasibility of joint Indian-Japanese security efforts in order to reduce the American defensive burden in Asia. The study concludes that because India and Japan perceive their Asia security environment in different ways they pursue different foreign policy strategies.

459
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard N., Graf von, and others. A WORLD POWER--EUROPE. Central Europe journal, v. 19, July/Aug. 1971: 253-277.
DB200.7.S74, v. 19

Contents.--A world power--Europe, by Richard Count Coudenhove-Kalergi.--Europe's role--past, present, and future, by M. W. J. M. Broekmeijer.--For a lasting peace in Europe and the world, by John B. Hynd.--What Europe should be, by Pietro Quaroni.--Partnership between two superpowers, by Theodor Baron von Guttenberg.--On the road to European integration, by Walter Hallstein.--European Eastern policy--Soviet European policy, by Herbert Hupka.--Brandt: a major triumph for the "European idea."--"Historic importance."

Essays on European integration. Coudenhove-Kalergi's open letter to the heads of government of Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany calls for a united Europe. Broekmeijer analyzes the significance of European culture for the rest of the world and concludes that "the United States and Canada have to defend the same spiritual heritage as we Europeans," while Hynd examines the roles of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association and asserts that only "federalism" can help Europe assume a suitable political role in the international community.

460
Djerdja, Josip. EUROPEAN WAVERINGS AND SEARCHES. Review of international affairs, v. 22, May 5, 1971: 6-8.
D839.R4, v. 22

Recent talks between French statesmen and President Tito and other Yugoslav officials have stimulated some new interest in all-European topics. Such enthusiasm has been missing from generally

stagnant European relations that have polarized around old issues and bloc interests. Developments in the Middle East and shifting relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China have portents for world politics. Continued inaction could make Europe "miss the chance thus offered it for consolidating relations, cooperation and security on its own soil and for ensuring for European countries, freed from bloc fetters and hegemony, the position and prestige they deserve."

461
Edwards, James B. A UNITED EUROPE? Ordnance, v. 56, Sept./Oct. 1971: 124-125. illus.
UF1.067, v. 56

A united Western Europe, if it could control its internal conflicts, would be a matchless world force capable of superseding both the United States and the Soviet Union economically and militarily. Initially United Europe would have to build up its supply of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons so as to deter any threatened attack. This would also relieve the United States of the burden of providing military and economic aid to European countries. An arms race with the Soviets is unlikely since the U.S.S.R. could not afford it. With an effective military machine a united Europe could "bring about a more favorable balance of power in the world and enjoy such an overwhelming margin of superiority that the Communists would not dare even to consider aggression in Europe."

462
Hansen, Niels. [POLITICAL COLLABORATION IN WESTERN EUROPE] Politische Zusammenarbeit in Westeuropa. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, July 10, 1971: 456-464.
D839.E86, v. 26

To revive the long-stalled efforts toward greater political unity, the six members of the European Economic Community approved the Luxemburg Report in October 1970. This report set procedures and goals to bring about a better understanding of major problems and a harmonization of viewpoints in foreign policy. There have since been two consultations of the Community's foreign ministers. Discussions on such topics as the proposed European conference on security and collaboration and the Middle East crisis have been broached. "In spite of the complexity of the two problems . . . success was attained in fulfilling the goals [set for] these consultations and in having the member states of the Community speak with one voice as far as possible." In the selection of topics for Community discussion, care must be taken not to overstep NATO's jurisdiction. Foreign policy collaboration in the European Community has generally considered the interests of NATO and the United States. Critics of the Luxemburg Report point to its limited goals, the absence of any dedication to a communality of policy, and its exclusion from defense policy. Nonetheless, a new start has been made and experience shows that limited pragmatic goals are more readily realized than the ambitious ones.

463
Inosemzev, Nikolai. [SOME ASSERTIONS ON QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Einige Thesen zu Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, June 1971: 578-582, 584-585.
D839.B57, v. 16

The movement for a European security system is gaining ground because of the current desires for a relaxation of tensions and the broadening of peaceful collaboration. The contrast between two opposing social systems, each with its own military apparatus, and the objective necessity and real potential for peaceful collaboration and competition is clearly expressed in Europe. That peace in Europe should be maintained by a mutual deterrence of forces is a destructive concept, for the arms spiral sharply restricts the scientific, social, and cultural development of the continent. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, improvements in missiles, lesser weapons systems, and nuclear submarines, and the development of new bomber types forecast a decade of heightened peril. What is needed is a system of European security wherein the inviolability of existing boundaries including those of the German Democratic Republic is recognized and the renunciation of force pledged. Peace is indivisible, and attempts to develop Europe without the Soviet Union are unrealistic in terms of geography and population. On the economic level, the East European market, not subject to the fluctuations of capitalism, could help stabilize the Western European economy and assist the Western states in solving the problem of the "technological gap." Admittedly the problem of European security is bound to other European and world questions, but an all-European conference on security and collaboration could be profitably held, independently of other negotiations and problems. The conference can assure that Europe will not be drawn into a conflict by a non-European power, prevent economic blackmail and trade discrimination, and bring about joint East-West research on the pressing problems of conflict resolution and environmental pollution. Soviet views are in consonance with the principles of the United Nations as regard the maintenance of peace and security.

464
Jansson, Jan-Magnus. [FINLAND'S NEUTRALITY. ITS EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES] La neutralité de la Finlande. Ses perspectives européennes. Politique étrangère, v. 36, no. 4, 1971: 361-372.
JX3.P6, v. 36

Neutrality, although passive in the past, in our age can become active. In the case of Finland, neutrality works in favor of European cooperation. In order to carry this task through successfully, the author proposes a structure that would not replace existing organizations, in the West or the East, but would offer a permanent framework for

negotiations between all European countries. (Translation of supplied abstract)

465
Kreis, Rudolf. [IS EUROPE POLITICALLY MAL-CONSTRUCTED? PLEA FOR A EURO-AFRICAN STATE FEDERATION] Ist Europa eine politische Fehlkonstruktion? Plädoyer für einen euro-afrikanischen Bundesstaat. Köln, Selbstverlag R. Kreis, 1970. 106 p. illus.
D1053.K7
Bibliography: p. 103-106.

Contents.--pt. 1. Historical starting point.--pt. 2. Socioeconomic expectations and forces for the federation.--pt. 3. Analysis of options for a new realm.--pt. 4. Political leadership structures in the Realm of Nations.--pt. 5. Operative principles for the establishment of the new realm.

Detailed proposal for the establishment of a socially, economically, politically and geostrategically viable federation of states to replace the current unworkable grouping of Western European states. After reviewing four possible groupings, Kreis opts for a Euro-African federation made up of the Common Market countries, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. This federation offers prospects of counterbalancing other world groupings like those led by the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly China.

466
Matthiesen, Gunnar. [WAYS TO DISARMAMENT, SECURITY, AND COLLABORATION IN EUROPE] Wege zu Abrüstung, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, June 1971: 564-577.
D839.B57, v. 16

The convocation of a European conference on security and collaboration is necessary to meet the increasing demand from the peoples of Europe for a peace policy to replace the current balance of terror and the confrontation that could easily escalate into general nuclear war. Political security in Europe requires the dismantling of the armament of both Eastern and Western Europe and a broadening of peaceful relations between the two systems which must be based on the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states and of international legal recognition of, and respect for, the territorial status quo. There must be no preconditions for this conference, for détente, the prelude to peace, is not possible if the solution of one question is made dependent on the solution of another. Priority items on the conference agenda should be the collective renunciation of force, multilateral collaboration agreements, and the creation of a permanent European body for the discussion of common problems. An easing of the military confrontation could be achieved through a graduated sequence of agreements in the following form: the freezing of nuclear weapons in Central Europe, a logical follow-up on the regional level of the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; the reduction of nuclear weapons, especially tactical devices; and, finally, a reduction of conventional weapons. NATO proposals having to do with symmetrical and asymmetrical force reductions fail to consider the effect of qualitative improvements in weapons and organizational structures. The European conference would also facilitate agreements on European economic development along the lines of work and product specialization and scientific and technical cooperation and exchange.

467
Melchior de Molènes, Charles. [FOR A EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY] Pour une communauté politique européenne. Revue militaire générale; general military review, July 1971: 165-185.
U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in English and German.

Evaluates several proposals for a European political union. The author offers his own propositions concerning European unification: a directly elected Parliament of the Six entrusted with legislative and budgetary powers and the creation of a second chamber or European senate. He emphasizes that a majority voting mechanism in the Council of Ministers will be necessary because a unanimous vote is impracticable.

468
Nerlich, Uwe. [ON THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY] Zur Struktur und Dynamik europäischer Sicherheitspolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, July 25, 1971: 481-494.
D839.E86, v. 26

Although the development of the overall military picture favors the Soviet Union, the West has convinced itself of an easing of the military threat from the East. This paradox highlights the basic inadequacies of political analyses. The Soviet Union was in a strategically inferior position at the time (1955-1965) when Soviet expectations of conflict in Europe were at their highest. During the ensuing five-year period, the Soviet Union attained a position of parity, but a different set of circumstances had emerged. For the first time there now appears to be a possibility of an agreement on strategic arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The West sees its stabilization policy of the 1960's as no longer offering any satisfactory options. Although Western Europe cannot renounce its dependence on the American strategic potential, it must begin to base its effort for political stabilization on criteria different from those of the 1960's. A dynamic Western policy should be oriented toward an extensive separation of military necessities from nonmilitary endeavors, maintenance of the existing security structure, and a normalization of relations between East and West. Further it should seek, within existing security arrangements, to limit the capability of the two superpowers to make any indirect use of force in Europe. In the 1960's the Atlantic Alliance was

concerned with changing its security structure. Now in the 1970's the problem is to maintain the existing structure long enough to protect the emerging new political structures against security disruptions. On the other hand, a Soviet policy aimed at worsening Western Europe's security position, disrupting its integration, and accepting only those arms limitations not affecting the Soviet Union would create formidable problems. In the last analysis, the Soviet Union must decide whether it wants military dominance or cooperation with the Western European community.

469
Neumann, Richard. [THE SECURITY CONFERENCE--A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION FOR 17 YEARS] Die Sicherheitskonferenz--seit 17 Jahren ein Diskussionsgegenstand. Zukunft, v. 25, Mar. 1971: 17-19.
H5.Z85, v. 25

Outlines East European initiatives for the convocation of a European security conference, starting with the original Soviet proposal in 1954, the Rapacki recommendation in 1964, and including the current Finnish memorandum now under study in European capitals. Neumann also examines the Austrian position. Initially Austria held the opinion that the proposed conference should not ignore the Middle Eastern confrontation. Later it dropped that contention, and now maintains that the conference need have no preconditions and that its convocation is a step in the right direction.

470
["NO NEED TO WORRY, NIXON'S NOT JOHNSON"] "Keine Sorge, Nixon ist kein Johnson." Spiegel, v. 25, June 21, 1971: 21-22. illus.
AP30.S66, v. 25

Domestic political anxieties in Washington, Moscow, and Bonn prompt the leaders in those capitals to ever greater desire and readiness for an easing of international tensions. The Nixon Administration needs to score a foreign policy success for next year's elections. Brezhnev must reduce defense expenditures if he is to carry out his promises about the economy. Brandt needs a Berlin settlement to get his stalled Ostpolitik moving again. The United States and the Soviet Union are outdoing themselves in their détente efforts, which Nixon credits the West German chancellor as having initiated. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is the only incongruent note in this harmony of interests. The four-power Berlin negotiations and talks on a mutual balanced force reduction will not bring the GDR any nearer to its cherished desire for international recognition. That will have to wait for the European security conference, which both the Soviets and the East Germans would like to see take precedence over force reduction accords. Henry Kissinger is prepared to take a giant leap forward in this connection by suggesting a 10 to 30 percent force reduction. The West Germans want to be included in such a reduction to enjoy for once the benefit of burden-sharing. The Americans may not be too disinclined to heed this request from Bonn, for "Nixon's not Johnson," who was wont to badger the West Germans into ever greater defense contributions.

471
Petković, Ranko. SECURITY SYSTEMS IN EUROPE'S PRACTICE. Review of international affairs, v. 22, July 5, 1971: 11-12, 17.
D839.R4, v. 22

Almost all the European states have accepted the idea of holding a European security conference. Four types of security conferences have been held since World War II but none has included all the conferees appropriate to the discussion of peace and security in Europe. Europe has experienced three variants of security (political and military alliances, policies of neutrality, and collective security arrangements) and though it has found none completely secure still lives with each of them. The success of an all-European security conference will be determined by the preconditions existing on the psychological, ideological, political, economic, and military fronts.

472
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich. [TROOP REDUCTIONS--BUT BALANCED. SOVIET INTENTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS] Truppenreduzierung--aber ausgewogen. Sowjetische Absichten und Erwartungen. Politische Meinung, v. 16, July/Aug. 1971: 80-84.
H5.P75, v. 16

Moscow's belated willingness to discuss mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) is attributed to its interest in cutting costs and its desire to relieve pressure in the West to meet the Chinese challenge. Yet there are arguments, from Moscow's point of view, against MBFR. A serious cut in forces in Central Europe would reduce Moscow's capability to enforce the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is important to remember that the Warsaw Pact conventional forces are far stronger than they need be for any attack from the West, meaning their purpose is more political than military. In any MBFR talks the West would probably wish to use the "building-block technique" in negotiations, since it has had some success in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Possible building blocks on which to base MBFR negotiations include: forces to be covered (apparently it is understood that foreign and indigenous forces are meant); geographic area, with the West favoring the old Rapacki zone; time frame; components (conventional and/or nuclear); quantitative units for reduction (divisions, troop strengths, weapons, infrastructure); disposition of withdrawn units (demobilization or reserve status); and verification.

473
Serafin, George. A NEW STAGE IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. Romania today, no. 6/199, 1971: 15.
DR201.R78, 1971

In the interest of the speedy establishment of a European climate of collaboration, détente, and

security, it is time to take up bilateral and multilateral talks preliminary to holding a European conference on security and cooperation. All European countries along with other interested parties like the United States and Canada should attend this conference. Romania has recommended for the agenda, subject to approval by other countries, the obligation not to use force or the threat of force between European states, the development of multilateral economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, and the creation of a permanent mechanism to deal with European security. Progress toward the convocation of the conference requires the renunciation of prior conditions or prior solutions, since the purpose of the conference itself is to resolve such problems.

474
Stinson, Hugh B., and James D. Cochrane. THE MOVEMENT FOR REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN LATIN AMERICA. Journal of inter-American studies and world affairs, v. 13, Jan. 1971: 1-17.
F1401.J68, v. 13

Describes three arms control proposals for Latin America: the Costa Rican proposal of 1958, the Chilean proposal of 1960 and the Five Presidents' Declaration of 1963 which culminated in the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. Efforts between 1963 and 1969 to ban nuclear weapons from Latin America are examined and the factors which slowed efforts at general arms control while promoting the banning of nuclear weapons explained. The responsibility for retarding general arms control is ascribed to Latin American security concerns, U.S. policy towards Latin American armament, the attitude of the native armed forces, and considerations of prestige. Due to the peculiar nature of nuclear armaments, the considerations which retarded general arms control promoted denuclearization of Latin America.

475
Tarschys, Daniel. NEUTRALITY AND THE COMMON MARKET: THE SOVIET VIEW. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1971: 65-75. DL55.C66, 1971

The Soviet doctrine on the legal implications of neutrality is liberal with regard to the nonaligned nations in the third world but rigid with regard to the neutral states in Western Europe. On the one hand, Soviet jurists defend the right of neutral countries to pursue a highly active foreign policy. On the other, they contend that neither membership nor association with the Common Market is compatible with Swedish, Austrian, or Swiss neutrality. This inherent tension in the Soviet theory of neutrality is not resolved at the level of abstract definitions of neutrality and neutralism where the liberal interpretation tends to prevail. (Abstract supplied)

476
Tolkunov, Lev. [VIEWS ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE] Aspekte der Sicherheit und der Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Sowjetunion heute (Cologne) v. 16, Aug. 1, 1971: 33-35. illus.
DK266.A2S784, v. 16

Since all European states have evinced genuine interest in the convocation of a European conference on security and collaboration, why then has there been such slow progress? The answer is that forces in NATO and extreme rightist groups are obstructing the conference. First they claimed that the conference was only a Soviet trick to separate Europe from the United States. This objection evaporated when the Socialist states took cognizance of American and Canadian interests in Europe and agreed to their participation in the conference. Next they questioned whether the conference could take up the renunciation of force since the Socialist states are not ready to discuss arms limitation in Central Europe. This too proved invalid, for Point 3 of the conference agenda, as proposed by the Socialist states, calls for the formation of a body to deal with just such security problems. Then these obstructionist NATO circles began setting up preconditions, although there is no logical connection between the preconditions and the holding of the conference. On the contrary, a better case could be made for the conference taking precedence and so paving the way for the settlement of more specific issues. The Socialist countries could also set preconditions. The German Democratic Republic could rightfully demand international legal recognition as a prerequisite to its participation in the conference. The signing of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw has generated a favorable climate for a further relaxation of tensions by a European conference on security and collaboration. However, should the German Federal Republic defer the ratification of these treaties, the prospects for international détente would suffer a grave setback.

477
Winiewicz, Józef. SECURITY AND COOPERATION. Polish perspectives, v. 14, May 1971: 3-7.
DK401.P7947, v. 14

Socialist Poland sees the essential features of a European security conference, which is commanding great interest throughout Europe, as including cooperation irrespective of political system, recognition of the status quo in Europe, and universalism. Bloc states and neutral states alike must participate as well as the two Germanys. The United States and Canada should also take part, for their interests are "linked to the fate of Europe." Poland envisages the conference, which should be the first of several, as a step toward the "Europeanization of Europe." The convocation of the conference should not be tied to the success or failure of any other negotiations. What Poland foresees in regard to disarmament is a regional arrangement, in which the first move would be a nuclear freeze barring "all states from obtaining nuclear arms and from transferring them to other countries," that is, in effect, the implementation of the nonproliferation treaty.

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

478
A. A. GROMYKO'S LETTER TO UN SECRETARY U THANT REGARDING MOON LAWS. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 13, July 7, 1971: 35-37.
DK226.A2R37, v. 13
Translated from Pravda, June 9, 1971.
Slav Rm

Letter describing Soviet interest in outer space exploration and concern for "the building of a firm international-legal foundation" for activity in space. The salient points of a draft treaty on the moon which accompanies the letter are summarized; included are restrictions on hostile acts, nuclear weapons, and claims to ownership.

479
Anders, Peter, pseud. [THERE IS MORE THAN JUST FISH IN THE SEA] Im Meer gibt es nicht nur Fische. Zukunft, no. 9/10, May 1971: 34-37.
H5.Z85, 1971

Examines the current controversies regarding the sea and its use, covering such topics as the extent of territorial waters, the continental shelf, the seabed ban on mass-destruction weapons, fishing and ocean-floor resources, and pollution. Points of departure for the examination are the signing of the seabed treaty and Ecuador's "tuna war" with the United States. The United Nations will have to continue to wrestle with the knotty problem of sovereignty over coastal waters, but the outlook for a speedy solution is not bright. Although the seabed treaty appears to preclude the contamination of the oceans by weapons of mass destruction, Anders notes that its applicability is restricted to areas beyond the 12-mile limit. International treaties to prevent pollution of the oceans will generally remain ineffective, the author holds, until the chemical industry has found better means for waste disposal. Exploitation of the ocean's vast resources may eventuate in the contamination of sea life, a potential source of protein for the world's underfed.

480
Baker, Sam, and Kerry Gruson. THE COMING ARMS RACE UNDER THE SEA. In The Pentagon watchers; students report on the national security state. Edited by Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970: 335-370.
UA23.P44
"Notes": p. 370.

The U.S. Navy is engaged in developing a technology that will give it a vastly expanded underwater capability. The Deep Submergence Systems Program's rescue vehicle, ostensibly a vessel for assisting stricken submarines, will in fact increase the staying power of the strategic missile submarine fleet and permit the deployment of undersea arsenals and bases. The program's search vehicle and "man-in-the-sea" projects have the same potential. The Deep Ocean Technology Program is at work on undersea weapons systems. A wide range of research programs and proposals makes it clear that permanent undersea bases will soon become entirely feasible. The Navy dominates research in basic oceanography, so much so that it has been criticized for distorting the emphasis given to the disciplines in the field. Competition for use of the sea has created problems between the Navy and the oil and fishing industries, but relations between the Navy and the defense industries that hope for a share of the undersea technology business continue to be excellent. The 1969 U.S. draft seabed treaty, which the Navy approves, in effect bans no weapons from the oceans in which the Navy would be interested. The United States presently holds a dominant lead in undersea technology. "Unless it is stopped, the U.S. Navy will extend the arms race to the ocean depths and extend the American military presence into the farthest reaches of nature's watery realm."

481
Hanevold, Truls. INSPECTIONS IN ANTARCTICA. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1971: 103-114.
DL55.C66, 1971

Because of the Antarctic Treaty, Antarctica has become the first, and so far the only, major demilitarized and atom free area. Among the rights given to treaty members is that of mutual inspection. The article gives an account of the major problems connected with the negotiations leading up to the inclusion of the inspection article in the treaty. After a description of the inspections which have been carried out, the ability of the member states to inspect is discussed in relation to the economic, scientific and logistic capability differences existing between them. Further, attention is drawn to the questions of effectiveness and sanctions. The possible consequences of being able and willing to inspect for the question of territorial claims and rights in the area are discussed, and finally, some alternative ways of carrying out inspections are suggested. (Abstract supplied)

482
Law of the Sea Institute. THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT; PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE . . . the University of Rhode Island, Kingston. Edited by Lewis M. Alexander. Kingston, University of Rhode Island, 1971. 390 p. illus.
JX4408.L37
Sponsored by the Graduate School of Oceanography and the Dept. of Geography.
Includes bibliographical references.

Statements, addresses, and discussions by Government officials and scholars concerning, among other things, U.N. activities relating to the seabed, international machinery for seabed development, arms control for the ocean floor, U.S. policies toward the seabed, and recent developments in Soviet maritime law.

483
O'Connell, D. P. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE EXPLOITATION OF THE OCEAN FLOOR. Impact of science on society, v. 21, July/Sept. 1971: 253-264.
Q1.I4, v. 21

While the nations are in principle agreed that the ocean floor, a potential mine of vast mineral resources, is the common heritage of all mankind, no law exists governing how it will be exploited. And if a law is not fashioned in the near future, a scramble for the sea bed may soon ensue which could have serious political repercussions. Fundamental to establishing such a law is defining the limits of the continental shelf. Only the continental-shelf areas are subject to national sovereignties, with the deep-ocean floor the common property of all--but no satisfactory legal definition of the outer boundary of the continental shelf has yet been arrived at. (Abstract supplied)

484
SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY TRANSMITTED TO THE SENATE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Aug. 16, 1971: 185-187.
JX232.A33, v. 65

Text of President Nixon's message transmitting the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, together with Secretary of State Rogers' report on the treaty, which briefly explains its principal provisions. The treaty, which prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed outside a 12 mile coastal "seabed zone" defined in the treaty, "represents a practical and timely step toward helping protect this new environment," and "is a significant addition to the structure of multilateral arms control agreements such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, contributing to international security."

485
Young, Elizabeth. TO GUARD THE SEA. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Oct. 1971: 136-147.
D410.F6, v. 50

Negotiations for arms control beneath the sea are unique in character. This quality stems in part from the lack of definition of national and international domains and rights, the generally "ungoverned status of the sea and seabed." Development of relevant international law is hampered by the near-impossibility of adequate inspection and enforcement. In addition, economic factors, like the oil interests, are involved, and often lead states to speak in ambiguous, if not contradictory, terms about the need for regulations. Regulation may be meaningless, however, if pollution continues unchecked. Strategic missiles located underwater would probably be safer than topside weapons and would allow the Americans and Soviets each to prepare a "nuclear umbrella" and secure the stable balance they require before beginning arms reduction negotiations. On the other hand, seabed limitations may well come about because of the development of conservation and anti-pollution regulations and their enforcement regardless of disarmament talks.

ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

486
Anglin, F. M. DISCRIMINATION OF EARTHQUAKES AND EXPLOSIONS USING SHORT PERIOD SEISMIC ARRAY DATA. Nature (London) v. 233, Sept. 3, 1971: 51-52.
Q1.N2, v. 233

Reports that "using data recorded at the Yellowknife short period seismic array in northern Canada, a simple two dimensional identification parameter has been found that completely separates a population of underground explosions ($4.2 \leq m_b \leq 6.2$) at the Urals, Caspian, East Kazak, Sinkiang and Novaya Zemlya test sites from a population of shallow ($h \leq 50$ km) earthquakes ($4.3 \leq m_b \leq 6.0$) within about 15° of these test sites." It remains to be seen "whether this short period will continue to hold on a worldwide basis, or for larger event populations," but if it does, "it will provide a positive discriminant for explosions with yields smaller than 10 kT in hard rock."

487
Dahlman, O., H. Israelson, and H. Wägner. GROUND MOTION AND ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE WAVES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Nature: physical science (London) v. 232, July 26, 1971: 79.
Q1.N2, v. 232

An analysis of recordings made at Hagfors Observatory, Sweden, of long period seismologic and microbarologic signals from two large airburst nuclear weapons tests conducted by the French in the Tuamoto archipelago on May 30 and July 3, 1970. One conclusion of the analysis is that there is no simple way to determine the yield of an atmospheric nuclear explosion from recorded seismic signals, since these depend not only on the charge size but on explosion altitude and ground properties.

488
DETECTING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AT LAST? Nature (London) v. 233, Sept. 3, 1971: 8.
Q1.N2, v. 233

Canadian researchers have established that the identification threshold for nuclear explosives in Eurasia is about 20 kilotons in consolidated rock. According to their report, existing seismic facilities could be improved at moderate cost to the point where 5-10 kiloton explosions could be identified with a 90% probability. The Canadian stud-

ies make use of the difference in amplitude spectra between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. With respect to a comprehensive test ban, however, the difficulty of recording Rayleigh waves from small explosions must be considered, and this is why there has been a revival of interest in the use of complexity criteria. This issue of this journal carries a report of the use of complexity and spectral criteria in combination to achieve the separation of explosive and earthquake samples from central Asia. However, since there were only four samples with a magnitude less than m_b 4.5, the "range in which P-wave discriminants can make a significant contribution to the Test Ban problem," it is clear that more work must be done. The physical basis for these discriminants has not been determined as yet, and consequently no one can predict whether a study of Nevada earthquakes and explosions would yield similar results.

489
DEVELOPMENT OF MODELS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE ON MOBILE NUCLEAR FORCES ON ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Chicago, Museum of Science and Industry, 1970. v. I (summary final report) 11 p. v. II (final report) 154 p. illus.
DLC

Prepared by the Academy for Interscience Methodology under contract no. ACDA/WEC 172.
"AIM 70-T-6 ACDA" and "AIM 70-T-7 ACDA."

Contents.--v. 1. Introduction. Mobile offensive systems. Reconnaissance vehicles. Reconnaissance sensors. Evaluation of mobile systems. --v. 2. Introduction. Mobile offensive systems. Reconnaissance vehicles. Reconnaissance sensors. The mobile system program logic. SIR NEM and MOBILE program integration. The rapid production model and the mobile systems. Appendix I: Sensor data. Appendix II: Inputs and printout. Glossary.

Computer program representation of land mobile missiles, dispersible aircraft carriers, and submarines. Focusing on mobile offensive systems, "the representation of these equipments includes their cyclic operational motions to, from and on, both maintenance bases and duty stations in peacetime and in conflict."

490
Douglas, A., P. D. Marshall, and D. J. Corbishley. ABSORPTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF P SIGNALS. Nature (London) v. 233, Sept. 20, 1971: 50-51.
Q1.N2, v. 233

Offers an explanation of the complexity of some underground nuclear explosion generated P waves. In the majority of cases these waves are simple, consisting of a single 2- or 3-cycle pulse and low amplitude coda. Complex explosion signals occur when "the direct P signal has traveled by a path that has lower average Q than the path followed by the later arrivals" with the result that "the direct P is attenuated relative to the late arrivals and the record appears complex." The complexity of earthquake signals may be attributable, at least in part, to the same mechanism. At one time it was believed that complexity might be a good criterion for distinguishing underground explosions from earthquakes. However, the recorded differences between the two may have resulted from the circumstance that "the first firings of underground explosions recorded at teleseismic distances were in areas of high (or at least uniform) Q and hence gave simple signals, whereas the earthquake with which they were compared occurred in regions of nonuniform Q."

491
Kolb, W. TUNGSTEN-181 AND OTHER SHORT LIVED FISSION PRODUCTS IN GROUND LEVEL AIR IN NORTH GERMANY AND NORTH NORWAY. Nature (London) v. 232, Aug. 20, 1971: 552-553. Q1.N2, v. 232

Reports some results of a long-term environmental radioactivity surveillance program conducted under sponsorship of the Federal Institute of Physics and Technology, Brunswick, Germany. Kolb reports that on three different occasions within recent months, samples of atmospheric dust collected in filters at 1.5 meters above ground level have been found to contain fresh radioactive debris. The Chinese nuclear test of Oct. 14, 1970, the U.S. underground test in Nevada on Dec. 16, 1970, and, with less certainty, the Soviet underground tests in Siberia on March 22, 1971, and in the Ural mountains on March 23, 1971, would appear to be the sources of these fission products.

492
Liebermann, Robert C., and P. W. Basham. EXCITATION OF SURFACE WAVES BY THE ALEUTIAN UNDERGROUND EXPLOSION MILROW (OCTOBER 2, 1969). Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, June 10, 1971: 4030-4034. QC811.J6, v. 76

The average surface-wave and body-wave magnitudes of Milrow are determined to be M_s=4.94 and m_b=6.47. Individual station magnitudes scatter by at least one unit about these averages. Milrow generated significantly smaller surface waves than earthquakes of comparable m_b from the same geographical and tectonic region. These observations are consistent with those for the Aleutian underground explosion Longshot (October 29, 1965) and with similar M_s versus m_b studies in other regions of the world that use data from a large number of seismograph stations covering a wide range of azimuth and epicentral distance. (Abstract supplied)

493
Portnoy, Barry M. ARMS CONTROL PROCEDURE: INSPECTION BY THE PEOPLE--A REEVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL. Cornell international law journal, v. 4, fall 1971: 153-165. LL

"This paper was originally prepared for a seminar . . . given by the Cornell Program on Science, Technology, and Society."

Reexamines a proposal for on-site inspection by resident nationals for possible violations of arms

control agreements and specifically proposes popular reporting as a control measure on the deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). In the proposal under study, the people--primarily those working in the research and development stages of weapons programs when internal secrecy is most difficult to maintain--would report violations to an international body. The author examines the obvious obstacles that come to mind (closed society, patriotism, espionage laws, and communication) and finds them not as insurmountable as they appear. "The most persistent criticism of people's inspection is that it would be politically unacceptable . . . to a 'closed society' like that of the Soviet Union," but Portnoy claims that the rationale behind this criticism is being increasingly questioned by new circumstances and the advance of technology. Since MIRV is potentially the most disturbing development in nuclear armaments, he suggests that "inspection by the people of a MIRV ban could operate within the context of a continuous SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]."

494
Rosen, Louis. RELEVANCE OF PARTICLE ACCELERATORS TO NATIONAL GOALS. Science, v. 173, Aug. 6, 1971: 490-497. illus. Q1. S35, v. 173
"References and notes": p. 497.
"This article is adapted from a talk given at the National Particle Accelerator Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 1-3 March 1971."

Discusses the ways in which particle accelerators can be utilized to realize "national goals"--national defense, international cooperation, acquisition of beneficial knowledge, and economic well-being, decent health, and educational opportunity for all. In evaluating the defense role of particle accelerators, Rosen states that the coming problem will be the identification, inspection, and control of fissionable materials produced in power reactors. More powerful accelerators will be needed to determine the contents of sealed containers. Increased worldwide plutonium production will require simple, accurate examination and identification of substances by sophisticated accelerators. "Sooner or later there must evolve an all-inclusive international treaty for control of fissionable materials," Rosen believes. Accelerators will be an essential part of verification in implementing any agreement.

495
Springer, Donald L., and Ross L. Kinnaman. SEISMIC SOURCE SUMMARY FOR U.S. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, 1961-1970. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 61, Aug. 1971: 1073-1098. illus. QE531.S3, v. 61

A summary of information is presented for all announced U.S. underground nuclear explosions detonated during the 1961-1970 time period. The data include detonation times, locations, and depths of burial, as well as information about shot media and surface collapse (subsidence) phenomena. This summary is intended to furnish all available source data for studies of seismic sources, as well as studies of seismic transmission characteristics of the Earth. (Abstract supplied)

496
Ungerer, Werner. [NUCLEAR ENERGY CONTROLS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NP TREATY] Kernenergiekontrollen gemäss NV-Vertrag. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Aug. 1971: 451-464. D839.A885, v. 22

Commends as a model agreement the guidelines drafted by a committee appointed by the International Atomic Energy Agency for presentation to the governing council of that Agency for approval and subsequent use as a negotiating instrument with the signatories of the nonproliferation treaty. Ungerer cites differences and incongruities that the draft agreement reconciles and describes the procedures recommended for reducing the frequency and intensity of inspections. For the nonnuclear industrial states, he concludes, approval of this draft agreement among signatory states could be an important achievement. It would allay their apprehensions that the security measures called for in the nonproliferation treaty might impede their development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and prejudice their ability to compete in world markets.

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL

497
Bialek, Adelaide E., and others. DEVELOPMENT OF RAPID RESPONSE FEATURES AND IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE MODELS FOR ARMS CONTROL STUDIES. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Chicago, Academy for Interscience Methodology, Museum of Science and Industry, 1970. 5 v. (various pagings) illus. DLC
Contract no. ACDA/WEC-176.
At heads of volume titles: AIM 70-T-4, AIM 70-T-8 through AIM 70-T-11.

Contents.--v. 1. Summary final report.--v. 2. Final report, by Norman H. Painter.--v. 3. Strategic international relations nuclear exchange model, SIR NEM 6, input sections to selected subprograms, by Herbert R. Hesse and Edward G. Richter.--v. 4. A comparison of the strategic nuclear exchange models, SIR NEM, CODE 50, and AEM, by Herbert R. Hesse.--v. 5. Analysis of uncertainty for arms reduction, by Merl L. Kardatzke.

Study contracted by the Weapon Evaluation Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to design a companion model to the bureau's Strategic International Relations, Nuclear Exchange Model (SIR NEM), "which is a simulation of multiple nations, strategic offense-defense weapon deployment, employments, interactions, and estimation of resulting national damage." SIR NEM itself, which supports the agency's capability to evaluate the implications of arms control and disarmament mea-

sures, was also modified. Volumes II through V report the results of the four tasks assigned under the agency's contract: "I. Development of an Improved Rapid Response Version of an Existing Model, II. Quantitative Analysis of Strategic Arms Negotiations, III. Maintenance and Modification of Computer Models and Additional Changes Mutually Agreed, and IV. Applications and Modifications of Computer Models for Naval Equipments." Volume III is a user's manual intended for the agency's in-house use; however, a short summary is given in volume I, chapter IV. Under support from this study contract, a related study by Paul Garvin was published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "NSSM 64--U.S. Strategic Capabilities, Part V, Volume III, Analysis of Small Attacks, JCS Paper #2101/560-5, November 1969."

498
DETRICK'S GERMS GONE, NCI'S VIRUSES DUE. Medical world news, v. 12, July 23, 1971: 25. illus.
R11.M864, v. 12

Reports on progress toward the conversion of Fort Detrick, the Department of Defense's onetime biological warfare research center, into a facility for medical research. The center is to be leased to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for occupancy by the National Cancer Institute and perhaps others of the National Institutes of Health. In the negotiations for the transfer, the Department of Defense seemed inordinately anxious to get rid of the facility while HEW was hesitant about accepting it. The resulting delay may have impaired the usefulness of the facility through the loss of valuable personnel--an allegation that HEW officials deny.

OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

499
Beer, Karl W. [TEN YEARS OF WALL STRATEGY] Zehn Jahre Mauer-Strategie. Politische Meinung, v. 16, July/Aug. 1971: 3-6.
H5.P75, v. 16

It is symptomatic of the disregard of German interests at the four-power Berlin negotiations that the talk is now of a Berlin settlement and not a Berlin solution. That change in perspective is, nonetheless, in consonance with the intentions of the major powers in the East-West conflict. The basis of discussion for these negotiations is the status quo. The status of East Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, is not being discussed, nor is the removal of the wall erected as an instrument of Soviet strategy. As for access to West Berlin, it is obvious that the condition of the roads is such that they can be closed for any reason. The only subject debated on freedom of movement within the city is the movement of West Berliners. Only the matter of the relationship of West Berlin to the Federal Republic is negotiable and not the relationship of East Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. The proposed Soviet consulate general will legitimize Soviet coresponsibility in the western half of the city, while denying the other three powers any rights in the eastern half. A Berlin solution is possible only when a condition of détente exists between the two Germanys, and that is a long road ahead. It is to be hoped that the Berlin settlement now being formulated will not prove a stumbling block on that road.

500
Doty, Paul. THE COMMUNITY OF SCIENCE AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. Science, v. 173, Sept. 10, 1971: 998-1002. Q1.S35, v. 173
"Notes": p. 1002.
"This article is adapted from the Robertson Memorial Lecture given on 26 April 1971 to the National Academy of Sciences."

Science is responsible for the technology which produced the population explosion and nuclear armaments, the two great hazards to world peace. Relations between Soviet and American scientists, who have made their nations the world's richest and best armed, are of special importance in the search for solutions. Soviet-American scientific exchange has grown enormously in the past decade, although the flow has been freer from the United States to the Soviet Union than the other way. Individually initiated, one-to-one ventures are still far off, but meaningful group collaboration in research is already doing quite well. The 20 Pugwash conferences since 1957 have had remarkable impact on arms control and disarmament. However, they have had less success in coming to grips with population problems, and are in need of rejuvenation. The intensity of Soviet-American discussions on arms control is a hopeful augury, but recent trends have created new difficulties. The arms race has reached a stage where the quantity of weapons of increasingly destructive power has gone beyond the needs of deterrence. The emphasis seems to be on the ability to fight a nuclear war to the finish, not on the ability to deter one. If this is true, the results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will be less than hoped for. "I have tried to present here enough of the picture to indicate that our progress in meaningful scientific contacts is only a means that may be helpful, even essential, in dealing with the two challenges I have focused on."

501
Farley, Philip J. THE ADVANTAGES OF A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Aug. 16, 1971: 182-185.
JX232.A33, v. 65

Enumerates "the potential advantages of a comprehensive test ban treaty, why adequate verification is essential to make sure that such potential advantages are real ones, and what efforts are being made to solve the verification problem." A comprehensive test ban treaty would retard the

U.S.-Soviet arms race, reinforce the nonproliferation treaty, create a favorable climate for other arms control measures, and allay widespread concern over the ecological impact of underground testing. To be effective, however, the treaty must include a system of adequate verification. Present seismic verification methods being subject to operational and inherent limitations, "even the fullest application of these methods . . . would leave events that cannot be clearly identified as explosions rather than earthquakes." It follows that "onsite inspections could play an important role in helping deter a potential violator and could provide the parties with added confidence that the treaty was being complied with."

502
Hacker, Friedrich. [THE FUTURE OF INHUMANITY] Zukunft der Unmenschlichkeit. In his Aggression. Die Brutalisierung der modernen Welt. Wien, München, Zürich, Molden [1971] p. 19-27.
BF575.A3H3

Contends that the peril of the unchecked escalation of personal and collective violence lies not so much in its geometrically increasing incidence as in the gross indifference with which society reacts to it. For the last 150 years at least one person has been killed through acts of violence--wars, police actions, incidents, and crime--for every minute of the 24-hour day. In the last 15 years, Hacker claims, that rate has tripled. What is needed, he concludes, are not appeals for the renunciation of force but rather knowledge and recognition of the hidden and interrelated forces making up the aggression cycle and of the dangerous inclination toward violence present in others and ourselves.

503
TEACHING ABOUT WAR, PEACE, CONFLICT, AND CHANGE. Intercom, v. 13, Mar./Apr. 1971: 24-68.
Z7164.I8I48, v. 13

Contents.--Preface.--What are the social studies?--Skills, abilities, and affective development.--Permeating the syllabus.--The concept approach.--Values.--Subject matter.--Appendix: Center for Teaching International Relations. Harvard Social Studies Project. World Law Fund. Selected organizations. Selected additional publications. Curriculum materials collection project

Materials and guidance for the secondary school social studies teacher in planning and conducting a course of instruction on the issues of war and peace, conflict and change. Questions relating to the skills and abilities that should be developed by the course of instruction, the difficulties in dealing with value judgments and moral issues, and how to structure the materials and prepare a syllabus are discussed. The resources available to teachers and previous work done in this field by other individuals and organizations are surveyed. The central problems intellectually for the program planner are those of defining the subject matter within the broader social studies context and giving specificity to the issues.

504
Woodward, David R. BRITAIN'S "BRASS-HATS" AND THE QUESTION OF A COMPROMISE PEACE, 1916-1918. Military affairs, v. 35, Apr. 1971: 63-68.
E181.M55, v. 35

The author concludes from the case history of the 1916-18 debate in Britain between military and civilian leaders over the question of a compromise peace that the "'Brass-Hats' were unsuited to give advice on whether or not a negotiated peace should be sought." Except for a short period of uncertainty in 1917-18, military leaders argued only for total victory over Germany. Woodward contends that the British military was out of contact with the political, economic and social conditions in both Britain and the allied states, yet it "demanded the right to determine the issue of war or peace despite the impact of its decisions on the entire British population."

AUTHOR INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

A

Abbass, Abdul M., 356
Abosch, Heinz, 46
Academy for Interscience Methodology, 489
Adam, Werner, 144
Ago, Roberto, 357
Ahmad, Eqbal, 186
al-Anani, Isam, 167
Aleksandrov, I., 145
Aleksandrov, L., 431
Alexander, Lewis M., 482
Ali, Mehrunnisa, 158
Alker, Henry A., 1
Almersleben, Busso von, 454
Alting Von Geusau, Frans A. M., 268
Anand, Mulk R., 217
Andel, C. Pieter van, 393
Anders, Peter, pseud., 479
Andreasian, R., 2
Angell, Robert C., 356
Anglin, F. M., 486
Arbatov, G., 47
Arkadev, N., 417
Ashford, Theodore A., 342
Ashkar, Riad, 190
Audi, Robert, 42

B

Baer, Daniel J., 231
Baez, Joan, 388
Bailey, Sydney D., 147
Baker, Sam, 327, 480
Baldwin, Hanson W., 148
Ballis, William, 356
Barclay, Cyril N., 218
Bardin, Bogdan, 455
Barham, Ahmed, 167
Barnds, William J., 149
Barnet, Richard J., 48
Barnett, A. Doak, 49
Baroch, Charles T., 50
Basham, P. W., 492
Baskin, Samuel J., 382
Beaufre, Andre, 3
Bebler, Ales, 435
Bechtoldt, Heinrich, 4, 150, 456
Becker, Benjamin M., 404
Beer, Karl W., 499
Benedict, Donald, 388
Berkenkopf, Galina, 51
Bex, John E., 219
Bialek, Adelaide E., 497
Bildungswerk Europäische Politik, 457
Bindschedler-Robert, Denise, 344
Birnbaum, Karl E., 52
Birrenbach, Kurt, 53
Bitensky, Reuben, 338
Blank, W. J., 54
Bletz, Donald F., 311
Boardman, Robert, 55
Bonsdorff, Göran von, 56
Booth, K., 220
Borosage, Robert, 327
Borowik, Genrich, 421
Bottome, Edgar M., 436
Boyd, Andrew K. H., 358
Boyd, James M., 378
Brandt, Willy, 57-58
Branfman, Fred, 192
Bredow, Wilfried von, 88
Brennan, Donald G., 405
Brezhnev, Leonid, 437
Briessen, Fritz van, 59
Broekmeijer, M. W. J. M., 459
Brosio, Manlio, 221
Brown, Sanborn C., 312
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 60, 128
Bu, Peter, 222
Buckley, James L., 223
Bullock, Alan, 5
Bundy, William P., 453
Burns, Arthur L., 29
Burns, Richard Dean, 401
Butler, William E., 343

C

Caflisch, Lucius, 344
Camilleri, J. A., 40
Campbell, John C., 61, 151
Carter, April, 383
Casper, Max, 338
Cattani, Alfred, 6
Chang, Wei-ya, 62
Chapman, George, 224
Chatfield, Charles, 402
Cheever, Daniel S., 372
Chen, Lung-chu, 152
Cherednichenko, M., 187
Childs, David, 63
Chopra, Pran, 154
Christie, Michael J., 425
Cimbala, Stephen J., 226
Claude, Inis L., 29, 356
Clough, Ralph N., 66
Clubb, O. Edmund, 67
Cochrane, James D., 474
Cohen, Irvine, 227
Cohen, Jerome A., 68
Cohen, Samuel T., 228
Columbia University. Southern Asian Institute/East Asian Institute, 458
Committee for Environmental Information. Nuclear Weapons Subcommittee, 193
Commoner, Barry, 342
Conference on Contemporary Problems of the Law of Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1969), 344
Converse, Philip E., 329
Corbett, Percy E., 356
Corbishley, D. J., 490
Cordes, Harry N., 229
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard N., Graf von, 459
Cummins, Ian, 40
Curtis, Michael, 155
Cycon, Dieter, 69

D

Dahlman, O., 487
Daly, Richard, 342
Davis, Kenneth S., 313
Delcoigne, Georges, 427
DeLong, Edward K., 225
Denker, Rolf, 8
Deutsch, Karl W., 356
Divine, Robert A., 156
Djerdja, Josip, 460
Dmitriev, E., 70
Dodd, Norman L., 230
D'Ombrain, Nicholas J., 9
Donnelly, C. L., 231
Dormann, Manfred, 10
Doty, Paul, 500
Dougall, Lucy, 384
Dougherty, James E., 406, 438
Douglas, A., 490
Dowd, Douglas F., 314
Drachovitch, Milorad M., 232
Driver, Tom F., 388
Drost, Bruce A., 11
Dubnic, Vladimir Reisky de, 12
Duchêne, François, 233, 268
Duncanson, Dennis J., 157

E

Edwards, James B., 461
Einstein, Albert, 342
Elble, Rolf, 234
Elkordy, Abdul-Hafez M., 159
Emerson, Rupert, 345
Engdahl, E. R., 194
Eron, Leonard D., 13
Etheredge, Lloyd, 235

F

Fabian, Larry L., 359
Farley, Philip J., 501

Farrell, Thomas F., 342
Faruki, Kamal A., 158
Fawcett, Jan, 14
Federation of American Scientists. Ad Hoc Committee on Military R&D, 195
Ferber, Christian von, 385
Fink, Clinton F., 356
Finkelhor, David, 325
Fîntînaru, Ion, 418
Fircks, Otto, Freiherr von, 71
Fitzgerald, C. P., 40
Florin, Peter, 15
Forschungsdienst China-Archiv, 112, 368
Forsythe, David P., 160
Fox, Douglas M., 236
Fox, William T. R., 356
Franz, Herbert, 196
Friedheim, Robert L., 29
Frye, Alton, 73

G

Gabelić, Andro, 407, 439-440
Gandolfi, Alain, 346
Gati, Charles, 74
Gebhardt, Hermann P., 16
Geisenheyner, Stefan, 237
Gelb, Leslie H., 75
Gelber, Harry G., 238
Geneste, Marc E., 408
Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-), 197
Gilberg, Trond, 76
Ginsburgs, George, 372
Goldberger, Marvin L., 194
Goldwater, Barry, 239
Goodrich, Leland M., 29, 378
Gottlieb, Sanford, 240
Graham, John R., 241
Gray, Colin S., 17, 315
Gromyko, Andrei A., 77, 478
Gruson, Kerry, 327, 480
Guarghias, Aloysius, 242
Gurtov, Melvin, 243
Guttenberg, Karl T., Freiherr von und zu, 28, 78
Guttenburg, Theodor Graf von, 459

H

Haas, Ernst B., 29
Habsburg, Otto von, 18
Hacker, Friedrich, 502
Halle, Louis J., 268
Halliday, Fred, 161
Hallstein, Walter, 459
Halperin, Morton H., 409
Hamad, Jamil, 167
Han Suyin, 86
Hanevold, Truls, 481
Hansen, Niels, 462
Hardin, Garrett, 342
Harding, Harry, 243
Harrison, Bernard, 42
Harrison, Stanley L., 79
Hasan, K. Sarwar, 158
Hasegawa, Sukehiro, 81
Hassner, Pierre, 128
Hattis, Susan, 386
Hatz, Oskar, 162
Hecht, Rudolf, 163
Hecht, Selig, 342
Helms, Richard, 244
Heradstveit, Daniel, 164
Herz, John H., 29
Hesse, Herbert R., 497
Hilsman, Roger, 422
Hinsley, F. H., 29
Hinton, Harold C., 165, 422
Hirasawa, Kazushige, 80
Hoadley, J. Stephen, 81
Höpker, Wolfgang, 245
Hoffmann, Heinz, 246-247
Hoffmann, Stanley, 29
Holbraad, Carsten, 19
Holbrook, James R., 248
Holloway, David, 198
Holmes, John W., 82
Holmes, Robert L., 42
Hosmer, Craig, 204
Hottelet, Richard C., 360
Hottinger, Arnold, 166
Hubbard, David G., 387
Huber, Wolfgang, 393
Hudson, G. F., 249
Hudson, W. J., 83
Humphrey, Hubert H., 84
Hunck, Joseph M., 85
Hunt, Gregory W., 316
Hunt, Raymond G., 316
Hunter, Robert E., 410
Huntington, Samuel P., 29
Hupka, Herbert, 459
Hutchings, Raymond, 317
Hynd, John B., 459

I

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency
IAkubovskii, I., 250
Ice, Solon, 338
Ihmels, Karl, 347
Iliff, Elisabeth F., 323
Ilsemann, Carl-Gero von, 251
Imai, Ryukichi, 430
Inosemzev, Nikolai, 463
International Atomic Energy Agency, 428
International Institute for Strategic Studies. See London. International Institute for Strategic Studies
Israelson, H., 487
IUrkov, S., 87

J

Jacob, Alain, 64
Jacob, Philip E., 361
Jacobsen, Hans A., 88
Jacobson, Harold K., 356, 372
Janowitz, Morris, 411
Jansson, Jan-Magnus, 464
Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, 252
Japan Defense Agency, 253
Jenner, F. A., 392
Jervis, Robert, 29
Jessup, Philip C., 362
Johnson, Joseph E., 344
Johnston, Douglas M., 153

K

Kaplan, Morton A., 89, 422
Kapur, Ashok, 254
Kardatzke, Merl L., 497
Karnow, Stanley, 90
Kaufman, Richard F., 318
Kavic, Lorne, 153
Kaysen, Carl, 29
Kelly, Peter, 430
Kennedy, Edward M., 319
Khalidi, Ahmed, 190
Kharich, V., 441-442
Kielmansegg, Johan A., Graf von, 251
Kiener, Franz, 20
Kimche, Jon, 167-168
Kinnaman, Ross L., 495
Kintner, William R., 21
Kirchschläger, Rudolf, 91
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., 225
Kissinger, Henry A., 29
Klein, Tom, 327
Klingberg, Frank L., 356
Klochko, Mikhail, 153
Kluss, Heinz, 412
Knaute, Hans J., 71
Knoll, Erwin, 255
Knorr, Karl-Ernst, 380
Knott, Paul D., 11
Kock, F. H. C., 256
Kohler, Foy D., 92, 257
Kolb, W., 491
Kolodziej, Edward A., 93
Konzelmann, Gerhard, 169
Kraft, Joseph, 443
Kramer, Marc, 327
Kramish, Arnold, 342
Kratzer, Myron B., 430
Kreis, Rudolf, 465
Krippendorff, Ekkehart, 94
Krüger, Joachim, 22
Kühn, Alfred G., 258
Kuliang, J. K. L., 23
Kuliang, K. K. L., 23
Kussbach, Erich, 348
Kutakov, L. N., 363

L

La Follette, Belle Case, 388
La Follette, Fola, 388
Laird, Melvin R., 259
Lakey, George, 383
Lall, Arthur, 372
Lambeth, Benjamin S., 444

Langer, William L., 29
Latter, Albert, 342
Latzo, Anton, 22
Law of the Sea Institute, 482
Lawson, Don, 388
Leff, Nathaniel H., 95
Lefkowitz, Monroe M., 13
Lehmann, Horst, 349
Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 96
Leonard, James F., 413, 432
Leonidov, E., 97
Levine, Robert A., 29
Lewan, Kenneth M., 350
Libby, Frederick J., 389
Liebermann, Robert C., 492
Lincoln, Abraham, 388
Lincoln, James B., 199
Link, Werner, 98
Lipton, Nancy, 200, 327
Löbl, Eugen, 99
Løvseth, Knut, 322
Lohs, Karlheinz, 12
London. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 260
London, W. Thomas, 339
Lotze, Herbert, 364
Luard, Evan, 29

M

McCarthy, Mary, 327
McGovern, George S., 329
McIntyre, William D., 261
McWhinney, Edward, 372
Małcużyński, Karol, 100
Malhotra, Inder, 64
Mansfield, Mike, 101
Marko, Ján, 102
Marriott, John, 201
Marshall, P. D., 490
Matthiessen, Gunnar, 466
Mehrish, B. N., 103
Meisner, Maurice, 153
Meissner, Boris, 104
Melby, John F., 153
Melchior de Molènes, Charles, 467
Melman, Seymour, 320
Mennicken, Jan-Baldem, 365
Merhav, Peretz, 390
Merton, Thomas, 391
Meyer, Wolfgang, 366
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm, 321
Mikheev, V., 188
Miller, Ronald B., 42
Miners, N. J., 262
Mitchell, C. R., 24
Mommsen, Ernst W., 264
Moore, William C., 265
Morgan, Roger, 105
Morgenthau, Hans J., 29, 342, 422
Morokhov, I. D., 430
Morozov, Grigorii I., 367
Morris, C. E., 266
Mosele, Victor F., 231
Muckerman, Joseph E., 267
Muller, H. J., 342

N

Nelson, Richard R., 194
Nerlich, Uwe, 468
Neumann, Richard, 469
Newcombe, Hanna, 426
Nissen, Iingjald, 25
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S., 64, 107, 484
North, Robert C., 356
Nydal, Reidar, 322

O

Obermann, Emil, 284
O'Connell, D. P., 483
Ogawa, Masaru, 64
Oksenberg, Michel, 108
Orr, Samuel C., 445
Ørvik, Nils, 268
Osakwe, Chris, 351
Osanai, Hiroshi, 252
Overend, William, 202

P

Pachter, Henry, 109
Pächter, Heinz. See Pachter, Henry
Painter, Norman H., 497
Palit, D. K., 429
Palmer, Norman D., 110, 170
Palsokar, R. D., 429
Panofsky, W. K. H., 446
Paul, David W., 111
Pauling, Linus, 342
Pearson, I. B., 392
Penzin, D., 2
Pépy, Daniel, 32
Pergent, Jacques. See Perret-Gentil, Jacques
Perle, Richard N., 447
Perret-Gentil, Jacques, 203
Peterfi, William O., 113
Peterson, Betty, 86
Petković, Ranko, 471
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., 270
Phillips, Warren R., 27
Picht, Georg, 393
Pierce, Allan D., 323
Pierre, Andrew J., 271
Platz, Heinz P., 28
Polmar, Norman, 272
Portnoy, Barry M., 493
Posey, Joe W., 323
Possony, Stefan T., 114, 204
Pournelle, J. E., 204
Prlja, Aleksandar, 171
Prokofiev, B., 381

Q

Quaroni, Pietro, 459
Quester, George H., 29

R

Rabinowitch, Eugene, 342
Radovanović, Ljubomir, 419
Rankin, Jeanette, 388
Rao, P. V. R., 273
Raskin, Marcus G., 327
Rathjens, George W., 194, 448
Ravenal, Earl C., 115, 128
Rawski, Thomas, 153
Reich, Michael, 325
Reinicke, Adolf, 274
Rhee, T. C., 275
Rice, Berkeley, 205
Richman, Alvin, 326
Richter, Edward G., 497
Riemer, Reynold A., 116
Roberts, Chalmers, 414
Rodberg, Leonard S., 200, 327
Rodinson, Maxime, 182
Rogers, William P., 117, 328, 484
Rolbant, Samuel, 276
Roll, Christian, 173
Romer, Alfred, 342
Ropp, Klaus von der, Freiherr, 30
Rosen, Louis, 494
Rosenau, James N., 356
Rosenberg, Milton J., 329
Roth, Karl-Friedrich, 394
Rubinstein, Alvin Z., 118, 372
Rubinstein, Georges, 427
Rudolf, Walter, 352
Ruge, Friedrich, 277
Rusk, Dean, 29
Russett, Bruce M., 29, 31

S

Šahović, Milan, 369
Saianov, O., 119
Sanakoev, Sh., 120
Sawyer, Robert K., 278
Saywell, William, 153
Scheel, Walter, 395
Scheider, Armin, 279
Schelling, Thomas C., 29
Schenke, Wolf, 121
Scherer, Frederic M., 194
Scherk, Nikolaus, 32
Schloss, Rolf W., 174
Schmid, Hans H., 396
Schmidt, Helmut, 122
Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaut, 280
Schneider, Heinrich, 370
Schoenau, Karl L. von, 330
Schofield, B. B., 175
Schütze, Walter, 176
Schwartz, Brian B., 312
Schwarz, Urs, 33
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich, 472
Schweitzer, Michael, 352
Scott, Fraser, 207
Scribner, Jeffrey L., 123
Serafin, George, 473

Serong, F. P., 177
Sewell, James P., 372
Shaffer, Jerome A., 42
Shannon, William V., 64
Shearer, Derek, 327
Shestov, V., 431
Shevchenko, A., 415
Shihadeh, Aziz, 167
Shizuo, Maruyama, 124
Sibirzev, IU., 178
Sicherman, Harvey, 21
Silber, Howard, 281
Silvestri, Stefano, 268
Sims, David E., 327
Singer, J. David, 356
Singh, Lalita P., 179
Sixsmith, E. K. G., 282
Slapnicka, Harry, 125
Sloan, Stephen, 34
Smart, Ian, 283
Smith, Douglas E., 35
Smith, Gerard C., 449
Snow, Edgar, 126
Snyder, Glenn H., 29
Sobik, Erich, 331
Spanier, John W., 127
Speed, F. W., 285
Spencer, Martin E., 36
Spiegel, Steven L., 37
Springer, Donald L., 495
Stauffer, Paul, 38
Stehlin, Paul, 286
Steltzer, Hans G., 129
Stepan, Alfred, 332
Stern, Sol, 180
Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey, 130
Stimson, Henry L., 342
Stinson, Hugh B., 474
Stivers, R. E., 333
Stivers, William, 327
Suhrke, Astri, 40
Sullivan, A. E., 287
Sundberg, Jacob W. F., 354
Svoren, Velimir, 39
Swamy, Subramanian, 288
Swift, Richard N., 397
Syed, Aftab H., 158
Syrstad, Oddveig, 322

T

Tanter, Raymond, 356
Targ, Harry R., 326
Tarr, Curtis, 289
Tarschys, Daniel, 475
Taubinger, L. M. von, 209
Taylor, Maxwell D., 290
Taylor, Michael, 416
Taylor, Telford, 334
Teichmann, Max, 40
Telegadas, K., 335
Teller, Edward, 342
Telpukhovskii, B. S., 291
Terman, Frederick E., 336
Terzibaschitsch, Stefan, 208, 210
Thant, U, 371, 374-375
Theobald, Robert, 376
Thiel, Elke, 292
Thomas, John R., 131
Thompson, G. D. Carlyle, 339
Thompson, Kenneth W., 356
Timmler, Markus, 398
Tödt, Heinz E., 393
Tolkunov, Lev, 476
Tolstoy, Leo, 388
Trager, Frank N., 132
Trainor, William J., 342
Trewhitt, Henry L., 293
Trukhanovskii, V., 134-135
Tunstead, J., 211
Tussing, A. Dale, 338
Twain, Mark, 388

U

Uhlmann, Ernst, 294
Ungerer, Werner, 430, 496
United States
  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 489
  Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, 295-296
  Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 136-137
    Subcommittee on Africa, 138
    Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 400
    Subcommittee on the Near East, 181
  Congress. House. Select Committee on United States Involvement in Southeast Asia, 297
  Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 212
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee, 213
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations
    Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, 450
    Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 298

V

Väyrynen, Raimo, 41
Vander Els, Theodore, 299
Verba, Sidney, 329
Vigor, P. H., 300
Viktorov, V., 451
Vladimirov, IU., 139
Vought, Donald B., 337
Vratusa, Anton, 377
Vukadinović, Radovan, 452

W

Wägner, H., 487
Wagner, Wolfgang, 140
Waines, David, 182
Walden, Mathias, 71
Walder, Leopold O., 13
Waldheim, Kurt, 423
Walker, Richard L., 43
Waltz, Kenneth N., 29, 37
Warner, Lawrence M., 388
Warnock, John W., 301
Watt, D. C., 183
Weinstein, Martin E., 302
Weiss, Edward S., 339
Weiss, George, 214
Wesson, Robert G., 372
Westmoreland, William C., 215
Wettig, Gerhard, 329
Weyel, Volker, 340
Whetten, Lawrence L., 304
White, Ralph K., 329
Whiteside, Thomas, 434
Whiting, Allen S., 356
Whitlam, Gough, 141
Wiener, Friedrich, 216
Wilson, David, 64, 453
Winiewicz, Józef, 477
Wohlstetter, Albert, 29
Wolfe, Thomas W., 142, 305
Wolfers, Arnold, 29
Wood, Peggy, 338
Woodward, David R., 504
Wriggins, Howard, 424
Wright, Christopher, 356
Wrong, Dennis H., 341
Wyzanski, Charles E., 388

Y

Yale, W. W., 306
York, Herbert F., 403
Yost, Charles W., 45
Young, Elizabeth, 485
Young, Louise B., 342

Z

Zador, Heinrich, 185
Zahn, Gordon C., 391
Ziebura, Gilbert, 143
Zumwalt, Elmo R., 307
Zwenig, Frances A., 308

SUBJECT INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

A

AFRICA
  French successor states, 32
  regional integration, 30
  U.S. policy for the '70's, 138
AGGRESSION. See Conflict
AIRCRAFT
  F-111, 214
  helicopters, 207
AIRPOWER
  criticism, 299
  strategy, 265
ALGERIA, foreign policy and relations, France, 176
ALLIANCES, 277
  behavioral analysis, 31
ANTARCTIC TREATY, 481
ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
  deployment, Safeguard, 206
  limitation, 439
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, detection, 201
ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. See under Middle East and North Africa
ARAB STATES, foreign policy and relations, Israel, 159
ARMED FORCES
  comparative strength, 260
  national service programs, 251
  See also under specific country
ARMS AND ARMAMENTS, 313
  comparative figures, 260
  embargo, Middle East, 426
  France, 203
  future developments, 216
  future infantry rifle, 191
  Israel, 190
  naval in the 1970's, 196
  reduction and elimination, 44, 406-407, 409, 419, 468
    antimissile defense systems, 412
    Asia, 1970-1975, 458
    conventional weapons, 413
    Eastern Europe, 305
    effect of technology, 21
    effect on deterrence, 438
    Europe, 408
    European security conference (proposed), 466
    history (1914-1941), 402
    Latin America, 474
    mobile offensive forces, 489
    NATO policy, 258
    nuclear arsenals, 193
    role of social science, 411
    Romanian policy, 418
    seabed, 485
    strategic stability, 447
    strategic weapons, 436, 446
    Soviet policy and proposals, 22, 104, 417
      history, 415
    strategic weapons. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
    U.N. role, 363, 374
    See also Mutual balanced force reduction
  standardization, NATO, 264
  trade and dissemination, United Kingdom to South Africa, 425
  United States, FY 72, 259, 295
ARMS AND SECURITY [LEWIS F. RICHARDSON], 416
ARMS RACE, 17, 313
  Cuban missile crisis effect on, 156
  Soviet-U.S. competition, 193, 315, 440
    strategic weapons, 404
  strategic weapons deployment, effect, United States, 450
  U.S. role, 200
ASIA
  power rivalry, 40, 153
  India, relations with, bibliography, 103
AUSTRALIA
  defense policies and programs, 258
  foreign policy and relations, 85
    history, 83
    Pacific area, 141
AUSTRIA, foreign policy and relations, 91, 423

B

BALANCE OF POWER, 29, 239
  Asia, 1970-1975, 458
  bipolarity, 6
BALKAN STATES, neutralism, 183
BANGLA DESH. See Pakistan--East Pakistan crisis
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
  aggression, 8, 13, 502
    chemical inhibitors, 392
  arms control and disarmament, 411, 416
  decisionmaking, 10
  international conflict, 27
  physiological, 35
  public opinion, 55
BERLIN, 57, 140, 499
  blockade (1948), U.N. role, 362
  quadripartite agreement (1971), 162, 172
BIBLIOGRAPHY
  behavioral analysis, arms control and disarmament, 416
  European integration, 457
  Indian foreign policy and relations, 103
  peace, visual aid, 384
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
  ban, draft convention, 431-432
  U.S. policy and program, 296
    conversion, 498
BIPOLARITY, 6
BRAZIL, civil-military relations, 332
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. See under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

C

CANADA
defense policies and programs, 301
foreign policy and relations, 82
CHEMICAL AGENTS, 433
U.S. policy and programs, 296, 434
CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
armed forces, air force, 209
border dispute with Soviet Union, 112, 173
defense policy and programs, 242, 296
decisionmaking, 243
nuclear self-reliance, 288
strategic weapons, 229
disarmament policy and proposals, five-power nuclear disarmament conference, 420
foreign policy and relations, 4, 62, 86, 106, 141, 153, 242
Balkan states, 183
British public opinion, 55
Eastern Europe, 131
Himalayan kingdoms, 179
Indo-Pakistani dispute, 170
Japan, 81
President Nixon's visit (planned), 66, 121
Soviet Union, 165, 249
United States, 46-47, 49, 53, 67-68, 90, 108, 124, 126, 238
nuclear capability, 260
nuclear policies and programs, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, effect on, 453
nuclear war potential, 429
U.N. membership, 147, 360, 368
CHINA, REPUBLIC OF
Taiwan plebiscite, 152
U.S. policy, 49
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Brazil, 332
Communist China, 242
democratic industrialized society, 274
Switzerland, 294, 303
United States, 248, 311, 333, 337
West Germany, 251, 330
COLD WAR, origins, revisionist thesis, 98
COLONIALISM
opposition, behavioral analysis, 1
Uganda, 340
COMMUNICATION, INTERNATIONAL, 23
COMMUNISM
divisive tendencies, 7
international organizations, role, 367
Sino-Soviet dispute, 145
Soviet Union, objective of, 257
CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
draft convention on biological weapons, 432
Romanian proposals, 418
CONFLICT, 394
aggression, 11, 13, 20
behavioral analysis, 36, 39, 302
international relations, 27
causes, 1, 8, 14
chemical inhibitors, 392
developing states, 34
education, 503
international, origin and scope, 37
philosophical considerations, 42
research, 234
settlement, 349, 386
CONFRONTATION, 33
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
reduction or elimination, 413
See also Arms and armaments
CONVERSION
Fort Detrick, 498
public pressure for, 240
See also economic conversion under Defense industry
COUNTERINSURGENCY. See under Warfare
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, effect, 156
CYPRUS, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Security Council action, 379
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
foreign policy and relations
Germany, Federal Republic, 125
history (1918-1970), 102
Soviet intervention, 111

D

DECISIONMAKING
Communist China, 243
foreign policy, 10
operational research, 279
quantitative analysis vs. statecraft, 9
Soviet Union, 198
United States
Central Intelligence Agency, 244
Congress, 73
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, 443
Vietnam War, 75
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (U.N.), 363
DEFENSE BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES
comparative figure, 260
Soviet Union, 317
United States, 255
arms control implications, 450
Congressional appropriations, 230
FY 71, 296
FY 72, 259, 295
NATO financing, 292
reduction, 320
DEFENSE CUTBACKS
effects on:
scientists, 312, 336
universities, 312
West Germany, tanks, 202
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
economic conversion, dialog, 325
United States, 316
profits, 318
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
United States, 199
C-5A-Galaxy, 205
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
expenditure gap, Soviet Union vs. United States, 195, 255
maritime, 211
United States, naval undersea programs, 480
DETECTION, nuclear explosions, 487
DÉTENTE, 233, 470
NATO role, 221
Scandinavia, 52
West German role, 122

See also Berlin; East-West relations; European security conference (proposed)
DETERRENCE
peace, contribution to, 412
U.S. Strategic Air Command role, 281
DEVELOPING STATES
attitude toward U.S., 16
Communist China, 18
Communist influence, 7
petroleum, Soviet view, 2
right to national self-determination, 345
Soviet foreign policy and relations, 118
violence, 34
world order, 370
DISENGAGEMENT, United States from Southeast Asia, 297

E

EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 18, 97, 221, 233
Europe (1945-1970), 5
Warsaw Treaty Organization, 250
ECOLOGY, marine environment, 181
EGYPT. See United Arab Republic
ENTHOVEN, ALAIN C., 226
EUROPE
division, 5
integration, 18, 277, 321, 395, 462
bibliography, 457
Scandinavia, 52
security, 26, 122, 178, 233, 270, 304, 408, 410, 460, 463, 466, 468, 471
NATO, 268
United States
role, 405
troop withdrawals, 79
unification, 28, 459, 461, 467
Western Europe and North Africa, 465
EUROPE, COMMUNIST STATES
European security conference (proposed), 469
Soviet influence, 74
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 395
expanded role, 58
Luxemburg Report, 462
Scandinavia, 52
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE (PROPOSED), 18, 91, 140, 414, 455, 463, 466, 470-471, 473, 476
Austrian view, 469
Polish view, 477
U.N. Secretary General, 371

F

FINLAND
foreign policy and relations, Soviet Union, 56
neutrality, 464
FOREIGN POLICY, theoretical analysis, 10
FRANCE
armed forces, 280
defense policy and programs, 286
foreign policy and relations
Africa, 32
Maghreb states, 176
Mediterranean area, 93
Soviet Union, 97, 139
West Germany, 143
nuclear policies and programs
cooperation with United Kingdom, 283
weapons tests, 487

G

GAMES AND GAMING
arms control and disarmament, 416
Strategic International Relations, Nuclear Exchange Model (SIR NEM), 497
GERMANY
division, 347
history (1918-1970), 363
GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
armed forces, 246
legal status, 347
strategic position, 305
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC
armed forces, 247, 284
attitudes toward, 330
navy, 196
operation research, 279
problems, 251
defense policy and programs, research and development, 197
foreign policy and relations, 58, 105
Communist states, 57
cultural affairs, 129
East Europe, 69, 71, 78, 88, 96, 122, 130, 353
France, 143
Soviet Union, 119
legal recognition of East Germany, 347
West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement, East German view, 184
GREAT BRITAIN. See United Kingdom
GREECE, foreign policy and relations, Communist neighbors, 183

H

HELICOPTERS, 207
HERBICIDES, U.S. policy, 434

I

INDIA
defense policies and programs, 269
Indian Ocean area, 217
foreign policy and relations
bibliography, 103
Communist China, 170
Friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, 133
Himalayan kingdoms, 179
Pakistan, 149, 154, 158
superpowers, 254
national security policy, 1970-1975, 458
nuclear policies and programs, 429
security threats by neighbors, 273
INDIAN OCEAN AREA, 132
great powers, 40
neutralization (proposed), 424
Sino-Soviet interests, 144
strategic consideration, 175, 217
INDONESIA, domestic violence, 34
INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION, 493
Antarctic treaty, 481

International Atomic Energy Agency, 428 430, 496
mobile offensive weapons, computer program, 489
particle accelerators, 494
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 244
underground nuclear explosions (Milrow), 492
seismic detection, 486, 488, 490, 501
INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION (IOC), 365
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
nonproliferation treaty, inspection procedures, 496
safeguards, 428, 430
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 355
contribution by Quincy Wright, 356
East Pakistan crisis, 158
human rights violations, 350
law of armed conflicts, 344
peaceful settlement of disputes, 349
piracy, privateering, and guerrilla war, 354
rules of war, 380
seabed, 482
self-determination, 345
Soviet doctrine, 50, 351
treaties, 352
United Nations peacekeeping, 348
war crimes, 324, 334, 341
West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement, 353
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 361, 377
Communist view, 367
maintenance of peace, 364
Soviet legal doctrine, 351
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 3, 29, 44, 109, 284
arms race, 17
behavioral analysis, 14, 27
lesser power, 41
Linkage model, 81
middle power, 19
polarized political communities, 24
Soviet view, 15
study and teaching, 346
world order, 370
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. See Security, international
INTERVENTION
Czechoslovakia, 111
superpowers, 33
ISRAEL
armed forces, 190, 276
defense policy and programs, 227
foreign policy and relations, Arab states, 159, 182
human rights violations, charge of, 350
military aid to Uganda, 340

J

JAPAN
defense policy and programs, 253, 275
rearmament, 263
Self Defense Forces, 302
foreign policy and relations, 59, 153
Communist China, 124
United States, 80
national security policy, 1970-1975, 458
JAPANESE-U.S. SECURITY TREATY (1951), 302

K

KISSINGER, HENRY, arms control role, 443
KOLKO, GABRIEL, 98
KRIPPENDORFF, EKKEHART, 98

L

LAOS, effects of U.S. bombing, 192
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, mandated areas and territories, 364
LESSER POWERS, 38
LIMITED MEASURES
Asia, 458
criticism, 403
history, 352, 402, 415
missiles, 439
nuclear-free zone, Latin America, 474
submarines, 401
technology, effect on, 21, 404
See also Biological agents; European security conference (proposed); Mutual balanced force reductions; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

M

MCNAMARA, ROBERT S., 293
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
comparative naval strength, 163
France, 93, 176
NATO policy, 268
Soviet Union, 166, 174
MELMAN, SEYMOUR, 226
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Arab-Israeli dispute, 159, 161, 181
arms embargo, 426
Arab
confederation, 171
view, 164
history, 182
occupied areas, 350
Palestinian liberation movements, 169
pro-Arab policy, 168
radical view, 180
reaction to Israeli occupation, 146
settlement, 150, 155, 167, 386, 390
Soviet Union, 160, 174, 185
superpower influence, 151
oil, strategic value of, 148
MILITARISM
Japan, 275
United States, 337
MILITARY BALANCE, 260
Soviet Union vs. United States, 406
MILITARY HISTORY, British Staff College, 282
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 313
C-5A Galaxy, 205
United States, 316, 325
MILITARY POWER, foreign policy role, 271
MILITARY PROFESSION, democratic, industrialized society, 274
MILITARY SERVICE
all-volunteer force, 306
history, 287
United Kingdom, 230
United States, 241, 289

MISSILES
  France, 203
  limitation, 439
  United States, 200
MOON TREATY. See under Space
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES, deployment ban and inspection, 493
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION, 58, 405, 410, 414, 419, 454, 456, 470, 472

N

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR, 389
NAVIES
  comparison, United States and Soviet Union, 307
  NATO, 210
NEGOTIATIONS
  arms control and disarmament, Communist Chinese view, 420
  diplomacy, 38
  East-West, 419
NEOCOLONIALISM. See Colonialism
NEPAL, foreign policy and relations, 179
NEUTRALISM, Africa, 398
NEUTRALITY
  Austria, 423
  European integration, Soviet doctrine, 475
  Finland, 262, 464
NEUTRALIZATION, Indian Ocean, 424
NEW ZEALAND, defense policies and programs, 261
NIGERIA, armed forces, 262
NIXON DOCTRINE. See under United States of America
NOBODY WANTED WAR [RALPH K. WHITE], 188
NONVIOLENCE, 222, 383
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 268, 277, 301, 410
  aircraft (F-111), 214
  British policy and programs, 220
  comparison with Warsaw Pact, 256
  defense policy and programs
    financing, 292
    flexible response strategy, 270
    northern flank, 237
    troop reduction, 286
  disarmament policies and proposals, 258
  East-West détente, 221
  European security conference (proposed), 455
  mutual balanced force reduction, 454
  navy, 196, 210
  non-military collaboration, 321
  nuclear weapons, tactical, 228
  Ostpolitik, influence of, 96
  standardization of arms, 264
  strategy, 266, 304
  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 278
  United States
    role, 405
    troop withdrawals, 79
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, 407, 417
  Communist Chinese view, 420
NUCLEAR ENERGY
  peaceful uses
    nonproliferation treaty, 496
    particle accelerators, 494
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, effects, 323, 491
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, UNDERGROUND
  Amchitka, 194
  ban, 501
  detection and measurement, 486, 488, 490
  Milrow, 492
  radioactive leakage, 491
  United States (1961-1970), 495
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, safeguards, 427
NUCLEAR PROPULSION, U.S. Navy, 212
NUCLEAR STRATEGY, Europe, 408
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, extension to underground testing, 486, 488, 501
NUCLEAR WAR, probability of, behavioral analysis, 409
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
  ban, Latin America, 474
  collaboration, Europe, 270
  competition, Soviet Union-United States, 315
  history, 342
  India, 254
  Japan, 263
  Nuclear Exchange Model, 497
  removal from Okinawa, 252
  tactical, 44, 228
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
  effects
    radiation, 339
    radioactive fallout, 335
    seismic microbarologic, 487
  United States, 309
NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, Indian Ocean, 424

O

OCEAN
  military technology, 211, 480
  peaceful use, 343, 479, 482-483
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, peaceful settlement of disputes, 349

P

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA
  great powers, 40
  regional development, 43
PACIFISM, 388
PAKISTAN
  East Pakistan crisis, 144, 147, 149, 154, 158
  foreign policy and relations, Communist China, 170
PARTICLE ACCELERATORS, 494
PEACE
  approaches, 388, 394
    cultural, 129
    education, 384, 503
    International Peace Academy, 382
    legal, 352
    nonviolence, 383
    religious, 113, 391
    scientific contacts, Soviet-U.S., 500
"PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION," 26
PEACE MOVEMENT
  revolution against war, 387

United States, 389
history (1914-1941), 402
Vietnam War termination, 329
PEACE RESEARCH, 394, 412
educational theory, 399
mobilization, 234
moral and ethical aspects, 391, 393, 396
Wright, Quincy, contribution of, 356
PEACEKEEPING FORCES
Canada, 301
United Nations, 262, 348, 359, 375, 378-379, 397
PENTAGON PAPERS, 421
PETROLEUM, role in world politics, 2
POLAND, foreign policy and relations, 100
POPULATION, Communist China, 173
POWER (CONCEPT), 385
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 427
nonproliferation treaty, 477
IAEA safeguards system, 428, 430
PSYCHIATRY, aggression, inhibitors, 392
PUBLIC OPINION
communications media role, 290
Communist China, 55
Vietnam War, 310, 326, 329
PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 500

R

RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT, 322, 335, 342, 491
REVOLUTION, 186
RICHARDSON, LEWIS F., 416
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. See Vatican City
ROMANIA
foreign policy and relations, 473
disarmament policy and programs, 418
ROSENAU, JAMES N., 81, 111
RUSSETT, BRUCE M., 226

S

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
comparative evaluation, 21, 195, 204
foreign policy, 117
maritime defense, 211
public policy, 342
scientific manpower, 312, 336
Soviet Union, 187, 195, 198
world peace, 500
SEABED
arms limitation, 479, 485
international law, 482
peaceful use, 483
SEABED TREATY, 484
SEAPOWER, naval armaments (1970), 210
SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL, 363
SECURITY, REGIONAL, 458
SEISMOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 492
SENSORS, electronic battlefield, 213
SMITH, K. WAYNE, 226
SOCIAL SCIENCE, arms control research, 411
SOCIALIST BLOC, divisive and integrative tendencies, 12
SOCIALIST WORLD ORDER, 15, 22
SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF
apartheid policy, African reaction, 54
arms purchases from Britain, 425
guerrilla warfare, 16
SOUTH ASIA, United States, policy, 110
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 132, 157
New Zealand, 261
United States, 297
SPACE, treaty governing exploration and use of the moon, 478
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, 140, 193, 370, 403, 406, 409, 436, 438-440, 442, 444, 447, 449, 452
ABM limitation, 448
Communist China, 453
forward-based systems, 414, 441
inspection by resident nationals, 493
intelligence, role of, 244
joint Soviet-U.S. commission to allay fears (proposed), 404
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, 443
Soviet Union, 123, 198, 331, 437, 451
United Nations, 371, 374, 435
United States, 267, 446-447, 450
STRATEGIC BALANCE, 245
parity, 239
STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NUCLEAR EXCHANGE MODEL (SIR NEM), 497
STRATEGY, 29, 33, 284
airpower, 265, 299
Communist China, 243
NATO, 304
Soviet Union, 187, 231, 300
Eastern Europe, 305
naval, 245
Western Europe, 468
SUBMARINES, 201
arms limitation measures, 401
comparison, Soviet Union vs. United States, 272
SWITZERLAND, civil-military relations, 294, 303

T

TAIWAN. See China, Republic of
TECHNOLOGY. See Science and technology
TENSION AREAS. See specific area or involved states
THAILAND, United States, 308
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC.
arms and defense pacts, 260
arms control, 403
establishment of United Nations role, 348
United States, 235, 298
See also Common name of the treaty

U

UGANDA, 340
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
defense budget and expenditures, foreign policy, 317
defense policy and programs, 232, 257, 291, 296
military exercises, 300
pursuit of strategic superiority, 239
strategic weapons, 229
24th Party Congress, 331
disarmament policy and programs, 406, 415
mutual balanced force reductions, 472
strategic arms limitation, 437, 444

European unification, reaction, 461
foreign policy and relations, 44, 92, 123, 135
Brezhnev Doctrine, 50
chronology, 65
Communist China, 4, 87, 112, 114, 131, 145, 165, 238
coordination, 120
Cuban missile crisis, 156
Czechoslovakia, 111
developing states, 118
Eastern Europe, 12, 74
Finland, 56
France, 97, 139
friendship treaty with India, 133
Middle East, 70, 142, 150, 155, 160, 174, 185
military power, 271
Nationalist China, 249
peaceful coexistence, 134
24th Party Congress, 15, 51, 77, 104
United Nations, 372, 381
United States, 61, 84
West Germany, 119
Western Europe, 76, 178
international law and United Nations, 351
military aid, Arab States, 160
navy, 245, 307
Mediterranean, 166
southern ocean area, 175
neutrality doctrine, 475
technology, effect on:
armed forces, 187
decisionmaking, 198
United States defense policy, criticism, 441-442
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, 70, 150, 160
foreign policy and relations, 161
UNITED KINGDOM
armed forces, 218, 230
arms sales to South Africa, 425
defense policy and programs, 218
East of Suez, 261
NATO policy, 220
nuclear cooperation with France, 283
public opinion, Communist China, 55
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, 361, 363, 376
Berlin blockade (1948), 362
charter revision proposals, 369
disarmament policies and proposals, 374, 435
East German view, 366
history, 357
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), 365
League of Nations territorial responsibilities, 364
membership, Communist China, 86, 149, 152, 360, 368, 373
peacekeeping operations, 348, 359, 378-380
Emergency Force withdrawal (1967), 375
Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, 397
Secretary General June 3, 1971, press conference, 371
Security Council, history, 358
Soviet Union, 381
superpower role (1945-1970), 372
Vietnam War, 355
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
aircraft
C-5A Galaxy, 205
F-111, 214
armed forces, FY 72, 295
Army, 215
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Strategic International Relations, Nuclear Exchange Model (SIR NEM), 497
Atomic Energy Commission, budget, FY 72, 309
Central Intelligence Agency, 225, 244
civil-military relations, 311
professional army, 248
Congress
defense appropriations, 236
foreign policy role, 73, 79, 298
defense budgets and expenditures
profits, 318
research and development, 255
defense cutbacks, Eisenhower tank, 202
Defense Dept.
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, 281
reorganization proposals, 219
weapons acquisition process, 199
defense industry, 316
defense policy and programs, 206, 223, 296, 327
air strategy, 265
arms control implications, 450
budget reduction, 320
collective security agreements, 235
communication media, 290
criticism, 226
electronic battlefield, 213
Europe, 270
fiscal year 1972, 259, 295
herbicides, 434
Japan, 302
military assistance program, 400
military-industrial complex, 240
NATO, 292, 410
research and development, 195
Robert S. McNamara, 293
Soviet view, 442
strategic superiority, 239
strategic weapons, 267, 405
tactical weapons systems, 228
technology, 204
troop withdrawal, Europe, 266
disarmament policies and proposals, 404, 406, 432
Assistant for National Security Affairs, 443
National Security Council, 445
nuclear test ban treaty, 501
seabed, 484
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 444
foreign policy and relations, 44-45, 48, 60, 72, 89, 94-95, 107, 109, 117, 128
Africa, 138
Communist China, 4, 6, 46-47, 49, 53, 64, 66-68, 90, 108, 115, 121, 124, 126, 238
Cuban missile crisis, 156
history, 127
Japan, 80
military power, 271
Near East, 151, 155, 181
President Nixon, 101, 137

Sino-Soviet dispute, effect, 238
South Asia, 110
Southeast Asia, 132, 297, 308
Soviet Union, 61, 84, 98-99
United Nations, 362, 372
Vatican City, 113
West Germany, 105
military assistance, FY 72, 136
missiles, strategic, 200
Navy, 212, 224, 333
comparison with Soviet Union, 208, 307
nuclear weapons, Okinawa, 252
nuclear weapons tests, 309
Milrow, 492
Pentagon papers, 328
Selective Service System, 289
State Department, decisionmaking role, 116
troop withdrawal, Europe, 286
Vietnam War, 422
weapons systems, 441

V

VATICAN CITY, 113
VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF, 177
VIETNAM WAR, 157
civilian casualties, 319
economic effects, United States, 314, 338
escalation, 421
international law, 355
moral and ethical aspects, 310, 334
My Lai incident, 324
public opinion, 326, 329
termination, 177
United States, 75, 422
VIOLENCE, role in society, 385

W

WAR
causes, 25, 188
economic effect, 338
mobilization, Germany (1939), 234
moral and ethical aspects, 341
philosophical approach, 42
prevention, 389
psychology of, 192
revolution against, 387
rules of, 344
study and teaching, 282, 503
Wright, Quincy, contribution, 356
termination, 504
unpublicized wars, 189
WARFARE
electronic battlefield, 213
guerrilla, 186
International Criminal Court, 354
WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION, 250
comparison with NATO, 256
WEST GERMAN-SOVIET RENUNCIATION-OF-FORCE AGREEMENT, 78, 88, 140, 184, 353
WESTERN EUROPE, Soviet influence, 76
WHITE, RALPH K. 188
WRIGHT, QUINCY, 356

Z

ZAIRE, REPUBLIC OF, peacekeeping (1960-1964), 262

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972 O - 453-385